Abstract: This paper will analyze France’s attempted foreign policy strategy in Yugoslavia and in Eastern Europe during the 1960s, beginning with the various positions of de Gaulle’s France and Tito’s Yugoslavia and the numerous similarities in how the two countries’ diplomacy functioned. In both countries, the course of foreign policy was determined according to the authoritarian characteristics of their systems and of their central figure—the president. Both countries were also interested in transcending the Cold War division of Europe, and they based their strategies on attempts to marginalize the United States and pacify the Soviet regime. De Gaulle’s attempt at a détente, which Yugoslavia was very sympathetic toward and had also committed itself to similar goals, failed due to unrealistic illusions of overcoming this bipolarity by forging a middle way between the two opposing Cold War blocs. Faced with an overestimation of their own influence, along with the Warsaw Pact’s aggression toward Czechoslovakia, Moscow’s complete lack of interest in pacification, and the US’s unwillingness to withdraw, end of de Gaulle’s attempts at détente, in which Yugoslavia would play an important role, came to an end. Nevertheless, similar European and global policy goals brought France and Yugoslavia closer together, and this established the principles on which a cooling down period in the mid-1970s became possible.

Keywords: Yugoslavia, France, foreign policy, détente, Charles de Gaulle, Joseph Broz, Tito, Cold War.

1. Introduction

When the Cold War system was first taking shape in the West, France willingly became an integral part of its political and military structure. At the time it signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, Paris agreed that Soviet expansion in Europe posed an imminent threat, and for this reason it set about building all the structures needed
for a common security policy while letting Washington take on direct leadership of this. During this time, France’s Fourth Republic was also experiencing difficulties in its recovery from the aftermath of the Second World War. Memories of its 1940 defeat and the creation of the Vichy regime had left deep scars in postwar French society, and the global process of decolonization was contributing to France’s loss of status in the world as a great overseas empire. During the 1950s, the epilogue to these numerous disappointments and the unrealized ambitions of French policies, of which the most notable was the unsuccessful Algerian War (1954–1962), made the need to devise a different foreign policy strategy all the more pressing.¹ Charles de Gaulle’s return to French politics in 1958 with the decisive support of the army represented a political and institutional break from the values of the Fourth Republic. For a French society divided and on the verge of civil war over Algeria’s unresolved status, de Gaulle’s new vision for the Fifth Republic offered strong presidential authority and a policy to return France to the ranks of the great European powers. Until 1969, French foreign policy carried de Gaulle’s personal stamp that emphasized an authoritarian approach and the subordination of all French diplomacy to his authority. As Georges Pompidou, the French prime minister from 1962, stated, his political views were merely “a reflection of de Gaulle.”²

Many authors agree that de Gaulle’s foreign policy strategy was as much a result of the general’s political philosophy as it was of changing international circumstances during the 1960s.³ Under the influence of the conservative French right of the interwar period, de Gaulle attributed less importance to the ideal of a strong and independent nation state in international relations and more to the influence of geostrategic interests and historical experience. In his view of the new postwar world, the order of the Cold War was an artificially constructed barrier between European nations that had disrupted the balance of power and established the hegemony of two superpowers over the continent. The so-called Yalta complex prevented France from fully exercising its interests and ensuring its own security beyond the framework of a bipolar world. In the early 1960s, de Gaulle considered the Cold War to be an outdated concept that did not correspond with the series of changes in international relations, and most of all with France’s interests in Europe. First and foremost, the French president was firmly convinced the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern Europe no longer posed a threat to Western European security. The Cuban Missile Crisis, and especially the Sino-Soviet split, seemed to indicate that Moscow was vulnerable and willing to compromise. In de Gaulle’s view, it was clear and indisputable that communism in Eastern Europe was transient and that, over time, an evolution in relations among the Soviet states would ease the bloc’s subordination to the Soviet Union and affirm the distinctions between Eastern European nations. The first evidence of this was the actions taken by the Communist Party of Romania in its quest for greater autonomy in decision-making within the bloc (1963/1964). In response to changes in the East, Western Europe had to seek out another kind of political union that was distanced from American policies and grounded in a French-German partnership. This newly established balance would sweep

away all the assumptions of Cold War policy, initiate a policy of détente with Eastern Europe, and ultimately create a new concept for Europe ("From the Urals to the Atlantic Ocean") and its security policy.\(^4\) As it was presented, de Gaulle’s alternative to the Cold War bore his purely personal signature, which had been secured by constitutional amendments in 1962 and was often implemented by elements of the general’s personal diplomacy.\(^5\)

Unlike Franco–Yugoslav relations during the interwar period, research into Franco–Yugoslav postwar relations has not been a focus of independent studies or of otherwise extensive historiographies of Yugoslav foreign policy during the Cold War.\(^6\) Katarina Todić’s “A traditional friendship? France and Yugoslavia in the Cold War World” is the first comprehensive study of Franco–Yugoslav relations based on extensive primary sources.\(^7\) Beyond this, relations between Belgrade and Paris have been mentioned in general studies of Yugoslav foreign policy during the Cold War and Yugoslav relations with the West or the Third World (Algeria), as well as those dealing with issues related to knowledge transfer and cultural influences.\(^8\)

Yugoslav diplomacy could not ignore Paris as an influential capital, despite France’s waning prestige as a great power in the postwar period. Founded on the principles of an active foreign policy orientation, Yugoslavia was interested in having a presence on the wider international political stage, especially during the turbulent 1960s, which was a time of significant political and cultural transformation. The emergence of de Gaulle’s strategy in Europe coincided with a general reassessment of postwar and Cold War hypotheses, which particularly resonated with Yugoslav strategic thinking. This paper will attempt to explain the emergence of de Gaulle’s vision of foreign policy from a Yugoslav perspective. It will also consider its range through the European perspective and the beginnings of the East–West détente, an important process in which Yugoslavia wanted to be as well-positioned as possible.


De Gaulle’s critical relationship to the main hallmarks of the Cold War corresponded with the main objectives of Yugoslav foreign policy. Once it became an independent subject in international relations and after the rift with the Soviet Union in 1948, socialist Yugoslavia promoted principles that went against the European Cold War order. First and foremost, criticism of the political/military blocs was a constant in Yugoslav diplomacy. Its negative encounter with Stalin’s notion of a closed, monolithic Eastern bloc and the attempt to directly challenge the state’s independence had been more than enough for Yugoslav leadership. Even though cooperation with the West enabled Yugoslavia to establish a

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\(^6\) Kocić 2013.
\(^7\) Todić 2015.
\(^8\) Perišić 2008; Bogetić 2000; Bogetić 2006; Selinić 2012; Bogetić 2013; Bekić 1988; Dimić 2014; Čavoški 2013.
necessary balance and new possibilities for Yugoslav society, the North Atlantic Alliance, along with many other political organizations in the West, were seen as the primary instruments for fulfilling imperial and neo-colonial objectives. The 1958 program for the Yugoslav League of Communists (SKJ) ostensibly specified that any division of the world into blocs hindered the “realization of the idea of coexistence and stood in opposition to the full sovereignty and independence of peoples and states.” Asserting the concepts of active, peaceful coexistence and openness to cooperation with countries of various socio-political orders and opposition to the dominant Cold War logic of cooperation and alliances was seen as a vehicle for overcoming the division into blocs. Unlike de Gaulle, Yugoslavia gave precedence to ideology when making decisions. The Yugoslav communists remained faithful to the unbending laws of history that foresaw the lawful transformation of capitalist social and economic relations and permitted criticism of contemporary imperialism, and they believed the causes of the Cold War lay in the refusal of leading (capitalist) countries to accept processes of transformation in the modern world. According to the Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito, the affirmation of socialist social relations and the emergence of many newly liberated Afro-Asian countries was incontrovertible evidence of significant global progress. Additionally, changes in the socialist sphere after Stalin’s death were sufficiently wide-ranging to provide Yugoslav strategy with enough room to maneuver to put this strategy into practice. In the Yugoslav estimation, Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin’s policies at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party (KPSS) and then the clash with the revolutionary radicalism of Mao’s China were positive signs favoring a policy of peace and a criticism of the negative Cold War legacy.

As was the case for de Gaulle’s strategy, Yugoslav foreign policy was similarly represented through the political authority of one figure: Josip Broz Tito, the leader of the Yugoslav party and of the state. All the important elements of de Gaulle’s personal diplomacy were present in the Yugoslav president. Strong authority in internal politics along with the halo of a leader of a resistance movement during the Second World War gave both men enough confidence to take action in international relations. Inside the Élysée Palace, de Gaulle was known to bypass the opinions of the foreign ministry at the Quai d’Orsay, often personally giving instructions to the French ambassadors and representing French interests through direct contact with foreign statesmen. In some cases, de Gaulle’s famous press conferences were where policies, and especially strategic foreign policy, was inaugurated. In Yugoslavia, all the essential elements of the political system further ensured Tito’s sovereign position as the supreme arbiter of key issues in state (and party) policy. Foreign policy was a specially reserved area, so many Western diplomats had the impression that Tito himself could have been the minister of foreign affairs all on his own. This was particularly pronounced within the contours of the diplomatic summit Tito embarked on in

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9 Program SKJ 1958: 75; for more on the SKJ program see Bešlin 2019: 11–33.
11 Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ), 837, Kabinet predsednika Republike (KPR), II-5-b-1, Zabeleške sa sastanka održanih u vezi sa izradom nacrta ekspozea Predsednika Republike.
13 Jackson 2019: 569–571.
14 Pirjevec 2012: 405.
the 1950s with the leaders of the newly liberated Afro-Asian countries, which allowed him to take on a prominent role in promoting an extra-bloc (unengaged) policy. At the opening of the conference of non-aligned countries in Belgrade on 1 September 1961, Tito condemned Cold War policy, which could “at any moment end in tragedy.” His speech at the conference made a big impression on foreign observers, primarily those from the West, who were displeased with Tito’s harsh assessment. Many reported his speech as being “pro-Soviet” for expressing sympathy for Soviet nuclear tests while simultaneously denouncing those by the French. The Yugoslav State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs (DSIP) had not been informed of Tito’s last-minute changes to his speech, which only further confirmed his position of authority. A year after the Belgrade conference, Tito began normalizing relations with the Soviet Union and stifling criticism of this decision within the country. In early 1963, party leaders condemned Yugoslav foreign policy’s “secretariat line,” that Tito believed was being promulgated by the DSIP and which was also out of step with the SKJ’s foreign policy orientation. Yugoslav diplomacy needed to stop being too pragmatic, rely more on the reality of Yugoslav socialism, and turn toward its proclaimed ideological objectives. In fact, it needed to be more in tune with Tito’s vision.

In the early 1960s, when both foreign policy strategies opposing the Cold War were being clearly represented, Franco–Yugoslav relations were experiencing significant difficulties. Ever since de Gaulle’s return to power in 1958, the question of Algeria had been an insurmountable obstacle in the development of stable international relations. Yugoslavia had actively supported the Algerian people’s struggle for independence and recognized the National Liberation Front as the only legitimate representative of Algeria. During two of Tito’s important appearances on the world stage—a speech given to the United Nations General Assembly in 1960 and another delivered at the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in 1961—his unequivocal support for the Algerian struggle was also followed by criticism of French policy. In a report sent while on his way back from New York in September 1960, Tito conveyed to the members of the Federal Executive Council (SIV) his personal impression that there had been considerable reservations and coldness on the part of the French diplomats, which had convinced him that relations between the two countries were poor. The messages at the Belgrade conference and Yugoslav recognition of the National Liberation Front led Paris to withdraw its ambassador to Belgrade in 1962 and relegated his responsibilities to the chargé d’affaires. Although de Gaulle had initiated a gradual end to the war in Algeria and a recognition of state autonomy, Yugoslavia’s actions were seen as direct challenges to his policies. De Gaulle resented this and made his feeling clear to Marko Nikezić during his visit as State Secretary for International Affairs in September 1967.

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15 See Petrović 2010.
17 For more see Žarković 2017.
19 Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije (DAMSPRS), Politička Arhiva (PA), 1967, Francuska, f-38, br. 432630.
Gaulle and Tito dated back to the Second World War when the French general expressed his support of Dragoljub “Draža” Mihailović, the commander of the Royalist forces, who had been convicted of war crimes and collaboration with the occupiers in 1946. These two reasons were often considered to be a significant factor behind the somewhat strained relations between Paris and Belgrade. Yugoslav officials were also displeased by de Gaulle’s frequent expressions of anti-communism, especially when he referred to Belgrade as being similar to the “totalitarian regimes” in Eastern Europe during public appearances.

The Évian Accords and Algeria’s independence on 1 July 1962 were crucial for the beginning of a new phase in Franco–Yugoslav relations. In August of the same year, Paris named Jean André Binoche as the new French ambassador to Belgrade. When presenting his accreditations to the Yugoslav president, Binoche gave center stage to their shared “brotherhood in arms” and the traditional friendship between their two countries. This emphasis on history and tradition in no way accidental. After the war, the French government had tried to make a connection through the continuity of cordial relations during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, even though a considerable number of influential figures from Yugoslav civil society, with whom the French ambassador had maintained close contact, had been eliminated from public life after 1945. The expectation that close political ties would quickly be established after so many difficult years of misunderstandings was not realistic, so a mutual agreement was reached to focus relations more closely on economics and culture.

However, the international context in Europe was rapidly changing, which provided both leaders with sufficient arguments that the postwar perquisites for Cold War policy were now in question. The conflict between Beijing and Moscow, which escalated in 1962/1963, became a central event in both French and Yugoslav foreign policy analyses. Yugoslav leadership viewed the conflict as a struggle between progressive (Khrushchev) and dogmatic (Mao Zedong) currents, and the consequences of these transcended the importance of the international workers' movement. French analyses, however, viewed the Sino-Soviet split as something beyond strictly ideological norms and viewed it as being significant for Moscow’s intentions to pacify its belligerent Cold War policy in Europe. De Gaulle’s conclusion was that Beijing’s provocation of Moscow by challenging its central ideological authority could push the Soviets to be more inclined toward negotiations with the West. Within certain shifts in the power constellation, which by 1963 had already resulted in meaningful changes

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21 De Gaulle’s New Year’s message was delivered on 31 December 1963. Dušan Kveder lodged an official protest with the French ambassador before the DSIP, noting that “the message had left a distressing impression.” The French ambassador argued that de Gaulle had failed to “differentiate between Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia” due to the brevity of the message. A part of de Gaulle’s controversial message was: “Without falling prey to the illusions that soothe the weak but without losing hope that freedom and human dignity will prevail, we should ultimately say that we are thinking about the day when, perhaps in Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia, Belgrade, Tirana, and Moscow, totalitarian communist regimes, which still manage to keep their people under oppression, will gradually achieve an evolution that can reconcile them with their own transformation.”, AJ, 837, KPR, I-5-b/28-4, Beleška o razgovoru sa francuskim ambasadorom g. Binoche-om; Antijugoslovenska izjava u novogodišnjoj poruci De Gola.
23 DAMSPRS, PA, 1962, Francuska, f-29, br. 429836.
for Yugoslav interests (the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, new trends in German government policy, the Élysée Treaty, Tito’s meeting with Kennedy, normalization with Eastern Europe), de Gaulle’s policy seemed Belgrade to be part of the same unstoppable process. At the DSIP conference in October, Marko Nikezić, the Yugoslav deputy secretary for foreign affairs also suggested that Yugoslavia should establish a “tacit agreement” with France as part of its policy strategy. It should then engage in a more “subtle policy” and observe where the two had common ground in any issue related to foreign policy.25

Until 1964, Yugoslavia’s open-door policy toward France succeeded in working out some of the more important elements of de Gaulle’s foreign policy strategy and then orienting Yugoslav policy accordingly. Reports from Mito Miljković, the Yugoslav ambassador to Paris, were an important benchmark at the DSIP for assessing French policy. In addition to regular monthly and yearly reports, the ambassador directly related elements of French policy at the DSIP conferences in 1963 and 1964. In his findings, he claimed that French foreign policy had been crafted according to de Gaulle’s personal traits, and its intention was for France to have a special role in a future united Europe. De Gaulle’s criticism of American policy and its role in NATO was seen as a policy aimed at the “disintegration” of the Western bloc. Constant insistence on the affirmation of national policies was interpreted as de Gaulle’s intention to remove European countries from the zone of influence of the two superpowers (Moscow and Washington) and thereby mitigate the militant, Manichean Cold War policy. Despite many positive examples, Miljković warned Yugoslavia not to count on any rapid development in relations with France, mainly because of de Gaulle, who was the personification of this sort of policy and personally was not particularly well-disposed toward Yugoslavia.26 Nevertheless, the leadership of the DSIP continued to focus on the importance of the French example, which in its view contributed to the strengthening of positive processes in the world.27 This view of France fit in well with the beginning of a new strategy for Yugoslav policy toward Western Europe, which the DSIP had begun proposing to state leadership in 1963. Apart from the obvious economic benefits for Yugoslav interests that would come from cooperation with the West, and primarily with the European Economic Community (EEC), from the DSIP’s perspective, Yugoslav policy should seek to to counteract the negative image that it was too much in collusion with Moscow after relations were normalized. Interesting developments in French foreign policy were recognized as opportunities for expanding political cooperation between the two countries, which would then result in the practical achievement of the active and peaceful coexistence that had been proclaimed. Apart from the DSIP, other actors in Yugoslav foreign policy (SIV, the Federal


27 On 26 March 1964, the Collegium of the DSIP presented some basic ideas for how to respond to France. Of the more important examples of French policies, the following results were highlighted: support for Algeria, recognition of the People’s Republic of China, a position on Cuba, recommendations for neutralizing Southeast Asia, recognition of a policy of non-alignment as a significant international factor, action plans to assist developing countries, opposition to the creation of a multilateral NATO nuclear force, recognition of the Odra–Neisse line, and strengthening commercial ties and contacts with East Germany. AJ, 837, KPR, I-5-b/28-4, Neke teze Kolegijuma DSIP za aktivniji nastup prema Francuskoj.
The French minister Louis Joxe’s visit to Yugoslavia on 20 June 1964 was the first postwar visit to Belgrade by a member of the French government. Joxe was believed to someone in whom de Gaulle had a great deal of confidence, which gave a special weight to these discussions. His trip to Yugoslavia was organized as part of the signing of a cultural convention between the two countries, but the discussions with Tito were focused exclusively on international politics. The Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Cairo was scheduled for the end of 1964, so the main focus of Yugoslav interests included French views on various unresolved issues such as those of Laos, Cambodia, Cyprus, and the newly liberated countries in general. In his discussion with Joxe, Tito praised French policy and welcomed its recognition of China. The very direction of these talks demonstrated that the differences between them were minuscule in comparison to the general state of the world, which further convinced Tito that French politics were definitely evolving, and that he could use this as a positive example during talks with other world leaders. For France, however, Joxe’s visit was just one of a series of initial general consultations it had begun with Eastern European countries in 1964. A visit to Paris by the Romanian prime minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer in July convinced de Gaulle that relations within the Communist bloc had changed due to Russia’s evolution and split with China. By the end of the year, foreign ministers from Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia also made visits to Paris, followed by one from Hungary in early 1965.

The Yugoslav minister Konstantin Koče Popović made an unofficial visit to Paris around the same time on 25–27 November but had two meetings with the French foreign minister Maurice Couve de Murville. The additional second meeting with Murville was later interpreted as an indication of France wanting to give Yugoslavia special consideration beyond what it had given other Eastern European representatives. Talks between Koče Popović and Murville once again demonstrated similarities in how they viewed many issues in Europe and the Third World. Shared criticism of the military blocs and certain aspects of American policies and European issues provided confirmation for both sides about their perceived need for meetings and consultations. Popović conveyed to Murville Yugoslavia’s support for an “independent Europe,” and that “this Europe should enable further
unimpeded development of relations between our two countries and their rapprochement, and it would not become a source of new complications.\textsuperscript{33} Not to be outdone by his Yugoslav colleague, Murville specifically emphasized that Franco–Yugoslav cooperation would be based on each country’s independent policies.\textsuperscript{34} Both ministers agreed that peace in Europe could only be secured outside of the existing blocs.

Koče Popović’s visit to France, although unofficial and arranged without a meeting with de Gaulle, was still a step forward in Franco–Yugoslav relations. First and foremost, for the French, Yugoslav views of relations within Eastern Europe were valuable extra-block insights into the possible evolution of the Eastern European Communist parties while de Gaulle’s Eastern policy of détente was being fleshed out. Popović’s report when he returned to Belgrade was not optimistic, and he recognized that the French had overly strong reservations stemming from, in his opinion, de Gaulle’s unwillingness to approach Yugoslavia more openly or as its equal. “For de Gaulle it is inconceivable, far-fetched even, how a small Balkan country would be able to take on such an important role on the world stage,” was Popović’s conclusion. Nevertheless, a French impression of the “individuality” of Yugoslav foreign policy had been achieved.\textsuperscript{35} The reform oriented Eighth Congress of the SKJ in 1964 only added to Western observers’ impression that Yugoslavia was ready for a democratic transformation and therefore ready to become more open to the West and more distanced from Moscow.\textsuperscript{36}

For the first time, President de Gaulle conveyed his personal greetings to President Tito and the Yugoslav peoples at a traditional New Year’s reception on 1 January 1965.\textsuperscript{37} The previously harsh criticism of Eastern European regimes was replaced by a call for cooperation for the sake of Europe’s future security. The extent to which Belgrade had changed its view of de Gaulle’s France was also discussed in Ljubomir Radovanović’s pamphlet “France and de Gaulle” published by \textit{Komunist} in August 1964. Radovanović, a prominent jurist and longtime member of the DSIP (1948–1963) who had been educated in prewar Paris, presented to his Yugoslav readership the political concept of Gaullism along with a broad historical perspective. Radovanović’s ultimate conclusion was that “France, by virtue of its tradition and prestige, its concept of international relations, its realistic assessment of European interests, and its opportunities in international relations, had the standing and was in the right position to contribute to the renewal of a general European policy. France’s basic concept had been freed from shackles of the principle of blocs, ideological narrow-mindedness, Cold War antagonism, and the bloc-based division that has hampered every initiative for general European cooperation.”\textsuperscript{38} For Yugoslav interests, France seemed to be a desirable international partner in the West, even though the structures of this cooperation were not yet certain.

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\bibitem{34} AJ, 837, KPR, I-5-b/28-4, Drugi razgovor Kuv de Mirvila i Koče Popovića, održan 27. novembra.
\bibitem{36} Rusinow 1978: 163–170.
\bibitem{37} DAMSPRS, PA, 1965, Francuska, f-38, br.4218.
\bibitem{38} Radovanović 1964: 86.
\end{thebibliography}
3. Yugoslavia and de Gaulle’s Eastern Policy
as the Pinnacle of Gaullist Strategy, 1965–1967

Of de Gaulle’s many public appearances, the press conference held on 4 February 1965 is considered the crucial moment when France made known its policy of détente toward Eastern Europe. Speaking to television cameras, the French president presented avenues for a resolution to the German question, which would involve formulating a long-term policy of pan-European cooperation beyond the limitations of the bloc structures. In de Gaulle’s opinion, the issue of a unified Germany could be resolved not through conflicts of differing ideologies or by the efforts of the two blocs, but solely through the cooperation of all European countries and by promoting a policy of détente. He then outlined three key prerequisites that needed to be fulfilled before Germany’s final unification. First, the evolution of the Eastern Bloc had to include the abandonment of the Soviet regime’s “totalitarian” aspects, further liberalization of relations between the socialist countries, and greater independence from Moscow. Second, it would be preferable for Western European integration (the EEC) to achieve a common policy and defense in addition to the already existing economic integration among its members. Finally, West Germany would have to make significant concessions in its policies and change its position on prewar borders (the Oder–Neisse line) and the possession of nuclear weapons.

De Gaulle’s envisioned process of détente would come to fruition through a Paris–Bonn–Moscow axis that would restore the old European equilibrium and balance of power. This would be done without any influence from US policy, which by the mid-1960s and after a series of incidents (Vietnam, the Dominican Republic), Paris considered to be the primary disruptive factor in international relations. In order to free the government in Bonn from Washington’s embrace, de Gaulle was prepared to serve as mediator between West Germany and Eastern Europe, especially since West Germany’s new coalition government had embarked on an Eastern policy in 1966. A week before the February press conference, Etienne Burin des Roziers, the head of de Gaulle’s cabinet, had met with the Yugoslav ambassador Mito Miljković and laid out for him how identical the two countries’ objectives were regarding a resolution to the German question. Despite the obvious differences in the two country’s views on the existence of East Germany, France nevertheless insisted Belgrade’s and Paris’s policies were similar but also criticized Yugoslavia for being overly passive about European issues.

Yugoslavia’s policy toward the socialist countries of Eastern Europe had preceded de Gaulle’s Eastern policy and had been adapted to suit the objectives of a global strategy and the needs of non-aligned countries in the Third World. Some of the main features of this policy had come about during the 1950s when Yugoslavia was in the first stages of normalizing relations with Russia, primarily through dialog with the post-Stalinist leadership in Moscow. At that time, clear principles for new relations were established by the Belgrade...
and Moscow Declarations. After a period of strained relations stemming from the Yugoslav party leadership’s refusal to sign the 1957 Declaration and the adoption of the SKJ’s new 1958 program, Yugoslav leadership began another process of normalizing relations within the context of the Sino-Soviet split, but this time with much broader objectives and expectations. At the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee (CK) of the SKJ on 18 May 1963, Tito outlined for the party membership the Yugoslav strategy for Eastern Europe and curbed previously hidden resistance within the DSIP. Tito attributed the significance of the Sino-Soviet split to “all of mankind” by invoking the concept of proletarian internationalism. Siding with Moscow in this dispute with Beijing meant supporting a process of de-Stalinization and strengthening the principles of peaceful coexistence and the struggle for peace on a global scale. Tito warned that Yugoslav policy must not “end up being detrimental to the socialist countries or the workers’ movement.” Up until 1968, Yugoslav strategy relied on joint action against the Cold War by all “peaceful forces” within the international community, which, in the Yugoslav interpretation, consisted primarily of the socialist and non-aligned Afro-Asian states. This was one of the reasons why, up until 1970, Tito’s foreign policy actions were primarily focused on these areas and bypassed Western European capitals. Unlike de Gaulle’s predictions, the Yugoslav communists expected the evolution of Eastern Europe to raise the possibility of socialist countries having greater autonomy, which could strengthen socialist social relations if paired with an appropriate policy of reform. Greater contact with Eastern European party leaders would also enable Yugoslavia to popularize greater engagement of socialist countries with those of the Third World, economic assistance for developing countries, and general support for the UN’s efforts to establish itself as the most important institution for promoting a policy of peace. The emergence of de Gaulle’s vision was in some ways unexpected, yet it was certainly in line with the sufficient openness of Yugoslav diplomacy, which also interpreted changes in the West as an identical process of dismantling the Cold War movement. Starting in the 1960s, given the changes in the West and its need to satisfy its own economic interests, Yugoslav policy started becoming more engaged in issues of European security.

De Gaulle’s Eastern policy drew even more attention in March 1966 when he wrote to Lyndon Johnson to inform him of France’s desire for full sovereignty over its territories and its intention to withdraw from the integrated NATO command. At the end of March, an aide-mémoire from the French government informed its Western allies of France’s intention to withdraw French troops from West Germany and its military personnel from NATO’s integrated command structures, along with a request for all foreign troops to be removed from French soil by 1 April 1967. Suddenly France’s future status in the alliance was in doubt because the 1949 agreement on accession was set to expire in 1969. But what the French president wanted most
of all was to show that this decision about NATO was an integral part of his Eastern policy. This policy was clearly presented during an extensive Eastern European diplomatic tour Murville went on between April and July of 1966 (Bucharest, Sofia, Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest) and during de Gaulle’s first official visit to the Soviet Union in July of that year.50

During this visit, de Gaulle invited Soviet leadership to participate in a joint effort to resolve European security issues of European security through agreed-upon action. France’s efforts were also aimed at softening the Soviets’ negative view of Bonn’s policies, and it insisted on better models of communication. De Gaulle’s message to Moscow was that if Soviet policies did not evolve, neither would Germany’s and vice versa.51 Paris was satisfied with the outcomes of the visit, and the signing of a joint declaration and establishment of a direct line of communication had created an expectation that concrete moves in French foreign policy toward the West would influence similar changes within the Eastern bloc. The Bucharest Declaration was adopted on 6 July 1966 at a meeting of the Warsaw Pact and included some of the suggestions made by the Romanian representatives. It also legalized a path for negotiation and détente with the West.52 At the end of the year, a declaration by the new West German coalition government (Kissinger–Brandt) announced a new policy of normalizing relations with the Eastern European countries, and this provided Paris with enough certainty that its vision for overcoming the Cold War in Europe could not be halted.53

The role of Yugoslavia in de Gaulle’s strategy for Eastern Europe was distinct. There was categorical support for Yugoslavia’s international position, its independence, and its independent internal development. Ministers in Georges Pompidou’s government (Peyrefitte, Joxe, Murville) rushed to express their sympathies for Yugoslav policy.54 Yugoslavia was referred to as a “champion of independence” whose views were more closely aligned with those of France than of other socialist countries.55 Judging by a statement from the French prime minister Georges Pompidou on 29 November 1965, Yugoslavia was viewed as an example of how to conduct policies independently, outside of the blocs, and without retreating into isolation.56 An official visit by the French foreign minister Couve de Murville on 13 September 1966 and Marko Nikezić’s reciprocal visit to Paris in September 1967 only served to confirm the high degree to which two countries agreed about the most pressing international issues. Various kinds of information from the Yugoslav ambassador to Paris seemed to indicate there had been a significant “softening” in de Gaulle’s attitude toward Yugoslavia, as evidenced by the new French ambassador to Belgrade, Alan Frankfort.57

50 Martin 2013: 105–108.
51 Jackson 2018: 657.
52 Crump 2015: 152–156.
53 Martin 2013: 119.
55 Aj, 837, KPR, 1-5-b/28-5, Zabeleška o poseti ministra za informacije Francuske Aleina Pezrefittea, državnem sekretaru za inostrane poslove Marku Nikeziću.
56 “Independence does not lead to isolation. Look to our predecessors. Take Yugoslavia. It has found a way to defy Stalin without crossing over to the opposing bloc and finally chose its own independence. What are the results of that now? The Russian have accepted it; the satellite countries have accepted it; the West has accepted it.” DAMSPRS, PA, 1965, Francuska, f-36, br. 444491.
On the other hand, concrete proposals from the French government for possible models of coordination and cooperation regarding the two countries’ European policies were regularly omitted, notwithstanding their officially close positions. Despite being the only socialist country outside of the Soviet sphere of influence, Yugoslavia nevertheless had a second-class role in De Gaulle’s Eastern policy. Many Yugoslav analyses investigating the rationale behind France’s reasoning often attributed much of it to de Gaulle and his negative attitude toward the regime in Belgrade.

A great deal of clarity on the issue came from the new Yugoslav ambassador to Paris, Ivo Vejvoda, who was sent to France in June 1967, shortly after the Brioni Plenum and the former ambassador Mito Miljković was recalled for political reasons. Before arriving in France, Tito gave Vejvoda specific instructions for how Yugoslav representatives should conduct themselves in diplomatic circles and in front of de Gaulle. He particularly emphasized that they should focus “maximum effort” toward strengthening relations with France. Tito advised him that “Yugoslavia has no intention of letting its policy of non-alignment “hinder” French efforts to bring all European countries closer together and unite them on new grounds, and if the French have any such reservations, they should be neutralized.”

In early August 1967, the Yugoslav ambassador tried to put forward in a comprehensive report on French foreign policy the main reasons for the conflicts between de Gaulle’s and Yugoslavia’s strategies. In addition to noting that France had been avoiding any event within their mutual relations that might be interpreted as resulting from “the two countries’ mutual extra-bloc position,” the ambassador specifically emphasized that France did not need Yugoslavia for its policy of “disintegration of the Eastern bloc.” One important reason for this attitude was that, for the sake of good relations with the Soviet Union, Paris did not want to overstate Yugoslavia as an example, especially considering Moscow’s reservations about Yugoslavia’s internal reforms. Similarly, French pretensions to becoming “a patron of the Third World” were not reconcilable with Yugoslavia’s policy of non-alignment and independent development of underdeveloped countries. De Gaulle was counting on France’s high rank as an equally great power in the multilateral world he envisioned. Yugoslav policy, however, was critical of the former colonial power’s “neo-colonial” intentions and did not exclude Paris’s negative influence on the francophone countries in Africa. The Yugoslav’s open invitation to de Gaulle to participate in the Non-Aligned Conference, which would be in line with the increasingly pronounced extra-bloc tendencies within French policy, was not successful. The French president’s response was that if war were to break out, France would side with the West.

The absence of more active Franco–Yugoslav cooperation around the disintegration of the European blocs and a disregard of Yugoslav leadership in extra-bloc politics did not mean that Paris intended to completely ignore Belgrade’s influence. The Yugoslav contribution to two aspects of de Gaulle’s strategy—opposition to American global policy

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62 AJ, KPR, I-1/236, Pismo Tita De Golu, 07.03.1968.
63 Berić 2013: 158.
and support for Bonn’s Eastern policy—was considered highly important. Criticism of US policy was an invariable part of Yugoslav engagement during the 1960s, even though stable relations with the United States were not questioned. As Tito said to Mito Miljković, the Yugoslav ambassador to Paris, “No matter how angry they are at our policies, we have to criticize them because doing so is in the interest of our country and the countries we are linked to.” In Belgrade, American military interventions (Vietnam, the Dominican Republic) were considered the result of reactionary and conservative Cold War advocates in Washington, while a significant number of civil and military coups and international crises in the Afro-Asian sphere were attributed to the work of US secret services. Whether it was driven by ideological reasons (imperialism as a higher state of capitalism) or by the practical needs of the Yugoslav non-aligned policy (protecting its extra-bloc position in the Third World), Yugoslav criticism of US policy coincided with de Gaulle’s efforts to suppress American hegemony in Europe.

During his talks with Tito, Couve de Murville, the French minister of foreign affairs, conveyed to him his positive impressions of de Gaulle’s trip to the Soviet Union while also drawing a clear distinction between Soviet and American policies. Murville believed that the Soviet Union did not have expansionist intents, and that American policy was far more dangerous for provoking armed conflict. The pinnacle of Franco–Yugoslav cooperation in opposition to American policies came during the 1967 Middle East crisis triggered by the Six Day War between Israel and the Arab states. France had no objections to Tito’s decision to support the Arab states desire to seek cooperation with the Eastern bloc; in fact, it wholeheartedly supported the Yugoslav initiative. At the United Nations General Assembly held in June 1967 to discuss the Middle East crisis, the French representatives voted in favor of a resolution put forward by Yugoslavia demanding the withdrawal of Israeli troops to the pre-5 June borders. During the crisis, Koča Popović and Marko Nikezić were sent to Paris for necessary consultations at the highest level, and in a separate letter, Tito also sought French support for Yugoslavia’s five-point proposal. The Yugoslav and French presidents had almost identical views of the war. They both viewed Israel as responsible for escalating the conflict and the American government as the primary sponsor of such policies. However, the Middle East crisis revealed the limitations of French and Yugoslav influence over the course of events and key actors, and it questioned whether it was even possible to resolve acute international crises without involvement from Moscow or Washington.

De Gaulle’s European policy was of particular interest to Belgrade in so far as how successful it was in putting forward a different resolution for the German question, and so help develop Yugoslav–German relations. As was previous mentioned, de Gaulle saw his West German policy as an important pillar for his strategy and a Franco-German partnership as a foundation from which his vision of a united Europe could be built. None of the accompanying elements of Cold War policy, of which the most obvious were militancy and

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64 See Bogetić 2012.
66 See Davidson 2010.
69 AJ, 507, SKJ, Međunarodna komisija, Francuska, IX, 30/V-119, Pismo druga Tita upućeno Šarlu de Golu.
ideological exclusivity, were appropriate for any attempt to resolve the issue of a divided, postwar Germany. Time and again, contentious issues around the German question, such as the status of West Berlin, were at the root of major crises and potential armed conflicts between the two blocs (the Berlin crisis, Khrushchev’s ultimatum, the Berlin Wall). Along with supporting the new French policy, de Gaulle envisioned freeing West Germany from the burdens of the past and creating a different approach to relations with the East European countries, in particular by abandoning rigid framework of Halstein Doctrine. It was Yugoslavia who had paid a high price in 1957 for applying the doctrine after recognizing East Germany and severing diplomatic relations with Bonn.

Once Ambassador Binoche arrived in Yugoslavia in 1962, the French embassy began investing considerable effort into supporting Yugoslavia’s officials in the process of normalizing relations with West Germany. They made similar interventions with the government in Bonn. In the spring of 1963, Binoche passed on confidential information to Belgrade that a current in the West German government favoring Yugoslavia had prevailed. A gradual reorientation in official German policy was anticipated, as was an abandonment of the Halstein Doctrine. Yugoslav officials were made aware that the reversal had been the result of “considerable efforts in this direction recently made by France with the government in Bonn.”

Binoche expressed France’s willingness to use its influence with West Germany to Yugoslavia’s advantage regarding any issues of interest to it. An agreement between Marko Nikezić and Rolf Otto Lahr in September 1964 laid out the basis for better communication between Belgrade and Bonn, which was reflected in reports by German diplomats from the French embassy in Belgrade during 1965 about positive changes in Yugoslav politics.

Although their views regarding the existence of East Germany differed, Yugoslavia found the important elements of de Gaulle’s policy to be acceptable. A West German policy that renounced nuclear weapons, recognized postwar borders, and was open to resolving contentious issues related to the Eastern European countries corresponded with Yugoslav interests—especially since de Gaulle’s strategy was a product of France’s independent assessment, which was free from American tutelage and the limitations of blocs. Paris’s promotion of the Kiesinger–Brandt government’s new Eastern policy gave the Yugoslav government additional assurances that these new trends in West German policy were authentic and less inclined toward revanchism, as Moscow had negatively portrayed them. In February 1967, information from the French ministry of foreign affairs indicated to Belgrade that new government in Bonn was planning to be “more flexible in its relations with Yugoslavia” and was ready to tamp down on emigrant organizations and to resolve the issue of reparations. However, this same information also included Soviet dissatisfaction with the French assessments of the Kiesinger government and Paris’s support for this sort of policy toward the East. Moscow viewed these moves by the Kiesinger government as part of a strategy to divide the Eastern bloc and intentionally isolate East Germany.

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71 Nečak 2015: 113.
However, all Soviet attempts to align Yugoslav policy with the policies of the Eastern bloc were unsuccessful. On 23 January 1968, Yugoslavia began its first round of negotiations in Paris with representatives of West Germany, which eventually resulted in renewed diplomatic relations. After Romania, this was the second positive response to the Keisinger government’s Eastern policy and to the generally stated goals of de Gaulle’s strategy. Ivo Vejvoda reported from Paris in December 1967 that de Gaulle’s mentions of Europe in his addresses were becoming increasingly infrequent due to the poor results of his policy in Eastern Europe. With its influence on East and West limited, France’s overly ambitious policy goals could not be achieved in a way that would bolster an overhaul of an entire international system. In Vejvoda’s opinion, European countries needed a less “ambitious and spectacular” form of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.73 As Murville put it, in order to achieve a European security policy, détente had to be approached without any illusions.74 The events that unfolded in 1968 provided a chance to let go of some these illusions.

4. Conclusion

Along with the violence that prevented a democratic evolution in Czechoslovakian socialism, the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact troops on 20–21 August 1968 essentially brought an end to de Gaulle’s European policy and attempts to revise the bipolar Cold War system. The basic prerequisites set during de Gaulle’s press conference in February 1965 were no longer achievable within the context of a Soviet doctrine of “limited sovereignty.” The overly high expectations for evolution in the eastern European countries, and especially for the Soviet Union’s policies, had dissipated during de Gaulle’s official visits to Poland and Romania. No matter how strongly French policy raised the issues of political, military, and economic alliances in the West, similar trends simply could not be achieved in Eastern Europe. Military intervention in Czechoslovakia demonstrated the Soviets’ willingness to use violence in defense of the European political status quo, which served as the basis for any discussion about European security. De Gaulle’s policies had considerably more resonance in the West, and especially in Bonn, than it had influence to reshape relations in the Eastern bloc. Furthermore, France’s exit from NATO in 1966 did not contribute to the kind of reorganization of alliances that de Gaulle had hoped for, but it did contribute to homogenizing the rest of its members in their response to de Gaulle’s challenge. Harmel’s December 1967 report put forward a policy of détente as an integral part of NATO’s strategy in which the détente would be more “Atlantic” than “Gaullist.” As the crisis in the Middle East demonstrated, communication between Washington and Moscow was crucial for easing tensions, and it would later be a significant contribution in the achievement of a policy of détente after the Czechoslovak crisis. As Marc Trachtenberg concluded, bipolarity prevailed, and in the end, the many intentions behind de Gaulle’s strategy were only well-conceived rhetoric without any solid grounding in reality.75 The fate of the Prague Spring contributed to a correction in Tito’s foreign policy.

74 Martin 2013:108.
75 Trachtenberg 2012: 88.
strategy, which in 1968 proved to be much more one-sided than initial ideological expectations had thought it was. Democratic evolution within the worker’s movement was curtailed by Moscow’s interventions and strictly limited to intra-bloc agreements. In addition to demonstrating repeated attributes of a hegemonic policy in Eastern Europe, military intervention ensured a conservative ideological trend toward re-Stalinization shaped according to the notion of “real socialism.” Moscow harshly criticized the directions Yugoslav economic and social reforms took in the mid-1960s for being a significant departure from ideological cannon, and in the context of the Prague Spring this exerted direct external pressure on the main trends in Yugoslav democratic transformation. After the clash with Chinese dogmatism, all of Tito’s initial hypotheses from the Fifth Plenum of the CK SKJ about the KPSS’s “progressiveness” were called in question, as much by the aggressiveness of Soviet policy as they were by a differing view of China’s role. Indirect criticism of this sort of policy of “irreplaceable allies” was lodged at the highest Yugoslav plenary immediately after the collapse of the Prague Spring. As with de Gaulle’s foreign policy strategy, the authoritarian political system in Yugoslavia revealed flaws in the final formulation of foreign policy and often ignored the opinions of other actors within the decision-making structure. The French Quai d’Orsay and the Yugoslav DSIP had the fewest illusions about possibilities for an evolution in Soviet policy, although their suggestions failed to dispel the political weight of the two presidents’ brands of personal diplomacy. The Yugoslav analysis of de Gaulle’s political fall pointed to the degeneration of his personal authority as a deciding factor. The effect of this was that his personal assessments of the situation in the world and in his country contributing to a “loss of reality” and with that his inevitable defeat.

Despite its overly ambitious goals and lack of specificity in its strategic commitments, de Gaulle’s revision of the Cold War was an authentic expression of the spirit of the 1960s and the aspirations for alternative conceptions of international policies. According to de Gaulle’s thinking, the bipolar order did not undergo a transformation, but numerous variations of a European détente (German, French, American, Soviet, Yugoslav) allowed for different kinds of communication within the European space and the beginning of a process that would eventually lead to the 1975 Helsinki Conference. De Gaulle’s political fall in 1969 did not mean a there was a complete renunciation of the Gaullist strategy in French foreign policy. As Frédéric Bozo noted, the “Gaullist legacy” significantly influenced policy formation during the presidencies of Georges Pompidou (1969–1974) and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (1974–1981). In the somewhat altered circumstances that came after 1968, France continued to insist on an independent and extra-bloc policy, criticize the bipolar system, and support contacts with Soviet leadership and Eastern European leaders.

Yugoslav policy, however, viewed de Gaulle’s revisionism as significant evidence of changes in the global framework, and especially in the suppression of bloc policy and the

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76 Bešlin 2022: 55–127.
77 AJ, 507, SKJ, Međunarodna komisija, Francuska, IX, Informacija Ambasade SFRJ u Parizu o Francuskoj posle referenduma.
hegemony of superpowers. Despite a greater reliance on socialist countries in Eastern Europe and non-aligned countries in the Afro-Asian sphere, Yugoslav foreign policy built its European policy in accordance with its own assessments and strategic positions while also remaining open to cooperation with various international partners. Although de Gaulle’s strategy appeared to be problematic for Yugoslav interests related to disarmament and its relations with former colonies and the UN, it allowed Franco-Yugoslav relations to be established on a different basis that allowed for cooperation to continue, even after de Gaulle’s political downfall, and especially in a joint effort beginning in 1970 to support a new phase of détente in Europe.

Translated by Elizabeth Salmore

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ЙУГОСЛАВИЈА И ГАЛИСТИЧКА РЕВИЗИЈА ХЛАДНОГ РАТА

Резиме

Француска политика након повратка Де Гола (1958) и социјалистичка Југославија под Титовим вођством, упркос различима и послератној дистанци у односима, имале су и бројне сличности на којима су функционисале дипломатије две земље. У обема земљама спољнополитички курс је био детерминисан ауторитарним карактеристикама система и њеном средишњом личношћу – председником. Такође, обе државе су биле заинтересоване за превазилажење хладноратовске поделе Европе, а своју стратегију заснивале на покушајима маргинализације САД и пацификације совјетског режима. Утолико је француска спољнополитичка стратегија била не само компатибилна са Титовим глобалним стремљењима, већ је управо Југославији припадало посебно место у покушајима политичке пацификације и потенцијалне интеграције Европе. Те Голов покушаја детанта за који је Југославија показивала велико разумевање и сама посвећена сличним циљевима, доживео је неуспех услед суфицита илузија о могућности да се биполарност превазиђе конституисањем средњег пута између два супротстављена хладноратоска блока. Суочавање са преценивањем властитог утицаја, али и агресија Варшавског пакта на Чехословачку и потпуна незаназубаност Москве на пацификацију, као и неспремност САД на повлачење, означили су крај Де Головог покушаја детанта ка мултилатералном поретку. Ипак, слични циљеви европске и глобалне политике, приближили су односе Југославије и Француске, остављајући принципе на којима ће током 1970-их постизања затегнутост постати могуће. Као и у случају Де Голове спољнополитичке стратегије, ауторитарни модел политичког система у Југославији показивао је недостатке у коначној формулацији спољне политике које жесто игнорисала мишљења других актера унутар структуре дипломатије Европе. Француски Кеј Д’Орсе и југословенски ДСИП имали су најмање илузија о могућностима еволуције совјетске политике, иако њихове сугестије нису успеле да наметну могућности перспективе у покушајима политичке еволуције, започинети коначно процес преговарања. Са друге стране, Југословенска политика је Де Голову ревизију Хладног рата доживљавала значајним доказом промена у светским оквирима, нарочито у суштинској супротстављенији европских стратегија, који ће коначно водити ка Конференцији Хелсинкија 1975. године. Са друге стране, Југословенска политика је Де Голову ревизију доживљавала значајним доказом промена у светским оквирима, нарочито у суштинској супротстављенији европских стратегија, који ће коначно водити ка Конференцији Хелсинкија 1975. године. Са друге стране, Југословенска политика је Де Голову ревизију доживљавала значајним доказом промена у светским оквирима, нарочито у суштинској супротстављенији европских стратегија, који ће коначно водити ка Конференцији Хелсинкија 1975. године. Са друге стране, Југословенска политика је Де Голову ревизију доживљавала значајним доказом промена у светским оквирима, нарочито у суштинској супротстављенији европских стратегија, који ће коначно водити ка Конференцији Хелсинкија 1975. године. Са друге стране, Југословенска политика је Де Голову ревизију доживљавала значајним доказом промена у светским оквирима, нарочито у суштинској супротстављенији европских стратегија, који ће коначно водити ка Конференцији Хелсинкија 1975. године.
социјалистичке државе Источне Европе и несврстане државе афро-азијског света, југословенска спољна политика је градила своју европску политику у складу са сопственим проценама и стратешким позицијама, остајући отворена за сарадњу према различитим међународним партнерима.

Кључне речи: Југославија, Француска, спољна политика, детант, Шарл де Гол, Јосип Броз Тито, Хладни рат.