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YUGOSLAVIA AND EUROCOMMUNIST PARTIES DURING THE ‘LONG YEAR’ OF EUROPEAN DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM (1974–1976)

Abstract: In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Mediterranean communist parties’ political practices and party ideologies, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia’s (LCY) policies, and the socialist model of the Yugoslav state, underwent gradual changes according to similar principles. This allowed existing cooperation between the LCY and future Eurocommunist parties to expand. At this time, the countries of Western Europe were experiencing a period of unprecedented economic growth and a reduction in social inequalities. This period eventually ended in political turmoil and crisis caused by ideological and cultural changes significantly driven by the same long-term consequences of developing welfare state models in the Western Bloc’s largest economies. A new social reality in Western Europe, the Mediterranean region, and Yugoslavia, the Mediterranean’s closest socialist country, would influence the events leading to the zenith of the LCY’s influence on the European far left and also to the eventual downfall of the international leftist initiatives launched by the LCY and the Eurocommunist parties. This article will present findings from archival research regarding certain aspects that may have influenced these changes in the international positions of and relations between the LCY and the Eurocommunist parties. It will compare it to those of previous studies within the humanities and social sciences.

Keywords: Eurocommunism, democratic socialism, welfare state, Cold War, League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, Enrico Berlinguer.

1. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Rise of Eurocommunism

Two decades of expanding economic and social policies characteristic of the European welfare state created a new social reality in which it became possible for many members of Mediterranean Marxist parties to contemplate reforms of party policies and, eventually, the creation of a new party ideology that would later become known

as Eurocommunism.¹ During this period, the Yugoslav Communists also experienced dynamic and complex changes in their relations with other communist and socialist parties of Europe. At this time, the Yugoslav party transitioned from the isolated outcast it had become after splitting with the Soviet party in 1948 to one of the most influential communist parties in Europe, and it remained so until just before the great turmoil of 1968.² The Yugoslav state's increased international influence and financial power attracted European communists searching for new allies and supporters anticipating a clash with the parties of the Eastern Bloc, which would become a foregone conclusion once the Italian, French, Spanish, and Greek Communists introduced new Eurocommunist ideologies. These also put the Yugoslav Communists in a position to organize numerous initiatives to expand cooperation between the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) and communist parties of the Mediterranean.³

Within a month or so of the Czechoslovakian crisis, the Italian Communist Party (*Partito Comunista Italiano*, PCI) leadership openly declared their party's intention to change the dominant political practices of the Italian Communists and, gradually, the party's ideology.⁴ From that moment on, the PCI's reformist policies and international initiatives would garner enthusiastic political support and financial aid from both the LCY's institutions and the Yugoslav government.⁵ In the years prior to the great split on the European far left in 1968, members of the PCI leadership were already discussing reformist ideas and criticism of the Soviet party and Soviet state policy in private meetings with representatives of the LCY. At these meetings, Italian reformists often spoke of the past and future Yugoslav role in shaping the new European Marxist ideology, which would later be recognized as Eurocommunism.⁶ The Italian Communists also stated that, in addition to the inspiration for new ideas they had found in the historical evolution of the Yugoslav socialist model, Yugoslav support would be crucial for their plans to undermine Soviet influence over international communist across the globe and to expand the emerging reformist bloc of European Marxist parties.⁷

In a joint effort with PCI, the LCY began using its growing international influence to support the reformist faction of the French Communist Party (*Parti communiste français*, PCF).⁸ The French party at this point was deeply divided between reformists, who advocated for moving party ideology in the direction already taken by the Italian party at the PCI's 12th National Congress, and the conservatives, who had opted to continue defining

¹ Pons 2001: 3–27; Macdonald 1996: 152–188; Weller and Sant'Ana 2019: 2–30.

² Miletić 2022: 289–333; Dimić 2012: 59–81; Mišić 2013: 121–145.

³ Živković 2021: 171–198; Bajin 2023: 117–138; Filipović 2022: 477–494.

⁴ The Archive of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, documents of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, fond 507, section IX, Commission for International Relations and Cooperation, files 395–427, Recorded conversations (of LCY members) with the leadership of Italian Communist Party (abbreviated: AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-395-427, Recorded conversations with the members of PCI leadership).

⁵ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-395-429-436, Reports of Yugoslav delegation present at the PCI's 12th Congress in Bologna.

⁶ The Archive of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, Archive of Josip Broz Tito, documents of the Cabinet of the President of the Republic, fond 807, section I-3-a, Information about visits of Palmiro Togliatti, Luigi Longo and Enrico Berlinguer (abbreviated: AJ, KPR, I-3-a/44, Information about the visits of PCI leadership).

⁷ AJ, KPR, I-3-a/44-38-39, Information about conversations between delegations of LCY and PCI in January and August of 1967.

⁸ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX,30/I-213, Information about the development of cooperation between the LCY and PCF.

party policies according to the principles of the Bolshevik socialist model and maintain ties with the Soviet party.⁹ The Italian Communists tried to integrate French reformists during international Marxist events organized by the PCI and financed largely by LCY, and the Yugoslav Communists hosted their French counterparts during visits to Yugoslavia to research the historical development and practical implementation of the Yugoslav socialist model.¹⁰ An analysis of archival sources indicates that, as debates about the Yugoslav socialist model began occupying more space in the French contemporary leftist press, research visits by French Communists and other Marxist intellectuals became more frequent. The Yugoslav Communists used the French Communists' frequent visits, financed by the Yugoslav state, as an opportunity to form close ties with the leading members of the reformist faction of the PCF.¹¹

The LCY and Yugoslav federal institutions also provided various forms of assistance and services to the leaderships of the Spanish and Greek Communist Parties (the PCE and the KKE respectively), who were still operating in exile during the turmoil within the European far left in 1968 and 1969.¹² Documents from the LCY's Department for International Relations state on multiple occasions that Yugoslav party's intention was, if possible, to not make ideological distinctions between various groups within the PCE and KKE, both in exile and at home, because it needed to follow the Yugoslav foreign policy of supporting all those who opposed far-right dictatorships in Spain and Greece. However, after the internal splits in the KKE in 1968 and the PCE in 1973, the LCY maintained connections and provided financial aid exclusively to the Eurocommunist factions of the PCE and KKE.¹³ It is also important to mention that Santiago Carrillo, who would later become the general secretary of PCE and one of the most important Eurocommunist thinkers, claimed he developed some of his later published theses about Eurocommunism and the future of European societies during frequent long conversations with his close friend, Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito, which is somewhat supported by notes taken during these meetings.¹⁴

In the early 1970s cooperation between the LCY and Eurocommunist parties continued to expand, reaching the point where the LCY was formally recognized alongside the PCI as a leading party in the reformist bloc of European Marxist parties.¹⁵ Reports created

⁹ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-210-255, Reports about the debates in PCF press about the Yugoslav socialist model, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-331, Information about the internal changes in French party and changes of PCF attitudes.

¹⁰ The Archive of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, documents of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia, section A, files from the years 1974–1978, Reports on international cooperation (abbreviated: AJ, SSRNJ, A-074-078, International cooperation, Reports on Mediterranean conferences).

¹¹ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-212, Information about the visit of PCF directorate member A. Kazanova, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-230, About the help provided to French journalist A. Gerec, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-236, Reports about the visit of French philosopher and PCF member Roger Garaudy.

¹² AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/I-82-110, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-1-710-736, Analyses of the drafts concerning financial aid to Spanish communists in exile and representatives of the Interior Greek party.

¹³ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-728, Information about internal conflicts in the Greek Communist Party, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-723, Reports on the formation of the new United Central Committee of KKE, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/I-81-110, Reports on cooperation and communication with the Spanish Communist Party.

¹⁴ AJ, KPR, I-3-a/110-7, AJ, KPR, I-3-a/100-8, Reports on the receptions of S. Carrillo and D. Ibaruri.

¹⁵ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/I-52-81, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-392-426, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-210-255, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-712-779, Information about the development of cooperation between the LCY and the PCI, PCF, PCE and KKE.

by various LCY party offices show that informal meetings between members of the Yugoslav and Italian Communist Party leaderships had become common enough that the LCY and the PCI reached an agreement to regularly share party documents classified as secret to prepare their representatives for increasingly frequent consultations between the two parties' leaderships.¹⁶ The LCY and the PCI started numerous initiatives and projects meant to augment the development of close connections between different parties on the European far left, including the influential French and Italian Socialist and Social Democratic Parties and those from Northern and Central Europe.¹⁷ Over the course of many cordial conversations with Josip Broz Tito, Enrico Berlinguer, the new PCI general secretary, informally agreed that he would work to align the PCI's practices with those of the LCY regarding changes in relations with leftist parties in Middle East, East Asia, and Africa.¹⁸

After the fall of De Gaulle following the general strikes and student uprisings of 1968 and 1969, France entered a period of long and succeeding political crises, often associated in historical and sociological analyses with other political and social upheavals of the 1970s in Western Europe. Sociologists would later describe this period as one of crisis for the welfare state in Europe and United States during its last decade which was later viewed as a crisis of the last decade of the welfare state.¹⁹ In rapidly a changing social and political environment and facing increasingly deeper division within the party and the increasing influence of old and new competition on the left, the French Communists elected a new party leadership that mostly included members of Georges Marchais's party faction, which was more moderate in comparison.²⁰ The new party leadership introduced reforms of political practices and new policies to democratize and decentralize internal party structures, and announced its intention to abandon the tradition of incorporating the principles of the Bolshevik socialist model in favor of creating a new party ideology.²¹ Changes in the French party's political practices and ideology were quickly followed by expanded cooperation between PCF and LCY and increased participation of the PCF and members of PCF-aligned unions in numerous Yugoslav programs that provided free research visits, healthcare services, and all-expense-paid vacations to Yugoslavia.²²

When the French party joined many of the international initiatives started by Italian and Yugoslav Communists,²³ the PCI and LCY departments for international relations jointly concluded that the only thing stopping the unofficial reformist bloc from further expanding its influence into Soviet-dominated relations among the European far left parties was the fact that the Greek and Spanish Communist Parties, which had already started reforming their policies and creating foundations for new party ideologies, were still largely

¹⁶ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-395-427, Recorded conversations with members of the PCI leadership.

¹⁷ AJ, SSRNJ, A-074-078, International cooperation, Reports on Mediterranean conferences, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-392-426, Recorded conversations with the Italian Communists about the possible organization of a Mediterranean conference, AJ, KPR, I-3-a/44-59-62, Recorded conversations of J. B. Tito and L. Longo.

¹⁸ AJ, KPR, I-3-a/44-48, Reception of the general secretary of the PCI, Enrico Berlinguer.

¹⁹ Obinger and Schmitt 2011: 246–270; Weller and Sant'Ana 2019: 2–30; Petersen and Mioni 2022: 43–59.

²⁰ Kriegel 1967: 253–268; Raymond 2005: 40–63.

²¹ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-213, Information about the development of cooperation between the LCY and PCF.

²² AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-331, Information about internal changes in the French party and changes in PCF attitudes.

²³ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-395-439, Recorded conversations with members of the PCI leadership, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-213, Information about the development of cooperation between the LCY and PCF.

operating in exile and did not have the necessary means to join international seminars, conferences, and European Marxist gatherings organized by PCI, PCF, and LCY.²⁴ However, this was soon about to change as a half century of periodic rule by far-right dictatorships in the Mediterranean quickly came to a close.

2. The Reign of Military Dictatorships in the Mediterranean Comes to an End

From the early 1920s to the latter half of 1970s, many countries in the Mediterranean region, including Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey, etc., experienced the rise and fall of different military dictatorships. This is considered a period of far-right supremacy in the Mediterranean because almost all of these dictatorships either established far-right parties upon coming to power or rose up from the ranks of military officers already belonging to existing right-wing movements.²⁵ Almost all of these right-wing parties and movements were at some point locked in bitter conflicts that sometimes resulted in civil wars with far-left parties and movements, who were their chief competitors in articulating the animosities and social tensions that surfaced during the expansion of social inequalities and economic crises that followed the late industrialization of Mediterranean countries.²⁶ Consequently, almost all military dictatorships in the Mediterranean viewed communist parties and movements as the biggest threats to their power. They were also hostile toward, and had almost non-existent diplomatic relations with, the post-war Yugoslav state, which had emerged as a new socialist power in the region. This new state rapidly expanded its international influence after enacting economic reforms and providing shelter, financial contributions, and sometimes even military aid to resistance and far-left movements in Mediterranean countries ruled by far-right dictatorships.²⁷

Even today there are numerous debates in the humanities and social sciences stemming from disagreements about how much influence various economic, geopolitical, or cultural factors may have had on the long process that eventually made it impossible for the cycle of military dictatorships, in which similar events led to various juntas and far-right regimes seizing power and then eventually falling, to repeat itself.²⁸ Analyses of archival sources show that Italian and Yugoslav Communists had predicted the downfall of military dictatorships in the Mediterranean and openly discussed future plans to support the Spanish and Greek Communists in their anticipated attempts to regain the influence they had before the Spanish and Greek civil wars. As early as 1971 and 1972, members of the LCY and PCI party leaderships were already sharing predictions during their talks that it was only a matter of time before Franco's regime in Spain, the Greek military junta, and Salazar's government in Portugal fell, and their demises could be expected in the near future, possibly in an event similar to a chain reaction or over the course of a new wave of revolutions in the region.²⁹ The Italian Communists reckoned it would

²⁴ AJ, SSRNJ, A-074-078, International cooperation, Reports on Mediterranean conferences.

²⁵ Mitrović 1998: 166–212; Ristović 2012: 37–61; Mouzelis 1978: 115–133.

²⁶ Berend 2009: 42–61; Kuljić 1977: 22–28; Bakić 2019: 539–598.

²⁷ Dimić 2014: 33–67; Mijatov 2019: 58–91; Filipović 2023: 97–109.

²⁸ Brogi 2018: 134–157; Sassoon 1992: 139–169; Drake 2004: 47–63.

²⁹ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-395-427, Recorded conversations with members of the PCI leadership.

be impossible for Mediterranean dictatorships to survive the outside influences of the sweeping political and cultural changes occurring in the United States and Western Europe after the turmoil and uprisings of 1968 and 1969. The Yugoslav Communists, however, argued that economic difficulties and social tensions within far-right dictatorships would force these military regimes to either radicalize internal control, which would incite rebellion, or to create wars and prolonged conflicts, which would eventually end with the same result (which was partially the case with Greek and Turkish involvement in Cyprus).³⁰

However, at the beginning of this decade marked by political crises and the later economic consequences of the oil shock (the last decade of the welfare state in Western Europe), there was another factor the Italian and Yugoslav Communists could not possibly have taken into account. This was the beginning of a new phase in the development of international relations, which would later be referred to in contemporary newspapers and by historians of the Cold War as the *détente*. During this period, the United States and the Soviet Union signed various treaties and agreements leading to mutual disarmament, an end to many of the proxy wars, and a temporary relaxation of international tensions in Europe.³¹ The formal end of Soviet support for many left-wing parties and movements around the world opened the door to further expansion of LCY influence; but more importantly, within the context of the joint interests of the LCY and the Eurocommunist parties, it eliminated the need for stronger US support of those regimes, which had to some extent been brought to power or maintained to stop Marxist parties from expanding their influence in various Cold War fronts and within the Western Bloc, as was the case with Greece and Spain.³²

Although official contacts between the Greek military dictatorship and the Yugoslav government were so rare as to be almost non-existent, from the late 1960s onward, Yugoslav diplomatic representatives in Athens expressed their fears that the junta would become much more brutal toward the opposition if its leaders felt they were losing the US support. They reported to the Yugoslav government that this scenario was highly likely to occur in the future, simply based on the amount of resentment Western European governments held toward the Greek junta, which would eventually force the US to relinquish its tacit support for it.³³ The writers of reports issued by the LCY's Department for International Relations concluded that, after the Greek government had brutally quashed the 1973 uprising at the Athens Polytechnic and launched a military operation in Cyprus (which was expected to fail sooner or later), it was very likely the US government would want to cut ties with the Greek military regime.³⁴ Finally, it is important to note that along with anticipating internal destabilization within the Greek government and waning US sympathies toward the Regime

³⁰ AJ, SSRNJ, A-074-078, International cooperation, Reports on Mediterranean conferences.

³¹ Andry 2019: 93–143; Macdonald 1996: 152–188; Obinger and Schmitt 2011: 246–270,

³² AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/1-52-81, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/1-392-426, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-210-255, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-712-779, Information about the development of cooperation between the LCY and the PCI, PCF, PCE and KKE.

³³ Diplomatic Archive of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgrade, Political Archive of the Federal Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, Greece, Year 1968, Folder 42, Reports on the activities of political parties (abbreviated: DA, SSIP, Greece, 1968, F-42, Reports on the activities of political parties).

³⁴ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-848-898, Reports about the social and political situation in Greece, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-887, Materials received from the KKE interior's central committee.

of the Colonels, the Yugoslav state and party institutions began increasing all forms of aid to the Greek resistance movements, and especially to the communist resistance groups associated with the KKE, the reformist interior Greek Communist Party.³⁵

Almost immediately after the fall of Greek junta in 1974, the Yugoslav Communists began helping with organizing the safe return of Greek refugees and with negotiations between the interior Greek Communists and the provisional government.³⁶ Recorded conversations between the LCY and PCI leaderships reveal that the Italian and Yugoslav Communists believed the time had finally come to use every form of influence (and ‘even exert pressure like the Soviets if necessary,’ as the Italian Communists humorously suggested) available to them with the KKE leadership. Some KKE members had been using the struggle with the military junta to justify delaying the formalization of already informally introduced reforms as part of official party policy. Now that the struggle with the military junta was finished, the LCY and the PCI wanted to motivate the KKE to fully and formally complete reforms of its political practice and official party ideology.³⁷ To this end, during discussions with the KKE leadership about continuing financial support from the LCY and PCI, the Yugoslav and Italian Communists insisted it was of crucial importance to the future of Eurocommunism, both in Europe and abroad, to increase cooperation between KKE and other political parties in Greece and reject offers of compromise with the Soviets and the exterior Greek party. It was also a necessary condition for the Greek Communists to participate in future international initiatives by parties who defined their ideologies as democratic socialism.³⁸

A year later, after the death of Franco, the PCI and the LCY defined similar shared positions and common policies regarding cooperation between the Spanish Communists and the temporary government in Spain.³⁹ Santiago Carrillo later claimed he had not expected the PCI and LCY to follow the Eastern Bloc parties in criticizing him for agreeing to participate in the process of political transition, which the temporary government defined as a process of democratization, and even for negotiating about possible communist contributions to the reforms of King Juan Carlos I’s administration. He also didn’t expect the Italian and Yugoslav Communists to be as supportive as they were of his new political strategy of tolerance toward and appeasement of capitalist left-wing and even moderate right-wing parties; nor did he expect them to expand financial aid to the Spanish Communists after the party leadership returned from exile and the PCE was again legalized, which was, as in the case of the Greek Communists, a unique precedent.⁴⁰ During one of many cordial meetings with Carrillo, Josip Broz Tito stated that the Yugoslav party would continue to provide the Spanish Communists with various forms of assistance historically reserved for parties in exile. Tito also joked that even though another Spanish civil war was unlikely, Eurocommunists and the LCY were already engaged in another form of conflict—not just with their traditional enemies embodied in the last remains of Mediterranean

³⁵ AJ, SSRNJ, A-074-078, International cooperation, Reports on cooperation with Greek unions, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-1-710-736, Analysis of drafts concerning financial aid to the KKE interior.

³⁶ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-889, Information about cooperation with KKE interior’s central committee.

³⁷ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-526-565, Conversations with Italian Communists about the situation in Greece and Spain.

³⁸ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-860-868, Reports on meetings held with the leadership of the KKE interior.

³⁹ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/I-147-155, Reports on the political and social situation in Spain.

⁴⁰ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/I-138, Recorded conversations with PCE party leadership.

fascists, but also with the parties of New Left, Soviet-inclined Bolsheviks, 'and all sorts of other extremists calling themselves worker's movements.'⁴¹

However, it is important to note that, unlike in Greece, the Yugoslav and Italian Communists supported possible negotiations in Spain about overcoming disagreements and developing cooperation between Eurocommunists and the more radical renegades that had formed their own organization after the split in the Spanish Communist Party.⁴² A document from the LCY Department for International Relations openly stated that from the standpoint of the LCY and the PCI's common interests, further development of cooperation between Carrillo's Eurocommunist PCE and Lister's Spanish Communist Workers' Party could be safely viewed as being beneficial. This was further expanded upon by a prediction that there was no possible future scenario in which the Soviet Communist Party would regain its influence over the Spanish Communists through General Enrique Lister and his closest associates as it had with the exterior Greek party, and thus a potential coalition or even a merger of the two former PCE factions would only serve to further strengthen the Spanish party's political position and influence in domestic politics and in the increasingly complex sphere of relations between European Marxist parties.⁴³

3. A Time of Enthusiasm: The PCI's Success in the Italian Elections and the French Communist Party's Historic Congress

When examining the common policies that Yugoslav and Italian Communists established regarding the Greek and Spanish parties after their leaderships returned from exile, we found that, in addition to protecting Eurocommunist factions within the Greek and Spanish Communist Parties from a possible renewal of Soviet influence, the LCY and the PCI expected the Greek and Spanish Communists to soon become valuable partners in their planned political initiatives.⁴⁴ These international initiatives, some of which had been launched during previous years, were supposed to include Marxist parties from Europe and around the world whose party ideologies had been derived from the values and ideas of democratic socialism and who had reformed their political practices in a similar manner to the LCY and PCI's reformist models.⁴⁵ Numerous recorded conversations between Yugoslav and Italian Communists show that the leading parties of an informal group that was already being labeled by the press and many contemporaries as a reformist bloc of European Marxist parties, were also counting on the Greek and Spanish Communist Parties to either return to the prominent political positions they had held before their civil wars or even surpass their previous influence. This would demonstrate the potential political benefits of adopting reformist policies to the European far-left parties that still maintained strong ties with the

⁴¹ AJ, KPR, I-3-a/110-18, Information about the visit of Santiago Carrillo, General Secretary of the PCE.

⁴² AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/I-143, Briefing about a meeting between S. Dolanc and A. Anna, a member of the PCE.

⁴³ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/I-144, Materials for the preparation of the LCY delegation for a meeting with Santiago Carrillo.

⁴⁴ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-526-565, Conversations with the Italian Communists about the situation in Greece and Spain.

⁴⁵ AJ, SSRNJ, A-074-078, International cooperation, Reports on Mediterranean conferences.

Soviet party and were continuing to uphold the principles of the Bolshevik socialist model.⁴⁶

To the same end, in conversations with their Yugoslav counterparts during the last months of 1975, the Italian Communists emphasized the importance of their own anticipated success in the upcoming Italian elections in 1976, and they claimed the perception of the PCI's growing popularity in Italy was already influencing minor Marxist parties and movements in Europe to adopt reforms similar to those adopted by Eurocommunist parties.⁴⁷ The PCI's popularity had previously been on the decline after the Red Spring (*primavera rossa*) of Europe (1946–1949) and during the years of forming the welfare state in Italy and creating an 'Italian economic miracle.' According to later studies, after splitting from the Soviet party in 1968 and subsequently adopting Eurocommunist reforms in 1969, the PCI's popularity steadily increased from one election to the next. The election of 1976 was considered crucial for proving that the political crises of the last decade of the welfare state in Europe had not had a significant effect on the rise of the PCI, the first Eurocommunist party in Europe.⁴⁸

Members of the Yugoslav party leadership claimed that even minor gains for the PCI over previous elections would greatly improve the image of all European reformist parties and movements on the far left, especially with periods of political crisis, the economic consequences of the 1973 oil shock, and an increasing number of terrorist attacks by right- and left-wing extremists in Europe.⁴⁹ During private conversations with Josip Broz Tito, Enrico Berlinguer said that anticipated successes in the local and parliamentary elections in Italy would not only help the LCY and PCI's plans to expand their influence among the Soviet-controlled European far left, but would also strengthen his own power base within the PCI. This would demonstrate that the PCI's program of political compromise with the Italian Socialists and the ruling Christian Democrats, the so-called historic compromise, was justified. This would then allow the Italian Communists to further expand this policy, which had been implemented to create a position from which the PCI could influence Italian national politics.⁵⁰

Through reports received from PCI party offices and through their contacts with the Italian Socialists and the Christian Democrats, the Yugoslav Communists were well informed about the plans Prime Minister Aldo Moro's plans to expand cooperation with the Italian Communists in an attempt to quell the political turmoil within state institutions and to suppress far-right and far-left terrorist groups who were constantly fighting in the streets with each other and the Italian police.⁵¹ Some reports from LCY party offices suggest that the Yugoslav party leadership found it very probable that with this new strategy of historic

⁴⁶ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/1-52-81, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/1-392-426, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/1-210-255, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/1-712-779, Information about the development of cooperation between the LCY and the PCI, PCF, PCE and KKE.

⁴⁷ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/1-426-513, Reports on the development of PCI attitudes toward other European Marxist parties.

⁴⁸ Pons 2001: 3–27; Macdonald 1996: 152–188; Weller and Sant'Ana 2019: 2–30; Obinger and Schmitt 2011: 246–270; Petersen and Mioni 2022: 43–59; Daniel 1964: 594–606.

⁴⁹ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/1-522-536, Recorded conversations with the PCI leadership.

⁵⁰ AJ, KPR, 1-3-a/46-61, AJ, KPR, 1-3-a/46-62, AJ, KPR, 1-3-a/46-64, Reports on the visits of PCI General Secretary, Enrico Berlinguer, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/1-602-618, Information on cooperation with the PCI.

⁵¹ AJ, SSRNJ, A-074-078, International cooperation, Reports about cooperation with worker's parties and unions in Italy, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/1-426-513, Reports on PCI attitudes toward other European Marxist parties.

compromise, future Italian governments would be formed by the Socialists and Christian Democrats, with the PCI serving as a cooperative power behind the official government helping to stabilize the country and, in turn, gain political concessions that would allow the PCI to influence events in ways that would allow welfare state policies and the rights of labor unions to expand. This would also allow for increased PCI influence and for the Italian society and the state to gradually evolve into a new form of socialism.⁵² In previous years, Yugoslav Communists had often served as mediators during meetings and disputes between the Italian Communists and Socialists and among powerful Italian labor unions, which were under influence of the two biggest parties on the Italian left. Aldo Moro administration also announced plans to deepen the already close relations between Italy and Yugoslavia, so the LCY and the unions began organizing various discussion groups, seminars, and joint visits to Yugoslavia by Italian Communists and Christian Democrats.⁵³

At a meeting of LCY and PCI delegations in 1975, Josip Broz Tito and Enrico Berlinguer both openly predicted that Aldo Moro and his compromise faction of Christian Democrats would be very pleased if the PCI achieved certain successes in the upcoming 1976 elections, since this would indicate that the moderate Socialists (with whom Moro, according to his own account, often found harder to come to an agreement during negotiations on policy and division of power than with the PCI about cooperation) and the more radical far-left parties in Italy were losing popularity, and their supporters were joining the Eurocommunists. This public demonstration of the PCI's growing influence also served as a strong argument for those Christian Democrats looking to expand unofficially established agreements within the concept of historical compromise and integrate certain aspects of it into the new government's official policy.⁵⁴ When the 1976 elections were over and it became widely known that the PCI had achieved astonishing success in local and parliamentary elections, Josip Broz Tito congratulated Enrico Berlinguer, calling him the 'future president of Italy' and the declaring the PCI 'a substantial part of the future government in all but name.' He also openly predicted that with further expansion of welfare state policies and other aspects of the historic compromise, under Moro and Berlinguer's informal governance Italy would become the first socialist state in the Western Bloc through a natural evolution of social reality and a balance of political power.⁵⁵

A possible consequence of the PCI's success in the Italian elections noticed by contemporary writers of many articles in the French, Italian, and Yugoslav presses, was a noticeable change in the PCF terminology used to describe recent changes in the party ideology, which had been under development for years but was not formalized until PCF's 22nd Congress held near Paris in February 1976.⁵⁶ Only a few weeks after the Italian elections, the LCY's Department for International Relations stressed its assessment that Georges Marchais and the PCF leadership had started using the term Eurocommunism in

⁵² AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-549, Analysis of conversations between Stane Dolanc and Enrico Berlinguer.

⁵³ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-392-426, Information about cooperation between the LCY and PCI.

⁵⁴ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-550, Analysis of a conversation between LCY member Alexander Gličko and member of CK PCI Giancarlo Pajetta, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-551, Reports on meetings between S. Dolanc and G. Pajetta.

⁵⁵ AJ, KPR, I-2/68, Berlin Conference of 1976, Reports on meetings with the PCI leadership in Berlin.

⁵⁶ AJ, SSRNJ, A-074-078, International cooperation, Reports about cooperation with worker's parties and unions in France, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-315, Reports from the LCY delegation present at the PCF's 20th Congress.

public to describe their party ideology much more often than they had even just a few months earlier. At the end of the summer, the French Communists shocked their Yugoslav and Italian counterparts by openly admitting the PCF leadership had recently often encouraged the use of the term Eurocommunism, which they considered to be 'attractive to the general public' and 'politically expedient.' Only a few weeks after the elections in Italy, the French party leadership stated that one of the PCF's primary goals was to further expand the reforms adopted earlier that year, and to actively engage in many international initiatives by European Marxist parties organized by the PCI and funded by the LCY.⁵⁷

Yugoslav diplomatic representatives in France later concluded that the only result of the PCF's 22nd Congress was the formal adoption of reforms that had already been implemented. The congress was immediately dubbed 'historic' by the contemporary press as a reference to the PCI's historic 12th Congress in Bologna in 1969, during which the Italian party outlined the principles of what was then called the Italian road to democratic socialism and later Eurocommunism.⁵⁸ During meetings held in Berlin in 1976, the LCY and PCI delegations concluded that there had been no important developments in PCF policies after the French Communists' 'historic' congress. However, the same could not be said for the new reforms the PCF adopted after the Italian elections, and especially those related to the planned expansion of cooperation between the PCF and other parties on the European far left.⁵⁹ For years, French Communists had been slowly increasing their participation in international initiatives launched by political parties claiming their ideology had stemmed from the fundamental ideas and values of democratic socialism; but until the summer of 1976, French party leadership had been rather reluctant to join initiatives launched by the leading reformist parties (the PCI and the LCY) that had not received support from the Soviet Communist Party and other Eastern Bloc parties.⁶⁰ However, the significant shift in PCF policies, which became apparent to the PCI and LCY party leaderships after the Italian election, and the minor changes in terminology the French Communists used during their public addresses, were about to take a much more radical turn after the events surrounding the 1976 conference of European communist parties in Berlin.⁶¹

4. The Berlin Conference and the Downfall of Soviet Hegemony

Even before its opening ceremony, the Berlin conference of 1976 researchers in the humanities and social sciences were already describing it.⁶² After the turbulent events that had marked the end of the 1970s—the student protests, the formation of the New Left, the Czechoslovakian crisis, and demonstrations against the war in Vietnam—numerous leftist parties and movements all around the world started demanding the Soviet party organize an international conference to serve as a forum for discussion about the future of global socialism. An analysis of archival sources indicates the political crisis of the early 1970s

⁵⁷ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-312-327, Information on changing attitudes and cooperation with the PCF.

⁵⁸ DA, SSIP, France, year 1980, F-41, Reports on the PCF's activities and meetings with the PCF leadership.

⁵⁹ AJ, KPR, I-2/68, Berlin Conference of 1976, Reports on meetings with the PCI leadership in Berlin.

⁶⁰ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-312-327, Information about changing attitudes and cooperation with the PCF.

⁶¹ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-317, Analyses of reports on a meeting between the LCY and PCF delegations.

⁶² Popov 1976: 387–992; McGregor 1978: 339–360; Osadczuk-Korab 1976: 178–193.

and the later consequences of the oil shock were factors that strengthened the resolve of various communist and socialist parties, who began pushing back against Soviet resistance to holding a conference for the international labor movement. One of their primary demands for the conference was to consider adapting old party ideologies, or even creating ones, that would align with shifting social and economic circumstances.⁶³ At the beginning of the *détente*, the Soviet party finally agreed to organize an international conference to address the growing concerns of various leftist parties and movements and to try to formulate universal principles to be followed by individual Marxist parties when adjusting their policies and party ideologies to the unique circumstances of their respective countries.⁶⁴

For the leaderships of Eurocommunist parties, this meant that their current approaches to defining party policies would be questioned and debated at this conference, which would be organized by the Soviet party and hosted by another communist party from the Eastern Bloc. There were several possible scenarios for how this could play out, with the two most extreme being either the collective condemnation of Mediterranean communist parties by the majority of left-wing parties throughout the world, or the final Soviet recognition of Eurocommunist reforms. The latter option could possibly lead to reconciliation between the communist parties in the Western bloc and their Eastern counterparts. Within the Eurocommunist parties themselves, it could also lead to reconciliation between the reformist factions and the more conservative Mediterranean communists, who still remained convinced of the universal character of the Bolshevik socialist model's defining principles.⁶⁵ However, as welfare policies in Western Europe entered their last decade, debates were already raging around the world concerning the organization and expected outcomes of the new labor movement conference. As a result, the Yugoslav and Italian Communists concluded that a collective condemnation of Eurocommunist reforms and a consequential deepening of the 1968–1969 split with the Eastern Bloc parties was the most likely outcome.⁶⁶

In the first months of 1974, at the beginning of a period that would see the greatest expansions of Eurocommunist influence thus far, the Soviet party announced that the long-anticipated international conference of Marxist parties would be held in East Berlin, and it instructed the East German party to create a work group comprised of representatives from all of the participating political parties to determine topics for discussion and the goals of the conference. Over the next two years, a revolving door of representatives and delegations of communist and socialist parties held long and passionate discussions in Berlin about various issues related to the conference. Possibly none of these were as important and fiercely debated as how individual leftist parties would reform their policies and ideologies according to new circumstances.⁶⁷ Together, the representatives of the LCY and the PCI

⁶³ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/1-52-81, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/1-392-426, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/1-210-255, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/1-712-779, Information about the development of cooperation between the LCY and the PCI, PCF, PCE and KKE.

⁶⁴ AJ, KPR, I-2/68, Berlin Conference of 1976, Materials for preparation of LCY delegation for Berlin Conference.

⁶⁵ AJ, SSRNJ, A-074-078, International cooperation, Reports about cooperation with worker's parties and unions in Italy, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/1-522-536, Recorded conversations with the PCI leadership.

⁶⁶ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/1-426-513, Reports on PCI attitudes toward other European Marxist parties.

⁶⁷ AJ, KPR, I-2/68, Berlin Conference of 1976, Materials for preparing the LCY delegation for the Berlin Conference.

were the most radical in their demands that the Soviet party not only officially recognize the other communist parties' right to independently change their political practices and ideology, but also promise to change the way it shaped the direction of dominant Marxist thought within the labor movement's international institutions.⁶⁸ The Yugoslav and Italian Communists were gradually joined by the PCE, the PCF, and many minor Western European communist and socialist parties, including the Belgian, English, Irish, and Swiss Marxists. The Eastern Bloc parties' position began to change when the reformist Romanian Communists started supporting the Yugoslav delegation's propositions and openly clashing with the most radical anti-reformists from East Germany and Poland.⁶⁹

The Soviet party tried to position itself as an impartial mediator, just as it had eight years earlier during disputes over reforms in Czechoslovakia. Then, it assessed the situation and maintained an image of undeterred power while allowing others to test the resolve of the reformists, until it eventually broke what the Italian Communists called 'the traditional menacing silence that echoes through Kremlin,' and deployed the military to the Czechoslovakian border.⁷⁰ Unfortunately for the Soviet party leadership, this approach was becoming increasingly unsustainable due to rapid political and economic changes shaping the social reality in the mid-1970s and changes in Soviet foreign policy in the early years of the détente. predicted that. Due to increasing pressure on the Soviet government to make a gesture of good will regarding the principles of the détente, in the last months of 1975, the Italian and Yugoslav Communists predicted that the more the Soviets got dragged into complex and exhausting negotiations with the United States, the more amenable they would become to compromise in Berlin. The Soviets, however, would also not want to miss an opportunity to demonstrate to the world how much influence the Soviet party still held over many leftist parties in Western Bloc countries.⁷¹ It is difficult to assess the impact events such as the KKE and PCE leaderships returning from exile, formal changes to PCF party ideology, or the PCI's success in the Italian elections may have had on the Soviet party's decision to open up talks about possible compromises with Eurocommunist parties and the LCY, which was also rapidly expanding its international influence.⁷² An analysis of archival sources indicates that many contemporary observers from Yugoslavia and Italy believed these events had ushered in what they referred to as a 'long year' for European democratic socialism and strengthened the Eurocommunist parties and their Yugoslav allies' position in Berlin. This had to some degree influenced the Soviet party's decision to seek compromise amidst growing opposition to its weakening control over the European far left.⁷³

According to reports from LCY party offices, a compromise was reached only a few

⁶⁸ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-550, Analysis of a conversation between LCY member Alexander Gličko and member of CK PCI Giancarlo Pajetta, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-551, Reports on meetings between S. Dolanc and G. Pajetta.

⁶⁹ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-317, Analyses of reports on a meeting between the LCY and PCF delegations.

⁷⁰ AJ, KPR, I-2/68, Berlin Conference of 1976, Materials for preparing the LCY delegation for the Berlin Conference.

⁷¹ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-542-571, Reports about meetings held between members of the LCY and the PCI Departments for International Relations, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-522-536, Recorded conversations with PCI leadership.

⁷² AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/I-110-162, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-426-513, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-779-825, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-255-290, Information about cooperation between the LCY and the PCI, PCF, PCE and KKE.

⁷³ AJ, KPR, I-2/68, Berlin Conference of 1976, Analysis of the LCY delegation's work and achievements. AJ, KPR, I-2/68, Berlin Conference of 1976, Outcomes of the European Worker's party Conference in Berlin.

weeks after the conference's official opening in Berlin in the summer of 1976. It included an informal agreement that the Eurocommunist parties and the Yugoslav Communists would sign a specific part of the conference declaration about the collective willingness among the European leftist parties to uphold the principles of détente; in return, the Soviet party would formally recognize that the Eurocommunist and LCY reforms did not call into question the Marxist spirit of their old and new party ideologies. The Soviet party would also offer support for further reforms of political practices (but not changes in ideology) by individual European Marxist parties that were in line with the unique and rapidly changing social realities in Western Bloc countries.⁷⁴ From a modern-day perspective, this may seem to have been nothing more than a symbolic recognition of an already completed historical process, but the writers of the archival documents analyzed here went to almost unprecedented lengths to emphasize the importance this symbolic recognition had for the LCY and PCI party leaderships and those of their contemporary counterparts from other parties of the European far left.⁷⁵ For the Yugoslav and Italian Communists, this was a historic victory. Some contemporary analysts, however, considered the conference a 'Pyrrhic victory' for Brezhnev, but this was an assessment based on Soviet foreign interests and was outside the context of the long-term process on the European far left.⁷⁶ For the LCY and PCI leaderships, the conclusion of the conference was a symbolic victory that ended over a decade of debate with the Eastern Bloc parties over increased reformist influence on the global left, a testament to their independence from the Soviet party and their growing influence with Marxist parties in Europe and abroad. It was also a major asset for their domestic political propaganda, which would present the success of the reforms as what put the LCY and the Eurocommunist parties in a position from they could successfully negotiate a compromise with the Soviets and other Eastern parties.⁷⁷

5. The Zenith of Yugoslav Influence on the European Far Left and the Road to Insignificance

Even outside the conference rooms in Berlin, Josip Broz Tito and Enrico Berlinguer spent many hours in cordial, confidential conversations about the LCY and PCI's future plans to expand the influence of their informal group, already referred to as the reformist bloc of the Marxist parties, beyond the Mediterranean into the sphere of European politics and the undefined and seemingly borderless yet ever-expanding sphere of the global far left that lay outside the limitations of the labor movement's international institutions.⁷⁸ Upon his return to Yugoslavia, the aging LCY leader enthusiastically issued instructions to party offices and Yugoslav state institutions to consider what future actions could be taken to help

⁷⁴ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-543-555, Analysis of the correspondence between the institutions of LCY and PCI.

⁷⁵ AJ, SSRNJ, A-074-078, International cooperation, Reports on cooperation with worker's parties and unions in Italy, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-426-513, Reports on PCI attitudes toward other European Marxist parties.

⁷⁶ Osadcuk-Korab 1976:178-193; McGregor 1978: 339-360.

⁷⁷ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/I-110-162, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-426-513, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-779-825, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-255-290, Reports on cooperation between the LCY and the PCI, PCF, PCE and KKE.

⁷⁸ AJ, KPR, I-2/68, Berlin Conference of 1976, Reports from the Yugoslav delegation present in Berlin, AJ, KPR, I-2/68, Berlin Conference of 1976, Analysis of the LCY delegation's work and achievements.

expand cooperation between the Italian and French Communists and the ruling parties in Italy and France, and to organize and finance various ways to bring together Eurocommunists and socialist labor unions across Western Europe.⁷⁹ After returning to Italy, Berlinguer reopened negotiations with Aldo Moro about the PCI's informal participation in the new Italian government. They would be brought even closer together through a new historic compromise between the Communists, Socialists, and Christian Democrats: Welfare state policies would be further expanded in Italy in exchange for Communist support to finally put an end to the revolts by far-right and far-left terrorist organizations and stabilize the political crises in Italy.⁸⁰

Just a few weeks after the Berlin conference, the LCY and PCI delegations met to discuss two main topics: organizing a large political initiative by many major and minor European left-wing parties and movements to strengthen the foundations of the continental welfare state, and organizing discussion forums about expanding cooperation between Eurocommunists and communist or socialist parties in the Middle East, Africa, and South America whose party ideologies had evolved in a similar manner to those used in designing reforms of the Yugoslav socialist model.⁸¹ Through personal contacts with Santiago Carrillo and other members of the PCE leadership, the LCY and PCI were able to initiate negotiations about expanding their individual cooperation with influential communist parties in the Far East, and about the possibility of East Asian parties outside the Soviet sphere of influence taking part in new international Marxist initiatives organized by Eurocommunist parties with support from the LCY.⁸² After almost a decade of developing and stalling, the LCY and PCI's plans to use a Mediterranean conference as a forum for discussions about cooperation between European communist and socialist parties finally came to fruition. In 1977 and 1978 socialist parties and movements from Mediterranean countries took part in conferences organized by the communist parties of Italy, Spain, and France that were substantially financed by the LCY.⁸³

However, contemporaries from this period, which was soon recognized by the Western European press as a time of reformist enthusiasm among the Marxists could not possibly have known that many of the Yugoslav and Italian Communists' ambitious plans would never be realized. After an initial increase in the popularity of PCE and KKE following the return of Spanish and Greek Communists to politics in their respective countries, the number of votes cast for the two prominent and symbolically significant communist parties began to decline, which the Spanish and Greek Communists themselves had predicted as an inevitable outcome of declining fears of right-wing dictatorships regaining power or initiating another civil war.⁸⁴ While the shocking events following the kidnapping and death of Aldo Moro disrupted the unfinished rapprochement between the Italian Communists and the Christian Democrats, the French Communists found themselves

⁷⁹ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-541-554, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-295-313, Information on relations with the PCI and PCF.

⁸⁰ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-549, Analysis of conversations between Stane Dolanc and Enrico Berlinguer.

⁸¹ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-543-555, Analysis of correspondence between the institutions of the LCY and PCI.

⁸² AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/I-109, Information about the visits of PCE General Secretary Santiago Carrillo to North Korea, China, and Japan, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/I-110, Reports on a conversation between J.B. Tito and S. Carrillo.

⁸³ AJ, SSRNJ, A-074-078, International cooperation, Reports on Mediterranean conferences.

⁸⁴ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/I-110-162, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-779-825, Information on cooperation with PCE and KKE.

locked in a bitter rivalry with the Socialist Party faction led by the future president Francois Mitterrand. They were ultimately unable to get past their disagreements with other major leftist parties and exploit the last time in the history of the twentieth century when French politics was dominated by left-wing parties and labor unions.⁸⁵

Lastly, gradual changes in Yugoslav domestic policies managed to cast a shadow over the LCY's role as the creator of an exemplary model for the internal democratization of communist parties, a role that would only expand in the years to come. The first cracks in relations between the Eurocommunist parties and the LCY can be seen at the very zenith of Yugoslav influence over the European far left. Analyses of archival sources indicate that the Yugoslav Communists were somewhat concerned about the sincerity of their relations with Eurocommunists. They were particularly worried about their close friends from the PCI after they were not fully informed about private conversations in Madrid in 1977 between Berlinguer, Marchais, and Carrillo during an official meeting of Eurocommunist leaders.⁸⁶ Even before Tito's death and the beginning of the economic, and later political, crises in Yugoslavia, the Italian Communists were already openly questioning the direction Yugoslav state and party ideology was taking as a result of the events of 1972 and 1974.⁸⁷ In the early 1980s, a new generation of Italian and Spanish reformists began criticizing Berlinguer and Carrillo for maintaining close ties with the Yugoslav party leadership, which was increasingly being seen as not being sufficiently reformed, democratic, or decentralized and was thus stagnating in comparison to the Eurocommunist parties. Finally, when Tito's successors declared their support for the French party's decision to end Eurocommunist reform, the Italian, Spanish, and Greek Communists began referring to the Yugoslav party-the same party that had created their former ideals for reformist policies and the democratic socialist model-as a Marxist party of the Eastern Bloc outside the Iron Curtain.⁸⁸

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⁸⁵ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-633-688, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-339-356, Information about the meetings and correspondence with the party institutions of PCI and PCF.

⁸⁶ AJ, SKJ, Ideological commission, II/2-b-(244-252), Materials from the session of the federal Ideological Commission regarding the worker's movements in Europe, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-543-555, Analysis of correspondence between the institutions of the LCY and PCI.

⁸⁷ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-513-626, Reports on the development of cooperation with the PCI.

⁸⁸ AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/I-110-162, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-779-825, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-633-688, Information on cooperation with PCI, PCE and KKE.

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**ЈУГОСЛАВИЈА И ЕВРОКОМУНИСТИЧКЕ ПАРТИЈЕ
ТОКОМ “ДУГЕ ГОДИНЕ” ЕВРОПског ДЕМОКРАТСКОГ СОЦИЈАЛИЗМА
(1974–1976)**

Резиме

Други процеси проширивања сарадње Савеза комуниста Југославије и комунистичких партија Италије, Шпаније и Грчке значајно су убрзани током оних догађаја у земљама Западне Европе који су обележили време које ће касније бити означено као “дуга година” демократског социјализма у Европи. Од 1974. па до 1976. године, дошло је до завршетка више од пола века дугог циклуса успона и падова војних диктатура и режима крајње деснице на Медитерану, што је омогућило повратак комуниста на политичке позорнице Шпаније и Грчке, до великих изборних успеха и јачања политичке позиције Комунистичке партије Италије, која је убрзо ступила у преговоре са демохришћанском струјом Алда Мора о неформалном учешћу у раду будуће владе, као и до званичне промене партијске идеологије Комунистичке партије Француске на XX Конгресу француских комуниста, на коме се француска партија коначно определила за еврокомунизам. Сви ови догађаји дешавали су се у време брзог смењивања зближавања и сукоба комунистичких партија Источног и Западног блока, и током дебата вођених у Берлину између представника реформистичких и конзервативних партија које су обележиле двогодишње припреме за одржавање велике Конференције радничких партија Европе 1976. године. Југословенска партија подржавала је еврокомунисте током сукоба са партијама Источног блока, пружала финансијску и друге врсте помоћи грчким и шпанским комунистима у земљи и у емиграцији, посредовала у преговорима између италијанских социјалиста, комуниста и демохришћана, као и између француских комуниста и социјалиста. Заједно са Комунистичком партијом Италије, Савез комуниста Југославије учествовао је у организацији различитих форми окупљања и планирању заједничких политичких иницијатива све бројнијих партија крајње европске левнице које су своју идеологију дефинисале следећи принципе демократског социјализма и које су напустиле покушаје прилагођавања болшевичког социјалистичког модела локалним историјским и друштвеним посебностима. Наведене активности југословенских комуниста допринеле су проширивању утицаја Савеза комуниста Југославије у сфери односа партија крајње европске левнице, па је југословенска партија достигла зенит свог утицаја како на европској левници тако и у институцијама Међународног радничког покрета, који ће непосредно претходити удаљавању СКЈ од еврокомунистичких партија.

Кључне речи: Еврокомунизам, демократски социјализам, држава благодестања, Хладни рат, Савез комуниста Југославије, Јосип Броз Тито, Енрико Берлингуер.