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MENTIONS OF THE DANUBE IN THE POETRY OF CLAUDIUS CLAUDIANUS

Abstract: Claudian (Claudius Claudianus fl. 395 CE–404 CE) was a late antique poet from the Hellenised East, who rose to fame as the court poet for the western Roman emperor Honorius (393–423). He came to Rome around 395 CE, and there he began using his talent as a classically trained poet to write panegyrics for wealthy and influential aristocrats and politicians. Claudian is considered one of the best authors of late Roman literature, even though he directed his talents toward propaganda primarily celebrating the well-known military commander Stilicho and writing invectives against Stilicho's enemies at the court of the eastern Roman emperor Arcadius (395–408). Claudian's poetry is one of the most valuable sources for the history of this period. In his rich poetic images, he mentions many toponyms, oronyms, and hydronyms, and his knowledge of Balkan geography seems truly enviable. One of the most frequently mentioned hydronyms in Claudian's poetry are those referring to the river Danube, which he mentions thirty-eight times. In this paper the authors cite and analyse Claudian's references to the Danube as a river that was a very important natural, political, and cultural border for the ancient world.

Keywords: Claudian, *Claudius Claudianus*, Danube, *Ister*, *Danuvius*

1. Introduction and methodological remarks

The late antique poet Claudian (Claudius Claudianus, fl. 395–404),¹ from the old Greco-Roman cultural centre, Alexandria in Egypt, rose to fame as the court poet of the western Roman emperor Honorius (393–423), and more specifically as a propagandist for the de facto ruler of the West, Flavius Stilicho (d. 22 August 408).² In Rome, Claudian chose to write in Latin, despite Greek being his native language. Nevertheless, this innate blend of Hellenic and Roman culture that Claudian possessed, gave him a literary breadth worthy of the classics of ancient literature.³ In his poetics, Claudian merged the literary form of the panegyric with that of the classical Roman epic.⁴ Thus it is hardly surprising that Claudian’s poetry reflected a broad familiarity not just with the physical geography of what was then the known world, but also with the mythological geography, which was almost a muse for ancient poetry, always ready to add a particularly intimate coloration to classical poetry. In Claudian’s rich poetic images one finds a myriad of toponyms, oronyms and hydronyms, and his knowledge of Balkan geography seems truly enviable.⁵ The body of water most frequently mentioned in his poetry, after the Nile of his youth, was the Danube. He mentions it thirty-eight times.⁶

In Claudian’s native language, the name for what is today the Danube had a completely different form, Ἰστρος, which is believed to be of Thracian origin because the Greeks first encountered this river via the Thracians who had settled along its lower right bank.⁷ In Latin, the language Claudian learned during his education and chose for his poetry, the terms *Ister* or *Hister* were used, especially by the poets under the influence of Greek. However, these names only referred to the Danube’s lower course, because until the end of the 1st century BCE, the ancient Greeks and Romans believed the upper and lower courses of the Danube to be two separate rivers. It was not until the time of the Roman conquest of Illyrian lands that they learned that these were, in fact, the same river.⁸ In the West, Roman conquests introduced them to a river known among the Celtic tribes as *Dīnuvius*, which in

¹ There is only indirect or fragmentary information about the dates of Claudian’s birth and death. The first date related to his life that is known for certain is the recital in Rome of the panegyric in honour Western Roman consuls Probinus and Olybrius in 395 (Martindale 1980: 299). Since there is no mention in Claudian’s works of historical events occurring after 404, and in particular Stilicho’s victory over the Gothic leader Radagaisus at Florence in 405, it is assumed that by this point he had already died (Cameron 1970: 390–418; Coombe 2018: 6–9).

² Cameron 1970: 1–2; Kenney, Clausen 1982: 705–707, for propagandistic poetry specifically, see Vukadinović 2020.

³ For Claudian’s life and works, see Kenney, Clausen 1982: 705–712; Martindale 1980: 299–300; Cameron 1970: 1–30, 390–418; Claudian 1963: vii–xxvi.

⁴ Although he seems to have written in a variety of genres—panegyrics, invectives, epics, and epithalamia—all were inferior to his panegyric style. See Coombe 2018: viii; cf. Ware 2012: 1–16; 44–47.

⁵ Vukadinović 2013: 14–28; Id. 2012: 49–66; Id. 2010: 175–177.

⁶ As *Danuuius*, see Claud. (Claudian 1963) 5.27; 8.52, 623; 17.235; 20.583; 21.126; 26.331, 523; 28.228; *Carm. min.* 25.70; as *Hister*, 1.135; 3.184, 308; 7.26, 150; 8.636; 10.277; 15.312; 20.165, 203; 21.215; 22.199, 367; 24.13; 26.81, 170, 337, 489, 569, 603; 28.220, 413, 648; *Carm. min.* 25.127; 50.7.

⁷ There was another name for this river, Ματώας, which originated from the Scythian, but it did not survive in European languages. For the various names for the Danube in antiquity, see *RE* 4.2 under *Danuuius*.

⁸ For references to the Danube by other ancient writers, see Boškov 2006; Obradović 2008; Šašel Kos 2010; Obradović 2015; Mihajlović 2018.

Latin became *Danuvius*.⁹ By Claudian's time, two names had been established: *Danuvius* (*Danubius* in Late Latin) for the upper course and *Ister* for the lower course between the Iron Gate, downriver from Singidunum, and the Black Sea. Over time, the former became the predominant name. Claudian made no distinction between the two names historically or geographically, instead subordinating the geographical framework to the needs of his poetry and often using both names for the same stretch of river within a single verse.¹⁰

When analysing Claudian's references to the river, it is necessary to refer to some theoretical and methodological principles that we will follow here. First is the view that physical geography and human geography have different ways of defining space:¹¹ the former deals with physical space as a constitutive element of every object in nature, while the latter defines space conceptually, in the sense that space exists because of the objects within it and depends on their interrelations. From the standpoint of humanistic geography, a particular river is understood first and foremost as a historically—and therefore culturally and politically—dependent term that is dynamic due to the relationship that humans define in connection to a particular space at a particular time.¹² For someone from the ancient world, the Danube was not only a water barrier or a waterway, but also a cultural and political border whose definition varied depending on the historical period in question.¹³ So when the ancient Greeks were first becoming aware of the contours of this gigantic European waterway, the Ἰστρος delineated the boundary between the known world and the mythological (as in Hes. *Theog.* 339). Perhaps the Hellenic etiological myth of the origins of the Illyrians, as preserved by Appian (*App. Ill.* 1.2), best portrays the Greco-Illyrian perception of ethnographic and geographic factors in the western Balkans that originated from the social relations among the peoples living in this area. According to this myth, the Illyrians speak of being the descendants of Illyrius, a son of the cyclops Polyphemus and his wife Galatea, who also had two other sons, Celtus and Galas. Illyrius had six sons, Encheleus, Autarieus, Dardanus, Maedus, Taulas, and Perraebus, and three daughters, Partho, Daortho, and Dassaro, from whom the tribes of the Enchelees, Autariatae, Dardani, Partheni, Dassaretii, Pannonians, Paeonians, Scordisci, and Triballi descended. This Hellenic myth provides both an ethnographic image of the pre-Roman Balkans and a geographical description, which includes names such as Pannonia that have survived up until today. Therefore, in our analysis of Claudian's use of the Danube, we will also consider the imagological aspect of the river in the Roman perception of it at this particular moment in history.

⁹ The name Danube in contemporary etymology is connected to the PIE root *dā*, meaning *to flow*, according to Pokorny 1959: 175 (= Revised Dictionary 536). The Slavic form *Dunaj* is found in Old Church Slavonic, Slovak, Polish, and Russian, and is a substitute for the Latin group *vi* (as in Ptuj < *Poetovia*), which is preserved in Balkan languages as *Dunav*, according to Skok 1971 *s.v.*

¹⁰ Claud. (Claudian 1963) 8. 623, 636; 20.203. In all three places he is referring to the Lower Danube, but even in the same verse he uses both *Ister* and *Danuvius*.

¹¹ Cox 2021; *cf.* Massey 1999.

¹² For the definition of space in human geography, see Gregory, Urry, 1985; Massey 2005.

¹³ V. Mihajlović also pointed out this valuable approach to examining issues of historical geography when he outlined the starting points for his research into perceptions of and the relationship between the notions of *Danube* and *Scordisci* in ancient thought and practice (Mihajlović 2018). Claudian is often overlooked in the analyses of ancient writers who mention the Danube, and mentions of the Danube are mostly studied in prose writers, and rarely poets. See Boškov 2006: 73–74.

2. Claudian's historical and mythical Danube

By Claudian's time, the Danube had emerged from mythos and solidified its significance in the sphere of Roman political interests as a *limes*,¹⁴ but in literary circles, it still serves the concept of establishing the supremacy that Greco-Roman civilisation wielded over all the spatial beyond it in the realm known as *Barbaricum*. As classically trained poet, Claudian knew well the stylistic value of a powerful waterway as an *ornamenta patriae*¹⁵ when making use of his scholarly talents to write panegyrics for wealthy and influential Roman aristocrats and politicians in the new Christian Rome.

After just a few months in Rome, Claudian had become a friend, and perhaps also a client,¹⁶ of the Anicii, one of the wealthiest and most prominent landowning families in Italy, and also one of the rare senatorial families that had accepted Christianity. Claudian's decision to place himself in the service of a wealthy senatorial (and also Christian) family was clearly a wise one.¹⁷ Theodosius I (379–395) did everything he could to peacefully coax wealthy landowners, most of them followers of the old Roman religion, to become Christians.¹⁸ He appointed two Anicii brothers of the same age as Claudian, Probinus and Olybrius, as consuls for the year 395.¹⁹ Because of their youth, they were hardly possessed of any great virtues or valour, but what had obviously set them apart was that their family had embraced the new faith. As their client and *sodalis* (companion),²⁰ Claudian was given the honour of writing and publicly delivering a panegyric commemorating their consulship. This would be his first public appearance during which he recited his verses in Latin. The panegyric tone and rhetorical elements of Claudian's poetry won over the hearts of the Roman aristocracy.

Claudian was able to place the mythical apparatus of classical poetry in the service of propaganda.²¹ This panegyric shows he was very familiar with the geographic space at the frontier of the Roman Empire. This is illustrated in his account of the emperor Theodosius's victory over the usurper Eugenius, he creates a conversation between the emperor and the goddess Roma, the late antique personification of Rome.²² In Claudian's metaphor, Theodosius vows to Roma that he will defend the borders of the Empire, and therefore mentions the Danube.

¹⁴ Visy 2012: 323–329.

¹⁵ An allusion to the ridicule of Roman ceremonies and rituals and idols as *ornamenta patriae* by the Christian poet Prudentius in his speech against Symmachus (*Prudent. C. Symm.* 1.503–505).

¹⁶ This can be deduced from a humble tone in the poems addressed to the Anicii brothers, Probinus and Olybrius. See *Carm. min.* 40.10 (*Epistula ad Olybrium*); 41.7 (*Ad Probinum*).

¹⁷ There is no scholarly consensus regarding Claudian's religious convictions. However, the prevailing opinion is that he was not a Christian. See Ch. 8 in Cameron 1970; Gnilka 1973: 144–160; Vanderspoel 1986: 244; Vukadinović, Smirnov-Brkić 2014: 59; Vukadinović 2011: 8.

¹⁸ Grünwald 1992: 462–487; Jordán-Montés 1991: 185.

¹⁹ These were the sons of Petronius Probus (c. 328–c. 388), one of the most prominent Roman aristocrats of the time. See Jones, Martindale, Morris 1971: 734–740.

²⁰ *Claud. Carm. min.* 40.1. Cf. Bloch 1963: 211–212.

²¹ For Claudian's poetic imagery, see Nolan 1973; Christiansen 1969.

²² Papadopoulos 2018: 29–33.

Pro te [Roma] quascumque per oras
ibimus et nulla sub tempestate timentes
solstitio Meroen, bruma temptabimus Histrum,

(*Panegyricus dictus Probino
et Olybrius consulibus* 133–135)

For you [Roma], across any land
we will go fearing no season,
in the heat of summer Meroë we will reach,²³
at the peak of winter the Danube.²⁴

In several places Claudian uses certain geographical contrasts to express boundaries or efforts,²⁵ such as *Meroen – Histrum*, which is immediately followed by *solstitio – bruma*, which guides the listener through a contrast between the inhospitable north and the tame south, the foreign and the Mediterranean world.

The success of this panegyric for the Anicii must certainly have helped bring him closer to the emperor Theodosius. Most likely, Probinus and Olybrius recommended him to someone from the imperial court, and perhaps to Stilicho himself,²⁶ but Theodosius died suddenly on 17 January 395. He left the Eastern Roman Empire to his older son, Arcadius, and the Western to the still-underage Honorius and his guardian, Stilicho, the supreme military commander of both empires. As Honorius's regent, Stilicho was essentially the lord of the Western Empire from 395 to 408, and he would come to dominate Claudian's poetry almost as the primary motif of all his propagandistic works.

The Praetorian prefect in the East, Rufinus (*Flavius Rufinus*, d. 395), quickly responded to the hasty decision that had given Stilicho authority over both parts of the Empire and declared himself Arcadius's regent. Rufinus thus became a leading figure in the East, with the emperor Arcadius little more than his puppet.²⁷ Rufinus is described in the sources as being a man of bad character, and which had earned him numerous enemies. Among those in the East was Eutropius, a high-ranking court official, and among his more serious rivals in the West was Stilicho. Claudian's first foray into adding invectives to his propaganda was directed at Rufinus (in two books, 395–397²⁸) and exalted Stilicho's moral and military superiority in defence of the Empire against recent attacks by Alaric's forces in Thessaly.²⁹ In the invective against Rufinus, he also mentions the Danube, but in two different ways. Being a classically trained poet, in the first reference, he reaches for a mythological landscape to make a symbolic reference to Rufinus's insatiability and relentless desire for gold (*In Ruf.* I 183–187).³⁰ In this allegory, the old Nereus drinks water from the largest streams to maintain a measure of balance for the world's waters. Here

²³ An island and ancient city on the Nile.

²⁴ We have used our own translations from Latin rather than those published by classical scholars. Our translations, which are more literal than literary, better serve the purpose of this paper. Our literary translations adhering to Latin prosody will be published in Serbian in a forthcoming publication.

²⁵ Cf. Claud. (Claudian 1963) 3.183–185.

²⁶ For Stilicho's rise in the West, see *Flavius Stilicho* V. Bury 1923: 106; *SAN* 13: 110–117; Jones, Martindale, Morris 1971: 853–858.

²⁷ Cameron 1970: 63; Nolan 1973: 21; Dilke 1969: 3–5.

²⁸ The chronology of Claudian's works is according to Coombe 2018.

²⁹ Dilke 1969: 5.

³⁰ Claud. (Claudian 1963) 3.183–187.

Claudian compares the Danube and the Nile and draws parallels between the swollen waters of former with the sevenfold mouth of the latter (*undantem Histrum – septeno gurgite Nilum*), again alluding to frontiers, in this case both moral and geographical.

ac velut innumeros amnes accedere Nereus
nescit et undantem quamvis hinc hauriat Histrum,
hinc bibat aestivum septeno gurgite Nilum,
par semper similisque manet. sic fluctibus auri
expleri calor ille nequit.

(*In Rufinum I* 183-187)

Though Nereus cannot stop countless rivers
draining there the swollen Danube,
drinking here the summer Nile with its sevenfold mouth,
yet he always remains the same. But all the rivers of gold
the thirst of this one [Rufinus] cannot quench.

Claudian liked to compare these rivers, the Nile and the Danube, and the following antithesis appears in the panegyric to Manlius Theodorus (399):³¹

lene fluit Nilus, sed cunctis amnibus extat
utilior nullo confessus murmure vires;
acrior ac rapidus tacitas praetermeat ingens
Danuvius ripas.

(*Panegyricus Mallii Theodori* 232–235)³²

Lazily flows the Nile, seemingly of all the rivers
the most benign, for not a single sound reveals its strength;
Swiftly and more speedily along its peaceful banks
flows the giant Danube.

In another context within the same work written against Rufinus, Claudian touches on historical facts related to the great uprising of the Goths in Thrace under Alaric I, when Rufinus, despite being able to surround and destroy them, allowed them to venture into the Western Empire and ravage Stilicho's lands. At the end of that same year, he was killed during a mutiny in which some historians believe Eutropius was involved.³³

Sic avidus praedo iam non per singula saevit.
sed sceptris inferre minas omnique perempto
milite Romanas ardet prosternere vires,
iamque Getas Histrumque movet Scythiamque receptat
auxilio traditque suas hostilibus armis
reliquias.

(*In Rufinum I* 305–310)

And like a greedy robber, he does not rage alone,
instead he hurls his threats against the sceptre, in every way
depriving the army and burning the Roman forces,

³¹ Jones, Martindale, Morris 1971: 900–902.

³² Most editions record the name in the title as *Manlii*, but Jones, Martindale, Morris 1971: 901 use *Mallius Theodorus*.

³³ Cameron 1970: 63; Nolan 1973: 21.

he pushes the Getae to the Danube, recovers Scythia
and sends in aid to enemy army
his remnants.

In another place, again, in an invective against Rufinus, Claudian uses a technique that combines mythical and historical landscapes. He mentions the Danube and the consequences of the barbarians moving against Rome when, as Claudian describes, Aeolus released the storm winds and freed nations, clearing the way for war, so that some of the barbarians then stormed across the frozen Danube. This was a depiction of real historical events—long known to the Romans—related to how the barbarians crossed the Danube.³⁴

Haec fatus, ventis veluti si frena resolvat
Aeolus, abrupto gentes sic obice fudit
laxavitque viam bellis et, nequa maneret
inmunis regio, cladem divisit in orbem
disposuitque nefas. Alii per terga ferocis
Danuvii solidata ruunt expertaque remos
frangunt stagna rotis;

(*In Rufinum II* 22–28)

As it were, when Aeolus released the stormy winds,
freeing the savages by unshackling them,
and the gates of war were opened, leaving no
safe ground, but world divided by the spreading evil.
Some stormed over the frozen back of the wild
Danube rending by wheels
what should have been rent by oars.

After the invective against Rufinus, in 399 Claudian wrote verses criticising Eutropium (*In Eutropium*), a former dignitary of the emperor Theodosius I in Constantinople, who had fallen from grace as a result of his intrigues against the throne, became a significant political rival.³⁵ Claudian mentions the Danube three times in this work. Here, he uses oronyms and hydronyms as metaphors for the court's political climate and Eutropius's military blunder that caused damage to the Empire.

Responsat Athos Haemusque remugit;
ingeminat raucum Rhodope concussa fragorem.
cornua cana gelu mirantibus extulit undis
Hebrus et exanguem glacie timor adligat Histrum.

(*In Eutropium II* 162–165)

Athos answers, and the Balkan Mountains echo;
Again the trembling Rhodopes create a loud uproar.
The Maritza, the marvellous water, raises horns of ice,
fear chains the Danube.

³⁴ Claud. (Claudian 1963) 5.27. Cf. 20.583, where there is also an allusion to the barbarians crossing the Danube.

³⁵ Claudian's works are one of the most important historical sources of information about the life of Eutropius (Martindale 1980: 440–444; Long 1996: 15).

Me nimium timido, nimium iunxere remisso
fata viro, totum qui degener exuit Histrum,
qui refugit patriae ritus, quem detinet aequi
gloria concessoque cupit vixisse colonus
quam dominus rapto.

(In *Eutropium II* 204–202)

Fate has again tied me to an overly timid, overly unworthy man,
the degenerate that stripped the entire Danube,
who abandoned the rites of the fatherland, whom the glory prevents
to live as a retired farmer, but as a lord through plunder.

In the short historical epic, *De bello Gildonico* (398), Claudian sings of Gildo,³⁶ a Berber general from the province of Mauritania. Gildo had revolted against the emperor Honorius and the Western Roman Empire. In one place, Claudian mentions the Danube, around which the belligerent barbarian tribes were concentrated. Here, the poet wonders:

debueras etiam fraternis obvius ire
hostibus, ille tuis. quae gens, quis Rhenus et Hister
vos opibus iunctos conspirantesque tulisset?

(*De bello Gildonico* 311–313)

You ought to meet with your brotherly foes,
and they with you, and which nation or the combined forces of the Rhine and the Danube
could stand in alliance against you?

In these examples it becomes clear that Claudian primarily mentions the Danube in poems with political themes written to openly praise or reproach the historical figures of his time, as is evident in those written in honour of the consuls Probinus and Olybrius (consuls in 395) or the Roman politician Malius Theodorus (399), and especially in the invectives against Rufinus and Eutropius. The river Danube is not an object of Claudian's inspiration, contrary to the Nile of his youth, to which he dedicated a shorter poem.³⁷ The Danube in Claudian is rather a hydronym he frequently uses to complete a geostrategic and geopolitical image of the late Roman Empire. This becomes even more apparent in verses explicitly glorifying the deeds and persona of his patron, Stilicho.

3. Claudian's 'political' Danube

Claudian primarily mentions the Danube in his works of political propaganda (*Panegyricus dictus Probino et Olybrius consulibus*, *Panegyricus Mallii Theodori*, *In Rufinum*, *In Eutropium*, *De bello Gildonico*, *De bello Gothico*, *Panegyricus de tertio consulatu Honorii Augusti*, *Panegyricus de quarto consulatu Honorii Augusti*, *Panegyricus de sexto consulatu Honorii Augusti*, *De consulatu Stilichonis*, *Epithalamium de nuptiis Honorii Augusti*). Of these, the frequent use of the Danube hydronym appears in an epithalamium for the wedding of the emperor Honorius (398), panegyrics honouring the emperor Honorius's consulships (third

³⁶ Jones, Martindale, Morris 1971: 396.

³⁷ Claud. *Carm. min.* 28 (47).

consulate, 396; fourth consulate, 398; sixth consulate, 404),³⁸ panegyrics in honour of Stilicho's consulate (400),³⁹ and most frequently in his historical epic *De bello Gothico*.⁴⁰ In all of these works, Claudian's primary motif is the glorification of Stilicho, which takes on epic proportions and often crosses into the realm of the divine with a selection of allusions to the Roman past and Roman values. Accordingly, he makes use of archaisms—classical vocabulary and syntax, mythical and historical landscapes—which were most certainly characteristic of late Roman panegyrics.⁴¹ In Claudian's works, historical facts are always subordinated to poetic motifs such as, for example, the intentional omission of Stilicho's origins. This was because his “semi-barbaric”⁴² protector and the true leader of not just the army but also the Empire needed to legitimise his social status among the western Roman aristocracy through Claudian's poetry.⁴³ Nevertheless, in Late Antiquity, when the barbarisation and Christianisation of Roman society was already well underway, the idea of Rome and what Rome represented (often identified in the current literature with the word *Romanitas*, coined by Tertullian⁴⁴) was a universally inherited good, available to all who were willing to accept the laws and institutions that were *fundamenta libertatis* (Amm. 14.6.5). Thus, in Claudian, the known world under Roman leadership became *gens una* (*De Consulatu Stilichonis* III 160). The earlier formulation of Hellenic and Roman identities and self-image required more demanding cultural imperatives such as linguistic and religious factors.⁴⁵ Claudian's *dea Roma*, who personifies the Romans' view of themselves in relation to the “Others,” is a benevolent goddess who accepts conquered peoples as a mother (*mater*) rather than a mistress (*domina*) and protects the *humanum genus*.⁴⁶

In an epithalamium sung in honour of the emperor Honorius's wedding to Stilicho's daughter Maria, Claudian glorifies the future empress in bravura verse, which Roberts refers to as an elevated “jeweled style”⁴⁷ by listing the rivers that will bow to her (the Rhine, Elbe, and Danube), again alluding to the Roman Empire's idealised geopolitical space:⁴⁸

³⁸ Claud. (Claudian 1963) 7.25, 150; 8.52, 623, 636; 28.220, 228, 413, 648.

³⁹ Claud. (Claudian 1963) 21.126, 215; 22.199, 367; *De consulatu Stilichonis* is in three books, and a shorter poem, *Ad Stilichonem*, is dedicated to Stilicho.

⁴⁰ Claud. (Claudian 1963) 26.81, 170, 331, 337, 489, 523, 569, 603.

⁴¹ Nathan 2015: 11–13; cf. Barnes 2005: 543; Nixon, Rodgers 1994: 11.

⁴² The epithet *semibarbarus* appears in Jerome's writings (Jer. *Ep.* 123:17). Stilicho was most likely the son of a Vandal military commander in service to Rome and a Roman woman (Jones, Martindale, Morris 1971: 853).

⁴³ By the end of the 3rd century, the presence of foreigners in the emperor's service had become commonplace in the West, and particularly in Italy, but the senatorial aristocracy held out the longest in resisting barbarization. See Schlinkert 1996; for the importance of self-representation among the Late Roman senatorial class, see Niquet 2000: 111–226.

⁴⁴ *De Pallio* 4.1. For the definition of the term *Romanitas*, see Papadopoulos 2018: 19–21.

⁴⁵ Papadopoulos claims that Christianisation contributed to the deconstruction of the traditional perception of *Romanitas* and that the example of Symmachus and the struggle with the court for the altar of Victoria was indicative of this transition (Papadopoulos 2018: 110–137).

⁴⁶ haec est in gremium victos quae sola receipt
humanumque genus communi nomine fovit
matris, non dominae ritu, civesque vocavit
quos domuit nexuque pio longinqua revinxit
(*De Cons. Style* III. 151–155 [Claudian 1963: 24.151–155]).

⁴⁷ Roberts 1989: 30.

⁴⁸ Claud. (Claudian 1963) 10.277.

iam te venerabitur Hister;
nomen adorabunt populi; iam Rhenus et Albis
serviet; in medios ibis regina Sygambros.
quid numerem gentes Atlanteosque recessus
Oceani? toto pariter donabere mundo.'

(*Epithalamium de nuptiis Honorii Augusti* 277–281)

The Danube will kneel before you;
all peoples will adore your name.
Now the Rhine and the Elbe shall protect you;
you will be queen among the Sygambri.
Why should I count the peoples and the far-off shores of the Atlantic?
All of the world will be your dowry.

In a panegyric dedicated to Honorius for his third consulship, Claudian vividly describes Honorius's, or rather Stilicho's, successes over the Getae, and does not forget the river:⁴⁹

Odrysium pariter Getico foedavimus Hebrum
sanguine, Sarmaticas pariter prostravimus alas
Riphaeaeque simul fessos porreximus artus
in glacie stantemque rota sulcavimus Histrum:

(*Panegyricus de tertio consulatu
Honorii Augusti* 146–154)

Together with Getic blood we stained the Thracian Maritza,
together we broke the Sarmatian wings,
on the snow-covered slopes of Mount Rhiphaeus we rested our weary limbs
and scarred the frozen Danube with our chariots' wheels.

Claudian describes these turbulent events of the war in a panegyric addressed to Honorius on the occasion of his fourth consulship (398). Here the Danube becomes the grave of many peoples:

ausi Danuvium quondam transnare Gruthungi
in lintres fregere nemus; ter mille ruebant
per fluvium plenae cuneis inmanibus alni.
...
tibi debeat orbis
fata Gruthungorum debellatumque tyrannum;
Hister sanguineos egit te consule fluctus;
Alpinos genitor rupit te consule montes.

(*Panegyricus de quarto consulatu
Honorii Augusti* 623–625; 634–637)

When the Gruthungi⁵⁰ dared to cross the Danube
they felled trees for boats; three thousand vessels
overloaded with crews made their way across
...

⁴⁹ Cf. Claud. (Claudian 1963) 8.52.

⁵⁰ This refers to an area occupied by the Gothic Gruthungi, a tribe that inhabited the Pontian steppes and started crossing the lower Danube in 376. Elsewhere, Claudian describes events that took place around 400, when they and the Ostrogoths were in service to Rome in Phrygia and took part in the uprisings. See Claud. (Claudian 1963) 20.203.

All the world owes you
for destroying the tyranny of the Gruthungi;
You were consul when the Danube ran red with blood,
and you were consul when your father crossed the Alps to victory.

In a panegyric dedicated to Stilicho to honour his receiving a consulship, Claudian extols Stilicho's important role in preserving the border of the Western Roman Empire around 400. The Danube limes is mentioned five times as the ultimate geostrategic line, but the following verse is particularly telling:⁵¹

Omne, quod Oceanum fontesque interiacet Histri,
unius incursu tremuit; sine caede subactus
servitio Boreas exarmatique Triones. (De consulatu Stilichonis I 215–217)
And all that lies between the Ocean and the Danube
trembled before the assault of one man; hunted down without blood
Boreas was enslaved and the Great Bear disarmed.

Also in the same poem, he tells of Stilicho's renewal of these desolate lands ravaged by war. Since one of these is Illyricum, he mentions the Danube and refers to Stilicho as *pacator Histri* (*De consulatu Stilichonis III 367*):⁵²

Exsectis inculta dabant quas saecula, silvis
restituit terras et opacum vitibus Histrum
conserit et patrium vectigal solvere gaudet,
immunis qui clade fuit. (De consulatu Stilichonis II 198–201)

By removing the uncultivated fields left by generations,
he restores the land overgrown and plants vineyards on the Danube's banks
and rejoices to pay taxes to his fatherland,
for in war there were none.

Thus, when praising Stilicho, the Danube is more than just the border of a country; it is also a symbol of political stability. Behind this line of water lay a wild, non-Roman world.

4. Claudian's "wild" Danube

All the previous illustrations demonstrate that Claudian was describing not only a political border but also something of a cultural one, which becomes explicit in the descriptions of battle scenes sung in the panegyric in honour of Honorius's sixth consulship (404) (*Panegyricus de sexto consulatu Honorii Augusti 220*⁵³). Rome then celebrated its victory over Alaric, the leader of the barbarian tribes along the Danube, which Claudian denotes with the syntagm *saevus Hister*, practically identifying the Danube with all that is wild and barbarous. Moreover, by referring to the Danube and the Rhine, Claudian is

⁵¹ Claud. (Claudian 1963) 21.126, 215; 22.199, 367; 24.13.

⁵² Claud. (Claudian 1963) 22.367.

⁵³ Claud. (Claudian 1963) 28.220.

repeatedly alluding to the tribes that, at the time, presented a serious threat to the Empire. He identifies the Danube with the enemy without any closer explanations: *et sextas Getica praevelans fronde secures colla triumphati proculcat Honorius Histri*.⁵⁴ It is worth noting that Claudian's barbarians were created according to what was then a commonly held view of the enemy, which was often a generalisation without any basis in historical fact. Additionally, Claudian's representations of that which should be feared beyond the borders, including the Danube, show us the Roman perceptions of the "Self" and the "Other."

As was shown earlier in one of Claudian's poetic scenes, when the divine Aeolus unleashes powerful winds along with the barbarian peoples and clears the way for war, some of the barbarians "stormed across the frozen waters of the wild Danube" (*alii per terga ferocis Danuvii solidata ruunt*).⁵⁵ Here Claudian uses the epithet *wild* (lat. *ferox*), thus making use of the concept of the non-Roman world beyond its borders.

In accordance with this theme, Claudian most often mentions the Danube in connection with the war against the Goths. His work *De bello Gothico* gives a description of Stilicho's campaign against Alaric in 401, in which he mentions the Danube eight times,⁵⁶ mostly as a natural boundary the barbarian hordes crossed before pillaging Roman lands. Particularly noteworthy is his image of a conversation between a Gothic elder and Alaric, in which he warns him of the danger ahead if he were to set off toward Rome:

"Si numero non fallor" ait "tricesima currit
bruma fere, rapidum postquam transavimus Histrum, (De bello Gothico 488–489)

"If I am not mistaken," he said, "almost thirty
winters have passed since we swam across the swift Danube."

Alaric, however, is offended by this disrespect for his military achievements and victories over the Romans, and he responds to the elder by again referring to the Danube, which has borne witness to his successes:

"Si non mentis inops fraudataque sensibus aetas
praeberet veniam, numquam haec opprobria linguae
turpia Danuvius me sospite ferret inultus. (De bello Gothico 521–523)

If your witless age had not deprived you of sense and reason,
I would never have allowed such crude insults
Be heard by the Danube and go unavenged in my presence.

Here in *De bello Gothico*, Claudian once again attributes almost divine properties to the Danube and the Rhine as well as the fate of guarding the borders of the Empire (*utraque Romuleo praetendens flumina regno*).⁵⁷

With this work Claudian's propagandistic writing ceases, and since he does not

⁵⁴ Claud. (Claudian 1963) 28.220, 443, 648.

⁵⁵ Claud. (Claudian 1963) 5.27. Cf. 20.583, where there is also an allusion to the barbarians crossing the Danube.

⁵⁶ Claud. (Claudian 1963) 26.81, 170, 331, 337, 489, 523, 569, 603.

⁵⁷ *De bello Gothico* 331.

mention any other important events in Stilicho's life, such as the burning of the *Sibylline Books* and the victory of 405 over the Gothic leader Radagaisus, who led the barbarians right across the Danube to Italy, it is widely held that, by this point, Claudian had already died. In the end, this learned poet, who joined together "the mind of Virgil and Homer's muse"⁵⁸ in an idealised Roman interpretation, spoke not only of the Danube as a great (*ingens*) and distant river at the edge of the Roman world. He also used the Danube as a conceptual ethnicon of a cruel (*ferox*) and uncivilised (*saevus*) enemy of Rome, and from a geopolitical perspective, an essential key to Roman power.

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⁵⁸ This is part of the inscription on a statue erected in Rome in Claudian's honour. In the original Greek: *Εἰν ἐνὶ Βιργιλίῳ νόον / καὶ μοῦσαν Ὀμήρου / Κλαυδιανὸν Ρώμῃ καὶ / βασιλῆς ἔθεσαν* (CIL 6.1710). See Ware 2012: 2–3; Kenney, Clausen 1982: 708–712.

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АЛЕКСАНДРА СМИРНОВ-БРКИЋ

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ПОМЕНИ ДУНАВА У ПОЕТИЦИ КЛАУДИЈА КЛАУДИЈАНА

Резиме

Позноримски песник Клаудијан (*Claudius Claudianus fl. 395 – s. 404*) са хеленизованог Истока, стекао је славу као дворски песник западноримског цара Хонорија (393–423). Клаудијан се сматра једним од најбољих писаца касне римске књижевности, иако је свој таленат усмерио у пропагандне сврхе, за писање панегирика богатим и утицајним аристократама и политичарима, славећи пре свега чувеног војсковођу Стилихона и пишући инвективе на рачун његових непријатеља на двору источног римског цара Аркадија (395–408). У богатим песничким сликама Клаудијан помиње многе топониме, орониме и хидрониме. После Клаудијановог родног Нила, најчесталији хидроним у његовом песништву је река Дунав. Песник је помиње чак тридесет и осам пута као *Ister*, *Hister* или *Danuvius*. Аутори рада навели су и анализирали Клаудијанове песничке исказе о Дунаву као реци, узимајући у обзир имаголошки концепт који је ова река имала у римској перцепцији тог времена које Клаудијанова поезија рефлектује користећи Дунав као митску, историјску, политичку и надасве културну границу. Река Дунав није објекат Клаудијанове инспирације, за разлику од његовог родног Нила, већ фреквентни хидроним којим песник употпуњава геостратешку и геополитичку слику позног Римског царства. Клаудијан помиње Дунав првенствено у својим политичким и пропагандним делима (*Panegyricus dictus Probinuso et Olybrius consulibus*, *Panegyricus Mallii Theodori*, *In Rufinum*, *In Eutropium*, *De bello Gildonico*, *De bello Gothico*, *Panegyricus de tertio consulatu Honorii Augusti*, *Panegyricus de quarto consulatu Honorii Augusti*, *Panegyricus de sexto consulatu Honorii Augusti*, *De consulatu Stilichonis*, *Epithalamium de nuptiis Honorii Augusti*), а нарочито у стиховима са експлицитним величањем личности и дела свога патрона Стилихона које поприма епске размере и често залази у сферу божанског, уз одабране алузије на римску прошлост и римске вредности, па у складу са тим уз употребу архаичних термина – класични вокабулар и синтакса, митски и историјски пејзажи, што је свакако била карактеристика позноримских панегирика. Примењујући технику мешања митског и историјског пејзажа, Клаудијан историјске чињенице подређује захтевима песничког мотива. Нарочито у стиховима који величају и славе слику и дела Стилихона, који је пореклом био *semi-barbarus*, видимо да се у позноантичкој перцепцији *Romanitas* граница између Римљана и „других” померила од класичних норми диктираних вером и језиком ка новом концепту *una gens humana*, како Клаудијан каже, који је уједињен класичним римским наслеђем, симболично персонификованим код позноантичких писаца у *dea Roma*. Штавише, Клаудијан више пута под реком Дунав или Рајном подразумева племена која у то време представљају горући проблем Царства и не користи никава ближа објашњења, већ Дунав идентификује са непријатељем. На више места показало се да Клаудијан користи одређене географске контрасте да исказе границе или напоре, наводећи слушаоца на супротности негостољубивог севера и питомиог југа, страног и медитеранског света. У оквиру овог концепта, Клаудијан је говорио о Дунаву не само као о

далекој великој (*ingens*) реци на граници римског света, већ је створио и концептуални етник суровог (*ferox*) и нецивилизованог (*saevus*) римског непријатеља, а у геополитичком смислу есенцијалан кључ римске политичке моћи.

Кључне речи: Клаудијан, *Claudius Claudianus*, Дунав, *Ister*, *Danuvius*.

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GRAND KNEZ STEPHEN VUKANOVIĆ AND THE MORAČA MONASTERY

Abstract: The Morača Monastery was built in the mid-13th century by Grand knez (prince) Stephen Vukanović, a member of a cadet branch of the Nemanjić dynasty (1166–1371), as his burial place. Interpreting the actions its founder reveals interesting details about the relationship of the center of power with the political periphery, ruling ideology, and the monk's place in society. The completion of the frescoes and other ornamentation at this monastic church of the Dormition of the Mother of God and Stephen's withdrawal from his political life to take monastic vows partially coincides with the action of King Uroš I (1243–1276), who consolidated his royal power during this time by eliminating the principalities in the Serbian coastal regions. Prince Stephen's transition to life as a hermit may have gone through two stages that included tonsuring and then admission into the Great Schema. These actions were motivated by his personal piety and his age or by a desire to emulate the Nemanjić dynasty's model of sanctity—which was a key feature of the ruling dynasty's political ideology—were possibly the result of political upheaval.

Keywords: Grand knez Stephen Vukanović, Morača Monastery, sanctity of the Nemanjić dynasty, Monasticism, Little Schema, Great Schema.

1. The Morača Monastery and its Founder

The Morača monastery was founded in the mid-13th century, and since then, apart from when it was damaged by the Turks, it has been a powerful spiritual and cultural center in the Serbian Dinarides.¹ Its ktetor (founder) was *knez* Stephen, son of Vukan and grandson of Nemanja (1166–1196), and it was built in the *župa* of Morača. Its construction was funded by the administrative area under his control.² The *župa* of Morača included the upper course of the Morača River, after which it had been named, was part of Raška, and belonged to the Eparchy of Budimlja. The Morača's lower course flowed through Zeta and the Eparchy of Zeta.³ The *župa* of Morača was connected to the valley through which the Lim River's upper and middle courses flowed and where many of the Nemanjić family's hereditary estates were located.⁴

The main church was built as the ktetor's mausoleum. It was built in the Raška style, and its architecture and aesthetics were based on the Church of the Holy Virgin at Studenica.⁵ Following in the footsteps of his famous ancestor, Stephen dedicated his burial church to the Dormition of the Mother of God and the Theotokos Evergethida.⁶ The ktetor's inscription on the lintel of the main western entrance highlights the strength of their family bond:

СН С(ВЕ)ТЫН ХРАМЬ ПРѢС(ВЕ)ТЫЕ Д(Ѣ)ВЫ Б(О)ГОРОДНЦЕ СЪЗДАХ И ОКРАСНХ В НАДЕ ВСПЕНННА Е АЗЪ
СТЕФАНЪ, С(Ы)Н БЕЛНЕГА КНЕЗА ВАКА, ВНСК С(ВЕ)Т(А)ГО СЪМЕОНА НЕЦАН(Н). И СІА БЫШ(Е) В
Д(Ь)НИ БЛА(А)ГОУ(Ь)СТНВА(Г)О КРАЛА Н(А)ШЕГО УРОШ(А), В ЛѢТ(О) · 5 · 5 · 5 · ННА(Н)КТА · 7 · 60.⁷

I, Stephen, son of the Grand *knez* Vukan and grandson of Saint Simeon Nemanja, built this holy temple in honor of the Dormition of the Most Holy Virgin, during the reign of our glorious King Uroš, in the summer of 6760, indiction 10 (1251/2).

In medieval Serbia, a ktetor had the exclusive right to choose where to build his endowment and to suggest what iconography should be incorporated into the frescoes. He

¹ The most significant works on the Morača Monastery are Okunev 1939–1946: 109–144; Mijović 1969: 179–196; Petković 1986. A collection of papers regarding this church, ed. B. Todić, D. Popović, was published on the 750th anniversary of the founding of the monastery.

² The members of the ruling class, including princes, could only donate a portion of their estate to their endowments with the ruler's permission and the blessing of the local bishop, Blagojević 2004: 36–43.

³ Aleksić, Koprivica 2019: 66–67. For the sake of formality, the term Zeta will be used, which replaced the name Duklja in the 13th century.

⁴ The *Župa* of Morača had a similar status as those in the Lim River basin. Ćirković 2000: 27; Blagojević 2006: 44.

⁵ Stephen Nemanja's main endowment, the Church of the Holy Virgin at Studenica, established a model followed by his descendants, both in the construction process and the temple's decoration. Čanak-Medić 2016: 233; Đorđević 2008: 207–223, 228–240; Živković 2016: 209. Hence, Studenica immediately ascended to the top of the monastery's hierarchy. Blagojević 2004a: 196.

⁶ Church of the Holy Virgin at Studenica was inspired by the Evergethida Monastery, an important monastic center in Constantinople. Saint Sava, who visited the latter several times, held it in high regard. Furthermore, he translated and adapted the Typikon of the Evergethida Monastery for use in organizing monastic life in Studenica. Živković 2016: 193–197, 200–202.

⁷ Stari srpski zapisi i natpisi I: 7, br. 17; Okunev 1939–1946: 110; Blagojević 2006: 33; Popović 2006: 55.

could set the legal structure and the rules for monastic life.⁸ The Morača monastery is considered an early example of a royal or noble endowment in medieval Serbia because of its size and date of construction.⁹

Almost nothing is known about Stephen Vukanović's role in Serbian politics during the early 13th century. Stephen received the title of *župan* by birth, which was in accordance with his noble origins.¹⁰ The absence of Stephen's title in the church inscription is explained by the fact that it was most probably equal to his father's.¹¹ Stephen is explicitly mentioned as *knez* in the charter establishing the landholdings of the Eparchy of Hum. The estates in Hum are confirmed in a charter from King Uroš (1243–1276),¹² which delineated the borders of Hum, which bordered Travunia near the village of Osolnik. Bishops Methodius of Hum and Bishop Spyridon, presumably of Dabar or Budimlja, also helped resolve this territorial dispute.¹³ The charter could have been issued as early as 1250 or as late as 1253. When determining the chronology, it was assumed that *knez* George, Stephen's older brother, was no longer alive in 1248.¹⁴

Stephen undoubtedly had jurisdiction over Travunia at the time and also over Zeta, but with the caveat that they would be unified as a single territorial and administrative unit only after his brother's death. He may have taken over his older brother George's lands at the end of the 1240s or beginning of the 1250s. Of course, for a time, the brothers were able to rule over two distinct parts of this vast historical and administrative unit simultaneously, as was often the case with Hum at this time. The presumed fragmentation of jurisdiction and territories between two members of one of the dynasty's branches would reduce the two Vukanovićes overall political influence. The title of *knez* was not hereditary in principle, but rulers typically kept it within the circle of the previous rulers' closest relatives, mostly sons or brothers. The king's approval of the transfer of power from George to Stephen reflects the political climate during period.¹⁵

Sources from later periods refer to Stephen as *knez*. His portraits in paintings of the Nemanjić family tree from the early 14th century found in the churches in Peć and Dečani are the most closely related to Stephen's time. The artists could not have been mistaken about this detail because they had access to reliable information the dynasty's genealogy.¹⁶

2. The Historical Context of the Frescoes in the Morača Monastery

It is impossible to know when exactly the frescoes in Stephen's church were created or when it received liturgical books and religious objects. The prevailing view is that all

⁸ For more about the church benefactors and the regulation that stipulated their rights and obligations in Serbia see Marković 1925: 100–124; Troicki 1935: 79–132.

⁹ Foundations by the nobility did not become commonplace until Stephen Dečanski's reign (1322–1331). Đurić, Babić-Đorđević 1997: 67–74; Đorđević 1994: 13–126; Đorđević 2008: 465–506.

¹⁰ Stari srpski zapisi i natpisi I: 17; Blagojević 2006: 33–35; Popović 2006: 55.

¹¹ Blagojević 2006: 33–34.

¹² Ibid. 37; Aleksić, Koprivica 2019: 62.

¹³ Aleksić, Koprivica 2019: 67.

¹⁴ Blagojević 2004: 37–38; Božanić 2013: 376–378.

¹⁵ Blagojević 2004: 35.

¹⁶ Ibid. 37; Blagojević 2006: 38–39. For further evidence, cf. Vojvodić 2006: 80.

construction work and the frescoes may have been completed in 1251 or 1252, but certainly sometime in the mid-13th century.¹⁷ Based on a depiction on the wall of the apse in St. Stephen's chapel of a procession of Serbian archbishops, it was assumed that the church was decorated in stages during the 1260s and 1270s. However, this segment of the fresco is not a reliable guide for determining the chronology for the frescoes' creation.¹⁸ Although this is still an open question, it can be roughly dated to the middle of the 13th century with possible subsequent refinements and additions.¹⁹

Although several important variations are noticeable, the portraits of the founder and his family are mostly realistic depictions of their clothing and primary physical characteristics that match the original compositions. *Knez* Stephen is depicted in the nave of Morača wearing secular clothing and in the narthex in monastic robes.²⁰ When considering inconsistencies in visual historical sources, it is vital to understand the general historical context of the era. It is particularly significant that Stephen's brother, *župan* Demetrius (David the Monk), built his burial church in the *župa* of Ljuboviđa, which was adjacent to Morača.²¹ Furthermore, Stephen's brother Rastko, and possibly even Mladen, or alternatively Bladinus, all become monks.²² It is important to remember that the founder of the dynasty and Stephen's spiritual role model had actively fostered monasticism by abdicating after a period of time and becoming a monk at Studenica, his own endowment. This sequence of events was viewed as an appropriate end to secular life, so Nemanja's descendants willingly followed in his footsteps.²³ Therefore, despite the lack of completely authentic visual evidence, it is reasonable to assume that *knez* Stephen became a monk sometime between the creation of the paintings in the nave and those in the narthex.²⁴

In the absence of written historical sources about *knez* Stephen, the surviving images of him in the Morača frescoes indirectly attest to his historical role. In the diaconicon, a small room on the south side of the altar, there is a fresco cycle depicting the accomplishments of the Holy Prophet Elijah.²⁵ This part of the church was presumably

¹⁷ Okunev 1939–1946: 109–144; Skovran-Vukčević 1958: 149–172; Radojčić 1966: 52–54; Mijović 1969: 179–196.

¹⁸ Todić 2006: 93–116.

¹⁹ This was the case with the main church at the Studenica Monastery, which was built between 1186 and 1196 and painted in 1208/9. Đurić, Babić-Đorđević 1997: 60–63, 172–176; Živković 2019: 37–44; Vojvodić 2016: 587, n. 2. Furthermore, around 1230, King Radoslav (1228–1234) authorized the exonarthex to be built and painted. Đurić, Babić-Đorđević 1997: 133; Todić 2016: 213–214, 220.

²⁰ Popović 2006: 60. In total, the following deviations from the original wall paintings were noted: Portraits of Abbot Toma and *knez* Vukić Vučetić were added to the depiction of founder in the nave. *Stephan* is also given the title of king, while his insignia and clothing details are the result of later improvisation. The Theotokos is holding a scroll in her left hand instead of the founder's hand, as is customary in medieval art. Inauthentic details on the garments and an incorrect inscription, were incorporated to the depiction of the family in the narthex. Milanović 2006: 158–180; Popović 2006: 58, 60; Vojvodić 2006: 76, 82, 88.

²¹ Ljubinković 1961: 113–123; Tomović 2003: 47–62.

²² Rastko was buried as the monk Theodosius at the Monastery of Studenica. Popović 1992: 45–46; Ječmenica 2018: 53, 61–74. Mladen is only known from a document dated 1208, but it has been cautiously assumed that he was the first hegumen of the Monastery of Sopoćani, and was eventually buried there. Todić 2006: 423–429.

²³ Marjanović-Dušanić 1997: 46, 274–286; Popović 2006a: 19–21, 41–74, 192–193.

²⁴ Popović 2006: 60.

²⁵ For more information on the compositional arrangement and a detailed description of the frescoes, see: Okunev 1939–1946: 117–123; Skovran-Vukčević 1958: 154–170; Radojčić 1966: 52–54; Mijović 1969: 179–

dedicated to this biblical figure.²⁶ This selection of the episodes from the prophet's life is unique in 13th century Byzantine art.²⁷ According to some scholars, the themes in this iconography were meant to highlight events connected to St. Elijah's monastic deeds. Due to his piety, he is sometimes credited with establishing eremitic and coenobitic monasticism. Thus, Elijah might have been used as a representation for both kinds of disconnection from worldly values.²⁸ As plausible as this explanation appears, it is preferable to claim cautiously that St. Elijah, whom Stephen had chosen to emulate, was a spiritual beacon for him. As a result, the events depicted in the diaconicon may have inspired Stephen to embrace the noblest of Christian values. Furthermore, this may relate to the idea of a pious secular lord, inspired by St. Elijah's zeal, who wanted to follow the purest religious rules to the letter. The integration of the scene "The Slaughter of the Prophets of Baal" in the Morača diaconicon supports this hypothesis. This idea may have reached *knez* Stephen through literary works attributed to members of the sacred Nemanjić dynasty's founding member. For instance, Sava Nemanjić included these verses in the *Service for St. Simeon*:

Venerable Father [St. Simeon of Serbia],
 You have found a good ladder
 by which you ascend to the heights,
 with which Elijah also acquired the chariots of fire,
 but he left no salvation for others,
 and you, after your death
 you showed the way to the kings in your fatherland,
 Oh heavenly man,
 Oh earthly angel,
 like the lighthouse to your fatherland,
 Oh blessed Simeon,
 pray for the salvation of our souls!²⁹

Stephen the First-Crowned wrote the *Life of Saint Simeon* between 1208 and 1216, in which the State Assembly convened by Stephen Nemanja is described. Its goal was to convict dualistic heretics and penalize their leaders in accordance with canonical norms.³⁰ When describing this event, Stephen the First-Crowned compared his father to Saint Elijah: "Like the ancient prophet Elijah, who rose up against shameless priests, he too railed against

192; Petković 1986: 26–39.

²⁶ The members of the Nemanjić family usually dedicated the church's side rooms to saints they admired or who were their personal patrons. Parekklesia were generally consecrated in this manner, and in some cases so were protheses and diaconica. Thus, in Mileševa, the diaconicon is dedicated to St. Stephen, whereas in Sopoćani and Arilje, it is dedicated to St. Nicholas. Petković 1986: 28–29; Pavlović 2016: 253–254.

²⁷ Skovran-Vukčević 1958: 154, 169–170; Petković 1986: 29. Morača's frescoes share many similarities with the wall decorations from the narthex of the church dedicated to the prophet Elijah near Suceava from the 16th century and main church at Romania's 15th century Neamț monastery, see Bedros 2008: 117–125.

²⁸ Petković 1986: 29–31, 33; Marjanović-Dušanić 2006: 48. Although Morača was designed primarily for coenobitic monasticism, there were a few hermitages nearby. Regrettably, there are no sources indicating when they were used. Petković 1986: 30. n. 105.

²⁹ Sveti Sava 1986: 123.

³⁰ Stefan Prvovenčani 1988: 70–72.

their evil natures.”³¹ It clearly alludes to St. Elijah’s encounter with the idolatrous prophets of Baal at the brook Kishon. Similarly, Stephen Nemanja resisted the heretics who worshipped idols: “some were burned, others were punished with various reprimands, others were expelled, and the tongues of the teacher and the chief were cut off.”³² This scene from the *Life of St. Simeon* exemplifies the basic premise that Nemanja brought peace to the land and led his people to the “true faith” throughout his reign.³³

The historical context of the Old Testament scene in which Saint Elijah anoints Hazael and Jehu as kings and Elisha as a prophet has long been speculated.³⁴ The scene is augmented by a bust of Christ, who bestows one crown to the kings and a scroll to the prophet. The fresco depicts two distinct Old Testament events as one. The originality of this visual solution complements the presence of Christ’s bust, which adds overtones of the New Testament to the scene. One explanation is that this fresco could have been inspired by two Serbian Kingdoms (Duklja and Nemanjić state), and by the anointing of Stephen the First-Crowned (1196–1228) as king of Serbia in 1217.³⁵ After being incorporated into the Nemanjić state, the Serbian southern Adriatic region was ruled for a time by Vukan Nemanjić. He became semi-autonomous king of the defunct Kingdom of Duklja and Dalmatia but lacked real royal authority and international recognition.³⁶ This was probably passed to his eldest son George, who is mentioned as a king on 3rd July 1208.³⁷ After that, George was not explicitly referred to as king. However, Stephen the First-Crowned claimed the right to the royal throne in part as lord of Duklja, which was regarded as a “great kingdom of old.” However, after 1217, the memory of the Kingdom of Duklja began to fade.³⁸ It should be noted that Stephen Vukanović is identified as a king in legends depicted in paintings created at Morača three or four centuries later.³⁹ The same pattern can be found in Morača’s *Pomenik* (Commemorative Book) of King Stephen the First Ktotor, the oldest extant transcript of which dates from the 1570s.⁴⁰ This was a reflection of efforts by the Serbian clergy to strengthen the ktotor’s reputation.⁴¹ Furthermore, distorted historicism should have turned Morača into an Orthodox shield against Roman Catholic proselytism,⁴² yet there is no indication that *knez* Stephen aspired to be the most powerful political figure in the country.

Returning to the frescoes of St. Elijah in the diaconicon, according to our analysis,

³¹ Ibid: 71.

³² Ibid.

³³ Popović 2006a: 45.

³⁴ Marjanović-Dušanić 2006: 45–52.

³⁵ Ibid.: 46, 50–52.

³⁶ On the tradition of the Kingdom of Duklja see Bubalo 2011: 79–93; Komatina 2016: 15–34. According to the ktotor’s inscription, the Church of St. Luke in Kotor was built *sub tempore d(omi)ni Nemanie, magni iupani, et filii sui Velcanni, regi Dioclie, Dalmatie, Tribunie, Toplize et Cosne*. Tomović 1997: 26. Despite his royal title, Vukan acknowledged the supreme authority of the Serbian Grand *župan*.

³⁷ Komatina 2020: 28, with a modern Serbian translation of the text of the oath. For a plethora of information about George Vukanović in one place, see Ječmenica 2018: 41–48.

³⁸ Komatina 2016: 30–32.

³⁹ These facts are supported by later written records of local monks and by local oral legends. Popović 2006: 60–70.

⁴⁰ Mošin 1960: 564–565.

⁴¹ Bubalo 2011: 88–89.

⁴² Popović 2006: 60; Bubalo 2011: 89.

Stephen had the right to identify himself as God's anointed who, by divine will, shepherds his blessed flock. Both the St. Elijah cycle and the fresco depicting the anointing subtly present a person determined to renounce all that is worldly to prepare himself spiritually for the afterlife. According to the interpretation offered here, Stephen was voluntarily renouncing his authority over his vast lands.

A chapel dedicated to St. Stephen was built along the northern side of the narthex. Judging by the coincidence of their names, the First Martyr was most likely the *knez*'s protector.⁴³ This relationship had already been established through baptism but had been continuously venerated. St. Stephen was regarded as the protector of the Nemanjić dynasty and, indirectly, of the "Serbian fatherland." The monastery of Morača is part of the extended family's practice as well as the ktetor's devotion.⁴⁴

Most of the frescoes date from the monastery's renovations in the 16th and 17th centuries,⁴⁵ and the focus here will be on portraits of the ktetor from that era. Although they are not contemporary to the church's construction, they still provide a good general illustration of his life and activities. In 1574/5, all the frescoes on the altar and nave were repainted and are thought to have mostly replicated the previous layout and content, including Stephen's burial portraits on the south wall of the nave's western transept above his sarcophagus.⁴⁶ In these, Stephen Vukanović, the first ktetor, holds a model of the church, his left hand in a gesture of prayer following the Mother of God, who presents him to Christ enthroned. Hegumen Toma and *knez* Vukić Vučetić, the second ktetors who restored the church, are both portrayed on the west wall behind Stephen. Stephen Vukanović is portrayed as an elderly man with a long white beard, dressed in clothing characteristic of a late-13th century Serbian lord's uncrowned sons and brothers, which denoted his membership in a holy ruling dynasty.⁴⁷ It was customary in Nemanjić dynasty endowments for founders to be buried in the western part of the nave,⁴⁸ and for scenes from the ktetor's life to be painted on the walls as part of long-term preparations for the afterlife.⁴⁹

The narthex was repainted in 1577/8 and 1616/7, but the new paintings most likely preserved traces of those from the 13th century.⁵⁰ In the first round of renovations, the ktetor's family was depicted on the lowest part of the narthex's north wall. On the east wall,

⁴³ Đurić, Babić-Đorđević 1997: 140.

⁴⁴ Chapels dedicated to the first martyr were built at the monasteries of Žiča, Sopoćani, and Gradac, Milutin's burial church at the monastery of Banjska (1282–1321) was dedicated to St. Stephen. On the significance of St. Stephen's cult in the Nemanjić state, see: Čorović-Ljubinković 1961: 45–62; Marjanović-Dušanić 1997: 42–59; Vojvodić 1995: 537–565.

⁴⁵ Okunev 1939–1946: 110–111; Skovran-Vukčević 1958: 165; Petković 1986: 44, 65–76, 93–94; Milanović 2006: 141–182.

⁴⁶ Skovran-Vukčević 1958: 165; Petković 1986: 44; Matić 2019: 19–27.

⁴⁷ Petković 1986: 42, 45; Vojvodić 2006: 74–76. On the physical appearance of second founders see Matić 2019: 19–27. The hoop-shaped wreath is a symbol of power renunciation and represents the likeness between the person represented and St. Joasaph. On the fresco in the southern parekklesion of Radoslav's narthex in Studenica, Saint Symeon the Myrrh-streaming is depicted with a similar insignia. Vojvodić 2016: 587–588.

⁴⁸ It is assumed that Stephen's body was buried in an underground tomb in front of an above-ground sarcophagus. It would be in accordance with the burial practices of the time. Popović 2006: 56–58.

⁴⁹ Popović 2006: 58; Vojvodić 2016: 587–591.

⁵⁰ Milanović 2006: 141–182.

an image of Christ sits on a throne while a depiction of the Theotokos on the north wall leads the founder Stephen to him, holding his left hand. The Stephen in this image is depicted as an elderly monk with a long gray beard wearing the Great Schema (μεγαλόσχημος) and holding in his right hand a model of the church bearing the inscription “кРАЛЬ СТЕФАНЪ ПРИЕМИШИ НОУТАСКИ ЧИНЪ” (King Stephen receiving the Great Schema). The differences between this inscription and the 13th century original are the result of the brotherhood’s view of the past.⁵¹ Following behind him is a woman dressed as a nun who is identified as “ГОСП(ОЖ)ДА КРАЛИЦА СТЕФАНА” (the lady of King Stephen). Her left hand is extended toward Stephen and the Theotokos, while in her right arm she holds her son, identified only as “ВЛАДИСАВЪ” (Vladisav).⁵² The son has long dark hair and a mid-length beard and is dressed in clothing characteristic of the nobility. It is believed that the appearance of the original fresco was completely preserved. These images are overshadowed by the Tree of Jesse, and the remaining walls of the narthex contain depictions of The Last Judgment and the Ecumenical Councils.⁵³ Depictions of the most revered holy fathers cover the entirety of the lower walls, making these images part of an even more complex collection of iconography.⁵⁴ The founder Stephen and his unnamed wife are thus presented as part of a series of holy mystics.⁵⁵ All of this together is indicative of the ktetor’s wish to be a part of the ecumene of venerated monastics. The original fresco appears to have been created to mark the enormous shift that had resulted from Stephen taking monastic vows.⁵⁶

The parekklesion of St. Stephen was repainted in 1642/3 and primarily contains modified versions of the original frescoes.⁵⁷ In this depiction, Stephen is identified as “СВ(Е)ТЫ КР(А)ЛЬ СТЕФАН(Ъ) С(И)НЪ ВЕЛИКАГО КНЕЗА ВЛ(Ъ)КАНА” (Holy King Stephen, son of the Grand *knez* Vukan).⁵⁸ He is dressed as a layman crowned with a wreath of pearls with two prependiculars hanging down the sides. This is the first instance of the ktetor being depicted as a saint.⁵⁹ In this portrait, he appears noticeably younger than in the other frescoes at Morača. The best estimates place him in his forties or fifties when the parekklesion was painted. In the nave fresco he appears somewhat older, and in the narthex he is an old man. The parekklesion was probably not painted before any other parts of the church. It is possible that this rejuvenation was intended to idealize the founder.⁶⁰ Although the extent

⁵¹ Vojvodić 2006: 82.

⁵² Popović 2006: 60.

⁵³ Petković 1986: 46; Milanović 2006: 154–156, 160–162; Pavlović 2016: 253–254.

⁵⁴ Holy Christian hermits are depicted in the nave of Studenica. However, in the iconographic programs of Žiča, Mileševa, and the so-called “royal” monasteries erected later, they are depicted in the narthex. Regarding the distribution of the images of the holy monks, columnists, and apostles in Serbian monumental paintings see Radojčić 1966: 33–76; Đorđević 2008: 207–271; Pavlović 2016: 249–259.

⁵⁵ Pavlović 2016: 254–255.

⁵⁶ Popović 2006: 60–62.

⁵⁷ Petković 1986: 93; Vojvodić 2006: 87–88.

⁵⁸ Vojvodić 2006: 87.

⁵⁹ Ibid. 88.

⁶⁰ The original frescoes, it is hypothesized, were painted after Stephen’s death. The artist might have used Stephen’s authentic depiction, which could have been created shortly before the portrait in the nave. For examples of frescoes created after the death of the person depicted, see Pavlović 2015: 112–113.

to which the original and the replica are related remains and open question, the visual representations of Stephen at this time in his life are multiplied.

3. Stephen as a Monastic

According to a theory that the symbolism of the name Stephen in the medieval Serbian context served to convey the status of a ruler, Stephen may have been born during the brief period after his father Vukan had usurped the throne of the Grand *župan* in the early 13th century. Although they are not contemporary, the portraits in the narthex create an image of a man in his later years.⁶¹ A preliminary examination of King's Uroš document, provisionally dated at the early 1250s suggests a possible timeframe when Stephen took monastic vows.

It is also frequently noted that Stephen is the only one of Vukan's sons depicted on the Nemanjić family tree, which suggests he was given the most prestige in the royal courts of the 14th century, and that he never strained relations with the Serbian crown.⁶² Nevertheless, this is deceptive. Dragutin's (1276–1282) son Vladislav, for example, came into conflict with the ruler in 1323, yet he was still included in the Nemanjić family tree painted in the church complexes of Peć and Dečani Monasteries.⁶³ Yet members of the Vukanović family, although greatly respected locally, were not included in commemorative books listing the leading figures from the Nemanjić past.⁶⁴

It has long been noted that Stephen is depicted like the monk of the Great Schema in the 16th century portrait in the narthex.⁶⁵ This distinction also included the privilege of wearing the headdress and cape called the *koukoulion* (κουκούλιον) and the *analavos-paramandyas* (παραμανδυας), which is a rectangular cloth that covers the shoulders and is decorated with circles and ribbons sewn onto the corners. They were ritually dressed on the occasion of public initiation, which shows just how important these garments were as a sign of the monk's new status.⁶⁶ The Great Schema, the highest and most demanding rank in Orthodox monasticism, was usually attained in old age. It required greater seclusion and more intense prayer. Monks of the Great Schema were viewed with special reverence, and if the church canon was consistently followed, the reception of this title would have been preceded by many years of spiritual devotion.⁶⁷

There was a set timeline for entering each level of monasticism. The first rank, the *Rassophore*, was granted to those who had completed a three-year novitiate. This is followed by the *Stavrophore*, or the *Little Schema* or *Lesser Schema*, which came after faithfully fulfilling customary monastic vows. This meant that experienced clerics closely

⁶¹ The portraits' authenticity, as well as the painted program that surrounded them, were particularly scrutinized. It is certain that painters from the 16th century restoration largely preserved the frescoes' original appearance. Skovran-Vukčević 1958: 165; Petković 1986: 42–45; Vojvodić 2006: 74–76, 82–86; Milanović 2006: 141–145, 156–181.

⁶² Blagojević 2006: 144; Popović 2006: 62.

⁶³ Radojčić 1996: 38–39, 49, 58.

⁶⁴ Danilović 1994: 35–63.

⁶⁵ Popović 2006: 60; Vojvodić 2006: 73–76.

⁶⁶ Mirković 1961: 160, 172. Simeon Nemanja is depicted as a monk in Studenica as well. Vojvodić 2016: 604.

⁶⁷ On the Great Schema see Mirković 1961: 170–173.

supervised and guided their spiritual development.⁶⁸ The rigorousness of the criteria for receiving the highest rank, known as the Great Schema, explains why there are so few documented cases of it in medieval Serbia. It has been noted that these monks followed canon law to the letter and had first passed through the previous stages. Nikola Radonja, son of the sebastokrator Branko Mladenović, and Dorotheos, who later became the Great Schema monk John Kalyvitis, were examples of those who had honored these strict rules.⁶⁹ According to some, Stephen Nemanja also followed a similar path.⁷⁰

It has been noted that representatives of the ruling house and other influential nobility would quickly enter a monastery out of political necessity or if their health had abruptly declined. Stephen the First-Crowned's quickly taking monastic vows is an example that resulted from an impending death or political retreat. According to both of St. Sava's hagiographies, Stephen received the Great Schema from his younger brother on his deathbed. If this is taken at face value, he must have been a Great Schema monk.⁷¹ Additional recorded examples of this include Stephen Radoslav (1228–1234) his brother Uroš I (1243–1276), Caesar Hrelja (1342), and Voivode Nikola Zojić (1398).⁷² Those who entered the monastery for reasons of ill health include Queen Helen (1276–1314) and, most likely, King Dragutin.⁷³ Interestingly, wives of local rulers and noblemen typically took their vows as widows. Nevertheless, as co-rulers of their dynasties, they wielded considerable power in secular and public affairs by participating in diplomatic missions, overseeing commerce, and issuing charters. These include Princess Milica (Eugenia, Euphrosyne), Theodora Nemanjić, widow of the despot Dejan (Eudokia), and Empress Helen, wife of Stephen Dušan (Elizabeth).⁷⁴

This illustrates that the choice to enter a monastery was the result of a variety of personal, political, and social influences. This makes it extremely difficult to contextualize Stephen's far-reaching and short-term intentions in a broader social or historical context. When exactly he received the Great Schema cannot be determined solely based on the revised portrait in the narthex. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the original image is commonly interpreted as having been painted during his lifetime.⁷⁵ If one adds to this the visible differences in physical appearance between his secular portraits in the nave and the chapel of St. Stephen and that of the image of him in the narthex as a hermit, it would seem that Stephen had spent many years as a monk adhering to canonical norms.

Since there is no information in the sources indicating he had previously been a Stavrophore, it is worth referring back to the earlier discussion of the extensive presence of the cult of St. Elijah on the walls at Morača. This unique presentation of the Old Testament

⁶⁸ Milaš 1890: 698–699, 704–705.

⁶⁹ Spremić 1997: 81–100; Aleksić 2015: 131–139.

⁷⁰ During his two-year stay in Serbia after his abdication, Stephen Nemanja was a monk of the Little Schema. There are indications that he was promoted to the rank of Great Schema after going to Mount Athos. Popović 2001: 53–78.

⁷¹ Domentijan 1988: 167–168; Teodosije 1988: 222.

⁷² Teodosije 1988: 232; Šuica 1997: 19; Aleksić 2015: 134; Aleksić, Živković 2020: 241–244.

⁷³ Danilo II 1935: 64. The politically motivated background of Dragutin's admission to the ranks of monks was explained considering the decades-long dynastic problem that arose because of the decisions made at the state assembly in Deževno. Aleksić, Živković 2020: 239–264.

⁷⁴ Aleksić, Živković 2020: 244–245.

⁷⁵ Petković 1986: 46; Popović 2006: 65; Vojvodić 2006: 81.

prophet may have reflected Stephen's persistent desire to, at an opportune moment, renounce the privileges of a powerful nobleman. This could be a strong indication that he had had been seeking a balance between his secular and religious views. His unnamed wife also became a nun. This is yet another repetition of the pattern established by Nemanja and Ana, who very quickly took monastic vows after the state assembly in Ras in 1196.

Once tonsured, the Stavrophore receives a new name that usually shared the same first letter of his or her secular name. Several factors can influence the choice of this new name, including the saint who was being celebrated on that day or a recommendation from an experienced priest who has taken monastic vows.⁷⁶ Stephen's monastic name and that of his wife have not been recorded.⁷⁷ However, Stephen could have preserved his baptismal name until his death, despite being (as is assumed) twice tonsured.⁷⁸ This absence of a different monastic name may not be solely attributable to ignorance on the part of the monks at the Morača Monastery. Stephen was inspired by the traditions of the Nemanjić state, of which one was the veneration of the cult of St. Stephen. Thus, it is possible that Vukan's son kept his secular name even after becoming a monk. Furthermore, it is strongly held that Stephen ended all political involvement without any major political upheavals. Otherwise, there would have been no motive for so persistently preserving the name that was a basic symbol of Nemanjić ambition.⁷⁹

Forcing wielders of political power to take monastic vows also entailed the renunciation of most secular rights. Little is known about what motivated Vukan's son to become a monk, but it must have occurred after 1254. The principality of Hum had ceased to exist after an international conflict.⁸⁰ During this time, it appears that *knez* Stephen had no influence on the major political events that unfolded in the Ragusan hinterland in 1254. Unfortunately, the causal link between the details of the conflict and Stephen's abdication remain unknown. The possibility exists that Uroš's victory over the international coalition laid the groundwork for quietly suppressing a secondary member of the dynasty by forcing him to take monastic vows. Yet it is also possible that the Vukanović principality in Zeta and Travunia gradually lost internal cohesion without any foreign interference, resulting in a total decline in the strength of the Serbian political periphery. This could have pushed *župan* Radoslav, a grandson of *knez* Miroslav of Hum who ruled the western part of Hum, to choose a desperate act of rebellion, as many of his predecessors had done, and forced Stephen Vukanović to completely abandon his political ambitions.⁸¹ Unfortunately, this is all a matter of speculation, although the history of the Morača Monastery points to the second scenario being closer to actual historical events. Regardless of these quandaries, what is certain is that Stephen's monastic vows had far-reaching consequences for the very fabric of the Serbian

⁷⁶ Grujić 1937: 237–239; Mirković 1961: 166–167.

⁷⁷ Vojvodić 2006: 81.

⁷⁸ Such practice was not uncommon. Uroš's widow Helen kept her secular name even after becoming a nun. Danilo II 1935: 64. This was also true of Angelina Branković, the wife of Stephen Branković, who became a nun between 1502 and 1509. Tomin 2011: 180. These are not isolated examples in Serbian medieval history. Grujić 1937: 239.

⁷⁹ Vojvodić 1995: 544–549, 551, 553.

⁸⁰ War broke out in 1254, when a coalition, led by *župan* Radoslav of Hum, and Dubrovnik, and the Bulgarian Czar Michael II Assen (1246–1256), came out against the Serbian king Uroš. Blagojević 2004: 32–34.

⁸¹ Mišić 1996: 50–53; Blagojević 2004: 32–34.

state because it marked the final end of the principality in Zeta and Travunia.

Whether Stephen took his vows voluntarily as a result of illness or deep and sincere piety, or if he was forced to by the king, it was then impossible for his son to continue his political career through the inertia that comes with princely dignity. Jurisdiction over Zeta and Travunia was not entrusted to Stephen's son Vladislav. In a 16th century fresco, Vladislav is depicted without any symbols of a ruling position.⁸² This of course does not mean he did not have secondary administrative responsibilities as Demetrius's descendants did. Nor were his hereditary lands chipped away at, which may have provided income to further ornament the family church. Interestingly, Stephen's brother Demetrius Vukanović did not inherit the title of *knez* and is only mentioned as a layman with the hereditary title of *župan*.

The year of Stephen's death is unknown, and the only source for it is a medallion with an icon depicting his death. It dates from 1644/45 and is built into the lower frame of an icon of Sts. Sava and Simeon located above his sarcophagus⁸³ and surrounded with scenes from Theodosius's *The Life of St. Sava*. *Knez* Stephen is depicted in the garb of a ruler without any symbols of the Great Schema, and with brown hair that suggests he was not particularly old at the time of his death, which is a deviation from his portrait as a monk in the nave. This one, however, should take precedence because it repeats the earlier representation originally created during Stephen's lifetime. The medallion contains a typical depiction rooted in a well established pattern. However, if it had been adapted, more or less successfully, to specific historical circumstances, or at the request of the person who commissioned it, then a question is raised as to whether the clergyman in Episcopal garments depicted on the medallion above Stephen is actually the bishop of Budimlja, who had prerogative and who, according to the customs of the time, could have participated in the event.⁸⁴

The Pljevlja Synodikon of Orthodoxy lists the bishops of Budimlja in the following order: Jacob, Kallinikos, Theophilus, Spyridon, and German. German was bishop at the time the Pljevlja Synodikon was written, which was during the reign of Archbishop Jacob (1286–1292).⁸⁵ Theophilus, however, is mentioned as the author of the Morača Nomocanon between 1 September 1251 and 31 August 1252.⁸⁶ He was most likely at the head of the Eparchy of Budimlja when Morača was consecrated sometime around 1251/1252, so he or his successor Spyridon could be this clergyman. The male and female figures in secular garb depicted in the middle are analogous to similar historical representations of this type, and must be members of his immediate family—namely his son Vladislav and his unnamed wife.⁸⁷

After a monk dies, canon law requires that his old vestments be replaced with a new *koukoulion* and *analavos*.⁸⁸ However, in the depiction on the medallion, Stephen is dressed

⁸² Vojvodić 2006: 83.

⁸³ Petković 1986: 79–101; Popović 2006: 66–67. The icon served to connect the local cult with already established forms of veneration of the Serbian fatherland's protectors, St. Sava, and St. Simeon.

⁸⁴ Bishop Danilo of Banja was present at Queen Helen's deathbed in 1314. Danilo II 1935: 71–72.

⁸⁵ Purković 1938: 28; Janković 1985: 151.

⁸⁶ Purković 1938: 28.

⁸⁷ Close to Stephen's death, frescoes in Sopoćani depicting the repose of Serbian Queen Ana Dandolo were created. The event was attended by her son King Uroš and his older brother, Archbishop Sava II (1263–1271), as well as her daughter-in-law Helen and grandchildren Dragutin and Milutin. Komatina 2014: 18.

⁸⁸ Mirković 1961: 184–186.

as a ruler and is bare-headed, therefore missing the symbols of the Great Schema. This corresponds with other 17th century portrayals depicting Stephen as a king rather than a monk, due to the monks at the time being primarily guided by a desire to present the founder of their monastery as a holy king. The oldest written evidence of his sanctification appears in a Zagreb chronicle from the 17th century in which there is mention of the holy relics of Vukan's son.⁸⁹

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ВЕЛИКИ КНЕЗ СТЕФАН ВУКАНОВИЋ И МАНАСТИР МОРАЧА

Резиме

О животу и политичком деловању Стефана Вукановића, унука великог жупана Стефана Немање, постоји свега неколико документа који указују да је деловао у областима српског приморја као удеоно кнез, оквирно до половине 13. века. Свакако, најпознатији је као ктитор цркве Успења Пресвете Богородице манастира Мораче у истоименој жупи, а за коју се овом приликом износи став да је била део Рашке „земље”, а не део историјске покрајине Зете. У основи овог рада је идеја да проучавање сликарства кнежеве гробне задужбине у контексту државног и идеолошког развоја Србије у истом том раздобљу делимично употпуњује слику о биографији ове личности. Значајне су ктиторске композиције на јужном зиду западног травеја наоса, где је Стефан представљен као властелин, односно на северном зиду припрате, где је обучен у монашку одору. Највероватније су настале за живота ктитора, те се претпоставља да се замонашио у периоду између њиховог настанка. Иако није могуће утврдити тачно време тог догађаја, додатне назнаке пружају остали елементи фрескописа, и поред тога што су и они у највећој мери ретуширани. Тако су ликови замонашеног Стефана и његове, именом непознате жене, у припрати окружени портретима светих отаца. Осим тога, оригиналне фреске у ђаконикону из 13. века посвећене су Светом Илији, који је узор подвижницима. Специфичност циклуса светог пророка се објашњава Стефановом тежњом да направи равнотежу између световних и духовних вредности, што је додатни наговештај о његовим истрајним плановима да се монашењем у одговарајућем тренутку повуче из државног и јавног живота. Анализа портрета и наша претпоставка да се Вукановић родио почетком 13. столећа упућују да је то било приближно ратовима које је краљ Урош (1243–1276) средином петог десетлећа водио у циљу централизације државе, када се гаси и удео кнежевина жупана Радослава Мирослављевића у Хумској земљи. Аутори су ближе идеји да је Стефаново повлачење са великокнежевске власти било добровољно, а да је тај чин са споменутим сукобима имао само посредне везе.

Стефаново отшелништво је можда било двостепено, односно укључивало је примање мале, а потом и велике схиме, која је налагала захтевније облике духовног подвигања. Занимљиво је да је, пролазећи кроз све монашке фазе, највероватније задржао своје првобитно име, можда као знак привржености идеолошким вредностима династије Немањића, које су у први план истицале светородност најистакнутијих чланова владајуће породице. Заправо, задужбинарство кнеза Стефана било је саставни део опсежног програма усмереног на учвршћивању државне власти под жезлом потомака Стефана Немање (1166–1196). Ово тумачење говори много о односу централне власти и политичке периферије у време док су удео кнежевине полако престајале да буду важна компонента државно-територијалног устројства.

Кључне речи: кнез Стефан Вукановић, Манастир Морача, светородност Немањића, монашење, мала и велика схима.

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***ASÂKİR-İ SERHAD* – GUARDIANS OF THE EMPIRE
IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY:
THE OTTOMAN FRONTIER ON THE SAVA
AND THE MIDDLE DANUBE IN THE 18th CENTURY**

Abstract: After the establishment of the border with the Habsburg Empire, the defense of the Ottoman Empire along the Danube and Sava rivers necessitated the establishment of new mechanisms. This study presents a structuralist attempt to systematize the incoherent military organization at the border in various border provinces; define the structure, means, and forms of administration; and, most importantly, to trace the changes in military organization throughout the 18th century. The frontier was divided into separate sectors in accordance with information collected from archival sources along with minor historiographical additions in accordance with consideration of the *longue durée*. The institutions of the *kapudan* and the *muhafiz*, how they were related to one another, and their position within the military organization will be more closely investigated and new interpretations will be given. The question of how the military capacity was organized will be meticulously examined, and lists of fortress garrisons will be presented with a focus on differences between times of war and peace. These will establish frameworks for further research.

Keywords: Danube, Sava, 18th century, *serhad*, *serhad kulu*, *kapudan*, *muhafiz*.

Researchers still have not established a fully clear understanding of how the 18th century Ottoman–European frontier along the Sava and the middle of the Danube was organized. Due to changes in various frontier defense systems and command jurisdictions, it is incredibly difficult to trace all the actors involved in local changes or to make credible interpretations. The goal of the study was to carry out a comparative examination of the frontier and the border regions along the rivers within the *eyalet* of Bosnia and the *sancak* of Smederevo (*Semendire*). The basic aim is to outline the structure of the Ottoman defenses, determine various models of military organization, and ascertain a coherent system within which these various systems functioned. This is not a study of the

army, military units, or the number of fortress garrisons, but rather of the organization of the Ottoman military defense against Europe in this region. Contemporary literature has established how the *kapudanlık* operated in the *eyalet* of Bosnia as a unified institution. It has also established that the Belgrade *muhafız*, who had the rank of vizier and the title of pasha, had certain jurisdictions over a significantly larger area than the *sancak* of Smederevo. What remains largely unknown, however, is how the government and administrative systems in the area around Šabac (*Böğürdelen*) and the *nahiye* of Šabac were organized, and which has the subject of recent studies.¹ The interconnectedness of these frontier defense systems and how they functioned during times of war and peace is the basis of the study presented here. During the 18th century, there were significant changes along the frontier between Europe and the Ottoman Empire. The decentralization of Ottoman rule caused important and sometimes abrupt changes in military organization and in jurisdictions, command, and the very existence of military units and commands. The nature and extent of these changes will be meticulously examined as part of this study of how the Ottoman defense operated.

1. Frontier Defense System

Research into the Ottoman frontier is invariably connected to the meaning and use of the Ottoman term *serhad/serhat*. During the period of conquest, the border zone was considerably wider, and before the introduction of Ottoman administrative organization in the conquered territories, the *vilayets*² functioned as specific territorial units organized around the *gazis*, or fighters for the Faith, led by *uc beyleri*, or march leaders. By the 18th century, the term *serhad* had disappeared from the sources and were replaced by the terms *nizam-ı serhad*, or troops of the frontier, and *serhad-ı/hudud-ı islamiyye*, or the borderlands of Islam. By this time, it was no longer possible to draw parallels with the organization of the *serhad* and the institutions dating from the early period of the Ottoman conquests.³ Therefore, in the sources, this term refers exclusively to the frontier. It is also important to bear in mind that the notion of a state border presented in Ottoman documents dealing with the delineation of a frontier area (*hududname* or *sınırname*), did not refer to a strictly defined line. The first time a precise land border was established through a treaty concluded in 1699 and was based on reports from members of a border committee and from cartographers and military engineers on both sides. If the border fell along a river, the waterway was not divided, and both sides were able to make use of navigable waters.⁴

When the Ottoman border was returned to the Sava and Danube rivers after the Great Turkish War (1683–1699), a need arose for new ways to manage the frontier. After 1699,

¹ Tričković 1970; Pavlović 2017.

² The term *vilayet* has multiple meanings. In the early period of the Ottoman conquest, it was used more broadly to designate a country or territory—for example, the *Sırp Vilayeti*, or Serbian Land. *Vilayet* was often used to refer to conquered territory in which Ottoman rule had not yet been consolidated. Beginning in the 19th century, this term was used to indicate an Ottoman province. (Šabanović 1959: 32–35).

³ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı, Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı, Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, Bab-ı Asafî, Divan-ı Hümayun, Mühimme Defterleri, No. 186, hüküm 478; 187/97; 157/593 (BOA. A. DVNS. MHM. d.).

⁴ Ágoston 2020: 416–420; Pelidija 1989: 43–44.

Bosnian territory became vulnerable to attack from the Austrian army on multiple sides; however, this was not the case in the *sancak* of Smederevo. Until the late 18th century, enemy raids originating from the Austrian Banat were not expected, which also determined how this part of the border was defended. A clear yet informal division of the frontier into three defensive lines emerged based on the main points for possible incursions by the enemy army: Belgrade and the lines along the Danube and the Sava rivers. The line along the Sava and east of the Drina, which was legally part of the *sancak* of Zvornik (*İzvornik*), was adjoined to the border line within the *eyalet* of Bosnia, where territories were named according to the most important border fortifications or a river: the Sava Frontier (*Sava-i serhad*), Bihać Frontier (*Bihke-i serhad*) and the Kilis Frontier (*Kilise-i serhad*).⁵ There was an exception to this only between 1718 and 1739 when both banks of the Sava and most of the *sancak* of Smederevo belonged to the Habsburg monarchy.⁶

According to composition and variety, and primarily by the number of military units, the Belgrade fortress was almost equal to all other total military capacities in the interior of the *sancak* of Smederevo put together. To finance the military defense of the frontier, the Belgrade vizier was given other provinces in the *arपालik* along with the task of financing the provincial units, known as *yerli kulu*, or *serhad kulu* in areas outside of the *sancak* that he governed.⁷ Other than financial responsibilities, it cannot be concluded that this led to the creation of new administrative or defensive structures. Although Belgrade was the most significant defensive position on the middle Danube, the organization of the defensive line in the interior had its own local specificities. Strategically, the protection of Belgrade's broader hinterland fell to the fortresses on the Danube and the Sava. If war broke out, the main enemy attack was expected to be on the Sava. Because of this, the most significant resources were deployed in Belgrade and Šabac, which required a specific form of military organization for the Sava line.⁸

The Danube line had no elements of a separate command. The system of fortifications along the Danube and in the hinterland served as a line of defense against the enemy, with each fortification functioning independently. *Palankas*⁹ were built in the interior to protect the main trade and travel routes and to ensure the safety of the immediate surroundings. Defense along the rivers was similarly organized. There was a single command of the river fleets, such as those on the Danube and the Sava, but in practice the viziers named the *kapudans* or "captains" of small river flotillas called *şaykas*¹⁰ within their own *sancaks*. For example, the Smederevo captains protected the Danube between Belgrade to the west and to the Ram fortress (*Hram, İpek*) to the east. There were fifty-four kilometers of waterway between Belgrade and Smederevo, which was similar distance along the roads between two *palankas* in the *sancak*. The commanders of the *yerli kulu* garrisons—the

⁵ BOA.A.DVNS.MHM. d. 125/8; 125/19.

⁶ Pelidija 2003: 56–60.

⁷ This was a principle of allocating to the vizier administrative authority over another *sancak*, in addition to his primary one, that was governed by his representative—a *kethüda* or *mütesellim*.

⁸ Pavlović 2017: 229–320.

⁹ There were two types of Ottoman fortifications: fortresses and *palankas*, forts built with wooden palisades.

¹⁰ N.B. The *kapudan* of a fortress and the *kapudans* of *şaykas* were completely separate positions and had no relationship to one another.

muhafizes, the unit officers under their command, and the captains of the *şaykas*—certainly had the authority to patrol their own areas. One of their most important responsibilities was the protection of river crossings, for which the *yerli kulu* from the nearest *palanka* were responsible. Some of the river units were deployed in the hinterland along the Great Morava, the final section of the Morava River.¹¹

Significant fortresses along the Danube line dating from the classical period (Smederevo, Ram, Ada Kale, Gradište, Golubac, and Poreč) did not have a strategic role in the 18th century. Until the 1780s, the *muhafiz* of Smederevo had no need to be constantly on guard, but the establishment of the Banat military frontier and the Austrian army's appearance on the Danube led to changes in the Ottoman defense. This was best reflected in the appointment of a certain Halil Pasha as the *muhafiz* of Smederevo in 1789.¹² At the same time, a dignitary in Niš with the title of pasha carried out the civilian role of *mütesellim*. Judging by the decision to send a pasha to Smederevo to serve as *muhafiz*, this strategic move was highly significant for the Sublime Porte. Smederevo protected Belgrade from enemy raids, along with access to Belgrade from the east and south. In the late 18th century it was threatened by Osman Pasvantoğlu's troops. It had fewer *yerli kulu* garrisons than Šabac (138 versus 272 after 1739). The first recorded reinforcements made to the Smederevo Fortress began in 1769, when the gates and bridges were repaired. There are records concerning a delivery of stockades from Bosnia to Šabac and Smederevo in 1783, along with cannon for Smederevo that same year. The number of standing *yerli kulu* was also increased to 150 just before the war in 1788. Other forts were also reinforced around the same time. A garrison of 200 soldiers at Ada Kale was mentioned in 1785, along with *gönüliyan*, shock troops known as the *serdengeçti*, and *Arnavud eşkiyası*.¹³

In 1699 the frontier in the *eyalet* of Bosnia was surrounded by enemy territory. However, not every border area was treated equally. Special orders from the sultan indicated which border areas of the *eyalet* might be accessible to the enemy's regular army, and which might be to a smaller number of regular units and a larger part of the irregulars, which the Ottoman sources referred to as the *serhad kulu* (frontiersman) and *akıncı* (Uskoks). During times of war, most soldiers came from the enemy side of the Sava at two crossings: one near the Gradiška¹⁴ fortress and the other near the Brčko *palanka*. A smaller number of soldiers crossed near the Brod fortress. The enemy army would also attempt to reach Banja Luka from Gradiška, Gračanica from Brčko, Šabac and Belgrade from the Rača *palanka* (on the Srem side), and Derventa from Brod. In addition to direct attacks across the Sava, enemy raids across the banks of the river were not uncommon.¹⁵

¹¹ Pavlović 2017: 165.

¹² Ibid., 2019: 87; Ilić Mandić 2020.

¹³ Ibid., 2019: 86–87. The term *eşkiya* referred to bandits who were often a source of recruitment for volunteers in the service of the vizier during the 18th century and served either alongside the *yerli kulu* or in direct personal service to the vizier as *kapu halkı*, which rendered the difference in meaning between bandits and troops almost moot.

¹⁴ The Austrian fortress at Stara Gradiška, where the Habsburg army gathered for an attack on the Bosnian side, was located across from the Ottoman fortress on the left bank of the Sava (Gezer 2020: 73–74).

¹⁵ Rašid, Čelebizade 2013: 337; Novili 2016: 62–63; Subhi 2007: 376; Pelidija 2003: 239–241; Feldzüge: 201–202; Čaušević 2004: 24.

In the 18th century, not all stretches of the Sava in Ottoman territory were handled uniformly. The capacity of the stretch of the river marking the border with the Habsburg monarchy was overlooked, while downstream from the Rača and Noćaj *palankas* to the confluence of the Danube was considered a navigable waterway. Throughout the 18th century, the parts of the Sava that passed through Ottoman territory was not given the same consideration. Part of the frontier up to the Brod fortress was secured by the army from the *palankas* and fortresses along the river and in the hinterland. The border forts built right on the river (Dubica, Gradiška, Brod, and others) were part of defense system that also included those located nearby hinterland (Doboj, Tešanj, Jajce, and others) and those farther afield (Maglaj, Kozarac, Tuzla, and others). The eastern part of the Sava line was more heavily fortified after 1739, when the Kobaš fortress was again repaired and Derventa and Brčko were fortified. In addition to building new fortifications and filling the ranks of the *yerli kulu*, new detachments were added to the old ones. This mainly pertained to fortifications in the nearby hinterland and was meant to strengthen their defensive capabilities. The *yerli kulu* at these fortresses were responsible for securing peace and security of the population under threat of *Uskok* incursions from the left bank of the Sava. Continually reinforcing fortifications, building new ones, and increasing the number of *yerli* garrisons was meant to increase the overall defense of the frontier during highly uncertain times and in anticipation of continual raids and new wars.¹⁶

An enemy army attacking from the east of the confluence of the Drina and the Sava, would be directed toward Šabac and Belgrade, so these two fortresses worked in tandem beginning from the construction of the Šabac fortress. The Šabac fortress served to shield the flank of the Belgrade fortress, and during the Ottoman defensive wars of the 18th century, it became clear that severing the link between the Šabac and Belgrade fortresses would result in either a punishing siege or the Šabac fortress falling into Habsburg hands.¹⁷ During peacetime, the population on the right bank of the Sava was constantly harried by raiding parties. The villages in the *nahiyes* of Upper and Lower Mačva were thus given *derbend* status.¹⁸ This became more of an issue after the 1737–1739 war when the *reaya* complained of enemy attacks and the mistreatment of the Zvornik *kapudan*. Consequently, in 1747 the Sublime Porte ordered the vali of Bosnia and the Belgrade vizier to launch an inquiry and oversee the situation. The vali and vizier were firmly reminded they had an obligation to hold and protect (*hıfz ve zabt*) the Šabac fortress during times of war. The same document states that at some earlier period, the Belgrade *muhafız* had been responsible for paying the

¹⁶ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı, Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı, Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, Bab-ı Defterleri. Büyük Kale Kalemi, Defterleri, 32295; 32318; 32410 (BOA. D.BKL. d.), Muallim Cevdet Tasnifi Belgeleri. Cevdet Bahriye, 95/4554 (BOA. C. BH.)

Kreševljaković 1991: 151, 154, 158; BOA.A.DVNS.MHM. d. 144/094; Handžić 1976: 109–110.

¹⁷ Pelidija 2003: 239–241; Feldzüge: 201–202.

¹⁸ Dangerous areas with access to enemy territory were classified as *derbends*. Villages with *derbend* status were those whose population had *reaya* status and were armed and on standby to provide defense in exchange for a lesser tax burden (Bojanić 1974: 140; Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı, Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı, Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, Bab-ı Asafî. Divan-ı Hümayun Sicileri. Bosna Ahkâm Defterleri, 1/15 (BOA.A.DVNS.AHKR. d.).

wages of the Šabac *yerli kulu*.¹⁹ The reasoning given for this was that the Sava line was so long that the Bosnian army was unable to carry out its regular duties in a timely manner across such a large distance. The Šabac *nahiye* was located far from its administrative center in Zvornik. Natural barriers and intense, ongoing pressure from across the border also contributed to this decision.

During war, in addition to the army from the Šabac fortress, which in peacetime was responsible for maintaining law and order, the Sava line was also manned by garrisons from Belgrade under the command of the Belgrade vizier and the *serasker* of the Rumelian front. This confirmed that, in times of peace and war, the part of the Sava defense line that extended from Rača to Šabac (and quite possibly to Paleš/Palej, now Obrenovac) was under the shared protection of the Belgrade and Bosnian *yerli kulu* from Šabac and Zvornik.²⁰ The Šabac *yerli* garrisons were thus under the command of the Šabac *muhafiz* but financed by the Belgrade vizier. It can be surmised that the Šabac *muhafiz* maintained an independent command during peacetime, but he served under the Belgrade vizier as *serasker* when hostilities broke out. How much informal involvement the Belgrade vizier had in the command of the *yerli kulu* in Šabac beyond his formal authority remains an open question, as it does for the other fortifications with *yerli* garrisons he financed. There is no information about this in the sources. It should be noted that the funds for the Šabac *yerli kulu* came from *cizye mukataa*²¹ from the Šabac *nahiye*, which were transferred to the *hazine*, or treasury, of the Belgrade vizier. This only increased the chances that the vizier and his representatives would abuse their authority.²² By the mid-18th century, however, the Belgrade vizier had fewer possibilities to control the *yerli kulu* within their immediate surroundings.

2. Frontier Defense Administration

Ottoman military organization during peacetime was not the same as during war. During times of peace, there was no unified military command. Military structure and command over the garrisons was not based on territory but rather on a clear hierarchical organization of garrisons and their commanding officers. When military operations began, a *serkasker* named to command the front and was placed in command of all regular and irregular formations and the local mustered population (*nefr-i 'amm*). In the 18th century the Bosnian *vali*, the Rumelian *vali*, or the Belgrade vizier were not only given the title of *serasker* (commander-in-chief) of the Sava and Danube Frontiers but were also required to personally carry out the duties of the one. The *seraskers* sent orders to muster troops, to the commanders of the *sipahi*, Janissary, and *yerli kulu* units. In the next phase of preparations,

¹⁹ The duties of the Belgrade vizier to protect the Šabac Fortress and pay the *yerli kulu*'s wages had no influence on the Šabac fortress's change in status, and especially not on the administration of the *nahiye*. The Šabac *nahiye* was not attached to the *sancak* of Smederevo, and throughout the 18th century the transfer of *timars* was noted in the registers as being within the *sancak* of Zvornik and the *eyalet* of Bosnia (Orijentalni institut – Arhiv, Sarajevo, Timari Bosna, Zvornik, Klis, Hercegovina, 245/1, 104–165 (OIS, Arhiv, AO).

²⁰ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı, Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı, Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, BOA. C. AS. – Muallim Cevdet Tasnifi Belgeleri. Cevdet Askeriye, 704/29556-1-2 (BOA.C.AS.); Pavlović 2017: 165, 247, 296.

²¹ *Mukataa* was a form of tax farming.

²² BOA.C.AS. 965/41989-1-1.

when the enemy had already entered Ottoman territory and important fortifications were under threat, the vali or the vizier would name a commander or *serdar* for a section of the front or a particular battle.²³ In these cases, the *serdar* was in command of all available units at the front. Most often the *kapudans* in command of the *yerli kulu* were installed as *serdars* to defend the Sava line but the defense of the Danube line was more specific.

Until the late 18th century, enemy incursions into the *sancak* of Smederevo were expected to come from across the Sava and head directly for Belgrade, so the *seraskers* of the front—either the Belgrade vizier or the *vali* of the Rumelian *eyalet*—was charged with the entire defense of this part of the frontier. It appears that the Sava and Belgrade frontiers along with some other less strategically important fortifications along the Danube, were under this *serasker's* jurisdiction. It is important to mention that the viziers of the *sancaks* in the *eyalet* of Bosnia could fulfill the function of a *serdar*, but it seems this was most often the case when the army from Bosnia was sent to one of the eastern battlefields.²⁴

Defense of the Ottoman frontier along the Danube and the Sava rivers had some other specificities, such as different roles for the Bosnian vali and the Bosnian viziers in comparison to the vizier in Smederevo and his superior, the vali of the Rumelian *eyalet*. The specific roles of two institutions, the *kale-i kapudan* (*kapudan* of a fortress) and the *muhafiz* should be emphasized. As part of the decentralization of the 18th century, the vizier in Belgrade was tasked with organizing the defense of the province and the Ottoman frontier. Apart from periods that were only nominally peaceful, the vali of the *eyalet* of Rumeli had no real authority in these matters during peacetime. During the transitional period, the military and administrative organization of the Bosnian *eyalet* was less decentralized than it was in the *eyalet* of Rumeli or the *sancak* of Smederevo. The reasons for these differences between the two neighboring provinces lie in the cohesiveness of Bosnian territory and in how all affairs were concentrated in the hands of the vali as the main administrator of the *eyalet*. The Belgrade vizier had responsibilities that matched the those of the Bosnian *vali*, but the Bosnian viziers remained in the vali's shadow. The administrators of the *sancaks* of Zvornik, Herzegovina, and Klis were also exempt from securing finances for the *yerli kulu*. Funds came from the Bosnian *vali* and went directly to the commanders of the armies at the fortresses: the *kapudans* and the *ağas* of the Janissaries.²⁵ As the *yerli kulu* garrisons took over the defense of the frontier, the office of the *kapudan* in the *eyalet* of Bosnia became more important than the role of vizier. The *kapudans* in the *eyalet* of Bosnia and the *muhafizes* in the *sancak* of Smederevo had very similar responsibilities.²⁶

Previous studies have not shed enough light on the office of the *muhafiz* within the Ottoman frontier.²⁷ In the historiography, the *muhafizlık* is primarily defined as a specific office within the Ottoman military organization. In this sense, it refers to a specific administrative unit—a *serhad*—governed according to a particular regime and under the administrative authority of a *muhafiz* who was directly subordinate to the central government.

²³ BOA.A.DVNS.MHM. d. 1442/139.

²⁴ Bosnavi 1979: 29; Novili 2010: 67; Subhi 2007: 388/389.

²⁵ BOA.A.DVNS.MHM. d. 125/8, 138/121, 1442/139; Kreševljaković 1991: 52.

²⁶ Hickok 1997:111; Muvekkit 1999: 415.

²⁷ This is supported by the fact that no such term appears in the *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi* (Encyclopedia of Islam).

This claim, however, can be challenged by suggesting that the institution of the *muhafiz*²⁸ did not have the actual authority that it was believed to have had in previous historiography.²⁹ The basic issues were territory and the nature of this institution's authority. The sources indicate that the Belgrade vizier, who had also been appointed *muhafiz* of the Belgrade *yerli kulu* formations, paid from his own *hazine* the wages of the *yerli kulu* units outside the *sancak* given to him to administrate.³⁰ Financing of garrison can rightly be understood as a form of jurisdiction over the command of the units, at least during times of war.

During the 18th century, the Belgrade vizier became increasingly less capable of controlling the *yerli kulu* within his immediate surroundings, and those outside of his *sancak* certainly had more autonomy to act. Due to financial responsibilities, he often involved himself in certain issues regarding the authority of the vizier in the neighboring *sancak* of Kruševac (*Alacahisar*), but this should not be associated with any sort of formal jurisdiction.³¹ Finally, even if he did have complete authority over the *yerli kulu*, which is doubtful, this did not mean he had any further jurisdiction over other military affairs, and certainly none over civil matters. For these reasons, it is important to emphasize that the *muhafizlik* should be understood as the service or office of the *muhafiz*, who was the commander of the *yerli kulu* at a particular fortress. In other words, the *muhafiz* was the commander of the new units rather than a commander of a new military precinct in the frontier.

In the historiography, the term *kapudanlık* refers to territory under the civil and military authority of a *kapudan*. Yet it was, in fact, the *office* of the *kapudan* of the fortress—the *kapudanlık*—that had strictly military jurisdiction over a fortress's entire *yerli kulu* or the *yerli kulu* of several *palankas* and fortresses.³² Starting in the mid-16th century, the first *kapudans*, commanders of local auxiliary fortress garrisons, had jurisdiction over the *yerli kulu* of a particular fortification (Gradiška, Jasenovac, Dubica, Kostajnica, Krupa). These were fortifications on the Sava, located at the busiest stretches of the river. At the time the *kapudans* were first mentioned as infantry commanders, the border with enemy territory was not at the Sava, but this area had a more difficult bridge crossing into the *sancaks* of Požega and Pakrac.³³

Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, *kapudans* were given jurisdiction over the *yerli kulu* garrisons at nearby fortresses, which included paying daily wages, installing lower commands, recruiting ordinary soldiers, ensuring the garrisons were properly equipped, etc. There is no mention in the sources regarding the *kapudan*'s territorial jurisdiction nor of any broader authority over other garrisons or civil affairs.

Within the *eyalet* of Rumeli, and primarily within the *sancaks* of Smederevo and Kruševac and parts of neighboring *sancaks*, the commanders of fortifications with *yerli kulu* garrisons, which during peacetime included fortresses and *palankas*, were *muhafizes* without a clear hierarchy of command. No one *muhafiz* was superior to another. Just like

²⁸ The Ottoman suffix *lık* is often misinterpreted. *Muhafizlik*, *kapudanlık*, and *defterdarlık* should be understood as the service, office, or institution of the *muhafiz*, *kapudan*, and *defterdar* respectively.

²⁹ Tričković 1971: 297–303; *Id.*, 1970: 347–349; Pavlović 2017: 305–319.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 2017: 293–304.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 2017: 118, 233, 301.

³² BOA.A.DVNS.MHM. d. 138/121; Kreševljaković 1991: 52.

³³ *Ibid.*, 1991: 81–87.

the *muhafizes*, the *kapudans* did not answer to each other. The *kapudan* was the direct commander of the *yerli kulu* garrisons at a fortress and also the commander of the first units (*cemaat*) of *farises* or *azabs*, depending on the service from which he had been named, meaning whether he had previously been the *ağa* of the first *cemaat* of *farises* or the first *cemaat* of *azabs*.³⁴ Documents attest to the *kapudan* being frequently referred to as the *muhafiz*.³⁵ The term was used within the context of the *muhafiz-i kale*, the warden or protector of a fortification. It is not clear that the *muhafiz* was in fact the warden of the fortress, as some dictionaries indicate, but nevertheless the term is mentioned in the context of defense and the office assigned to him in this regard. The term *muhafiz-i kale* referred to the service of defender or protector, which fell within the duties of a *kapudan* and was mentioned as synonym for the *kapudan*'s duties.³⁶ In Rumeli, there were no fortress *kapudans*, but the *muhafiz* was seen as an office with similar authority. At some of the smaller fortifications, it was not unusual for the *yerli kulu* garrisons to be made of up of only the *mustahfiz*'s units headed by a *dizdar*, who would then be the only commander.³⁷

The *kapudans* used the honor and importance they had gained during the wars of the early 18th century to enrich themselves and extend their political influence through tax farming. From the mid-18th century onward, they can be considered as part of the financial elite rather than belonging strictly to the military elite. As the 18th century drew to a close, the *kapudans* and *muhafizes*, the commanders of the *yerli kulu*, and other representatives of the late 18th century financial elite, began to develop rivalries with the already powerful civil elite. There were two basic consequences of this: greater financial pressure on the *reaya* and the diminishing effectiveness of the *yerli kulu* as a means to defend the frontier and maintain security. This was how things stood when the Austro–Turkish War broke out in 1788, during which the Bosnian *vali* and the Belgrade vizier relied almost exclusively on hired troops in their personal service (*kapu halkı*). It was not uncommon for these mustered soldiers to have been previously known as *eşkiyas* or *levends*.³⁸

3. The Army on the Frontier of Islam

The army that fought to defend the frontier along the Sava and the middle of the Danube was basically divided into units of regulars and irregulars. The regular army consisted of imperial units or *kapı/kapu kulu*. The irregular formations included the *serhad kulu* or *yerli kulu* and the *nefr-i 'amm* (the local mustered population). The elite infantry and cavalry units of the imperial army were made up of Janissaries and *sipahis*. By the end of the 16th century, the need for the style of fighting these units were trained in began to gradually diminish. State revenues and territory decreased during the transition to defensive wars, which directly influenced the effectiveness of the Janissaries and the *sipahis*.

³⁴ In the year 1748/1749, the *ağa* of the first *cemaat* of *azabs* in Banja Luka was el-hac Mehmed Ağa, who was also the *kapudan* of the Banja Luka fortress (BOA.D.BKL. d. 32410 p. 10).

³⁵ The *ağa* of the first *cemaat* of *farises* and the *kapudan* el-hac Süleyman Ağa was also addressed as the *muhafiz* of the Janissary cavalry and infantry at the Prijedor fortress (BOA.D.BKL. d. 32410 p. 99).

³⁶ Pakalın 1993: 564; Redhouse 2000: 789.

³⁷ BOA.D.BKL. d. 32541, p. 1, 5, 10; Kreševljaković 1991: 51–71; Moaćanin 1998: 241–246.

³⁸ BOA.C.AS.927/40082-1-1; Muvekkit 1996: 610; Korić 2016.

Documents also testify to the presence of Janissaries and *sipahis* in the provinces, but they were not significant military elements of defense. Along the Sava and the Danube lines, the numbers of active Janissary and *sipahi* soldiers were not the same in the *eyalet* of Bosnia and the *sancak* of Smederevo. Some studies indicate that by the end of the 17th century, there were no Janissaries at all stationed at the forts in the *eyalet* of Bosnia.³⁹ In the Janissary payroll records, however, there are documents indicating a smaller number of Janissaries stationed at fortifications in the *eyalet* of Bosnia.⁴⁰ In contrast to Bosnia, the Janissaries in the *sancak* of Smederevo were a significant factor at fortifications, particularly in Belgrade where they numbered around 6,000, or 40–50 percent of the *sancak*'s total capacity.⁴¹ As is the case with determining the effectiveness of the Janissaries, it is difficult to determine how many battle-ready *sipahi* there were. According to statistics, it appears that the Bosnian *vali* was more able to rely on the *sipahis* than the Belgrade vizier.⁴² It is important to mention that the true number of *sipahis* assembled cannot always be established. Until the 1770s, the response from the *sipahis* was deemed satisfactory by the central government. *Fermans* containing warnings that the *sipahis* would appear when called up were very common in the late 18th century.⁴³

The most important and effective border army was made up of the *yerli kulu*, which had once been a local auxiliary army recruited from among the *reaya* who were without land or work, or impoverished members of some of the older *kapı kulu* units. Apart from the *reaya*, the ranks of the *yerli kulu* also included relatives of the *ulema* and administrative officials. The *yerli kulu* army was made up of different infantry and cavalry detachments divided into units: *müstahfizes*, *azabes*, *farises*, *gönüllüs* (volunteers), and *beşlüs*. Within the *yerli kulu* units there were also units of *timarlı* and *zaim*, who were under the command of former *timar* and *zeamet* holders and who were then listed as paid mercenaries at the fortresses.⁴⁴ It was not uncommon for organized units to have names like *nizam-ı cedid* (the New Order) or a captain's *cemaat*, etc. All *yerli kulu* units were under the special command of an *ağa*. In addition to the *ağas*, the command also included officers or *zabits*: *kethüda*

³⁹ Gezer 2020: 248.

⁴⁰ There are 80 soldiers listed in the Janissary payroll records for the year 1749, but in the 1769 census, only 20 were listed (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı, Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı, Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, Yeniçeri Kalemi Defterleri, 34311; 34349 (BOA.D.YNÇ.d.). This was also mentioned in the chronicles among the units called up for service, although there is no record of how many reported for duty. At the end of the century, they were primarily *yamaks*, but as a part of the paid forces in personal service to the *vali*, (Muvekkit 1999: 554, 560; Bašeskija 1991: 74).

⁴¹ In Belgrade, there were just over 6,000 Janissaries. The numbers varied between 5,308 (in 1695) and 6,196 (in 1779). One of the major Janissary strongholds on the Danube was the fortress of Ada Kale, or *Ada-ı Kebir* (Pavlović 2017: 281–290).

⁴² According to a list of the *sipahis* from 1711 of those sent to the Russian front, there were 1,569 *timars*, which according to the author was also the number of *sipahis* (Skarić 1930: 8). Based on the *rûznameçe defter* of 1769/1770, it is clear there were around 800 *sipahis* (OIS, Arhiv, AO, 245/1, 104–165). These numbers do not represent the total number of *sipahis* in the *eyalet* of Bosnia. In the year 1768, it is mentioned that 4,000 *timarlıs* and *zaims* were called up to put down a rebellion in Montenegro. Within all of the *sancak* of Smederevo, there were at the most 877 *sipahis* and 26 *zaims* (Ibid., 2017: 268–270; Muvekkit 1999: 58; Bašeskija 1991: 79).

⁴³ Stein 2007: 63–75; Aksan 2007: 54–56.

⁴⁴ Pavlović 2017: 239.

(second-in-command or lieutenant), *alemdar* (standard-bearer), and *çavuş* (sergeant).⁴⁵

River captains and their units were stationed at the Belgrade and Šabac fortresses to protect the waterways. The captains' units provided auxiliary defense for river fortifications, which was even more important for preventing the enemy from crossing the river and creating pontoons.⁴⁶ The most important river fleets were stationed at Šabac and Belgrade, and foremost along the Danube line. The *derbendci* played a particular role during times of war, when their officers were tasked with working alongside civilians to protect territories under threat, and particularly those from which the most income came from the *cizye*.⁴⁷ It was around this time when parts of local volunteer regiments made up of Christians and led by *knezes* (local *reaya* representatives) began appearing alongside the Ottoman army on the battlefields along the Danube and the Sava.

The *yerli kulu* were stationed at fortresses and *palankas* primarily to safeguard the fortifications in the event of an enemy attack. These small garrisons were tasked with policing duties to maintain law and order. They lived with their families in the *mahalles* alongside the civilian population and were engaged in farming and other everyday activities. One part of the *yerli kulu* garrisons were housed exclusively in the fortifications and performed duties related to the fortress itself such as guarding the gates and ramparts. These were units of the *müstahfiz*es under the command of a *dizdar*. Other *yerli kulu* units performed duties outside the fortifications. During war, if there were fortress garrisons that were not under attack, one out of every eight or ten soldiers would be chosen from them and sent out to assist other fortifications under threat or to another front. The remaining army stayed remained at the fortification with the *müstahfiz*es. Units were also organized in the same way in the *eyalet* of Bosnia and the *sancak* of Smederevo, with some fluctuations in capacity throughout the 18th century.

Along the Danube line, the Belgrade fortress had the largest capacity for the *yerli kulu* and provided the main support for the Belgrade vizier. The number of *yerli kulu* at the Belgrade fortress varied between 2,576 (before 1688) and 5,611 (in 1702), or about by two thousand by the end of the 18th century.⁴⁸ The same changes in the total number of *yerli kulu* stationed at all fortifications were also noted in the *eyalet* of Bosnia. Before the war of 1716, records indicate there was a total of 9,316 *yerli kulu*, but according to the 1748/49 census, that number had more than doubled to 22,547.⁴⁹ However, this was not just a matter of an

⁴⁵ Uyar, Ericson 2009: 104–109; Hegyi 2018: 117–137; Özcan 2013.

⁴⁶ Members of the *yerli kulu* garrisons could not be Christians, but at the river fortresses and the surrounding *palankas*, there are records of them being coxswains or rowers. This was the case in Golubac (*Güvercinlik*) and the town of Dobra, where there were 92 rowers, and on the island of Krajina (Old Poreč) 94 Christians were registered, some of whom belonged to *şayka* units. There is no reason to assume that it was any different at other river forts. In Šabac 21 rowers under only one *kapudan* were mentioned (Pavlović 2017: 165).

⁴⁷ BOA.A.DVNS.MHM. d. 126/71; Özcan 2013.

⁴⁸ At the more important fortresses, along with the *yerli kulu*, there were also Janissary garrisons. At the smaller *palinkas*, the *yerli kulu* were the only effective military power. There were 300 of them in Šabac, 100 in Užice and Leskovac, 94 in Hasan Pasha Palankası (now Smederevska Palanka), Karanovac (Kraljevo) 20, Kolari 45–70, Jagodina 60–70, Kragujevac 30–45, Batočina 40–80, Valjevo 40, and so on. (Pavlović 2017: 281–290, 286–292; Tričković 2013: 87–88, 206–207, 307).

⁴⁹ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı, Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı, Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, Ali Emiri Tasnifi Belgeleri. Ali Emiri Sultan Ahmed III, 052/05193-1-1; 052/05193-1-2 (BOA.AE.SAMD.III);

increase in the number of garrisons stationed at already-existing fortifications. It was also a reflection of newly built ones with larger yerli kulu garrisons.⁵⁰

The conscripted army primarily consisted of civilians who were called up only when needed. They were divided according to those who were paid and those who were not. The recruitment base for the mustered army was partially the same as for the *yerli kulu*. The paid mustered units were, for the most part, made up of those first referred to as *sarucas/sekbans/seymens*, later on as *levends*, and finally by the end of the century as *eşkiyas*, who were part of the *kapu halkı*, (men in personal service to the *vali* or vizier), former commanders, and administrators of the *sancak*. Various groups of volunteer units were formed from the *levends*, among whom were the *serdengeçti*, who served as the vanguard. These units were synonymous with the bravest volunteers who stood in the front ranks and were the first to enter carrying banners during the defense or conquest of a fortress. The term itself, in the context of volunteers, appears along with both Janissary and *yerli kulu* soldiers, and referred to an unpaid mobilized population, although it was most often associated with units of volunteers recruited from the ranks of the *levends*.⁵¹

The precise number of mustered local troops and paid soldiers cannot be established because the lists were compiled by the commanders. Because they were privately financed, usually through funds from the *ayans*, there are no payroll records available in the state archives. From the very start of the 18th century, the brunt of the fighting in the Sava Frontier and the area within the *eyalet* of Bosnia was borne by paid and conscripted *reaya*. Along the Danube Frontier, the need for their increased presence and engagement among the troops was connected to the latter part of the century. This was due to the difference in the level of threat from the enemy in these two areas. The entirety of the *eyalet* of Bosnia, including all three areas under the most serious threat, was under the same threat of attack throughout the 18th century. Until the latter part of the century, the *sancak* of Smederevo was not threatened by the Austrian part of the Banat and in the interior, so the *yerli kulu*, the Janissaries, and small units of mustered troops were able to manage the burden of defense.⁵²

During times of peace when the mustered units were disbanded and only salaried

BOA.D.BKL.d. 32410, p. 219; Pelidija 2003: 138–156.

⁵⁰ In the latter half of the 18th century, the number of garrisons at fortifications right on the river was reduced. According to the 1706/7 census, Gradiška had 558 *yerli kulu*, Dubica 329, and Brod 325 (BOA.D.BKL. d. 32295, p. 2, 3, 5). In the following war, the number of soldiers in Gradiška decreased to 411, in Dubica to 268, and in Brod to 143 (BOA.D. BKL. d. 32318, 2–3). After the 1739 Treaty of Belgrade, the same number of soldiers remained in Gradiška. In Dubica, they were reduced to 152, and in Brod the number dropped dramatically to only 48. (BOA.D.BKL. d. 32410, p. 8, 91, 99). During this time, new fortifications with increased military capacities—the Derventa and Kobaš fortresses and a *palanka* Brčko—were added to the eastern part of the Sava Frontier. Existing fortifications in the nearby hinterland and in the interior were given new *yerli kulu* detachments. The largest army was in Banja Luka. In 1706/1707 it numbered 1,225 soldiers, and according to the census of 1748/1749 that number had increased to 2,413 soldiers (BOA.D.BKL. d. 32410, p. 19).

⁵¹ They were often also called *ölüm eri* (pupils of death). A unit of around 120 soldiers was led by an *ağa*, who often appeared in the *mühimme defters* as one of the most important officials in Belgrade. The ranks were also being filled in the provinces by enlisting the *levends*. Like the *dahis*, ethnic background was very important to them, especially among the Anatolian troops. Another term for these units was *dalkılıç*. (BOA.A.DVNS.MHM. d. 173/933; Subhi 2007: 484; BOA.A.DVNS.MHM. d. 110/247; 126/78; Novili 2016: 76; Pelidija 2003: 351; Özcan 2009; İpşirli 2001).

⁵² Muvekkit 1999: 560; Bašeskija 1991: 266; Sućeska 1965: 95; Pavlović 2017: 121.

troops remained at the fortifications (*yerli kulu* and Janissary), along with those in service to the provincial elite. In peacetime, the *yerli kulu* were responsible for maintaining security in the interior and along the banks of the river. They secured roads, bridges, and other crossings; ensured the safety of the *palankas*; and served as the security force responsible for assisting the *kadis* (judges) by arresting and interrogating those who had committed criminal acts. By century's end, they had managed to bring under control those areas that had been previously unsafe due to banditry. When a stronger response was needed, assistance would come from groups of paid irregulars and those in direct service to military officers and provincial administrators. Toward the end of the century, despite increased numbers at the fortifications, the *yerli kulu* were not able to defend some areas, including the southeastern part of the *sancak* of Hercegovina and northeastern part of the *sancak* of Smederevo. Because of this, the troops hired from the Bosnian *vali*'s and the Belgrade vizier's personal services were the only ones who offered up resistance to the increasingly powerful army of former *ayans*, or warlords, such as Osman Pasvantoğlu.⁵³

Research into the Ottoman army's capabilities in the European frontier during the 18th century has pointed to the limited importance of the *yerli kulu* units and an increasing reliance on mustered troops during times of war. As a result, defensive capabilities became increasingly dependent on powerful private financiers—most often the *ayans*. The types of defensive structures within the frontier depended on anticipated enemy incursions, the way in which the units and the command structure of the defensive forces were organized in the *eyalet* of Bosnia did not differ from the neighboring *eyalet* of Rumeli, as has previously been claimed. In terms of their jurisdiction, the *kapudans* of the fortresses did not differ significantly from the *muhafizes* as an element of the Ottoman defense system, and the term *muhafiz* in fact became synonymous with the office of the *kapudan*. An important segment of research has pointed to the absence of territories with organized administrations and defenses such as the *serhad* and has to a significant extent also challenged conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the *yerli kulu* units, especially concerning their importance in military engagement. It is important to emphasize that the relationship of the viziers toward the *muhafizes* and the nature of their command jurisdiction over the *yerli kulu* are not simple matters and thus require further research. Military jurisdictions and command structures should in no way be linked with administrative or governmental apparatuses, but within the volatile circumstances of the 18th century, particular attention should be given to the position and prerogatives of the vizier's rule and to his officials in the provincial interior.

Translated by *Elizabeth Salmore*

⁵³ Šabanović 1956: 191–195; BOA.C.AS. 1188/53054; Hickok 1997: 153–155; Korić 2016: 224.

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***ASĀKIR-I SERHAD* – ЧУВАРИ ЦАРСТВА У ДОБА НЕИЗВЕСНОСТИ:
ОСМАНСКА ГРАНИЦА НА САВИ И СРЕДЊЕМ ДУНАВУ У XVIII ВЕКУ**

Резиме

Одбрана Османског царства на Сави у Дунаву у XVIII веку, након успостављања границе са Хабзбуршким царством, подразумевала је успостављање нових механизма. Истраживање представља структуралистички покушај систематизације некохерентне војне организације на граници у различитим пограничним провинцијама, дефинисања структура, начина и облика њиховог администраирања и посебно праћења промена војне организације кроз XVIII век. Установљена је подела граничног простора на посебне секторе у складу са подацима из архивских извора уз мање историографске допуне у складу са факторима дугог трајања. Посебно су истражене институције капетана и мухафиза, њихов међусобни однос и положај унутар војне организације, са датим новим тумачењима. Минуциозно је испитан проблем функционалности војних капацитета и представљени су пописи посада утврђења са нагласком на разлике током мирнодопског и ратног периода, те су тиме створени оквири за даља истраживања.

Кључне речи: Дунав, Сава, XVIII век, серхад, серхад кулу, капудан, мухафиз.

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NAPOLEON I, KARADJORDJE, AND THE GLORY OF THE GREATEST MILITARY LEADER*

Abstract: This article addresses a statement allegedly made by the French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, in which he says that Karadjordje (“Black George”), the leader of the First Serbian Uprising, was a great war leader who was even greater than he himself. Every effort has been made to analyze all relevant sources for this anecdote. The purpose is to systematically prove or disprove this academically neglected but publicly influential rumor.

Keywords: Napoleon, Karadjordje, Jovan Hadžić, Velibor Berko Savić, 1809, Wagram, W. M. Petrovitch.

For over one hundred years, in literary works and newspapers, in television and radio shows, more recently on many internet sites, and even more so on various social networks, an anecdote has been mentioned that Napoleon Bonaparte once said the following:

It is easy for me to be great with our experienced army and vast resources, but far away to the south, in the Balkans, there is a leader who emerged from a simple peasant people, who gathered his shepards around him and without guns and with only cannons of cherrywood, was able to shake the very foundations of the all-powerful Ottoman Empire and free his enslaved people. That man is Karadjordje, and to him belongs the glory of being the greatest military leader!¹

There are numerous arguments supporting the authenticity of Napoleon’s praise. A historian of the First Serbian Uprising, one who was highly respected due to the meticulously assembled historical sources he published, mentions this anecdote. He

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¹ Even the well-respected daily Politika published this quote without any context as if it were incontrovertible and based on uncontested primary sources. Mirko Magarašević, “Srpska buna u Evropi”, Politika, 10. 03. 2007. (<http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/23082/%D0%A1%D1%80%D0%BF%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0-%D0%B1%D1%83%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%B8-%D0%95%D0%B2%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%BF%D0%B0>, accessed 01.01.2021).

referred to a primary source when he incorporated this event into his collection of documents. A well-known 19th century Serbian lawyer and journalist from Southern Hungary also wrote about Napoleon's praise as a contemporary event. He mentioned another renowned participant, the French marshal Berthier. Sometime later, a French writer confirmed the event, although what she wrote about it was completely different. An Italian volunteer in the Serbo–Turkish War of 1876 also reported the anecdote. Finally, at the end of the First World War, a librarian from the New York Public Library wrote about this praise in a letter to the editor of the *New York Times*. On the basis of this letter, Serbian newspapers later concluded that the British Prime Minister Lloyd George knew of the anecdote.

Nothing has been written about this anecdote in older or newer syntheses of Serbian-French relations.² No direct or unequivocal thoughts Napoleon had concerning Serbia and its leader have been found by scholars of Napoleonic France.³ Nevertheless, this story has maintained a foothold in the public imagination.⁴ It always crops up in collections of statements about Serbia and the Serbs made by well-known figures.⁵ Furthermore, this quotation was also entered into the official calendar of state and military holidays published by the Defense Ministry of Republic of Serbia.⁶ It has also been mentioned by a few publicists.⁷ However, they are not the ones responsible for launching this into “the orbit of modern Serbian mythomania,”⁸ as some have claimed. This quote did not appear in older encyclopedias, but the most important of these are now available online. They have been added to by a multitude of voluntary contributors, and as a result, the quote now regularly appears in them. This alleged statement also appears in the otherwise completely respectable online publication, the *Serbian Encyclopedia* (srpskaenciklopedija.org), but the only source cited is a modern-day daily newspaper.⁹

² Popov 2004: 435–503; Popović 1933; Not even General Gofman (1930: 10, 11, 95) wrote anything about this and neither did Ferdo Šišić (1923) in one of the earlier studies of French-Serbian relations during the First Serbian Uprising. Based on a French source, Šišić claimed that influential people in Napoleon's inner circle at the time wanted France to expand its rule into Bosnia and Serbia, and the emperor himself mentioned in a letter from 1810 the possibility of the French army invading Bosnia. Šišić (1923: 61), however, claims that after the French victory in 1809, Austria was “exhausted and humiliated,” while “at the same time the entirety of the Serbian people blamed Russia for their misfortune, and it was “completely natural for public opinion in Serbia at that critical moment to favor Napoleon.” French assistance was then sought, but Šišić only mentioned the position of the Serbian leader (*vožd*) and the assembly. Public opinion differed, as can be seen based on the report from the Austrian agent.

³ For an interesting and unusual quotation, see Broers 2010. Almost half of the seventh chapter, “The Balkans: The Bandit's Paradise,” deals with Serbia, and mentions Karadžorđe eleven times - Broers 2010: 177–180; Kovařík 2009.

⁴ Stevanović 2004.

⁵ Damjanović 1996.

⁶ *Kalendar državnih i vojnih praznika i obeležavanja godišnjica istorijskih događaja oslobodilačkih ratova Srbije*, Republika Srbija Ministarstvo odbrane, Sektor za ljudske resurse, Uprava za tradiciju, standard i veterane 2018. godina, 18, (http://www.mod.gov.rs/multimedia/file/staticki_sadrzaj/tradicija/2018/Kalendar%20drzavnih%20i%20vojnih%20praznika%20i%20obelezavanja%20godisnjica%20istorijskih%20dogadjaja.pdf, accessed 15. 06. 2020).

⁷ Mulić 2004 i Marković 2005. Mulić was a highly educated engineer, and Marković was a philologist.

⁸ Ristić 2020: 147.

⁹ “Karadžorđe”, *Srpskaenciklopedija.org*, (<http://srpskaenciklopedija.org/doku.php?id=%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%92%D0%BE%>

At the same time, in *Gallica*, the online library of the Bibliothèque nationale de France, Napoleon and Karadjordje are mentioned in 452 books, magazines, and newspapers up until the 1980s. In most of them, the two men are not mentioned together, but around two hundred instances include recountings of known historical information connected to France and Serbia during the First Serbian Uprising, which will also be presented here.¹⁰

Historians and biographers of Karadjordje, do not mention this statement from Napoleon.¹¹ However, according to Radoš Ljušić, a biographer of Karadjordje, there is some indication it might be true. In the third edition of his biography, he writes, “When Napoleon took Vienna, he wanted to meet with the leader of the uprising because ‘I and Black George are great heroes and champions.’” This uncorroborated statement was retold in Belgrade in early June 1809, three weeks after the fall of the Austrian capital.¹² However, Ljušić never mentions this statement again anywhere else. At the very end of his biography, Ljušić writes that, “If by any chance Napoleon did admire Karadjordje, his Oriental policy contributed to the Serbian leader’s downfall.”¹³

Even today, numerous myths have been built around the relationship between the first French emperor and the leader of the newly restored Serbia, as is demonstrated by a French author’s recent claim published in a Serbian academic journal that, at some point in time, Napoleon gave a saber to Karadjordje as a gift. This is understandably not outside the realm of possibility, but the author provided no source for this information, and no other historians have mentioned this gift.¹⁴

Two contemporary sources for Napoleon’s statement about Karadjordje appear in the third volume of a detailed and far-ranging collection of sources connected to Karadjordje, published more than three decades ago by Velibor Berko Savić.¹⁵ According to the first of these, which aligns with the anecdote mentioned previously, after the Battle of Aspren-Essling, Napoleon gathered his marshals and asked them who they thought was the greatest current military leader. When they answered that it was he, Napoleon allegedly replied humbly and artfully.

D1%80%D1%92%D0%B5_%D0%BF%D0%B5%D1%82%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D1%9 B, accessed 15. 06. 2020).

¹⁰ Karageorges, Napoleon

(<https://gallica.bnf.fr/services/engine/search/sru?operation=searchRetrieve&version=1.2&query=%28gallica%20all%20%22Karageorges%2C%20Napoleon%22%29&lang=en&suggest=0>, accessed, 13. 04. 2021); Even Serbian speakers do not try to deviate from known historical facts when giving speeches about the anniversaries of victories during the First World War. One of the two Yugoslav speakers at the celebrations in 1930 (Andrić or Mirković) claimed that after Napoleon received the letter on 16 August 1809, he asked: “Šta je onda srpski narod?” (Qu’est-ce donc que le peuple Serbe?) ‘La belle Manifestation du 26 Octobre à Chalon-dur-Saône’, *Le Journal des Poilus d’Orient*, Decembre 1930, 7^e Année, No 68, 1.

¹¹ Ljušić 2003; Vukićević 1981.

¹² Ljušić 2003: 274.

¹³ Ljušić 2003: 520–521.

¹⁴ “Mais Napoléon ne peut accepter de soutenir les insurgés. Adversaire de la Russie, il se méfie des Serbes parce qu’elle les protège; cependant leur héroïque résistance à Mišar, à Deligrad, partout, le pousse à conseiller aux Turcs pour les détacher du tsar de leur accorder des concessions, et il fait don d’un sabre au Chef serbe” - Fauriel 2017: 128; This gift is mentioned by a French author of a book that was also published in Serbia and Herzegovina in the late 19th century - Reinach 1876: 80.

¹⁵ Savić 1988: 1579.

The author found this alleged statement in published material from the Zemun archives.¹⁶ However, this report from a confidant of the Zemun commander was written in German and translated into Serbian by the compiler. Under Point Four, is written: “A. C *exp[onierter] P[ortier]*: One of my confidants told me the following: That it was recounted to the Serbs in Belgrade that Napoleon had a very strong desire to meet with Black George, because the two of them, he and Black George, were great heroes and champions. The Serbs feared the Frenchman would prevent them from having their own country, so they were only told the most pleasant stories about Napoleon.”¹⁷ In the Serbian translation, at the end of the second-to-last sentence (“...because the two of them, he and Black George, were great heroes and champions”) there is an annotation in which “they say” that after the Battle of Aspren, Napoleon asked his marshals this question about the greatest military leader.¹⁸ Considering the other annotations that appear in these published documents, it would have been logical for the compilers to also add annotations to this document.¹⁹ The annotation in question does not appear in the original German document, even though this transcription was based on it.

Assuming that, for some reason, there might exist a Serbian translation of the German report to which contemporaries added this quote, we decided to search through documents from the Zemun magistrate, which are now inventoried differently.²⁰ They had been transferred to the Croatian State Archives in Zagreb after they were published, and are

¹⁶ *Grada iz zemunskih arhiva za istoriju Prvog srpskog ustanka 1809*, Knj. II, 1961, 195.

¹⁷ Komandant Vojne komande komandantu Generalne komande - o odlasku Rodofinikina i Ml. Milovanovića u Deligrad, o alarmantnim glasovima da je velika ruska vojska došla u Srbiju pa žuri prema Nišu i Drini i drugim vestima, 11. jun 1809, Corr. Prot. No. 106, Ibid.

¹⁸ “...4^{-tens} Einer meiner Vertraute eröffnete mir Folgendes: dass denen Serbiern in Bellgrad vorgemahlen wird, dass Kaiser Napoleon zu Wien söhnligst wünschet mit den Czerni George zusammenzukommen, wilten er und Czerni Geroge beide grosse Junaken oder Helden sind. Die Serbier fürchten sich, dass der Franzos ihr Reich wegnehmen werde, dero wegen ihnen von Napoleon viel Gutes vorgemacht wird.”

¹⁹ The source of Napoleon’s statement was not given in the annotations. Documents from the Zemun archive were compiled by Tanasije Ž. Ilić, Bosiljka Mihailović, and Vasilija Kolaković. As far as we know, only the first one, Tanasije Ž. Ilić (1901–1987), was a trained historian. Ilić was an archivist at the Belgrade Historical Archives. He studied history (1921–1925) at the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade. He worked as a history teacher and substitute teacher at several secondary schools, but in 1945 he was released from his duties at the Second State Male Gymnasium in Belgrade. After this, Ilić worked at the archive until the early 1970s. In that time, he compiled several document collections that were primarily connected to the First Serbian Uprising during the late 18th and early 19th centuries. See “Ilić Ž., Tanasije” in Ćirković and Mihaljčić (eds.) 1997: 398. Tanasije Ž. Ilić was a child when one hundred years had passed since the end of the First Serbian Uprising. It is possible that stories from that period reached him in the same way we hear about stories from the First World War.

²⁰ Fond Zemunski magistrat, Odeljenje P, godina 1809., 774–980, Inv. broj 1904, Istorijski arhiv Beograda; Ibid., Odeljenje J, godina 1809, 1073 - 1199, Inv. broj 1916. The Belgrade Historical Archives contain reports from June and July of 1809 (a few documents are from May of the same year). There is not a single report among them. There are two documents from 11 June 1809, but they have no connection to this topic. Although the Belgrade Historical Archives are mentioned as the publisher on the covers of the document collections, the preface to the first volume of *Grada iz zemunskih arhiva za istoriju Prvog srpskog ustanka...* mentions there is a small part that is just partially preserved material from the Zemun Magistrate connected to the uprising, and is held in the Croatian State Archives in Zagreb (this is what the official website for the Hrvatski državni arhiv uses). This refers to the collection of the Zemun Brigade (militaria/ Semliner-Belgrade- Akten 1817?) and one in the archival book (one of the three preserved) Correspondence-Prothocol von 1^{ten} December 1808 bis 21^{ten} November 1809. *Grada iz zemunskih arhiva za istoriju Prvog srpskog ustanka 1804–1808*, Knj. I, XI.

now kept in a separate archive in the village of Kerestinac. We succeeded in finding the entire collection, and this particular document exists only in German. Not a single document originating from this period in this collection is written in Serbian.²¹ The Serbian version with the annotation regarding Napoleon's thoughts on Karadjordje appeared later. The document was not falsified or added to other documents in the archive. Rather, it is a translation written when the compilers published *Grade iz zemunskih arhiva za istoriju Prvog srpskog ustanka* (Documents from the Zemun Archives Related to the History of the First Serbian Uprising). Velibor Savić cited this notation in an appendix to his own document collection without any additional information, as if it were no question that he was citing a contemporary document.

In any case, this anecdote traveled from Serbia to the Austrian authorities, and according to this confidant, the Serbs themselves were dubious of it. It is telling that not even Savić, who included this quotation in his document collection and correctly stated the name of the document collection (*Grada...*) it had come from, did not reproduce it in its entirety nor did he mention it was an annotation made by the compiler or that it contained reported speech without referring to its source. It is easy to conclude from his citation that this was a document confirming what Napoleon actually said, rather than being something written by the compiler.

More than three decades after 1809, a similar statement attributed to Napoleon was recounted in an article by Jovan Hadžić published in the newspaper *Serbski ulak*. This could very well be another version of the first statement. Hadžić wrote:

It was Karadjordje who revived the deadened spirit of bravery within the Serbs, who poured a love of freedom into their hearts, and their hearts danced. Under Karadjordje, the Serbs performed such never-before-seen miracles, that word of unprecedented heroism spread far and wide, and even the powerful French emperor Napoleon was in awe and immediately imparted to his first general Berthier, "Oh, that I could meet but once with the Serbian leader Karadjordje and see him and his Serbs, with whom, considering their disproportionate means and position, he did more than I could have with my Frenchmen."²²

Jovan Hadžić (1799–1869) was still a child when Napoleon ascended the throne. If he heard any stories from his contemporaries, then he would most likely have heard them well after 1809. If it was only this anecdote he heard, it most likely would have come from the same source that started the rumors swirling around Serbia during the uprising. It is also telling that the anecdote introduced a contemporary witness, General Berthier, which suggests that perhaps Napoleon's statement might not have come to him as a rumor. If he had read about it, then it must certainly have been in a book about Napoleon, and because of the nature of this anecdote, it had to have been published in Serbian. By 1867, eight books had been published in Serbian about Napoleon,²³ of which five had been published by 1843, when Hadžić wrote his article.²⁴ Only four of these, of which three (published by 1843), can

²¹ With the exception of two in Hungarian. The rest are in German.

²² Hadžić 1843: 6–8.

²³ Novaković 1869: 95, 129, 218, 244, 317, 414, 553.

²⁴ 1. Vuić 1814 = Вунчъ, Иоакимъ, Суваровъ и Кутусовъ у царству мертвыхъ, У Пешти, 1814; 2. Slava Napoleonova = Слава Наполеонова како главнаго военачалника, У Будиму, 1814; 3. Magarašević 1822 =

be considered truly historical accounts. There is no connection made between Napoleon and the Serbs in any of these books.²⁵

* * *

However, Napoleon knew about Serbia.²⁶ The turbulent and tumultuous 1810s saw at least two changes in French policy regarding the Ottoman Empire. Animosity gave way to friendship. After its victory over the Austrians, France became a neighbor to the Ottoman Empire and took greater interest in its internal affairs. Relations with Russia, however, which would eventually become hostile, dictated that France turn its back on Serbia. At this time, perhaps the only opportunity arose to cite Napoleon's position regarding Serbia. In its struggle to become a world leader, France could not permit a Russian army on the right bank of the Danube, in Serbia. Hence Napoleon's July 1810 letter to Metternich in which he announced, "One day, Serbia must belong to Austria."²⁷ He also wrote just as explicitly to the French ambassador in Constantinople that, "...it would please me if Turkey made peace by ceding the left bank of the Danube, but if Russia were to preserve something on the right bank and if it were to interfere in matters related to the Serbs, then Russia will have reneged on its obligations to me."²⁸

At this time in Serbia, and especially during the crisis in relations with Russia a year and a half previously, the possibility of approaching France and even accepting French patronage began to be considered. Under the influence of the pragmatic Mladen Milovanović and the French Colonel Boyer, Karadjordje wrote to the French emperor on 28 August 1809 (according to the new calendar):

The glory of Your Excellency's arms and exploits has spread throughout the entire world. In your August person the people have found a savior and bringer of law. The Serbian nation wishes to be worthy of this good fortune. Monarch! Bequeath your example upon the Slavic

Магарашевић, Г. *Нове историческе памятидостойности живота Наполеона Бонапарте преведено съ немецкогъ языка*, У Будиму, Пис. Кр. Унив, 1822; 4. Simonović 1839 = Симонович, Максимъ, *Наполеонъ царь Францускій*, У Пешти, Писмени Баймелови, 1839; 5. Zuban 1843 = Зубан, Лазо, *Наполеона Бонапарта себе истога описъ Изводъ изъ собственога Бонапартова рукописа одь еднога Американца Съ нѣмачкога превео Членъ Совѣта Княж Сербіѣ*, У Београду, 1843; 6. Nenadović 1850 = Ненадовић, Љубомир П, *Наполеонъ Бонапарта или тридесетъ година изъ исторіѣ Француске Драма у VI дѣйства одь А. Дима Съ Францускогъ превео*, У Београду у книгопечатњи княжества Србскогъ, 1850; 7. Burić 1860 = Бурић, Димитрије, *Ратна начела Наполеонова Превео с Францускогъ питомацъ воене школе*, У Београду у правител книгопеч, 1860; 8. Čvarković 1867 = Чварковић, Александар, *Краљица Хортенза или црте Наполеоновогъ живота, Од Лујзе Милбах Посрбио с немачкогъ професор немачкогъ језика у вел гимн београдској*, I Свезка, У Београду у државној штампарији, 1867.

²⁵ Authors of the time saw a connection between France and Serbia during that era. For this reason, Lazo Zuban, a member of the State Council of the Principality of Serbia, when describing the concept of revolution in his 1843 biography of Napoleon, quoted the poem, "Početak bune protiv dahija" without any particular explanation, which was in fact an adapted translation of a book by an American author that was allegedly based on Napoleon's own writings - Zuban 1843: 34.

²⁶ Yannick Guillou, the author of the most recent synthesis about relations between France and the Ottoman Empire during the time of Napoleon, rarely mentions Serbia - Guillou 2021: 292, 306–309.

²⁷ Popov 2004: 371; The French Emperor even proposed that Austrian army should also take Belgrade - Popović 1933: 132.

²⁸ Popov 2004: 371.

Serbs, in which you shall find virility and faithfulness to their Benefactor; time and opportunity will justify this truth and their worthiness of being dignified as the recipients of the patronage of a great nation. With hope that your Imperial Highness will do me the highest honor of granting me His response, I remain, as ever, your most humble and obedient servant, Kara George Petrović, Supreme Leader of the Serbian people and their government.²⁹

Along with this grandiloquent letter, Karadjordje also sent Napoleon—the most powerful leader in the world—a fifteen-point “Resolution of the Serbian People,” which included some suggestions that Serbia become a French protectorate, garrisons be sent to its towns and cities, and the Serbian people, along with the peoples of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Macedonia would be loyal and fight alongside one another.

Karadjordje and Serbia had their own diplomatic representative with Napoleon. Napoleon spent October 1809 in Vienna, and at that time, the Serbian representative Rade Vučinić, a former officer serving on the Austrian Military Border, was also in the Habsburg capital. Vučinić never met with Napoleon during that time nor did he during his long five-year stay in Paris, but he established contact and correspondence with Champagny, the French minister of foreign affairs.³⁰ By the end of January 1810, Karadjordje had written a new letter to Napoleon. He also had turned to Minister Champagne and General Mariage to seek protection and mentioned the “fortune and liberty” that had been brought to many peoples by the “Great Napoleon,” including the Illyrian people, “among whom our compatriots live.”³¹ This time, Rade Vučinić was sent to Paris. Vučinić also sent General Mariage a complete plan for a Serbian state delineating the borders for the future country and listing the benefits for France as its protector, while also including some more practical requests related to the ungoing war against the Ottomans.³²

Vučinić finally arrived in Paris in late May of 1810. However, there had been no change in France’s already cautious foreign policy regarding Serbia, and the possibility for any kind of change in it had become increasingly unlikely.³³ Two months before Vučinić’s

²⁹ Popov 2004: 357–358.

³⁰ Bop 1888: 116–133, 335–383, 603–631, 91–117, 225–254; Popov 2004: 363–364.

³¹ Popov 2004: 366.

³² Popov 2004: 367.

³³ There is no mention in the historiography of a personal letter Mahmud II sent to Napoleon that was written on 26 May 1810. In it the sultan appeals for the same assistance the French emperor had offered Karadörde. Out of thousands of documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the consulates and the empire, this letter –wrapped up in a red silk bag but preserved among documents regarding Portugal and Brazil– would be the only letter the Ottoman sultan sent to the French emperor in which Karadörde was mentioned. However, when conducting research in the National Archive of France, instead of this letter (but under the same inventory number), we found another, written in 1806, in which Sultan Selim III mentioned Serbia but not Karadörde. *Lettre personnelle du sultan Mahmoud à Napoléon pour se plaindre de l'aide qu'il fournit à Karageorges* [lettre enfermée dans un sachet de soie rouge], 26. mai 1810., No. 43, Archives du pouvoir exécutif, Consulat et Secrétairerie d'État impériale. Relations extérieures, RELATIONS EXTERIEURES, AF/IV/1671 - AF/IV/1706/F, Turquie (suite), Portugal et Brasil, AF/IV/1689; *Archives du Consulat et de la Secrétairerie d'État impériale: Relations extérieures (an VIII-1815)*, Inventaire analytique (AF/IV/1671-AF/IV/1706/F), Par Ph. du Verdier, repris par I. Chave (2015) Archives nationales (France), Pierrefitte-sur-Seine XXe siècle, 389.

It showed that the French archivists compiling an inventory of documents from the time of the Empire had incorrectly read and classified the letter: It appears that “*Crno More* (Black Sea)” was read as “*Crni Dörde*

arrival, the war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire had begun anew. Politically isolated and without support from the Great Powers, the Serbian insurgents again began fighting alongside Russian troops. In the end, the first Russian detachment arrived in Serbia for the first time. Despite these developments, Captain Vučinić's mission continued. He sent memoranda to various state institutions in which he alluded to the danger the Ottomans posed to Serbia and the Illyrian provinces. He also declared the Serbian people's loyalty, claiming the Serbs had no desire to fight alongside the Russians unless forced to by a Turkish offensive. In these proposals, he also mentioned hundreds of thousands of soldiers and even more ducats for the taking. Although France had officially decided to abandon Serbia to the Habsburg Monarchy or Ottoman reprisals, the broader nuances behind the sovereign's predominantly negative position can be understood through an overview of the Serbian question sent to Napoleon by Minister Champagny. Napoleon had given the minister certain instructions the previous year, which the minister then reminded him in July 1810 that, "Your Excellency had then charged me to express our interest to the Serbian envoy and to convey your message that You '**could only look favorably upon a people that fights for its independence with so much bravery and persistence** [emphasis added],' but that Your Excellency cannot offer the Serbs any positive guarantee of Your assistance."³⁴

The emphasized portion is the most positive statement, albeit rather secondhand, that can be reliably confirmed concerning Napoleon's feelings about the Serbs— but not those concerning Karadjordje. Although somewhat reminiscent of the much more direct statement mentioned at the beginning of this article, which has since become the object of hyperbole, this diplomatically worded thought could have planted the seed that inspired it.

Napoleon did not think the Serbian Uprising should be given assistance, but in his minister's estimation, aiding the Serbs could drive a wedge between them and Russia, and then Serbia and the other Balkan peoples friendly to it might enable France to vastly increase its influence in the peninsula. This difference in opinion between the emperor and his official—who was not at all independent—may have eventually contributed to Vučinić remaining in Paris for so long. Despite not having any official position there, he would remain in Paris for four more years, even after the uprising had collapsed. An official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was tasked with keeping any eye on him. Vučinić had no money of his own, so he was periodically given financial assistance.³⁵ According to available sources, after numerous requests, Champagny was finally ready to grant him leave to return to Serbia, but it appears Napoleon had insisted he remain in France.³⁶ During this period, Napoleon had even threatened the Sublime Porte if it entered into an alliance with Great Britain by raising the possibility of losing Wallachia and Moldavia along with

(Black George)".

³⁴ Popov 2004: 372.

³⁵ Popov 2004: 373. Vučinić had received financial assistances several times in similar amounts, which in the end totaled 23,000 francs. This was a large sum of money for the time: Due to inflation caused by the 1813 war, a fish or a small chicken cost 5-6 francs. For the price of bread in Paris, see: Mansel 2003: 111; On the other hand, Napoleon's ministers were paid enormous sums, which over the years increased from 100,000 to 400,000 francs. *La Correspondance de Napoléon Ier: par ordre de l'empereur Napoléon III (1793-1815)*, Paris: Bibliothèque des Introuvables, 2002, n° 16, 223.

³⁶ Popov 2004: 373.

territory on the right bank of the Danube, including Serbia. He claimed that it would be to his liking to engage the Russian army on the lower Danube and that losing significant territories would lead to the fall of the Ottoman Empire, which was something he himself would “bitterly regret.”³⁷

During the following years, and up until 11 January 1814, Captain Vučinić wrote twice to Napoleon, fourteen times to the minister of foreign affairs, and three times to other dignitaries. He often went directly to the authorities and spoke with several functionaries.³⁸ When Napoleon II was born in March 1811, Captain Vučinić formally congratulated the emperor on the birth of his heir, saying, “I pray to God that this precious and unforgettable day for Your Excellency and His loyal subjects will also be a time of survival and good fortune for the Serbian people who, with full confidence and an unspeakable yearning, await the decision that must determine their fate.”³⁹

At that time, however, it was virtually impossible to expect any sort of change in French policy toward the Serbs. In January, the Serbian leader and the Assembly accepted Russian protection. Not even three weeks later, on 10 February 1811, a musket regiment from the Russian Imperial Army marched into Belgrade. Up until the end of the First Serbian Uprising, relations could not be altered, especially after the Grande Armée crossed the Russian border in June 1812. A month later, Russia concluded a peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire. From the perspective of international politics, the Serbian Uprising could now be stamped out. But despite all of this, and undoubtedly by the will of Napoleon himself, Captain Vučinić was still detained in Paris, and when he found himself in financial trouble, he was given rather substantial amounts of money.

* * *

In his article published in *Srbski ulak*, Jovan Hadžić does not mention a source for Napoleon’s praise. It seemed to have originated from the rumors that had been swirling around Serbia and various parts of Southern Hungary thirty years ago. However, the entrance of another player in this story may give some credence to rumors. At this time, Louis-Alexandre Berthier was one of Napoleon’s favorite marshals.⁴⁰ In a well-known biography of Berthier, there is no indication such a statement was made or, more importantly, what the source for it was.⁴¹ Frank Favier, the author of the newest biography of Berthier, says that there was no mention of such a statement regarding Karadjordje anywhere in the extensive number of archival documents or memoirs.⁴²

³⁷ Popov 2004: 373.

³⁸ Popov 2004: 374.

³⁹ Popov 2004: 374.

⁴⁰ Louis-Alexandre Berthier (1753–1815), First prince of Wagram, sovereign prince of Neuchâtel and marshal of the empire who served as war minister and chief of the imperial staff under Napoleon.

⁴¹ Favier 2015; Zieseniss 1985; Courvoisier 1959; Derrecagaix 1904–1905; There is nothing about any sort of connection between Karadorde and Napoleon or France in any of the first biographical entries for Karadorde in the French *Biographical Dictionary...* of 1834. “Czerni-George”, *Dictionnaire, biographique universel et pittoresque*, II car-gas, Paris: Aime Andre Libraire Editeur, 1834, 209.

⁴² “Cher Monsieur Antic, La Fondation vient de me transmettre votre message dont je vous remercie. En vérifiant mes archives et documents, je n’ai malheureusement pas retrouvé trace du fait que vous recherchez. Je dois m’y rendre d’ici peu et je vous tiendrai au courant de mes possibles découvertes. Bien cordialement F. Favier”.

Hadžić, however, was not the only one at the time to claim that Napoleon had given some thought to Karadjordje's actions and fate. In her book *Le Berger Roi*, published in Paris in 1845, Charlotte de Sor wrote:

'Kara-Georges, un de ces géants qui ébranlent le sol partout où ils posent le pied, et tout à la fois inhabiles à rien réédifier, à rien fonder!' disait Napoléon à Vienne en 1809, en parlant du chef de l'insurrection serbienne, qui, après vingt années de combats consacrés à l'émancipation de la patrie, n'avait pas su lui donner une forme de gouvernement stable, cette première condition de vitalité.⁴³

Even though this event occurred at the same time and in the same place and is attributed to the same person, this quotation is completely different from the two known versions. This all resembles a reconstructed rumor—an alleged anecdotal event that everyone interprets differently. Charlotte de Sor wrote this book to glorify and elevate the exiled Prince Miloš—the “Shepard King” of the book's title. It is believed that she had been strongly influenced by one of the exiled Serbian prince's supporters, which is likely where this new “anti-Karadjordje” anecdote came from.⁴⁴ A later author observed that Charlotte de Sor had presented Prince Miloš as the “Serbian Joan of Arc.”

* * *

In the absence of sources for this anecdote, most modern authors cite each other or a public encyclopedia that publishes unverified information. It is rare for one of these current articles to cite even one of these older sources. In his book about the First Serbian Uprising, Živko V. Marković cites a book by Giuseppe Barbanti-Brodano, an Italian volunteer in the first Serbo–Turkish War of 1876, in which the author recounted a much shorter version of Napoleon's praise of Karadjordje. The book, however, clearly states that Barbanti-Brodano heard this from Karadjordje's dedicated admirers in Serbia.⁴⁵

According to citations from newspaper articles, Napoleon's alleged praise of Karadjordje was reported by the *New York Times* in 1918 when reporting on an important speech by none other than the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, after a careful perusal of issues from that year's *New York Times*, it is possible to find the source but not a full quotation of the primary anecdote. In early 1918, it was highly significant that the prime minister's speech was held at the Trade Union Conference, which focused on manpower. In this wide-ranging speech on global topics, the prime minister mentioned Serbia and Montenegro, but only when pointing to the causes of the war and the

Franc Favier - Čedomir Antić, 30. 06. 2020., 16:25, (the complete correspondence is in the author's possession).

⁴³ “‘Karadžorđe, one of the colossuses who shake the earth wherever they trod, yet simultaneously incapable of even raising a banner once more!’ said Napoleon in Vienna in 1809 when speaking about the Serbian Uprising, which after twenty years of fighting for the liberation of their homeland, was not in any position to offer a stable government—the first condition for a robust state” - de Sor 1845: 6.

⁴⁴ Popov 2004: 398–399.

⁴⁵ Barbanti-Brodano 1877: 104; Ristić 2020: 150–151.

⁴⁶ “Napoleon je hvalio Karađorđa, a NY Times je ovako izveštavao o tome!”, *Espresso.rs*, 06.08.2016, (<https://www.espresso.rs/vesti/drustvo/61857/napoleon-je-hvalio-karadjordja-a-ny-times-je-ovako-izvestavao-o-tome>, accessed 9 April 2021).

importance of restoring them. The reaction to the speech from the Serbian government-in-exile was negative, which is why Lloyd George was more reserved when speaking about restoring the occupied countries. It was for this reason that he clearly stated that the Allied powers were “not fighting to destroy Austria–Hungary.” In a letter to the editor published in the *New York Times* three days later, Vojislav M. Petrović, Chief of the Slavonic Division at the New York Public Library, commented very highly on the speech. Among other things, he wrote:

History is crowded with diplomatic triumphs. At least British history is. Napoleon’s victories have vanished just like the powder from his guns; what remained good from him is Code Napoleon. Good Generals are most often impossible diplomats. The maker of Serbia, Kara-George Petrovitch, the grandfather of our King Peter, was, relatively speaking and in the opinion of Napoleon himself, the greatest General of all times and nations; but he lost all through bad management of foreign relations.⁴⁷

What clearly emerges is that, according to this commentary also, Lloyd George did not mention Karadjordje. Petrović did. It is true that Lloyd George often mentioned Napoleon in speeches and in his memoirs.⁴⁸ An analysis of his speeches and writings in both contemporary newspapers and his published memoirs does not reveal that Lloyd George ever connected Napoleon with Serbia or Karadjordje. Based on all of this, it appears this quote originated with Petrović.⁴⁹ He brings up Karadjordje in his letter as “the grandfather

⁴⁷ Petrovitch 1918 advises South Slavs to trust in peace plans of Allies, as result of Lloyd George’s reference to Serbia and Austria–Hungary in his statement of Britain’s war aims.

⁴⁸ In his 1918 War Memoirs, Lloyd George mentions Napoleon six times - Lloyd George 1937: 21, 28, 137, 164, 345, 354.

⁴⁹ Vojislav M. Petrović (Vojislav Maximus Petrovich, 1885–1934) was a Serbian diplomat, philologist, and historian. Before and during the First World War, Petrović served as press attaché for the consulate of the Kingdom of Serbia in London. While living in Britain during the first phase of the Great War, he published a book about Serbia in English - Petrovitch 1915. Unlike most books of the time, this one went through numerous reprints, starting with the second edition of 1923 and ending with the editions published in 2007 and 2014. His book on Serbian folk tales and heroes is also very well known - Petrovich 1942. Along with books about Serbian grammar, he also translated the drama *Balkanska carica* (Empress of the Balkans) by King Nikola I of Montenegro into English. He moved to the United States with Čedomilj Mijatović. He was employed for some time at the New York Public Library, and he was an active public intellectual in New York City. He also wrote a few entries for the 1918 *Encyclopedia Americana*. Petrović’s restlessness was on full display in the US. He was employed by the library in early 1917 to replace Herman Rosenthal, the previous head of the Slavonic Division who had died unexpectedly. Petrović only served as head until the end of the year. By the time his letter was published in the *New York Times*, he was no longer employed at the library. In August 1917, he married Vera Winger, an American from North Dakota. Nine months later, their tumultuous divorce became a topic in American newspapers, including the *New York Times*. What is also interesting—and also relevant to his credibility—is that after the war he became one of a number of political émigrés. Despite claiming during his divorce that he had fought in the Serbian army “in one of the bloodiest battles of the war,” that all of his property in occupied Serbia had been confiscated, and that he had lost thirty-two of his relatives during that period, after 1918, he quickly threw his lot in with Croatian nationalists and emigrant loyalists to the Montenegrin king allegedly due to his Montenegrin descent. Just before his death—and it was never clear if it was murder or by suicide—he wrote a document called “The History of the Black Hand and the Great War.” Milan Jovanović-Stojimirović (2008: 721) described him as a gifted polyglot who was also weak, impressionable, and prone to drinking. He left London after the war, allegedly for bigamy. He later left

of our king” without making any connection between Lloyd George’s speech and Napoleon’s alleged opinion.

* * *

Clearly, this well-known quotation of Napoleon’s praise of Karadjordje came from rumors in Serbia. It also appears that not even those in Serbia who heard it thought it was particularly credible. It is highly significant that the quote itself does not exist in any German-language documents written for the Austrian government, on which the Serbian translation with the notation from the compiler was then based. It is possible the reason behind the dissemination of this praise lies first and foremost in the motives of the person who wrote it and included it as a notation from an unidentified compiler in the documents published from the Zemun archives. Was it an attempt to “do justice” to Karadjordje and the Serbian people and “confer on them a well-deserved yet forgotten honor”? We can never know for sure, but could such motives also be those of a sidelined historian, such as Tanasije Ž. Ilić, who had been removed from his position due to alleged collaboration with the Nedić quisling government of Serbia during World War II? It is telling that the diligent and meticulous Velibor Savić did not consider it necessary to critique this document nor did he present or explain the source of the quotation. He simply presented it as an indisputable statement made by Napoleon.

The more precise anecdote given by Jovan Hadžić seems to indicate something did happen in Vienna, and perhaps Napoleon did in fact say something about Karadjordje.⁵⁰ After all, there is also the 1810 report in which Champangy reminded his emperor that he had said he “could only look favorably upon a people that fights for its independence with so much bravery and persistence.” It should also be noted that Napoleon’s praise of Karadjordje was not mentioned in any book published in Serbian during this period. This praise was not recored by anyone present at the time, no historians of the French court ever

Belgrade in 1929 under suspicion of being a foreign agent, only to reappear in various South American capitals where he presented himself as a diplomat on a special mission and swindled the people he met for his own material gain. Jovanović-Stojimirović says he was born in Niš in 1878 and died in 1930. He also mentions his nickname, “Gramatikus.”

⁵⁰ It is quite possible that all the sources for Napoleon’s praise originated from rumors that had spread throughout Serbia in 1809. However, so many sources and retellings do raise a small possibility that at one point Napoleon may have said something favorable about Karadorđe, which was later blown out of proportion by secondhand sources for a number of reasons. To date, a primary source confirming its authenticity has never been found, and it is almost certain that it either never existed, or if it did, it now no longer does. Nevertheless, the broad range of secondary sources makes it difficult to completely dismiss the possibility of its existence, as some authors such as Dejan Ristić have. As he writes, “There is not even the slightest dilemma that Napoleon I never uttered such praise or flattery regarding Karadorđe that was then attributed to him without question at the end of the century in which he lived, and which was then revived and embellished by a few publicists in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries” - Ristić 2020: 154. In this rather unclear sentence (which should probably have begun with, “There is not even the slightest *possibility* that that Napoleon I ever uttered...), Ristić shows that he had not read the document published in *Grada iz zemunskih arhiva...*, because if he had, he would have realized the compiler’s annotation was connected to contemporary rumors and that, despite being incorrect practice, the insertion was not completely unrelated to the contents of the original document. Subsequently, he did not consider Minister Champangy’s July 1810 report, or Jovan Hadžić’s later article and Charlotte de Sor’s suggestion, which are decades older than Giuseppe Barbanti-Brodano’s book.

encountered it, and no biographer of either Napoleon or Berthier has ever mentioned any such praise of the Serbian leader. Stories about Napoleon's opinion of Karadjordje had probably circulated for thirty years after they were first heard in Serbia, which is how they reached Hadžić and Charlotte de Sor. Although unreliable, Petrović did not add anything to the stories that have apparently persisted in Serbia even a century later. By then they could have been heard by a boy named Tanasije Ž. Ilić, later a learned historian in the old tradition, who curated the materials in the Zemun archives connected to the First Serbian Uprising.

Petrović commented positively on Lloyd George's speech in which he mentioned Serbia while inserting his own claim that Napoleon had considered Karadjordje to be "the greatest general of all time." It is interesting to note that each commentator had his or her own interpretation of this anecdote: Hadžić tried to emphasize the importance of Karadjordje's achievements. Charlotte de Sor wrote of the impermanence of Karadjordje's deeds, while Petrović wrote of the ephemeral nature of Napoleon and Karadjordje's achievements. Petrović's letter shows how using an authoritative source such as the *New York Times* can easily reawaken fame. In our current age of an information revolution, a letter about Lloyd George, one of the most significant politicians of his time (who also often mentioned Napoleon), along with a statement about Napoleon's judgment of Karadjordje as an additional argument in favor of the Serbian people, has breathed new life into an unsubstantiated claim.

Translated by *Elizabeth Salmore*

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НАПОЛЕОН, КАРАЂОРЂЕ И СЛАВА НАЈВЕЋЕГ ВОЈСКОВОЂЕ

Резиме

Ова студија је посвећена наводној изјави француског цара Наполеона Првог, према којој је Карађорђе, вожд Србије и предводник Првог српског устанка, велики војсковођа, већи и од њега самог. Ова изјава је цитирана у српској јавности, француској литератури, аустријским државним документима и чак на страницама Њујорк Тајмса.

Постоји пет различитих извора ове наводне Наполеонове изјаве. Они су анализирани у овом раду. Према расположивим изворима Наполеон никада није непосредно споменуо Карађорђа. Вероватно је, према одређеним наводима, да је француски цар о српском војду разговарао са сардницима и изразио се похвално и са дивљењем о српском ратном напору. Управо су власти устаничке Србије имале интерес да ове гласине прошире како би оправдали и ојачали своју привремену политику приближавања Француској. Ипак, каснија препричавања и рационализације, те коначно непотпун и прогрешан начин објављивања једног аустријског документа из 1809. године, учинили су да ова навода анегдота почне да буде прихватана као истинита.

Кључне речи: Наполеон, Карађорђе, Јован Хаџић, Велибор Берко Савић, 1809. година, Ваграм, Беч, Војислав М. Петровић.

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ECCLESIASTICAL VISITATIONS OF SLOVAK EVANGELICAL CONGREGATIONS IN BAČKA, SREM, AND BANAT IN 1835 AND 1836*¹

Abstract: The first ecclesiastical visitation of Evangelicals in Bačka-Srem and Banat Seniorates took place in 1798, after which followed visitations in 1810 and in 1818. This paper will focus on subsequent visitations of Slovak Evangelical congregations in these regions conducted by superintendent Ján Seberíni during the years 1835 and 1836. These two Evangelical seniorates were part of the Banský dištrikt/superintendature based in Banská Bystrica and had approximately the same number of Slovak and German congregations. The visitation returns provide a great deal of information that has not been fully made use of in the historiography. This paper will analyze only Slovak Evangelical congregations.

Keywords: Evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession, Slovaks, Banský dištrikt/superintendancy, Bačka-Srem Seniorat, Banat Seniorat, ecclesiastical visitation, confessional schools.

The Slovaks began settling in the region that is now modern-day Vojvodina during Empress Maria Theresa's planned colonization in the 1740s, first Bačka in the Futog Estate (in Petrovec in 1745), Kulpín around the same time,¹ and later Kysáč in 1773, and in other settlements), then Srem (Stará Pazova in 1770) and Banat (Aradáč in 1786, Kovačica in 1802, and Padina in 1806).² Until the 1781 Patent of Toleration (*Toleranzpatent*) was issued, the Evangelicals in these areas were not permitted to establish

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¹ The returns from this visitation states that the first Slovaks arrived in Petrovec in 1740, which was inhabited by Serbs, and in Kulpín around 1743.

² The dates given come from the returns from this visitation. For more on the immigration of Slovaks to Bačka, Banat and Srem see Ján Sirácky (1980).

congregations or parishes and were under the jurisdiction of the Roman Catholic Church.³

In 1779, Evangelical Slovaks in Petrovec were first permitted a school teacher for their religion in the school, in addition to the Roman Catholic teacher (1779), who also performed the duty of a chaplain who led prayers and could perform some religious rites, including baptism and burial. The first pastor came in 1783. The first school teacher came to Kysáč in 1785, and the first pastor in 1788.⁴ Until parishes were established, some settlements only had prayer halls that were most often in the school (Petrovec, Kysáč, Kulpín). After parishes were established, the first Evangelical churches were built in Petrovec in 1783, in Kysáč in 1795, in Stará Pazova in 1786–1792, etc.

Visitation returns were created as ecclesiastical documents primarily to fulfill the needs of the church. The higher church authorities who inspected congregations in their area kept detailed records that are of special importance for church history. However, they also are of much broader value because they offer detailed information about the state of religious buildings, church inventories, the parishioners, church officials, and the population in general, schools, teachers, cemeteries, church holidays, and customs. As primary sources, they often also contain important information about the parishioners' morality and daily life, social and economic relations, farm yields, grain prices, and construction work on church and secular buildings.

In the Bačka–Srem Seniorat, there were Slovak Evangelical congregations in the towns and villages of Bajša, Hložany, Kysáč, Kulpín, Lalit', Nový Sad, Petrovec, Pivnica, Selenča, Silbaš, and Stará Pazova, and in the Banat Seniorat in Aradáč, Butín, Hajdušica, Kovačica, Padina and Vuková. Both of these seniorats were part of the Banský dištrikt centered in Banská Bystrica.⁵ A review and brief analysis of the records of the 1836 visitation to the Banat Seniorat was compiled by György Kurutz.⁶

As part of the preparations for the ecclesiastical visitation of 1835/1836, the Banská superintendancy sent all the pastors of these two seniorats a survey with questions to be answered within a formal document. The compiled report was submitted to the superintendent Ján Seberíni (1780–1857) and the committee conducting the visitation.⁷ All documentation, visitation returns, survey answers from individual pastors, and the commission's remarks were written in Latin. These records are kept at the Lutheran Central Archives in Budapest (EOL)⁸ and are available online.⁹ Some records also included

³ The first registries for the Slovaks in Petrovec and Kysáč were kept by the Roman Catholic parish in Futog.

⁴ The register of marriages in Petrovec lists group weddings Kysáč performed by the pastor from the main parish in Petrovec.

⁵ This was a territorial and administrative unit created based on a 1734 imperial resolution. From the time they were established, the Bačka-Srem and Banat seniorats were part of the Banský Dištrikt.

⁶ Kurucz 2010: 193–208.

⁷ The full title of the document is *Schema Visitationis Canonicae Anno 1835 per Inclitum ac Venerabilem Senioratum Bacs-Sirmiensem instituendae* and is transcribed in the book *Protocollum Intimatorum et Curentialium Ecclesiae A. C. Addictorum Vetero-Pazoviensis ab Anno 1826. Volume VIII* in the Central Archives of the Slovak Evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession based in Stará Pazova.

⁸ Evangélicus Országos Levéltár, Budapest

⁹ The minutes of the Bačka-Srem Seniorate are available on the website:

https://library.hungaricana.hu/en/view/Banyai_04_1835_Bacs_Szerem/?query=1835%20B%C3%A1cs-Szer%C3%A9mi%20egy%C3%A1lzmegye&pg=0&layout=s

vocators, or contracts written in Slovak,¹⁰ Latin, and German between congregations and pastors and teachers regarding their remuneration, which were.

In this paper, we will review the questions from the 1835/1836 ecclesiastical visitation of the Slovak Evangelical congregations. Since the 18th century, the content of these questions was very similar to those of canonical visitations conducted by Roman and Greek Catholics in this region.¹¹ Surviving returns from canonical visitation to some parishes in the Archbishopric of Karlovci in the mid-18th century are very short and usually only provide information about the number of pastors and their names, funds paid by congregations to the diocese, the number of congregants, names of church tutors and teachers, if there were schools in the village, and the number of students.¹²

Drawing from our analysis of the visitation returns from these Slovak congregations and the attached responses from the pastors, we will present and then interpret their content. We focused particularly on what was previously unknown in the historiography of the Slovaks in this area, which will allow us to contribute to and correct current understandings and perspectives. We will also look at the similarities and differences in the congregations' responses.

The visitation was planned ahead of time with an exact date set for the commissions visit to each individual congregation. As an introduction, a motto from the Holy Bible was proposed to set the theme for the sermon at the service that would begin the visitation. The Questions (*Schema Visitationis Canonicae*) has eleven chapters marked with roman numerals¹³ and is divided into sections marked with arabic numerals and uppercase and lowercase Latin letters. Following The local pastors gave their answers to The Questions in the return. Some of the returns had between twelve and eighteen handwritten pages, depending on how detailed the answers were and on the document itself.

The beginning of each report contains general information about the congregation,

The minutes of the Banat Seniorate are available on the website: https://library.hungaricana.hu/en/view/Banyai_05_1836_Bansag/?query=1936%20b%C3%A1ns%C3%A1gi&pg=0&layout=s

¹⁰ *Biblická čeština* (Biblical Czech) was a standardized variant of the Czech language. It was officially recognized and accepted as the liturgical (and official) language of the Slovak Evangelical Church in Hungary by the decision of the Evangelical Synod, the legislative and highest body of the Evangelical Church in 1610 and 1614. For more see: Obšust, Kuzmanović: 2019: 74–76). In the region of Vojvodina, the lexis and grammar of the language was influenced by Slovak, as was its pronunciation, and it took on the softness and accent of the local Slovak dialects. As a result, some authors refer to it as the biblical Slovak language (Botík 2016: 68).

¹¹ In the 1830s, canonical visitations of Catholic parishes in Vojvodina were performed by the Roman Catholic Diocese of Đakovo (1833) and the Greek Catholic Eparchy of Križevci (1838). For the canonical visitation of their congregations, the Diocese of Đakovo sent a forty-seven-page survey with space next to each question where answers could be written (Šršan 2007: XV–XVI). The returns of the 1838 canonical visitation by Greek Catholics in Bačka and Srem contains reports for three congregations in Bačka (Krstur, Kucura, Nový Sad) and two in Srem (Šid and Petrovci). In addition to the questions, short answers were immediately written in the record. Only the appendix to the record of the parish in Krstur (now Ruski Krstur) contains more information about the financial state of the parish and the school (Ramač 2020).

¹² Ninković 2019: 19–49; Ninković 2020: 53–86.

¹³ Records in all Evangelical Church communities were structured according to the following: I. Congregation, II. Political and economic situation of the congregation, III. Internal, moral, and religious condition of the congregation, IV. Priestly duty, V. School, VI. Midwives, VII. Gravediggers, VIII. Charitable institutions, IX. Annual devotions, X. Notes and complaints, XI. Proposal to eliminate specific bad habits.

including how and when it was founded, which is mostly known in the historiography of Slovaks in this area and found in monographs about Slovak villages in Vojvodina and in other literature.¹⁴ Next, the most significant changes in the congregation since the last visitation in 1818 were listed, which most often involved the arrival of new pastors or schoolteachers. The records, presented in Table 1, provide basic statistics about the parishes and their affiliate congregations; the number of congregants, their gender and confirmation status; and the number of people born, deceased, married, and confirmed in the previous year.

Congregation (year founded)	Congregants	Confirmed	Confirmed in 1834	Married couples	Mixed marriages	Births	Marriages	Deaths
Bajša (1786)	1245	450		295	2	63	12	38
Hložany (1785)	1537	990	30	366	2	152	33	111
*Čelarevo affiliate	203	133		52	2			
*Palanka affiliate	311	190		71	2			
*Begeč affiliate	114	69		24				
*Congregants on the other side of the Danube	247			60				
Kysáč (1788)	2060	1118	70	489		129	38	69
*Rumenka affiliate	107							
Kulpín (1818)	1100	656	32	263	1	60	14	66
Lalič (1817)	880	402	27	165	1	27	16	16
Nový Sad (1812)	513	252	13	119	32	27	9	39
Petrovec (1783)	5031	2500	114	1106	2	290	84	277
Pivnica (1792)	1635	956	39	323	2	103	26	80
Selenča (1768/1787)	1149	693	61	269	1	74	21	72
Silbaš (1786)	450							
Stará Pazova (1770)	2631	896	53	629	5	145	62	136
Aradáč ¹⁵ (1786)	1738	110	56	371	7	84	26	67
Butín (1814)	714	472	27	163	4	39	13	41
Hajdušica (1829)	536	358	21	151	0	30	11	22
Kovačica (1802)	2160	1365	82	470	1	116	22	107
Padina (1806)	2525	1605	63	542	1	112	40	70
Vuková (1832)	350	242		84		10		6
Affiliates: Dragšina, Veľký Keveš, Buziáš, Dragoest, Netzkefalva, Vermeš, Blažova, Topolovetz, Teš, Lukarec, Szinerseg, Bolduš, Magyar Szákos, Barbotz, Lugoš, Ferdinandsberg, Rusberg, Karansebeš. Number of congregants in Vuková including its affiliates: 836.								

Table 1: Statistics for the congregations and their branches.

¹⁴ Čaplovič 1928; Sirácky 1980; Botík 2011; Sklabinská, Mosnáková 2012; Vereš 1930; Vojničová-Feldyová 2017.

¹⁵ Together with congregants from Elemir, Bečej, and Melenci.

Pastors provided this information based on registry books and lists of congregants. There were few mixed marriages among Evangelicals (0.052%), and only with the Reformed or with Roman Catholics. The records do not state if Evangelical men or women were more likely to enter into mixed marriages.¹⁶ There is no information regarding apostates. There are some reports of deaths during the 1831 cholera epidemic, including the deaths of ninety-five congregants and a pastor named Juraj Rohoň in Hložany,¹⁷ 390 people in Petrovec, and 130 in Aradáč. There was a serious drought in Aradáč in 1794, which was recorded as a “hungry year,” during which grain harvests and wine production throughout Banat were very poor.

Information about the construction of churches and their external and internal appearances is given in detail. Some records relate the enthusiasm congregants had for building new churches and how generously they donated money, goods, and their own work. Smaller congregations sometimes turned to the upper classes and the wealthy, such as landowners, for assistance. In 1820, the congregation in Bajša sent delegates to other seniorats who then sent assistance. These included the landowners Georgije Zako, who was Orthodox, and Matija Vojnić, who was Catholic, who provided funds for the construction of an Evangelical church. In 1824, Vasilije Stratimirović, a landowner from Kulpín, left 20,000 baked bricks in his will for the construction of a church. In Aradáč, some county officials and wealthy people also contributed to the construction of an Evangelical church. As a rule, congregations with a larger number of congregants also had larger churches, as measured in *hvats* (hv):¹⁸ Petrovec, 25x11x25 hv.; Kovačica, 22x9.5 hv.; Stará Pazova, 20x6 hv. and one foot. Inscriptions or chronograms were sometimes placed above the front door or inside the church.

Lists of church inventory most often included religious items such as cups, bowls, ciboria, cruets, candlesticks, altar cloths and covers, albs, altar knives, bells, etc. Cups and other items were usually gold- or silver-plated and engraved with the name of the congregation, the year of purchase, and sometimes the name of the donor. The books most commonly used in the church were the Bible, Kreuzberg’s *Meditations*,¹⁹ Palumbini’s book of prayers,²⁰ and Plachý’s *Agenda* (official Slovak liturgy).²¹ In Petrovec, in addition these, there were also

¹⁶ Among the Ruthenians in Bačka and Srem during this period, more women than men entered into mixed marriages, mostly with Orthodox Serbs, much more often than men - Ramač 2007: 255–270.

¹⁷ Other variants: Rohoni, Rohony, Rohoniy.

¹⁸ The *hvat* is an ancient measurement of length equal to 1.896 m; The smaller measurements used were the foot (32cm) and the thumb (2.6 cm).

¹⁹ Kreuzberg, Amadeus: *Pobožná Přemyslowánj na každý den celého Roku, w njchž se wěrný Ewangelický Křestanskze nábožné rozgimánj vybraných Řečj Pjsma Sw. a vraucý Modlitbu probuzuge a potěssuge. Z Nemeckého Gazyka w Slowenský preložena skrze Balthazare Pongrátz. V Presspurku 1783. V Frant. Aug. Patzko.*

²⁰ Palumbini Ondre: *Nowý Modlitebnj Poklad k službám Chrámowým Wssednjm, Nedělnjm a Swátečnjm, y ke wssem celého roku, a gakowéhokoli losu lidského, potřebám, co neypřjhodněgi, gakož gedenkaždý pastýř wěřjčjch, genž mocý pomázánj swého modlitebnjkem gestiit, pořádati může, přiměřený, skrze Dwogctihodného... wětssjm djlem wypracowaný a na swětlo wydaný. W Pessti 1823. Pjsmem Jana Tomáse Trattnera z Petróce.*

²¹ Plachý, Ondrej: *Agenda Ecclesiastica Slavonica August. Conf. addictorum In extractu Propter majorem V. D. Ministros rum harmoniam. Accedit Brevi-Extractus Ritualis Hungarici et Germanici. Neosolii MDCCCLXXXIX. Typis Joannis Jos. Tumleri.*

Sartori's *Biblický denník*²² and *Postilla*,²³ Plachý's *Kochánj v Bohu*²⁴, *Poklad modlitebný* by Jakobaei,²⁵ Blaho's *Kázne*,²⁶ Kollár's *Kázne*,²⁷ and Tranovský's *Knihá spevov*.²⁸

When churches were initially built, the bell towers were sometimes made of wood and were often built next to the church or were built sometime later. For example, the church in Bajša was built in 1820 followed by the bell tower in 1827. At the church in Petrovec, there is a balcony with an iron fence on the bell tower under the clock. Two, three, or (rarely) four bells of different weights or sizes were hung in or on the bell tower. The bells were usually inscribed with engravings stating when and how the bell was procured and who cast it. The bell casters mentioned are, among others, Heinrich Eberhard and Johann Kohl of Budapest, Michael Joseph Egardner of Timisoara, and Therezia Scheichelin of Vienna.

Revenues were collected in a similar way in all congregations: during services with a bell, as charitable donations on yearly holidays or voluntary contributions, and for ringing bells at funerals. In addition, lectical donations were collected from married couples in cash or in dues in kind according to certain stipulations. For example, each married couple in Bajša gave thirty kreuzers a year; in Kulpín one forint and twenty-one kreuzers for the salaries of pastors and teachers; in Kysáč every married couple and everyone who used a quarter of a land *sessio* contributed a third of a Pest grain measure.²⁹ Some congregations had different annual revenues,

²² Sartorius, Daniel: *Diarium Biblicum aneb Hystorye Biblické Starého y Nowého Zákona, wedle Počtu Dnů celého roku vybrané a napařád trogim sumownjm Včenjm a rytmownim Přemyslowánjm wyswětlené, gak k rozsřfenj Sláwy Boha Neywysřho tak Mládeži Křestanské a Lidu sprostěgssjmu k vřitečnému wzdělánj, s wěrnau bedliwostj sepsané a s Přjdwkem Hystorye o konečné Zkázě Města Geruzalema na swětlo wydané*. B. m. Wytisstené L. P. 1744.

²³ Sartorius, Daniel: *Summownj Postylka na wssecky Dny Nedělnj y Swátečnj w Roce, dwogjm Kázanjm Ewangelickým y Epistolickým k Rannj y Nesspornj Nábožnosti Domownj zaopatřená: w njžto Každý zpořádaný Text po dwogj kratičké Předmluwě na tři Částky rozdělený, we wssj vpřimné Sprostosti se wyswětluge a k tomu Spasytedlné Naučenj, Horliwé Naprawenj a Pronikawé Potěssenj, wssudy napařad se připoguge: K Sláwě Neyswětěgssjho Gmena Božjho a Dussj po Slowu geho srdečně taužicých prospessnému Wzdělánj na swětlo wydaná od ——. B. m. 1746. Dwa Djly.*

²⁴ Sturm, Christoph Christian: *Kochánj s Bohem w Rannjch Hodinách, na každý den w Roku od - - sepsané. A skrze Ondřege Plachý z nemecké Ržeči k wsseobecnému wzdělánj, podlé nowé naprawené Edýcyi, přeložené. Dwa díly*. W B. Bystricy 1790. Wytisstené v J. Jozefa Tumlera, král. přiv. Kněhotiskár (translated by Ondrej Plachý).

²⁵ Jakobaei, Pavel: *We Gmeno Trogice Swaté! Duchownjch Modliteb Poklad, obsahugjcy w sobě Modlitby Křestanské horliwé a nábožné gak Swátečnj, Nedělnj, Wssednj, tak též y k wsselikému Času a k rozličným Potřebám obecným y obzwlásstnjm slaužjcy. K sláwě Božj a k wzdělánj Cyrkwe, z mnohých Modlitebných Knižek shromážená a na swětlo wydaná od ——. W Žitawě 1732. Wytisstené nákladem Wáclawa Kleycha u Michala Hartmanna.*

²⁶ Blaho, Matúš: *Nábožná Kázanj na wssecky Neděle a ewangelické Swátky celého cýrkewnjho roku, z částky z ewangelických, z částky z epistolických obyčegnjch Textů wypracowána, a na žádost mnohých ku wsseobecnému wzdelánj wydaná. Dwa díly*. W Lewoči 1828. Wytisstená v Jana Werthmüllera.

²⁷ Kollár, Ján: *Nábožné Kázanj při Slawnostech Welikonočnjch roku 1826 s připogenu modlitbau, držané we chrámě ewang. Cjrkwe Pesstansko-Budjnské*. Wydané od Poslucháčů. W Pessti 1826. Pjsmem Matěge Trattnera z Petroce.

²⁸ Tranovský, Juraj: *Cithara sanctorum. Pjsně Duchownj Staré y Nowé, křerýchž Cýrkew Křestianská při Wýročnjch Slawnostech a Památkách, Gakož y we Wsselikých Potřebách swých obecných y obzwlásstnjch s mnohým prospěchem vřjwá: K njmž přidaný gsau Pjsně Dra Martina Luthera wssecky z Nemecké Rečj do nassj Slowenské přeložené. Od Kněze Gřjčka Tranowského, Služebnjka Páně, při Cýrkwi Swato-Mikulassské w Liptowě*. Wytisstené w Lewoči 1638.

²⁹ A Pest measure is 94 liters.

depending on the number of members and established quotas for giving. For example, in Petrovec, the revenue in 1834 was 4085 forints and nine kreuzers with expenses totaling 4,053 forints and five kreuzers in Viennese currency. In Kysáč in 1834, 965 forints were spent and 4,152 forints remained in the coffers. In Padina, the income in 1835 was 10,000 forints in conventional currency with 2,000 forints in expenditures. The church authorities required the pastors to keep in order the archives, church books, documents, registries, inventory and accounting records, and protocol registers. In their remarks, the visitation commission alerted parishes about perceived shortcomings and gave strict instructions for these be rectified. In the parish archive in Petrovec, in addition to the usual documents, older documents have been preserved that describe the beginnings of the congregation and the construction of the church. The chronicle was kept by a pastor named Ján Stehlo.³⁰

Particular attention was given to the state of the cemetery—whether it was fenced off to keep out livestock, who made use of the grass cut from it, and who took care of it and how. If the cemetery had no more room for burial plots, the commission would recommend that the congregation secure a new space for burials. In accordance with general sanitation regulations in the Habsburg Monarchy, Evangelical cemeteries were always located outside the settlement, as was also the case for other denominations.

In Kulpín, money from the sale of cemetery grass went to the congregation's treasury. In Kysáč, the cemetery grass was used by the sexton, who also protected the cemetery from roving livestock. In Petrovec, revenue from the grass from one cemetery went to the bell ringer, and that from the other cemetery went to the congregation. Only Kysáč had an official gravedigger who was also the bell ringer. In other Evangelical communities, graves were dug by friends or relatives of the deceased according to the prescribed depth and sequence.

Specific questions were asked about the affiliate congregations: Did they have a prayer hall? A school? How was the school attendance? and so on. Only a few parishes had official affiliate congregations, and each had a certain number of congregants nearby or in the wider surroundings. The parish in Hložany had affiliates in Čelarevo (203 congregants), Palanka (311 congregants), and Begeč (114 congregants), along with a considerable number of congregants scattered across several settlements across the Danube in Srem (Čerević, Banoštor, Grabar, Sviloš, Susek, Neštin, Ilok, and others). According to incomplete data from local notaries, there were a total of 247 Evangelical Slovaks and sixty married couples in these settlements. There was an Evangelical cemetery in Palanka, and in Čelarevo and Begeč the cemetery was shared with Orthodox Serbs. The congregation in Vuková (Temeš-Vukovár) had eighteen affiliates, the most in the region. The main congregation in Vuková had 350 congregants and 486 more in the affiliates, of which fifteen Vuková, and fifty-six in the branches were nobles.

The Slovak Evangelical community in Silbaš was an affiliate of the German parish of Buljkes³¹ and had a prayer hall and a confessional school. Bajša had an affiliate in Topola, which was mostly inhabited by Germans who were said to be rather demoralized due to frequent relocations and, furthermore, were considerably intolerant of the Hungarian villagers.

³⁰ Sztchlo, Joannes: *Historia Ecclesiae Aug. Evang. Petováz Statistico-Ecclesiastica*. 1818. Ján Stehlo, an Evangelical pastor, kept this chronicle from 1818–1862. The manuscript has 320 pages of text and a four-page index. It is kept in the Archives of the Evangelical Church in Báčsky Petrovec.

³¹ Maglič after 1949.

The Evangelical Community in Kulpín was an affiliate of Petrovec from 1783 to 1821, when it became a parish. Kysáč had an affiliate in Novi Piroš.³² The Evangelical Community in Lalit' was initially an affiliate of the Selenča parish, but from 1817 it was an independent parish. The parish in Aradáč did not have any affiliates, but it had congregants in Turkish Bečej/Franjevo,³³ Melenci, and Elemir. Stará Pazova had an affiliate in Nova Pazova, where there were Germans, until it became independent in 1821.

Another chapter dealt with the congregation's political and economic circumstances. Congregations in Bačka did not officially have an inspector to monitor their revenue and expenses, but in the Military Frontier, this carried out by the Frontier authorities.³⁴ As in other religious congregations, Evangelical congregations' revenues and expenses were managed by a steward, a layman chosen by the community for a period of one year. His obligations were also to collect lectical donations from congregants in money and dues in kind. Despite his many duties, the steward's salary was usually small. It could be a pair of new, as in Hložany and Lalit', or one pair of new shoes and one pair of and repaired ones, as in Pivnica, or sometimes a sheepskin coat and pants, as in Kysáč. In Kysáč, Petrovec, and Pivnica, in accordance with the dispensations granted to congregations and the clergy, the steward and the sexton, were exempt from unpaid labor (*robot*), transporting goods for the landowner, and lectical donations. In Petrovec, the steward and the sexton were paid 30 kreuzers per workday, and they would receive a salary of five forints a year. Since the steward was not usually well-enough educated, the communities' revenues and expenses were entered in the account register by the local pastor. Money was kept in a lockbox on the parish grounds and was usually secured with two locks and two keys, one of which was kept by the steward and the other by the sexton. In addition to daily bell ringing, ringing for Sunday services and prayer, announcing a death, and ringing for the funeral,³⁵ the bell ringers had other duties such as, for example, serving as the night watchman (Hložany).

As a rule, each congregation had a constituted presbytery.³⁶ According to established practice, the presbytery was required to meet at the very beginning of January to review the congregation's revenues and expenditures, and if necessary, other prominent members of the congregation would often also be invited to the meeting. In smaller congregations, all adult men could attend such meetings. This practice demonstrates the important role Evangelical congregants had in overseeing the congregation's income and expenditures. Some communities, however, did not have an elected presbytery. One example is Stará Pazova, which had only assessors, a total of 30, who were appointed by the congregation, and invited to a meeting, if necessary. In Aradáč, the presbytery also acted as the village magistrate because only Evangelicals lived in the village.

Unlike the provinces, in the Military Frontier, there were different rules and practices for ordering public and social life. The authorities in the Military Frontier were responsible for everything, including auditing congregations' finances. The revenues and expenditures

³² Rumenka after 1922.

³³ Novi Bečej after 1952.

³⁴ Štefan Leška, a pastor in Stará Pazova, was active as a publicist, and among other things he published newspaper articles about the life of the Slovak population in the Military Frontier - Leška 1843: 77–93.

³⁵ More about ringing in Kysáč: Surový 2013: 263–269.

³⁶ An executive body consisting of spiritual and elected lay representatives of the congregation.

of all congregations, including the Evangelical communities, were managed by the regiment and its military company. In Stará Pazova, the Evangelical congregation's lockbox was kept with the regiment's lockbox, but the congregation's accounts were kept both by the steward and the pastor. Money was kept in a lockbox with three locks and one key held by the steward, another by the military company, and the third by the company commander. This congregation had two sextons who assisted the pastor in the church, maintained the church and the churchyard, readied the organ, led singing in church and at funerals in the absence of a schoolteacher, cultivated parish land, prepared the Host, and in autumn used their own cart to collect lectical income in grain and other forms from the congregants. Each year they received twenty-five Viennese forints, a pair of shoes, and an assigned basket for donations from congregants that was passed around in church during important holidays. In Kovačica, the Frontier authorities served as inspectors and audited the Evangelical congregation's finances. This was the same in Padina, where the regiment fulfilled the duties of the inspector and one of the officers managed the Evangelical congregation's revenues, kept accounting records, and secured the safe. The steward, sexton, and presbytery oversaw everything else related to the congregation's wellbeing.

The third chapter dealt with the congregation's morality and religious observance: how often congregants attended services and participated in other rites, if any congregants avoided taking Communion, were there people who openly opposed the faith and the rites or were openly engaging in sinful behavior, etc. In general, local pastors commented that religious services and prayers were well attended, more women attended than men, and that attendance was higher when there was less work to do in the fields. However, there are some differences in the description of the situation in certain congregations. In Pivnica, it was recorded that some congregants did not attend Sunday services and were profaning the Sabbath by weighing and selling coal. In Kysáč, Hložany, Kulpín, and Petrovec, some pastors reported that young people roamed around at night and were thus becoming morally corrupt, and that admonishing them made no difference because the pastors had no support from the children's parents.

In the returns, the pastors reported on whether their congregants were literate and if they were willing to purchase religious texts such as *Tranoscius*,³⁷ the Bible, and the Gospels, and whether parents regularly sent their children to school. Answers to these questions differed from one congregation to another. Many people in Hložany were illiterate and rarely bought religious texts, and parents were reluctant to send their children to school. Many in Bajša were also illiterate. In Kysáč, on the other hand, with the exception of a small number of the elderly, most congregants were literate, and almost everyone could make use of ecclesiastical and religious works. Lalit' and Selenča were similar in this regard. In Banat in Aradáč, Kovačica, and Padina, the majority of congregants were also literate and bought religious texts, and parents dutifully sent their children to school.

Each report also included an account by each pastor regarding their congregants' morality: if particular bad habits or behaviors were common, if there were any illegitimate children, if there had been divorces, if anyone from the congregation was in prison, etc. In general, no one was openly engaging in sinful behavior or was an outright opponent of the faith.

³⁷ The basic book of church songs.

In almost all congregations, however, there were widespread superstitions related to witchcraft, accidents, and household calamities caused by the evil eye, folk healing, etc., and the pastors' efforts to stamp out these "weaknesses" among their congregants were usually ineffective.

In Stará Pazova, drunkenness, arrogance, and lack of self-awareness were mentioned as bad habits among the inhabitants of the Military Frontier and this congregation. The pastor rebuked the congregants for not habitually donating to the church. In Petrovec, a pastor reported that one woman was in prison for killing her child during childbirth (which had probably been conceived out of wedlock, because her husband, a soldier at the time, had been absent). Additionally, young men avoided services and instead went to taverns where they danced to music, drank, and played cards, often staying out until dawn.

Having children out of wedlock was considered a serious moral failing, but such cases were rare. In Stará Pazova, according to the returns, out of 1,775 births there were fifteen illegitimate children conceived with outsiders. In Kovačica, in 1834 there were only two illegitimate children among the 2,160 congregants. In the previous year, no illegitimate children were born to any of the 1,149 congregants in Selenča, 2,525 congregants in Padina, and 1,835 congregants in Aradáč. Divorce was also considered a moral failing, but it was relatively rare in Evangelical congregations. In their returns, pastors sometimes explained their attempts to somehow reunite divorced couples.

Different answers were given regarding what the pastor and the presbytery were doing to correct and move beyond these shortcomings and to what extent the civil authorities were assisting them. In Bajša, boys, or young men who behaved inappropriately in church were publicly punished in the town square. The local pastor in Kulpín noted that, recently, some Evangelicals were following the example of Orthodox Serbs, and were not so zealous about attending services³⁸ In Bajša, the congregants' most serious vices included decadent celebrations, swearing, and debauchery. In Selenča, there were reports of intemperance, theft, quarrels, and gossip. The pastors would attempt to remedy these, but if they were unsuccessful on their own, they reported the culprits to the civil authorities. Superstition was also quite widespread, with people visiting conjurers, and the like. The pastor in Kovačica stated that whenever he noticed abuses or offenses, he would first give his congregants a warning, and if that failed to remedy the situation or if it were a more serious offense, he would hand the matter over to the military authorities. However, he also emphasized his congregants' good qualities. For example, they had built the church with their own hands, which in his opinion was the best evidence of their devotion to the church.

Pastors in some congregations had very different evaluations of their congregants' readiness to make donations for the needs of the church and the congregation and to support Evangelical grammar schools. Records from Selenča, Hložany, and Pivnica show that congregants did not regularly make donations to the church and were reluctant donate to the Senioral School in Novi Vrbas.³⁹ In Kulpín, congregants donated according to their means

³⁸ Čelovský misinterpreted the original and stated that was not due to Serbian influence of (1996: 82).

³⁹ Bierbrunner 1902: 63 states that, at the general convention of the Bačka Seniorat in Novi Vrbas, on October 10, 1822, a decision was made to classify the Evangelical church communities of this seniorat into five groups according to their number of congregants and to pay for the Senior School according to the following: Group I, 25 forints and five Pest measures of wheat (These were Petrovec, Crvenka, Stará Pazova, and Novi Vrbas); Group II, 15 f. and 4 measures of wheat; Group III, 10 f. and 3 measures of wheat; Group IV, 2 f. and 2

and circumstances, and more often when there was an illness or a more serious misfortune in the family, but they rarely left anything to the church in their wills. Every year, the congregation gave fifteen forints from the church treasury to the grammar school in Upper Hungary but gave nothing to the Senior School in Novi Vrbas. The parish pastor in Petrovec stated that the willingness of congregants to donate for the needs of the church had been recently declining, but there were still individuals who bequeathed larger sums after their deaths. The congregation allocated 25 f. for the Senior School in Novi Vrbas per year, 30 f. for a school in Bratislava and for other schools. In addition, voluntary contributions were collected from congregants to support candidates and students.

The returns provide quite detailed information about local pastors and their performance of their pastoral duties. A short biography was included with information about their parents and their education. Most of the local pastors were from the Upper Lands. They were most often graduates of secondary schools and grammar schools in Modra, Mezöberény, Trenčín, and Banská Bystrica, and had studied philosophy and theology in Bratislava, Sopron, Banská Štiavnica, Wittenberg, and Halle. These pastors were usually the sons of pastors and teachers or less often of a clerk or craftsman. They all spoke at least three languages—German, Latin, and Slovak—and often also Hungarian and Serbian. Some also stated they spoke Romanian and French. The church authorities required pastors, and especially the younger ones, to write sermons, but were permitted to interpret them freely in church. During the visitation, the commission reviewed the written sermons. The older ones often only wrote in theses. Pastors were also required to mention the sovereign in church during their sermons and to instruct congregants to respect the secular authorities. Pastors mainly held Catechism classes from the first Sunday of St. Trinity until Advent. The basic literature they worked from was Luther's *Small Catechism* and Herder's *Catechism*.⁴⁰ According to reports, young people, and especially boys, were careless about attending Catechism classes and did not attend regularly, which was considered the fault of parents who were not overly concerned with their children's spiritual life.

In most congregations, catechumens were prepared for confirmation during Lent, and the Rite of Confirmation was performed in front of the congregation on Maundy Thursday or Good Friday. Only in Petrovec and Kulpín were these lessons held during Advent and the rite performed on Christmas Eve. In the reports, the pastors mostly mentioned that the rites of baptisms, weddings, funerals, and the distribution of the Eucharist were carried out according to accepted practice and in accordance with laws and regulations.

In all congregations, services were held on Sundays and before noon on holidays, and prayers were led in the afternoon. Morning prayers were recited on weekdays. Pastors

measures of wheat. He further states that, depending on the size of the congregation, pastors and teachers also paid. Franz Hamm 1960: 26–27 took this information from Bierbrunner. Ján Stehlo also states in his History of the Evangelical Church in Petrovec that the congregation there gave 25 f. and 5 Pest measures of wheat per year for the Senior School (Sztehlo 1818: 20).

⁴⁰ Herder, Johann Gottfried: *Katechismus doktora M. Luthera, s obssjrným Katechetyckým Výkladem Výsoce oswjceného Doktora Jana Gottrieda Herdera, ... k prospěchu sskol ewangelických z nemeckého od Jana Ğryssy, někdegssjho Sl. B. K. Pezynského, přeloženým. Wydal na swůg náklad, toto Slowenské přeloženj ponaprawiw, Ğiřj Palkowič. W Presspurku 1809. Pjsmem Ssimona Petra Webera.*

mostly commended congregants' attendance at services and prayers, but they reprimanded young people, especially boys, who did not attend regularly or behaved inappropriately while in church. The commission noted that there were considerable differences in the way services were held in certain congregations, so it proposed a way to unify them for ten Slovak and ten German congregations.

The reports noted there was still not enough trust in doctors, and there were no doctors in many settlements or the nearby surroundings. Pastors tried to raise awareness among congregants of the need for inoculations, as did the secular authorities.

When performing marriages, pastors followed royal decree and did not marry girls younger than sixteen or boys younger than eighteen. In the settlements in the Military Frontier, anyone who wished to marry had to obtain permission from the military authorities. The order not to bury the deceased until forty-eight hours had passed from the time of death was also respected.

As inspectors of local confessional schools, pastors were mostly positive about the schools and teachers operated, but they also noted that some students did not attend school due to a lack of concern from parents. Evangelical congregations had autonomy in terms of finding, signing contracts with, and firing pastors and teachers. Compensation for teachers and pastors consisted of a fixed amount in cash, goods, grain (wheat, maslin, oats), wine (in wine-producing regions), firewood, and both usually received a rooster once a year from each household. In addition, communities received land from landowners for pastors (whole or $\frac{3}{4}$ of a *sessio*) and teachers (half of a *sessio*).⁴¹ In some communities, congregants cultivated the land without compensation, while in others it was cultivated by the pastors and teachers themselves. It is difficult to precisely calculate incomes for pastors and teachers because they received part of their salary as dues in kind, and the prices of these, especially grain, fluctuated from year to year and even within the same year.⁴² Grain donations were made in Pest or Požun/Prešpork measures,⁴³ and cash donations were made in Viennese currency (hereafter: V. c.) or conventional currency (hereafter: c. c.),⁴⁴ but which one was sometimes not specified in the reports. Furthermore, there were always congregants who were in arrears, so pastors and teachers were owed debts that were difficult to collect.

The pastor in Petrovec received 200 forints in c. c. and 100 Pest wheat measures.⁴⁵ Since this parish had more than 5,000 congregants, the stolar income⁴⁶ was no less than 300 forints a year in c. c. Thus, he received about 1000 forints a year in c. c. in cash, and the value of the cereals received that year was about 1000 f. in V. c. The pastor in Lalič, which had 880 congregants, received 100 forints in cash per year in c. c., in grain about 800 f. in V. c., and about 50–60 f. in c. c. of stolar income. In Pivnica, with 1635 congregants, the stolar income

⁴¹ A *sessio* was an urbarial (peasant) plot, which in Bačka was equal to 32 acres of arable land, 22 acres of meadow, and an acre of homestead. An acre was equal to 1100–1200 sq. hvats (sq. hvat = 3,59 m²).

⁴² Stehlo 1818: passim; Kmeť 1981: 42.

⁴³ Pest measure – 94 liters, Požun/Prešpork (Bratislava) measure – 62.52 liters.

⁴⁴ The forint of a conventional currency at that time was 2–2.5 times stronger than the paper forint of Viennese currency.

⁴⁵ Sztehlo 1818: 148.

⁴⁶ Stolar income (stola) was a tax congregants paid to the pastor (and sometimes a teacher) for performing rites such as baptisms, weddings, funerals, etc.

was about 100 f. in c. c., and the value of the collected grain donation was about 1000 f. in V. c.; in Selenča, there were 1149 congregants and cash revenues were 270 f. in V. c., grain revenues were about 1200 f. in V. c. and about 150 f. in c. c. in stolar income. In Stará Pazova, with 2631 congregants, the annual revenue in cash was 158 f. in V. c., in money from married couples about 630 f. in V. c., about 700 f. in V. c. in grain, and about 120 f. in V. c. in stolar income. In Aradáč, the pastor had about 1000 f. in grain in V. c., about 100 f. in V. c. in stolar income and about 1000 f. in V. c. from Coleda (donations collected for Christmas caroling, a third of which went to the congregation's schoolteacher).⁴⁷ Of course, revenue varied, and could be higher or lower depending on the price of grain, from which a significant part of their wages came. The records sometimes do not specify whether the amount was in Viennese or conventional currency, which makes comparisons difficult because hard currency was worth two or two and half times more. The superintendent required that pastors not ask for payment only in hard currency if it was not specified in their contract.

Wages for Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic priests and teachers in the confessional schools in Bačka and Srem at that time were similar, and they were similarly structured. The Greek Catholic parish pastor in Krstur (now Ruski Krstur) had an annual income of about 2,000 forints, the chaplain about 700 forints, and the schoolteacher about 450–500 forints.⁴⁸ Roman Catholic priests in Srem earned approximately 1000 forints, and teachers approximately 400 forints.⁴⁹ Although Ján Stehlo, the pastor in Petrovec, noted he had a large parish and a great deal of work but earned a small income and was unable to hire a chaplain.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, as he recorded in the Petrovec Chronicle, he managed to secure scholarships to schools in Upper Hungary for his five sons and five daughters.⁵¹ Other Evangelical pastors, and often teachers, sent their children to secondary and higher schools in Upper Hungary.

Schoolteachers in Slovak Evangelical confessional schools were paid two to three times less than the pastors. Teachers were always given a free apartment and usually received half a cession of land and use of the garden. They also received a portion collected from Coleda and donations collected on three big annual holidays—Christmas (sometimes on New Year's Eve), Easter (sometimes on *Kvetná nedel'a* [Palm Sunday]), and *Turice* (Pentecost).⁵² They also received a portion of the stolar income for the rites he participated in with the pastor, along with part of the money from confirmations. Sometimes, teachers were paid a *didacta*, or tuition fee, from each student. They usually received a rooster and a few eggs from each family, and the grain he received for his own needs was also milled for him without charge.

Teachers' wages included around 100 forints in c. c. and around 500 forints V. c. in grain. He also received a portion of the Coleda and the stolar income. The teacher in Stará

⁴⁷ During the period between Christmas Eve (*Štedrý večer*, December 24) and Epiphany (January 6), school children visited houses, sang Christmas carols, and received gifts, usually of money and cakes. The children were usually accompanied by a teacher who recorded the number of family members for the church records. The pastor also visited congregants' homes and blessed them. In exchange, the congregants made voluntary or pre-determined donations, as in Aradáč (1 coin [groschen] or 3 kreuzers).

⁴⁸ Ramač 2020: 110–147.

⁴⁹ Sršan 2008.

⁵⁰ Sztehlo 1818: 51–52.

⁵¹ Sztehlo 1818: 201, 298; Kmeť 1981: 44.

⁵² Voluntary donations collected after services for the church.

Pazova, who was both a cantor and an organist, received 170 forints in V. c. and about 500 forints in V. c. worth of grain; in Aradáč, the teacher received 25 forints from the municipal treasury in c. c., about 130 forints in V. c. from his pupils parents, and a third of the Coleda, which was around 330 forints in V. c.

The year each congregation was established, the names of the pastors and teachers at the time of the visitation, the year the church was built, when the school was opened, and the number of students is listed by town in Table 2.

There is a great deal of information about confessional schools in the records. According to the 1777 school law *Ratio educationis*, attending school was mandatory for children aged six to twelve. However, the number of children who actually attended was much smaller than the total number of eligible school-age children, and the number who passed their annual exams and went on to the next grade was even smaller. The school year was supposed to run from September 1 to the end of June, but it was often noted that the school year began later in either October or November, and after exams, which were usually held right after Easter, most children would stop coming to school. The records list numerous reasons for children's erratic attendance, including parental neglect, lack of clothing (especially in the winter), household chores, service, and caring for younger siblings. In Stará Pazova, more than half of school-aged children did not attend school due to a lack of concern from the head of their household, who did not buy them books and instead sent them to look after the livestock. A pastor in Stará Pazova stated children living in the Military Frontier were not required to attend school. However, according to records from Kovačica and Padina, the Frontier authorities took steps to ensure all children attended school. Clearly, the position of the military authorities regarding compulsory schooling varied from one part of the Military Frontier to another.

The visitor also recorded his opinion and assessment of the pastor's moral character, and these were usually positive. In Bajša, the pastor Ján Šimšálek was reported to be well-educated, smart, and mild-mannered; in Kulpín, Daniel Koléni, a honorable man, was well-educated and a good pastor and preacher; in Stará Pazova, Štefan Leška, was good-natured, modest, performed services well, preached well, and lived modestly; in Padina, Peter Kramár was good and worthy of the vocation, faithfully performed services, was a conscientious and experienced preacher, and an exceptional catechist; in Petrovec, the pastor Ján Stehlo was decent, well-educated, and noble but was elderly; in Aradáč, Daniel Abaffy had a good education, was a good and pious preacher, was conscientious in his ministry but overly sensitive; in Lalič, Michal Borovský was young and had more to learn, but he was a good orator and preacher and performed his pastoral duties well; in Selenča, Juraj Plachý was elderly and his son Daniel, the chaplain, was not educated enough but conducted himself decently. However, not all observations were positive. The record from Hložany states that the pastor Ján Rohoň was the unworthy son of a worthy father—hypocritical, avaricious, and at odds with his congregation. In Kysáč, Juraj Jesenský was poorly educated but haughty, as a pastor he was neglectful and unapproachable, and his library was covered in dust. In Pivnica, Samuel Borovský was ambitious and greedy, in dispute with the congregation, and poorly educated. The pastor Josef Spannagel from Buljkes, who would also go to the affiliate community in Silbaš, was said to be a good man but a poor orator, hard to hear, and not well-liked by his congregants. Some pastors could boast of wonderful libraries which, alongside religious and theological works also contained those written in Slovak by Pavel Jozef Šafárik, Ján Kollár and others.

Congregation (year founded)	Pastor	Year church was built	Teacher	Year school was founded	Number of eligible students required to attend	Number of students enrolled (M+F)
Bajša (1786)	Ján Šimšálek	1820	Daniel Martinek		150	115 (70+45)
Hložany (1785)	Ján Rohoň	1772– 1797	Juraj Rohoň		235	150
Kysáč (1788)	Juraj Jesenský	1795– 1799	Samuel Michalovič	1785		257
Kulpín (1818)	Daniel Koléni	1875	Juraj Turčáni	1789		
Laliť (1817)	Michal Borovský	1802	Jozef Godra	1791		132
Nový Sad (1812)	Samuel Hajnáci	1822	Štefan Čepčáni	1830		19
Petrovec (1783)	Ján Stehlo	1783	Benjamín Reisz Eudovít Zvaríni	1779		596 (322+274)
Pivnica (1792)	Samuel Borovský	1824– 1826	Ján Tychon	1796		242
Selenča (1768/1787)	Juraj Plachý	1790	Ignác Ručkay	1768		164
Silbaš (1786)	Jozef Spannagel	had a prayer hall	Karol Bohúni	had a school		50
Stará Pazova (1770)	Štefan Leška	1786– 87	Ján Kutlík		400	220
Aradáč (1786)	Daniel Abaffy	–	Alexander Bako			136
Butín (1814)	Jozef Vodár	1817	Pavel Daruľa	1834	56	
Hajdušica (1829)	Štefan Jestrebíni	no prayer hall	Teachers’ duties carried out by the bell ringer.	no school		32
Kovačica (1802)	No pastor at the time	1828	Jakub Lauf			265
Padina (1806)	Peter Kramár	1834	Andrej Vozár			300
Vuková (1832)	Ján Salmovský	School premis es used for this	Jakob Imrich			36

Table 2: Pastors, teachers, and the number of students in Slovak Evangelical congregations during the 1835/1836 ecclesiastical visitation.

For most congregations, the returns provide detailed information about the confessional school and began with a brief biography of the teacher. Most teachers came from the Upper Lands, such as Jozef Godra, a teacher in Laliť, Ján Kutlík in Stará Pazova, Ján Tychon in Pivnica, Andrej Vozár in Padina, and Ignác Ručkay in Selenča. However, some came from the Lower Lands, such as Ján Blázi, a teacher in Kulpín, and Juraj Rohoň, a teacher in Hložany. Teachers most often completed their schooling in the Upper Lands in Bratislava, Mezőberény, Szarvas, Schemnitz (now Banská Štiavnica), Kežmarok, Modra, Pápa, Trenčín, Prešov, Aszód, and Pest, and in the Lower Lands in Novi Vrbas, Nový Sad, Sremski Karlovci. Some teachers often changed postings. Schools usually had one teacher, but larger congregations had two: a head teacher and an assistant, as in Kovačica, or one for the boys and the other for the girls, as in Petrovec.

As the local school inspectors, pastors provided descriptions of the teachers' moral character and their pedagogical work. Their opinions were usually positive. However, the visitation commission sometimes had serious objections to the teachers' moral character, behavior, and pedagogical work. The teachers were either reprimanded or were made aware of their shortcomings and instructed to correct them in the future, as was the case with J. Rohoň in Hložany, D. Martinek in Bajša, and J. Tychon in Pivnica.

Special attention was given to teaching methodology and the subjects taught. In addition to reading and writing in Slovak and Hungarian, arithmetic, religious instruction, Bible history, natural history, and the geography of Hungary, some congregation schools also taught the history of the Reformation, civics, dietetics, Hungarian history, choral singing, penmanship, and in terms of physics they were taught "what was appropriate to the students' intellectual abilities and to eradicate folk superstitions."⁵³ Teachers employed catechetical, analytical, ex cathedra, and Bell-Lancaster methods of instruction. The reports list only two textbooks used by both teachers and students: Kollár's *Textbook* and Luther's *Little Catechism*. Teaching aids are not mentioned. Teachers also made use of Herder's *Catechism*,⁵⁴ Luther's *Little Catechism*, Hübner's *Biblical History*,⁵⁵ Bartholomaeide's

⁵³ In the 1820s, the deacons of the Evangelical schools in the Bačka-Srem Seniorate prepared instructions for teachers called *Úprava pre učiteľov evanjelických a. v. school of the Bács-Srijem seniorát*. It describes twenty-four items, among which were how the teacher was hired and remunerated, educational goals, disciplinary measures in cases of non-compliance with regulations, the teacher's approach to students, etc. Item 7 of these instructions referred to the curriculum and teaching content. It was recommended that young people be taught everything they needed for day-to-day life, which included making calculations in one's head, penmanship, several areas of the natural sciences, catechism of religious instruction, catechism of health, selections from Bible history, geography, civics, and in physics, above all, natural phenomena to eradicate superstition - Čelovský 1996: 85–86. It appears the teachers followed these instructions because the visitation returns also state some of these.

⁵⁴ Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803), German poet and writer, General Superintendent of Weimar. *Katechismus doktora M. Luthera, s obssjrným Katechetyckým Výkladem Výsoce oswjceného Doktora Jana Gottrieda Herdera, k prospěchu sskol ewangelických z nemeckého od Jana Čryssy, někedgssjho Sl. B. K. Pezynského, přeloženým. Wydal na swiug náklad, toto Slowenské přeloženj ponaprawiw, Giřj Palkowič. W Presspurku 1809. Pjsem Ssimona Petra Webera*. They most likely used the fourth unchanged edition, which was printed in Bratislava in 1825 in the printing house "Karla K. Snjžka."

⁵⁵ Johann Hübner (1668–1731, German pedagogue). *Biblické Hystorye, w Počtu Sto a čtyry, po Padesáte a dwau, gednak ze Starého gednak z Nowého Zákona, wybrané od J. H., Škol Hamburských Rektora, Nyni pak k dobrému Slowenské Mládeže, která se Augsspurského wyznánj přidržj, w domácy Gazyk přelumočené. W Presspurku a w Pessti 1834. U Ludwjka Landerera, urozeného z Fűskutu*.

Geography,⁵⁶ Palkovič's *Geography*,⁵⁷ Michalko's *Physics*,⁵⁸ Kollár's *Textbook*, Leška's *Catechism*, the *Gospels of the New Testament*, and students also learned from *The Natural History*, *The History of Hungary*, as well as prayer and funeral songs.

In the larger and more affluent congregations, the school buildings and teachers' apartments were in good condition. In Petrovec, the school building was relatively new, spacious, built of good material, and was shingled. It had two classrooms and apartments for two teachers. Each apartment had three rooms, an entryway, and a pantry. In Stará Pazova and Kysáč, the school building with the teacher's apartment was quite spacious. In Pivnica, the school was new, but there were no rooms for a teacher. In Aradáč, the classroom was quite large, made of mud and straw, and also served as a prayer hall. The teacher's apartment was in very poor condition. According to the records, some school buildings in other congregations, such as Hložany, were in very poor condition with a shortage of inventory that was often insufficient to accommodate all school-aged children. Not one Slovak Evangelical school in the Bačka-Srem and Banat seniorats had its own foundation. In Padina, it was noted that Evangelical schools in the Military Frontier did not receive any financial support from the Chamber.

In confessional schools, according to Evangelical practice, the inspector was the local pastor. The annual examination was held in the presence of the deacon, the local pastor, and the congregants. The practice in the Military Frontier, however, was different. School principals for Orthodox and Roman Catholic schools were elected. The Evangelicals did not have their own principal, and their schools were under the jurisdiction of the Roman Catholic principal. The congregation in Padina appealed to the principle of freedom of religion and requested they be removed from the influence of the Roman Catholic principal. In Stará Pazova, the inspector of the Evangelical school was an imperial official and a local pastor. As a rule, the deacon suggested the content of the teaching material and chaired the annual exams.

Each congregation had its own midwives, and usually two or three. Only in some communities were they examined by a county surgeon and required to take an oath of diligent service. Midwives knew the baptism ritual and had permission to baptize a newborn infant if necessary. They were paid fifteen to thirty kreuzers per birth, one loaf of bread, and in some municipalities, they were exempt from unpaid labor (*robot*) or transporting goods for the landlord.

Although no congregation had an official charitable institution or home for the widows of pastors or teachers, congregations led by local pastors found ways to help orphans and the poor (from voluntary contributions, with the help of landowners, etc.).

The annual rites and ceremonies differed only slightly from one congregation to the next. The Eucharistic service was held after the harvest in Bajša, Hložany, Kulpín, Kysáč,

⁵⁶ Bartholomaeides, Ladislav (1754–1825, Evangelical priest). *Geograffia aneb Wypsanj Okrsslku Zemského s sesti Mappami vlastnj Rukau geho wryrytými*. W Baňské Bistřicy 1798. Wytisštěné v Jána Sstefániho.

⁵⁷ Palkovič, Juraj (1769–1850, professor of Czechoslovak language and literature at the Evangelical Lyceum in Bratislava). *Známost Wlasti. Neywcj pro sskoly Slowenské w Vhřjch sepsal a na swüg náklad wydal J. P. Oddělení Prwnj. Známost geografická*. W Presspůrku v Symona Petra Webera 1804.

⁵⁸ Michalko, Pavel (1752–1825, teacher in Piliš). *Fizyka, aneb Včenj o Přirozenj (Nature) k prospěchu, gak celého Národu, a pěkného Vměnj žadostiwého sepsané*. W Budjne 1819. Wytisštěné Literámi Anny Landererky.

Lalič, Petrovec, Pivnica, Stará Pazova, Padina, and Kovačica, In Aradáč, it was performed after the harvest and after the wine grapes had been picked. Mentioning the sovereign during services was an accepted practice in Evangelical churches, and prayers were usually said for him on his birthday. It was not a custom among Evangelicals to hold large celebrations marking Pentecost and Reformation Day. In some congregations, a rite of inauguration was held for members of the new local government, who were called on to conscientiously perform the service that had been entrusted to them. In Padina, there was a military magistrate who did not take an oath in the church.

A section of the return dealt with complaints and appeals lodged by pastors, teachers, and members of the congregation. In Bajša, the teacher and the pastor raised objections against parents who were not sending their children to school as required. In Hložany, the congregation were displeased with the Rohoň brothers, who were the teacher and the pastor, with whom they were in the middle of a lawsuit.⁵⁹

At the end of this section, the pastor gave his opinion about what should be changed or done away with as part of church life. Proposals included doing away with the Christmas Eve service and children singing under windows, the custom of throwing water at people on Easter, and big feasts at baptisms, weddings, and funerals that did not befit the principle of Christian temperance.

The key part of the visitation return was the commission's conclusion, in which they made remarks, reprimands, orders, and requests—essentially everything that needed to be changed or implemented within the congregations' everyday life and religious practice. For example, in Bajša this included breaking the habit of arriving late for services, and in Bajša, Hložany, Kulpín, and Pivnica, school-age children need to be dutifully sent to school and catechesis, and adults should also attend catechesis. In Petrovec, the instructions were to ban the “ugly custom” of congregants dousing each other with water on Easter because it desecrated the solemn atmosphere of the holiday, and besides, soaking people in cold water during this time of year at this time of year was harmful to their health. In Bajša, Kysáč, Hložany, Lalič, Petrovec, and Pivnica, congregants were told to keep the chalices and other Communion ware cleaner, and that they needed to be gold-plated and engraved with the year and name of the town. Congregants in Bajša were also told to pay their taxes for supporting the pastor and teacher in a timely manner. In Bajša and Kysáč, they were instructed to use the best flour when baking the Communion bread. Pastors were required to follow protocol more diligently and to copy circulars and reports from the conventions. The pastor in Petrovec was warned not to make announcements from the pulpit about lost items and the like. The teacher in Pivnica was told to refrain from stirring up ill will toward the pastor and to be more conscientious in teaching his pupils. The pastors were also asked to formally hold confirmations in the church and in the presence of other congregants. Congregants were reminded they were obligated to provide transportation for pastors to seniorial conventions. In Pivnica, where there were Slovak and Hungarian Evangelicals,

⁵⁹ After the visitation, in his ceremonial address in Vrbas, superintendent Ján Seberini mentioned had received numerous verbal complaints from congregants about the teachers' work and moral character. Thus, in his instructions, the Bačka-Srem senior Ján Stehlo wrote special regulations calling on teachers and deans to set a positive example through their own behavior for congregants and especially for their students (Maliak 2000: 7–8; Čelovský 1996: 88).

pastors and teachers were required to teach catechesis in both languages. The commission also called upon pastors to refrain from collecting debts from congregants forcefully or through civil authorities as this could sow antipathy and mistrust toward the clergy among the congregants. One of the commissions more interesting remarks was that Aleksandar Stanković, the judge for Torontál county, had praised the Slovaks from Aradáč for being good and obedient, and that they served as an example for those of other faiths.

At the end of the visitation, the visitor, superintendent Ján Seberini, called on the pastors of these two seniorates to cultivate good relations in the spirit of Christian fellowship with the Orthodox clergy and their dignitaries, and mentioned that he and his retinue had been exceptionally well received by the Orthodox bishop of Bačka at his residence in Nový Sad.

Conclusion

We were unable to locate records of any visitations that preceded that of 1835–1836, or from the 1847 visitation, which would have enabled us to compare statistical data and other information. However, on the basis of existing literature and relevant sources (church chronicles and registries) we can conclude that, during this period, the number of congregants in Slovak Evangelical congregations increased due to natural growth and the arrival of new colonists. Economic stabilization and population growth provided bigger opportunities for improvements within the congregations. New churches were constructed, and some were expanded, renovated, or repaired. New school buildings and housing for teachers were also built. Most school-aged children who were required to attend school did so, and most of the Slovak population was literate. Many of them purchased church and religious books. Pastors mostly came from the Upper Lands where they completed their secondary education and studied philosophy and theology. Teachers also generally had the necessary qualifications, and most often had graduated from schools in the Upper Lands. Liturgy, religious texts, and schoolbooks were also procured from the Upper Lands. Thus, the Evangelical creed, religious connections with their compatriots in their place of origin, and written works significantly contributed to cultivating and preserving a sense of unity with the Slovaks in the Upper Lands and protected them from assimilating into the multiethnic and multi-confessional environment in Bačka, Srem, and Banat. Having churches and confessional schools that taught in the mother tongue were able to preserve congregants' morals in the broadest sense of the word, to improve general health and the civic culture, to maintain Evangelical secondary schools and colleges, and to build up their own intelligentsia.

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ЈАНКО РАМАЧ

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КАНОНСКЕ ВИЗИТАЦИЈЕ СЛОВАЧКИХ ЕВАНГЕЛИЧКИХ ЦРКВЕНИХ ЗАЈЕДНИЦА У БАЧКОЈ, СРЕМУ И БАНАТУ 1835. И 1836. ГОДИНЕ

Резиме

Записници о канонској визитацији словачких евангеличких/лутеранских црквених заједница у Бачко-сремском и Банатском сениорату коју је комисијски обавио суперинтендант Банског округа Јан Себерињи 1835. и 1836. године су изузетно значајан извор за историју Словака на Доњој земљи, јер пружају обиље података који још нису довољно коришћени у историографији. Анализом записника 17 словачких евангеличких заједница (Арадац, Бајша, Бутин, Вукова, Гложан, Кисач, Ковачица, Кулпин, Лалић, Нови Сад, Падина, Петровац, Пивнице, Селенча, Силбаш, Стара Пазова, Хајдучица) настојали смо да, следећи образац са постављеним питањима, на која је сваки свештеник требало да да писмене одговоре у форми документа, укажемо целу палету одговора на бројна питања формулисана у 11 поглавља.

На почетку записника дају се основни подаци о времену и околностима у време досељавања Словака у конкретно насеље, о организовању евангеличке заједнице, о оснивању конфесионалне школе и парохије. Следе статистички подаци о броју верника за претходну годину. У записницима се дају доста детаљни описи о првим школским зградама које су у почетку често служиле и као молитвени домови, о првим учитељима и свештеницима, о подизању храмова, понекад са детаљним описом екстеријера и ентеријера као и описом каснијих доградњи или репарација. Посебно се описују црквене утвари и књиге које се користе на богослужењима и молитвама, као и црквена звона са навођењем угравираних натписа на њима.

У записницима има доста података о финансијским и имовинским приликама у црквеној заједници: о приходима и начину њиховог прикупљања, о расходима, о управљању иметком заједнице. Поглавље о религијско-духовним и моралним приликама у заједници пружа веома интересантне податке о верницима, о лицу и наличју њиховог верског и друштвеног живота, о разним облицима сујеверја, о неким моралним «слабостима» заједнице или појединаца.

Поглавље посвећено свештеницима садржи податке о њиховом пореклу и школовању и евентуалном претходном службовању. Ту је описана и укупна делатност свештеника у заједници: богослужења; да ли свештеник пише проповеди; када и како врши катехизацију и припремање катехумена за конфирмацију; да ли све обреде обавља сагласно пракси евангелика и државним прописима. Суперинтендант је као визитатор давао кратку примедбу о духовном и моралном лику сваког свештеника.

Доста су детаљни подаци о учитељу, о његовом пореклу, школама које је похађао, као и подаци о конфесионалној школи: у каквом је стању школска зграда, колико има деце за школу, да ли је редовно похађају. Наводе се предмети који се уче у школи, методе рада, школске књиге и слично.

У извештајима се дају подаци и о бабицама у црквеној заједници, о њиховим платама, о гробарима, о издржавању сиромашних и сирочади.

На крају, у додатку комисија канонске визитације даје своје примедбе, препоруке или наредбе шта треба да се уради, промени, исправи. Понекад су ту и доста озбиљне опомене или упозорења упућена верницима, свештеницима или учитељима.

Записници ове канонске визитације пружају аутентичну слику црквених заједница, њиховог верско-религијског, али и шире, друштвеног и привредног живота, и у значајној мери могу да допринесу стварању прецизније и комплексније слике о животу Словака у овим крајевима тридесетих година XIX века.

Кључне речи: Евангеличка црква аугзбуршке вероисповести, Словаци, Бански округ/суперинтендантура, Бачко-сремски сениорат, Банатски сениорат, канонска визитација, конфесионалне школе.

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THE CHILDHOOD OF MILAN OBRENOVIĆ, THE FIRST KING OF THE SERBIAN RESTORATION: CONTRIBUTIONS TO HIS BIOGRAPHY

Abstract: This paper deals with establishing basic biographical information about the Serbian prince and king Milan Obrenović, (1854–1901), which has been very arbitrarily cited in popular and academic publications. The aim is to direct the public to first-rate historical sources that provide information about where he was born, his childhood and education, and the people he encountered before he ascended Serbian throne in 1868. He is an important modern Serbian monarch whose views and actions have become controversial, so it is thus of the utmost importance to ascertain the circumstances surrounding his upbringing and coming-of-age. This is compounded by an ongoing tendency to create myths around his early life based on the content of numerous pamphlets published in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

Keywords: Milan Obrenović, Maria Katardži, Prince Mihailo Obrenović, Prince Miloš Obrenović, Jaši, François Huet.

Milan Obrenović was born on 22 August 1854¹ and was the second child of Miloš and Elena Maria Obrenović (née Catargiu), during their time in exile (1842–1858). Their firstborn child, Tomanija, died in late 1852 or early 1853 at the age of two before Milan was born, so he never met her.²

Miloš, Milan's father, was born in Šabac on 25 November 1829 to Jevrem and Tomanija Obrenović. He was the youngest of nine children and nephew of the reigning prince, Miloš Obrenović. He was schooled in Belgrade until 1840 by Austrian tutors hired by his father, Jevrem. After the Serbian throne changed hands in 1842, he lived with his parents at Manasia, the family estate (*spahiluk*) in Wallachia, and from there he was sent to Russia to be schooled with Emperor Nicholas I's Page Corps (Пажеский корпус). He chose to leave Russia before completing his education so he could continue at military schools in Austria and Prussia. He served in the Prussian military for a time. Financed by his uncle,

¹ All dates given in this article are according to the new calendar unless otherwise specified. Milan Obrenović was born on 10/22 August 1854.

² Veselinović, Ljušić 2002: 41.

the former prince Miloš, he traveled to France, England, and Italy with his uncle's brother, the future prince Mihailo. Young Miloš was headstrong but had a pure soul and radiated kindness, and for that Mihailo grew fond of him.

After the 1848/49 revolution, Miloš returned to his regiment in Prussia. Soon after, at the request of his uncle Miloš Obrenović, King Friedrich Wilhelm allowed him to leave his regiment but still maintain his rank as a lieutenant of the guard in Prussia, and also granted him the rank of captain outside of Prussia for as long as he lived. He then toured estates in Romania and Hungary with his uncle's brother, the future prince Mihailo. In around 1850 he settled at the court of Prince Barbu Dimitrie Știrbei of Wallachia, who employed him as adjutant. He was only twenty-one years of age at the time.

While he was there, Miloš married Maria Catargiu, an aristocrat of Moldavian descent, in 1851. Maria was the eldest daughter of Constantin Catargiu (1800–1871), who would serve briefly as minister of interior affairs (1857), and Smaranda Baș. Duchess Cantacuzino, accompanied by the young boyar Maria, had asked Prince Miloš to consent to the marriage between Maria and his nephew Miloš. Nevertheless, the former prince had serious reservations about his son Mihailo and his nephew Miloš both rushing to marry foreigners.³ Maria was indeed a Romanian noblewoman, but not from such an “old and distinguished” family as is often claimed. Maria had three sisters and three brothers of whom Giorgi and Alexander were particularly important. They were uncles of the Serbian prince and king, Milan Obrenović, and served as his adjutants and emissaries during many missions abroad. Up until the early 1890s they were among the ruler's most important advisors.

Milan Obrenović, prince (1868–1882) and king of Serbia (1882–1889), was born in Iași, his mother Maria's birthplace and residence of her grandparents on her mother's side, the boyar family Catargiu. More precisely, Maria, who was pregnant at the time, lived in Manasia, the feudal holding of her father-in-law, Jevrem Obrenović. Maria herself stated that, during the first few years of her marriage, she and her husband Miloš, Jevrem's son, lived at her husband's estate, and that could only have been Manasia, a feudal property in Wallachia purchased by Jevrem Obrenović in 1839 from Alexander Ypsilantis, the prince of Wallachia.⁴ It was also the only foreign property Jevrem owned, so it was the only property where his son Miloš and his daughter-in-law Maria could have lived.⁵ After the death of their first child, problems began to arise in the marriage, which are known about only from Maria's telling.⁶ A letter from Prince Miloš Obrenović to his brother Jevrem dated 9 October 1854 revealed that Maria had left her husband before the birth and gone to her parents in Iași. In this letter he tells his brother that he had received a letter from his nephew Miloš in Iași informing him that “your grandson is healthy,” and then says that he cannot describe the child, “but if God grants that you see him, then you will see for yourself.” He also consoles him, telling him not to despair because his daughter-in-law left, his grandchild was born outside his home, and

³ Petrović 1939; Leovac 2019.

⁴ Kaljević 2006: 34; <https://domeniulmanasia.ro/istoric/>

⁵ The estate was in Ialomița County, the most fertile region of Wallachia, and included the villages of Manasia, Uluci, and Racoreci. There Jevrem Obrenović built a residence and a church dedicated to the Ascension of the Lord: Gabriela Alexandru, See Jašin,

https://www.academia.edu/35456222/srpsko_rumunski_odnosi_pdf?email_work_card=thumbnail

⁶ Kaljević 2006: 34–35; M. Jovanović-Stojimirović 2008: 175–176.

that he had not yet seen him.⁷ This means that Miloš, the baby's father, had to have traveled to Iași to see his newborn child. This refutes the claim that Milan Obrenović was born in Mărășești, where his father was serving as a captain in the Romanian army.⁸

Milan lived in Iași from his birth until his father's death in 1860.⁹ It was only later that his mother, Maria, could have left for the court of the Romanian Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza, because, according to sources, in 1860 she accepted an invitation from her husband Miloš in Belgrade to reconcile and live together in Serbia. This was made possible by the return of the Obrenović family to the throne after the decision handed down by the St. Andrew's Day Assembly in 1858. Prince Mihailo Obrenović, who ascended the throne after the death of his father in 1860, took in his cousin Miloš, who had been his childhood companion, as he was already suffering from tuberculosis. With Mihailo's help, the ailing Miloš managed to reconcile with his wife. In the presence of the prince, an agreement was made for them to first travel to Cairo where Miloš would try to recover his health. Maria agreed to a reconciliation and came to Belgrade in September 1860. In the presence of Prince Mihailo, they came to an agreement that starting in the spring of 1861, she and her child would reside permanently in Belgrade with her husband. It is highly unlikely that her husband, Miloš, would make such an offer to his wife if she had been Prince Cuza's mistress at the Romanian court, as is frequently claimed. Grandmother Tomanija, Miloš's mother, had also moved to Serbia with her daughter Katarina and grandchildren Katarina and Alexander soon after the Obrenović family was restored to the throne. In the summer of 1860, she took it upon herself to find a tutor to instruct her youngest grandchild, Milan's son, at her home in Belgrade. She was unsuccessful in this endeavor.¹⁰

In the meantime, Milan's father died in Belgrade in November of 1860. A fierce struggle then erupted between Grandmother Tomanija, who had taken up residence in Belgrade at the intersection of Krunska and Kneza Miloša streets after the Obrenovićs' return to power, and Milan's mother, Maria, over guardianship of the child. In a letter to Prince Mihailo, Maria complained about her mother-in-law and her scheming and lamented the fact that Tomanija had written to her multiple times in Iași, where she and her son were living with her parents, to send her son to Belgrade where she, as his grandmother, would see to his education. Maria did not want to live in her mother-in-law's house after her husband's death, and she also did not wish to be separated from her six-year-old son. Maria proposed to Grandmother Tomanija that she would bring Milan to Belgrade for a few days in May 1861, and even to leave him there for a few months in the fall, but refused to surrender custody, which Romanian law granted to the mother.¹¹ Thus Milan spent the most of his early life in Iași, Romania with his mother and her parents.

Not many sources mention that from his birth up until the Obrenovićs were returned to Serbian throne (1854–1858), Milan also spent time at the estate in Manasia with his paternal grandparents. There he played with the children of his aunt Anka, Jevrem, and Tomanija's

⁷ Letter from Miloš Obrenović to his brother Jevrem dated 27 September/9 October 1854, Crnjanski 1927a: 4.

⁸ Kralj Milan 2019: 13.

⁹ The year of Miloš (Jevrem) Obrenović's death is often erroneously cited as 1861. See the announcement of Miloš J. Obrenović's death, *Srpske novine*, br. 136, 10/22. 11. 1860.

¹⁰ Letter from Maria Obrenović to Prince Mihailo, Crnjanski 1927b: 3; Krstić 2005: 27, 124.

¹¹ Letter from Smaranda Catargiu, Milan Obrenović's maternal grandmother, to Prince Milan, 1872, Crnjanski 1927c: 9.

daughter. Milan was the youngest grandchild and enjoyed being in the company of his cousins Aleksandar and Katarina. According to the recollections of Katarina, who was three years older than Milan, the future prince and king, all three of Jevrem's grandchildren, Milan, Aleksandar, and Katarina, grew up together at the Manasia estate, alongside governesses and teachers.¹² This could explain their later closeness, and especially between Milan and Katarina. She had a very important place in Milan's life.¹³ Grandfather Jevrem died in 1856, and his wife, Tomanija, became the head of the family. She was an elderly, domineering woman and, judging by her relationships with her daughter Anka and granddaughter Katarina, possessed some truly bizarre habits and practices regarding the family.¹⁴

Milan's mother, Maria, was young and beautiful widow who found herself with many suitors. When exactly she became the mistress of the Romanian prince is hard to determine. Judging by the illegitimate sons she had with Prince Cuza in 1865 and 1866, she moved to his court sometime after had taken Milan to be schooled in Paris, as Prince Mihailo had agreed, which was after 1863. There is also another fact pointing to this. The Austrian writer and playwright Arthur Schnitzler remembers playing with young Milan, the future king, on Hauptstrasse, located in what was then the Viennese suburb of Döbling.¹⁵ The house, most likely rented, was directly across from a villa owned by Prince Cuza.¹⁶ There is no doubt that the Maria and the Romanian prince had rented the house so they could see each other and continue their relationship far away from Bucharest. Maria took her son and his governess with her, which shows that she saw to Milan's upbringing as conscientiously as her circumstances allowed.

Young Milan had a governess, a Scottish woman named Miss Allen, who was also his teacher, at his grandparent's home in Iași and later at his mother's home in Vienna. She frequently told her friends all about Milan's animated nature, and about his antics and rambunctiousness that were characteristic of spoiled children, but she also spoke of her charge's good and noble heart. Milan's memories of Miss Allen never faded. When he found himself visiting the Romanian prince Carol in Bucharest in 1874, the twenty-year-old Milan exited the carriage that had brought him to the palace. Among the crowd of curious people who came to see and greet the Serbian ruler, he spied his teacher, whom he had not seen since he was nine. Just as he was about to climb the steps up to the palace accompanied by his officers, Prince Milan suddenly turned, pushed past his officers, and approach this dear woman with a bow, saying, "Are you not Miss Allen? I am sure you are. I could not forget your face even after all these years. I have never forgotten you..."¹⁷ This anecdote alone

¹² Ivanić 2012: 66.

¹³ Ibid.: 76.

¹⁴ Jovanović-Stojimirović 2008: 179; Milanović 2011: 117–122.

¹⁵ Zlatan Stojadinović, in his book *Dinastija Obrenović u javnim zbirkama Beča* (Stojadinović 2016: 316), states that Milan's mother Maria owned a house at Hirschengasse 29 in this Viennese neighborhood, according to an entry in the Viennese Lehmann directory of 1871. However, this is not the same house. The timeframe Schnitzler refers to preceded the time when she owned the house on Hirschengasse. Milan was not, his mother at the time, nor could he have been because he had ascended the throne in 1868. His first visit to Vienna after his ascension was in 1873 when he was nineteen.

¹⁶ Schnitzler 1971: 15–16.

¹⁷ Vacaresco 1904. The part pertaining to the Obrenović family, translated by Ivan Radosavljević, was published in *Književni list*, January - March 2020: 22–23.

reveals Milan Obrenović's subtlety and depth of feeling, which have never been explored, despite the amount of interest in his life.

Milan was six years old when his father died. There are many incredible stories about his father, but what is indisputable is that he was a talented man and an intellectual force. Young Miloš never had trouble in school. He studied economics and political science in Vienna, and attended military academies. In other words, Milan's father, who was barely older than thirty when he died, was a talented man. His kindness was well appreciated by Prince Mihailo. This was one of the reasons that he took over young Milan's education in 1863. He took care of him and prepared him as a possible heir to the throne.¹⁸

* * *

As was previously mentioned, after the death of his father, Miloš, his mother, Maria, was their child's sole guardian. Prince Mihailo had no intention of taking custody away from his mother. On the contrary, his intention was for her to be included in every aspect of his upbringing. This was evidenced by Article 17 of the 1859 Act of Succession, which states that prince's upbringing was to be entrusted to his mother and two other individuals designated by the highest civilian court, in agreement with her.¹⁹ The three of them together would be the child's guardians, with the mother taking precedence. However, after the assassination of Prince Mihailo in Topčider, the regent Milivoj Blaznavac did all he could to exclude his mother from her son's upbringing and education and to separate her from the future prince. Five days after the assassination, the Russian consul Nikolai Shishkin notified Petersburg that the regents were not permitting Maria Obrenović to be the minor prince's legal guardian, despite what the law stated. "They are even ready," the dispatch further stated, "to forbid her from coming to Belgrade because they know the prince is very attached to his mother and that he is of an age in which it is difficult to explain to him why his mother is being kept from him and what the plans are for his future."²⁰ The prince's grandmother, Tomanija, had always been openly antagonistic to her daughter-in-law, but this time she tried to help Maria. However, she relented when, under very strange circumstances, she agreed to marry her granddaughter Katarina to Blaznavac, who was twenty-seven years her senior.²¹

¹⁸ Petrović 1939; M. Jovanović-Stojimirović 2008: 175–178; Komandant aktivne vojske, a typed manuscript of Svetolik Grebenac, private collection of Ilija Mrkobrad.

¹⁹ *Act of succession* 1859, article 17.

²⁰ AVPRI, F. 161-1, op. 181-2, d. 254 b, l. 334, Shishkin's dispatch from Belgrade, 3/15 June 1868. Maria Obrenović, accompanied by her elderly Lady Catargiu, came to Belgrade on 24 April 1869. She announced her arrival five months in advance. Her arrival was an added complication for the regents because they feared the influence Maria had over her son since the minor prince was extremely attached to her. Maria then demanded that her legal right to custody over her son be honored. Russia supported her because Maria had objections to his tutor, Huet, who taught the Serbian prince western values. However, the regent Blaznavac, a staunch opponent of Russian influence in Serbia, succeeded in removing the prince's mother from the country. The National Archives, Foreign Office, 78, 2088, Longworth's reports from Belgrade, April to October 1869, especially those from 6 and 11 May. Maria occasionally contacted the other regent, Ristić, to congratulate him on his name day of St. John but did not return to Serbia until the prince's wedding in 1875.

²¹ At the time, Milan's grandmother was in a precarious financial situation because the house and estate in Manasia, Romania were deeply in debt. Prince Mihailo personally resolved her financial troubles by providing legal assistance and his own funds. After his assassination, the property was in jeopardy and could easily have been seized by lawyers and creditors. Tomanija decided to cooperate with the regents for practical reasons.

In late 1863, with the permission of his mother and the will of his uncle Prince Mihailo, nine-year-old Milan was sent to be schooled in Paris. At the age of nine, Milan and his mother had never been apart. During his first few years in Paris, Milan longed for his mother. His letters were full of sadness for her.

Before Milan was sent away, his aunt Anka's son Aleksandar had been sent to Pest in 1860 to be tutored by a Lutheran pastor named Sekač, and his cousin Katarina had been sent to an academy for girls in Paris. Her brother joined her there later, and in 1863, Milan joined them as well. In Paris the children regularly saw each other almost every weekend. Aleksandar was in a men's boarding house, Katarina in a women's, and Milan was taught by a private tutor with whom he lived as a member of the family. These weekend outings were eventful and well organized. Visits to museums, art exhibitions, the zoo, boating trips, and tours of the city were an integral part of the children and their companions' time together. One of the most enthusiastic organizers of these pleasant moments spent together was Milan's mother, Maria. She visited him in Paris, and Milan saw these meetings as some of the loveliest of his young life. In his letters to his uncle Mihailo, he wrote of waiting impatiently for his mother's next visit and how sad he was when his mother left Paris. That he wrote so freely and opening to his uncle of his warm feelings toward his mother strongly suggests that Prince Mihailo supported maintaining and strengthening this close bond between mother and son, which later, after Mihailo's assassination, was no longer the case.²² The forceful alienation of this child from his mother that the regents Blaznavac and Ristić both pursued caused Milan Obrenović irreparable damage during his formative years and when it was necessary to secure his emotional stability.

Milan remained incredibly attached to his mother up until he arrived in Serbia, as can be seen in both local and foreign sources. The claim that Milan did not care for his mother and that he was not an affectionate son has been repeated many times,²³ but this could not have been further from the truth. He adored his beautiful and caring mother. In her struggle with Tomanija over the custody of her only child, Maria demonstrated considerable devotion to her son. In her fight to the end, she demonstrated that her motherly affection for her child came before anything else in life. She was right to fear that her son would be "poisoned by evil tongues." She acknowledged her mistakes, but she did not understand why she had to pay such a high price and be forever separated from her son.²⁴ The true cause of the cold and strained relationship between mother and son lies in the systematic alienation of Milan from Maria orchestrated after he ascended the throne in 1868. The first one to point this out was Miloš Crnjanski, although he did not go into detail.²⁵

It is clear from communication with Professor François Huet, initiated by Jovan Marinović on behalf of the boy's guardian, Prince Mihailo Obrenović, that the prince had insisted Professor Huet cooperate with Maria so the boy's "upbringing and education" could

²² The letters of Milan Obrenović to prince Mihailo from Pariza, 1863 to 1867, Građa 1965: 339–397.

²³ Kaljević 2006: 33; Jovanović-Stojimirović 2008: 176; Obrenović 1999: 75. His wife Natalia from the moment of their marriage greatly contributed to the separation of prince Milan from his mother. Later, in her memoirs, she hypocritically faulted him for his arrogance to his mother

²⁴ Kaljević 2006: 33.

²⁵ "This is how this beautiful, frivolous, and tired woman, who was otherwise very confident of social norms being upheld, was completely torn away from her child..." Crnjanski 1927b: 3.

be done successfully in concert. The goal was to facilitate the young Milan's moral and intellectual development gradually and systematically under the close care of his tutor. When analyzing the details and precision of the negotiations with Huet, it can be discerned how much interest Prince Mihailo took in this. In particular, he insisted on instruction in Serbian language and religion, which became a key part of the curriculum the French professor prepared for Milan.²⁶

François Huet, a Frenchman and retired professor of French literature and Latin writers who had taught at the University of Ghent in Belgium, was a prominent and respected educator.²⁷ When his mother brought Milan to the professor's house in September 1863, the professor's first impressions were negative. The fact was that the young Milan's education up until the age of nine had lacked structure. In Paris in 1863 it was determined that there had been considerable omissions in the child's upbringing and education.

Despite having a substantial salary and a contract with the Serbian prince, after a month Huet was ready to quit. The boy simply would not follow the professor's orders and instructions. However, after only half a year of patient and persistent work, the professor's reports on the boy's progress were favorable. Along with acquiring necessary knowledge and comportment, the boy also developed physically, since the French professor placed considerable emphasis on gymnastics and swimming, as well as the boy's overall health and physical condition. Professor Huet engaged a veritable army of respectable tutors, from calligraphists who taught Milan proper penmanship to artists and teachers of piano and music. In December 1863, after only six months, he noted that steady progress was being made. In early January 1864, Huet wrote that Milan was a sweet and gentle child who showed promise. Although he required much more work, the professor noted that his charge was extremely intelligent and had already declared himself a Legitimist at the age of ten. He praised him for studying each subject equally and reported that he would be assessed every three months with a general recapitulation of what he had learned. Later, in his numerous reports to Prince Mihailo, Huet would stress that his pupil was achieving excellent marks, but he was struggling with his scores in subjects such as Latin and mathematics, which required more patience and attention to detail.²⁸

As soon as he arrived in Paris, Milan was given Serbian lessons in addition to those in French, German, and Latin. Within two years he had completely mastered the Serbian language, although he still spoke with a slight French accent. Starting in November 1865, a doctor named Sava Petrović, a French student who had also quickly obtained his doctorate in Paris, served as both Milan's Serbian tutor and the doctor who took the necessary care of Milan's health. He quickly formed a close relationship with the young Milan, who simply adored him. Prince Mihailo now had an indirect source of reliable information about his young protégé.

For the next four years, from the fall of 1863 to the summer of 1868, the young Milan demonstrated considerable progress. In Paris in 1867, just before he was to enroll at the Lycée, Prince Mihailo introduced Milan to his friend, the Grand Duke Constantine of

²⁶ DAS, MID, Hartije Jovana Marinovića, k. 1, br. 16.

²⁷ François Huet (1814–1869) was a student of an even more eminent professor in Belgium, the philosopher and sociologist Jean-Guillaume-César-Alexandre-Hippolyte de Colins de Ham (1783–1859), the founder of rational socialism.

²⁸ DAS, PO, k. 26, br. 131, Huet's reports to Prince Mihailo Obrenović.

Russia.²⁹ In Prince Mihailo's journal, currently in private possession, there is a note from 1863 that Milan (Miloš) Obrenović was a *possible* heir to the throne.³⁰ There were some indications that his wife, Princess Júlia, had proposed to Prince Mihailo that they adopt the young Milan, but that he declined.³¹

The reports of Milan's exams promised continued success at the Lycée Louis de Grand, in which he had just enrolled. In June 1868 he was living in the school's dormitory and completing his third year. He was ranked seventh in his class, a respectable result, as he boasted for what would be the last time to his "dear uncle and prince" in a letter from 3 June 1868.

In a letter to his uncle in the summer of 1866, Milan expressed a desire to visit Serbia during the school holidays. This, however, did not occur. The following year, the priority was to prepare for the Lycée, so no mention was made of his visit to Belgrade. Only a week before the prince's tragic death, Milan wrote from Paris, "I hope, dear uncle and prince, that this year I will have the good fortune to visit Belgrade, where you and all of my family are." That 3 June, as he expressed his wishes to Prince Mihailo, little did fourteen-year-old Milan know that within a few days' time, a delegation would arrive to take him to Belgrade to assume a throne splattered with the blood of his uncle and benefactor.³²

Jovan Ristić, along with the delegation and Milan, the future prince, set off from Paris on 19 June 1868. Milan Obrenović set foot on the dock of the Sava on 23 June 1868, at five o'clock in the morning. Also disembarking with him was his cousin, Aleksandar Konstantinović, whose mother had died bravely defending the prince from his assassins. Despite the early hour, a curious crowd had flooded the streets from the dock to St. Michael's Cathedral and all the way to Terazije. On the Sava dock, the honor guard for the reception consisted of a company of liveried infantry soldiers and a detachment from the people's cavalry, led by a military band. Milan Obrenović was greeted on the deck of the steamboat by the war minister, Milivoje Petrović Blaznavac, a significant number of senior bureaucrats from the district, the State Council, and the courts, along with many distinguished citizens. The prince exited the steamship followed by Jovan Ristić and the first adjutant to the late prince, Dragutin Žabarac. Blaznavac met him with open arms and embraced him, while the military greeted him with calls of "Long may he live!" and "Welcome!" Most of those in attendance doffed their hats when Milan Obrenović appeared but remained silent. Accompanied by Blaznavac, he passed through the ranks of the standing army and throngs of people and stepped into an open carriage along with Blaznavac, Ristić, and Colonel Žabarac. Ahead of them rode the people's cavalry and a unit of the royal guard, and behind them followed the prince's guardsmen and adjutants. The more prominent citizens followed

²⁹ Grand Duke Constantine Nikolayevich, brother of the Russian Czar Alexander II and a personal friend of Prince Mihailo, claimed that, in 1867, the prince had personally presented Milan to him as his heir. He showed his esteemed friend the boy's curriculum, which Mihailo closely supervised. GARF, F. 828, op. 1, d. 1147, l. 16.

³⁰ I am very grateful to my colleague and collaborator Danko Leovac, for the access to information from the prince's private journal.

³¹ According to Princess Júlia, who proposed they adopt the young Milan and prepare him for his reign, the prince replied that it was still possible for them to have children. And if not, by law the throne would pass to Milan. That is why Piroćanac's claim, based on hearsay, that Prince Mihailo resisted the proposal that Milan become his heir should be dismissed, Ristić 1895: 53; Piroćanac 1895: 48–49.

³² ASANU, br. 8818, Milan Obrenović – knezu Mihailu, Pariz, 3 June 1868.

the prince's carriage in fiacres. The procession made its way to St. Michael's Cathedral and stopped at the church gate. Milan Obrenović quickly jumped out of the carriage and hurried into the church. The people gathered there gave him a livelier reception.

The young prince wore a hat and an unadorned black suit. The audience gazed in curiosity at the handsome, well-developed boy with thinly pursed lips, a wide forehead, and large expressive eyes. Brown hair, combed to the side with a part above his left sideburn framed his pale, round face.

After prayers of thanksgiving in the church, during which he knelt at the grave of his great-uncle, buried only a few days earlier, Milan Obrenović returned to the carriage and drove toward Terazija and his palace with Blaznavac and Ristić. The others who saw him concluded that Milan was a "lively and intelligent child," but nonetheless just a child. One moment he would have the reasoning of an adult when it came to serious matters, and then the next he would again act like a boy.³³ It was very odd for those around him to have such high expectations of such a young creature of barely fourteen. He was criticized for being a child, for "running around the garden, muddy and dirty, chasing sparrows."³⁴

His young age was one of the reasons Milan was not accepted at the time by many politicians. A great deal of effort, investment, and patience was needed for him to grow into a proper monarch. Many compared him to his uncle Mihailo, his reputation in the world, his commitment to the affairs of state, and his kindness and open nature. As a child, Milan possessed none of these qualities, so no one was pleased or satisfied with his ascension to the throne. Doubts, fears, negative predictions, and a complete lack of trust in this newly arrived young man characterized the mood in the country at the time of his ascension and for quite a long time to come. "Today we know fear, yet have nothing to place our trust in," wrote one insightful observer of these events.³⁵ In truth, few in the country had even heard of Milan Obrenović. The interim government issued instructions to all authorities that, until the assembly met, they were to inform the public that Milan, a descendant of the Obrenović dynasty, was alive, was thirteen to fourteen years of age, and that the late prince had sent him to Paris for schooling. Following instructions from Jovan Ristić, Huet had taken young Milan to be photographed in Paris, and so the young prince set foot on Serbian soil for the first time with a package of photographs. These were distributed to representatives of the local state authorities, who were tasked with introducing the people to their new ruler.³⁶

Milan arrived in Serbia while it was under martial law, with arrests, interrogations, and executions of those convicted of the assassination. Huet also came to Serbia with Milan on 23 June 1868. He was never apart from Milan and lived with him at the royal residence. Blaznavac moved to the small residence next door to Prince Milan and his surveillance of the young prince became constant.³⁷ Professor Huet, to Milan's great sorrow, died suddenly

³³ ASANU, Istorijaska zbirka, 14556/134, Printouts from the Garašanin archives, note from December 1868 on impressions by the prince's adjutant, Tihomilj Nikolić; Todorović 1997: 130–131; Kalaj 1976: 43.

³⁴ Krstić 2006: 107.

³⁵ Krstić 2006: 40, 47–49, 66.

³⁶ MGB, II 2839, *Pregled izdavanja kneza Mihaila 1865–1868*, Huet was paid by the late prince's estate a sum of 710 francs for the portraits of Milan O; Krstić 2006: 39, 43–44; Vasiljević 1990: 93; Hristić 2006: 526; DAS, PO, k. 68, br. 8, Confidential correspondence of Radivoj Milojković.

³⁷ Krstić 2006: 86–87.

in Paris in June 1869. The second person, after his mother, whom he trusted and was close to, had disappeared from his life. What followed were heavy challenges for his young shoulders that necessitated a constant struggle for sheer survival.

Translated by *Elizabeth Salmore*

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**ДЕТИЊСТВО ПРВОГ КРАЉА ОБНОВЉЕНЕ СРБИЈЕ
МИЛАНА ОБРЕНОВИЋА.
ПРИЛОЗИ ЗА БИОГРАФИЈУ**

Резиме

Милан Обреновић кнез (1868–1882) и краљ Србије (1882–1889) рођен је у граду Јаши (Румунија) 22. августа 1854. године као друго дете у браку Милоша и Елене Марије Обреновић, рођене Катарци. Отац Милош рођен је у Шапцу, 25. новембар 1829, као најмлађе од деветоро деце Јеврема и Томаније Обреновић и синовац тадашњег кнеза Милоша Обреновића. После смрти прворођеног детета, кренули су и први брачни проблеми између Миланових родитеља. Мајка Марија је 1854. године напустила мужа и отишла у Јаши родитељима где се и породила. Милан је име добио по прерано преминулом најстаријем сину кнеза Милоша, који је кратко време седео на српском престоу. До девете године живота није се раздвајао од мајке Марије. Изгубивши у шестој години живота оца, мајка је постала и његов једини старатељ. У договору са Милановим стрицем, кнезом Михаилом Обреновићем, 1863. године послат је на школовање у Париз. Првих година по одласку, јако је патио за мајком. Захваљујући вештини и компетенцијама профеоора Франсоа Хиета, у чијој је кући мали Милан живео, за релативно кратко време прилагодио се новонасталим околностима. После само пола године стрпљивог и упорног рада, професор је са задовољством извештавао о дечаковом напредовању. Милан се лепо и физички и умно развијао и био је здраво и интелигентно дете. Српски језик је учио од десете године живота и до ступања на престо изузетно добро се њиме служио.

У Србији није боравио пре него што је, Законом о наследству престола из 1859. године, постао кнез. То је било након атентата на његовог стрица кнеза Михаила. Имао је тада непуних четрнаест година. Милан Обреновић крочио је по први пут на српско тле, на савском пристаништу, 23. јуна 1868. године у пет сати ујутру. Дочекан је уз све владаре почастима. Упркос томе, владало је велико незадовољство у политичким круговима због његовог ступања на престо. Његове младе године један су од разлога за незадовољство. Требало је пуно труда, улагања и стрпљења да би он занста израстао у владарску личност. Многи су га поредили са стрицем Михаилом, његовим угледом у свету, преданошћу државним пословима, ширини духа и доброты. Пошто, као дете, ништа од тога није поседовао, његовим доласком на престо нико није био искрено обрадован, нити задовољан. Сумње, страхови, лоша предвиђања и потпуно одсуство поверења у то тек пристигло младо биће, какартерисали су главно расположење у земљи у време ступања на престо.

Кључне речи: Милан Обреновић, Марија Катарци, кнез Михаило Обреновић, кнез Милош Обреновић, Јаши, François Huet.

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FROM RENAISSANCE TO A PRECIPICE OVER THE ACHE
PATRIARCH LUKIJAN BOGDANOVIĆ

Abstract: Patriarch Lukijan Bogdanović was the last head of the Patriarchate of Karlovci, which had existed for two centuries, first as a metropolitanate and later a patriarchate. He was elected Bishop of Buda when he was very young, and he proved to be a highly capable at running the diocese/bishopric. From 1908 on, as a young patriarch, he faced unresolvable difficulties and issues related to religious and educational autonomy, the Patriarchate itself, and relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Attacked, defamed, and misunderstood by the Serbian public, he soon began falling victim to poor health. His tragic death, which many years later again became an object of public interest, made him seem more sensational than he actually was, and his educational and ecclesiastical work remained in the background.

Keywords: Patriarchate of Karlovci, Lukijan Bogdanović, Radicals, Jaša Tomić, Mihailo Polit Desančić.

In late October 1913, the Serbian press in the Habsburg Monarchy wrote of a day, sunny and cold, with palpable apprehension and disbelief hanging in the air around those present, as the body of Patriarch Lukijan Bogdanović was taken from the church in Sremski Karlovci and placed in the crypt of the Upper Church. Lukijan Bogdanović, the Patriarch of Karlovci, had disappeared without a trace in early September 1913 while recuperating at Bad Gadstein. Soon after, speculation grew over the reasons behind his disappearance, his financial difficulties, his private life, and his political leanings. An air of spectacle and sensationalism began to grow around the patriarch, which was certainly not beneficial for either the Patriarchate of Karlovci or the Serbian elite in the monarchy. For a while, it was forgotten that all this had been about one of the most important ecclesiastical and, for quite some time, political offices the Serbs had in the monarchy. It was also about a man who had become a patriarch when he was only forty-one, and whose many talents had distinguished him within the Church. Even-tempered, mild-mannered, yet highly experienced in Church affairs, he could potentially have been one of the most significant patriarchs to sit the throne of the patriarchate. Nevertheless, his close ties to government

elites in Budapest made him highly unpopular with the Serbs.¹

It was clear from his very first days with the Church as a monk and a bishop, he was something quite alien for the Serbs. He was born in Baja in what is now Hungary, educated at Serbian and Hungarian schools, had a distinct gift for languages, and spend a great deal of time in Egra and Buda, where he was elected bishop on the recommendation of his uncle, Patriarch Georgije Branković, when he was only twenty-nine. They were both sober and realistic in their understanding of key decisions made in Budapest and Vienna regarding the status and position of Serbs in the monarchy, and that Karlovci was no longer the main Serbian center in the monarchy that it once had been. By the late 19th century, Novi Sad and Zagreb had more attractive political and financial power, so the seat of the patriarchate had become the center for all events during sessions of the National Church Council, and from 1869 onwards it became an arena for Serb-on-Serb fights and disputes and the destruction of the potential for Serbs in the monarchy.²

Patriarch Georgije Branković, a former liberal, understood very well that it would not be enough for the Church to simply settle its finances or reorganize monastic life. He quickly decided to surround himself with young, energetic bishops who would be capable of running the Church according to the prevailing zeitgeist and in the best interests of the Church. Many of his protégés would go on to have important roles in Church life even up until the First World War. This was how the patriarch's decision led Lukijan Bogdanović to find himself at the head of one of the most demanding bishoprics in the Karlovci Patriarchate. The decision proved to be a good one. Bishop Lukijan ran the bishopric for fifteen years, and during this time he made notable progress in organizing and repairing the Serbs' standing in the center of the Hungarian half of the monarchy. His predecessor, Asenije Stojković, had headed the bishopric for forty years, which had resulted in almost everything coming to a complete standstill during the last few years of his tenure. His involvement in the National Church Councils held in 1872–1874, 1879, and 1881, when as part of the Miletić's group he was elected patriarch, had been met with criticism from the Hungarian elite, and especially from Kálmán Tisza. For this reason, old bishop tried to stay out of the attention of the police in Buda and Pest.³

Bogdanović's education in Baja, Eger, and Karlovci would shape his views on many future political and ecclesiastical decisions. Living in Eger and Karlovci gave him a clear view of all the advantages and disadvantages of life at the center and at the periphery of this great empire. As a young student in the 1880s, he made some acquaintances who would slowly but surely help establish him among the Budapest elite. Stevan Čamprag, a priest in the Bishopric of Buda, saw Lukijan as a handsome, elegant man who should become a priest rather than a monk, but Patriarch Georgije had had a direct influence on Bogdanović being tonsured in 1891 in Beočin on Fruska Gora. His priestly path was then tied to all higher and lower offices. He was a religious teacher at the gymnasium in Novi Sad and also taught at the Karlovci Seminary. The period from 1892 to 1896 was a difficult one for the patriarchate, and during this time, Bogdanović learned about the Serbian parties' political

¹ Vasin 2020: 17–20.

² Mikavica, Lemajić, Vasin, Ninković 2016: 72–77; Mikavica 2015: 292–295.

³ Vasin, Ninković 2018: 123–127; Vasin 2020: 231–248.

situation and their conflicts, primarily through the example of Patriarch Georgije who was a daily target in opposition newspapers of vicious attacks and horrible smears. Branković's attempts to bring order to religious and educational autonomy were obstructed by the Radicals, who stood at the forefront of anti-clerical opposition. During these years, Bogdanović had an opportunity to see what would be in store for him if he became more deeply involved in politics and religious and educational autonomy. This may have been at the root of the health problems that would later befall him. For a young man of only twenty-five in the patriarch's inner circle, exposed to the daily attacks, schemes, and provocations of the political elite, there was no respite and nowhere to hide. The monarchy's older, experienced politicians, whose time had passed, gave little thought to the next generation of clerics and politicians.⁴

This proved to be to the detriment of the Serbs in the monarchy. The generation gap was wide, and during the National Church Councils the decades between Mihailo Polit Desančić and Svetozar Pribićević were readily apparent. The Serbian elite were no longer acting in concert as they had been during the revolution of 1848–1849 or under Svetozar Miletić's leadership. After the Congress of Berlin and a decade of wholly unsuccessful opposition, there was an attempt to pursue a policy of realism or balance. Voices were growing louder that they needed to also engage with the Hungarian political system and abandon Miletić's stubborn opposition, which had not delivered any results and for which he himself had fallen victim to in a show trial in 1876. Patriarch Georgije, then Miletić's closest associate, was aware of this and found a way to move closer to government circles. In the 1880s, politics in the Kingdom of Serbia were also moving in that direction, so the situation was somewhat different. King Milan's abdication in 1889 caused another political stir on both sides of the Danube.⁵

The political situation behind the scenes during Lukijan Bogdanović's election as Bishop of Buda in 1897 was difficult. The electrified anti-Church atmosphere among the Serbs in the monarchy left little room for maneuver. The Millennium Celebrations of 1896 in Budapest and throughout Hungary evoked considerable political emotions among the Serbs in Hungary. The Church was constantly under attack as being the main collaborator with Dezső Bánffy's government and the main support behind the process of Magyarization. Although this could not have been further from the truth, the Radical's manipulations of their electorate left no room for compromise. The patriarch and the Synod were openly accused of actively taking part in Magyarization and were presented in the radical, rather anti-Semitic press as servants of the Jews and whose goal was to destroy religious and educational autonomy. This all culminated in a series of articles written against Patriarch Branković in which he was referred to as Satan himself. This was the atmosphere surrounding Lukijan Bogdanović's election as bishop, which the press welcomed with a series of attacks claiming the patriarch had decided to introduce the principle of inheritance in the Serbian church and that he was readying a "dauphin" to continue his dynasty.⁶

On 20 January 1898, Bishop Lukijan was officially confirmed by Emperor Franz

⁴ Vasin 2014: 96–137.

⁵ Vasin 2015: 441–457; Mikavica 2015: 297–308; Mikavica 2018: 268–272.

⁶ Vasin 2020: 42–55.

Joseph and was hirotonisan by Patriarch Georgije in Szentendre. In 1898 he was faced with a number of serious problems in his bishopric that for years had not maintained ordinary church life. Expenses were high, and some churches were lacking even the most basic liturgical objects, which Lukijan complained to the patriarch about at the Conference in Karlovci in June 1898. This conference was meant to serve as a forum for some of the bishops to meet with politicians who were seeking a resolution to for the issue of religious and educational autonomy. Some of the most prominent of these were Baron Jovan Živković, Ilija Vučetić, and Nika Maksimović. None of them were Radicals. Between 1898 and 1902, things further deteriorated. The attacks on the patriarch and the Synod were so vehement, that in 1902 the Radicals took control of all affairs related to religious and educational autonomy. The Church had no means of defending itself from so many attacks aimed solely at attaining power, no matter the cost to the Radicals, of whom Jaša Tomić wielded the mightiest pen.⁷

It was during these years that, contrary to the prevailing circumstances, were incredibly fruitful for Bishop Lukijan in the Bishopric of Buda. From his personal correspondence and archives, it is easy to see that many churches and priests were looked after, a significant number of churches were renovated, and a magnificent building project was started to erect the Tekelijanum in central Budapest. Bishop Lukijan had a feel for the prevailing zeitgeist. From the 1890s until the First World War, substantial funds were allocated to present Budapest in all its splendor through a revitalized city center, broad boulevards, the Parliament building and the Opera House, numerous hotels and cafés, the first metro lines (which the city was at the forefront of in Europe). This gave the Serbian community the chance to establish itself and contribute to the city's development. The Serbian churches of Saint George in Pest and Saint Demetrius in Buda (in the Taban) were well-positioned, which provided the bishop an opportunity to raise funds to maintain and expand the capacity of the Church community on Váci Street and to begin the ambitious construction of the Tekelijanum on Veres Pálné Street. Capable Serbian merchants had been well-known for years in the center of Pest and they did more than enough to fully preserve the church's splendor. A not small number of individuals personally contributed to these grand ventures. Serbian members of the Hungarian Parliament within the ranks of the Hungarian parties also helped.⁸ Patriarch Georgije Branković did the same in Sremski Karlovci. Sure and persistent in his convictions, he chose to seize the opportunity offered and turned Karlovci into a true Serbian residential center in Hungary. He was quite successful in this endeavor. Grand buildings were built, the city was electrified, and new streets began to spread through the city—all due to the work of the patriarch, who invested millions of crowns into repairing and building new schools and renovating countless churches and monasteries throughout the patriarchate.⁹

One of the most prominent of those in Bishop Lukijan's circle in Szentendre was the longtime mayor and patron of the Church, Jenő Dumtsa/ Evgenije Evgen Dumča. Dumča/Dumtsa, a strong supporter of Bishop Lukijan's church renovation projects, was wealthy and had an extensive, primarily mercantile, network and strong connections in

⁷ Vasin 2014: 182–188; Mikavica, Vasin 2017: 22–27.

⁸ Vasin, Ninković 2018: 129–132.

⁹ Vasin 2014: 215–237.

Budapest. Contemporary writers described the bishop as soft hearted, averse to conflict, and very popular among the elites at the center of Hungary. He may have been hated and essentially misunderstood in Karlovci, but in Budapest he was successful in surrounding himself with his own people and connecting with the most influential people in the capital.¹⁰

Bogdanović, did not find it particularly difficult to manage the affairs of his parish, to obtain gas driven machines for wells, to advise priests on how to better manage their resources, to support electrification, or to use his own private funds to purchase books or assist poorer students and clergy. During the years when laws symbolic of Magyarization were passed that eventually culminated in the Apponyi laws in 1907, he raised considerable funds to begin building the Tekelijanum. The priest Stevan Čamprag openly wrote that the bishop was good and wise in how he managed the bishopric, that he was kind and gentle with his subordinates and supported their ideas, but he could not abide negligence and indolence in those closest to him.¹¹

At the National Church Council of 1906–1907, when the question of Georgije Branković's removal was raised, he stood in open opposition to such a radical initiative and supported the older patriarch in front of the government in Budapest. After Patriarch Branković's death on 30 July 1907, the forty-year-old Lukijan soon found himself in an unenviable position.¹² Not only did the Serbian press claim he was the Hungarians' pet, but his fellow bishops also believed he had been elected only because he spoke fluent Hungarian. The Hungarians, on the other hand, viewed Lukijan as well-educated, intelligent, and popular, and also as the only individual who could represent the symbolic connection between Serbs and Hungarians. The bishop tried not to engage with all the speculation and spent the greater part of 1907 working on the construction of the Tekelijanum. He also intentionally set aside time to consecrate renovated churches and meet with many members of the clergy. During these years, there were extensive construction projects in the bishopric of Budapest. In numerous epistles, the bishop also endeavored to strengthen the spiritual health of both clergy members and the congregants who attended church. These epistles are still relevant today. He openly criticized and condemned intemperance, greed, selfishness, and disrespect for one's fellow man, and recommended moderation and respect for modern medicine and recent scientific achievements that benefited humanity. Significant parts of his epistles were also symbolically linked to politics, and he appealed to his readers to respect the Hungarian state and its ruler, Franz Joseph. He stated unequivocally that there were storm clouds gathering over the Serbs and rough times were ahead, but he also stressed the Serbs' love of the Crown of St. Stephen and the dual monarchy. His pleas were also directed at the consciences of the Serbs, asking them to refrain from needless criticism or speaking publicly about politics without knowing all the facts.¹³

Nevertheless, despite his reticence, it was impossible to avoid the National Church Council of 1908, which had to be convened to select a new patriarch for the Patriarchate of

¹⁰ Vasin, Ninković 2018: 131–134.

¹¹ Vasin, Ninković 2018: 142–144.

¹² Rakić 1986: 186–189.

¹³ Vasin, Ninković 2018: 139.

Karlovcí. Prior to this, the government of Sándor Wekerle had named Lukijan as the patriarchate's administrator in March 1908. He was also named secret advisor and the title of His Excellency, which accompanied this office.¹⁴ Not long after, the press launched a campaign to elect a new patriarch. The Radical newspaper *Zastava* insisted that Wekerle would force through Lukijan Bogdanović. The situation only became more heated with frequent speculation about the impending annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Elites in Budapest felt Nikola Pašić, Jaša Tomić, and King Petar were trying to interfere with Serbian ecclesiastical affairs in the monarchy. In an interview on 18 July 1908, the Radical candidate for patriarch, Bishop Gavriilo Zmejanović of Vršac, said he had discussed this several times with Wekerle. He did not conceal the fact that he had mentioned to Wekerle that Kálmán Széll and Dezső Bánffy could confirm he was working to tamp down anti-state activity.¹⁵ He also felt that not speaking Hungarian posed a problem for him but gave Bishop Bogdanović full advantage. Mihailo Polit Desančić, a veteran of the Serbian political scene, stated unequivocally that if there were no other option, Wekerle would force Bogdanović, and that the Radicals bore full responsibility for all of this because they had permitted Wekerle's interference with their own malfeasance in the business of religious and educational autonomy.¹⁶

At the Serbian National Church Council, the proceedings eventually fell into chaos. First, Bishop Gavriilo Zmejanović of Vršac was elected patriarch on 1 August 1908, which Wekerle did not wish to recognize due to Zmejanović's lack of Hungarian. In the second round on 6 September 1908, Bishop Mitrofan Šević of Bačka was elected, but he withdrew, announcing that he had not been asked or consulted, and that he did not want the position. Finally, on 22 September 1908, Bishop Lukijan was elected. A Radical majority supported him, but they had first consulted with Wekerle and Ferenc Kossuth. Following the election, dozens of articles were written by the ruling Radicals and opposition Liberals, in which both sides hurled insults, threats, and a litany of accusations that only further undermined the election. Patriarch Lukijan was enthroned on 8 October 1908 in Karlovcí, but the atmosphere was strained and bleak due to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina a few days prior and the tensions that followed among the Serbs in the monarchy. The monarchy's Serbian elite openly discussed the historic defeat and the Austro-Hungarian hostility directed at the Serbs, along with growing warnings of a clash between the dual monarchy and the Kingdom of Serbia.¹⁷

It was against this backdrop that Lukijan Bogdanović assumed leadership of the patriarchate. At only forty-one, he found himself needing to resolve issues that his predecessors, German Anđelić and Georgije Branković, had been unable to for decades. Both had been energetic and persistent, which were qualities the patriarch's contemporaries did not believe he possessed. Constant references were made to him being soft, mild-mannered, and conciliatory, and this made him an ideal target for Serbian and Hungarian politicians, who saw issues related to the Church and religion as nothing more than

¹⁴ Vasin 2018: 22–29.

¹⁵ Mikavica 2006: 396–398.

¹⁶ Mikavica 2011: 256–259; Mikavica 2018: 273–283; Rakić 1983: 57–59; Pal 2009: 265–270.

¹⁷ Vasin 2015: 687–697; Vasin 2014: 301–314; *Branik*, br. 173, 2/ 15 avgust 1908; *Branik*, br. 184, 17/ 30 avgust 1908; *Branik*, br. 192, 27 avgust/ 9 septembar 1908; ASANUK, MPA, A, 349/ 1908.

additional tools for dealing with major crises in the Balkans. The trial of Serb elites accused of treason in Croatia in 1908–1909 only served to further inflame political tensions. The patriarch kept himself removed from this politically motivated proceeding, but he publicly called for Serbs to be allowed the Cyrillic script and the flag and to preserve their traditions within Croatia and Slavonia.

A multitude of new and unresolved issues were raised at new National Church Council that met over two sessions between 1 June 1910 and 28 July 1911. The agendas at both lengthy sessions were dominated by the monasteries' accounts, aid for the clergy, financial disarray, running the Council committee, and the current state of various funds. Friction continued relentlessly within the Radical–Liberal Independents. It was almost impossible to conduct a meeting without interruptions or to make any more important decisions. The question of religious and educational autonomy continued to elude the Serbian political actors and it eventually fell to the government in Budapest, where on-and-off discussions had been going on for years about introducing some sort of special administration for Serbian schools and religious affairs. The adoption of the Synod organization in 1911 was a step in this direction. The patriarch wanted the Church to take full control over all internal administrative affairs without any secular interference, which had been the case since the Assembly Statute of 1869–1875. Earlier attempts by Patriarch German Anđelić in 1882 and Patriarch Georgije Branković during 1892–1897 were unsuccessful, and Lukijan's move was viewed as by some of the Serbian public as a betrayal.¹⁸

The abolishment of religious and educational autonomy in 1912 went hand-in-hand with all of these other issues. There is no doubt that, for many years, the government wanted to limit autonomy or partially suspend it, but it is also true that the Serbian ecclesiastical and the political elites were supportive of this. The patriarchate had been in disarray for decades, which was reflected in its poor financial state, constant in-fighting, failure to implement decisions, the work of autonomous institutions being constantly blocked, and the catastrophic state of Serbian schools. This all came to a head during the period of 1911–1912. Patriarch Lukijan was not directly responsible for this state of affairs. Decades of neglect and discord were the consequences of prior inaction long before the events of 1912. Nevertheless, blame was largely attributed to Lukijan personally.

After several petitions sent by members of the Hungarian parliament to the prime minister, László Lukács, religious and educational autonomy was considerably narrowed by the Emperor Franz Joseph's infamous Decree.¹⁹ With this, numerous decisions made by the National Church Council were repealed. These included Act of 29 May 1871 on the interim organization of the bishopric, the Act of 29 May 1871 on the interim Patriarchate Ecclesiastical and Education Council, Act of 29 May 1871 on the selection of representatives to the council Act of 14 May 1875 on the National Church Council, all the rules and regulations based on interpretations of these decrees, and the Statue of 23 March 1908.²⁰

¹⁸ Vasin 2015: 700–707.

¹⁹ ASANUK, MPA, A, 237/ 1912, from a handwritten letter from Franz Joseph and László Lukács, with an accompanying letter from the bishopric written by the patriarch's secretary, Dr. Laza Sekulić.

²⁰ Rakić 1986: 207–215.

Minister Lukács instructed Patriarch Bogdanović on 17 July to carry out this order, and in response Bogdanović sent a representative on 26 July 1912. His representative received a very hostile welcome from the Serbian political parties. The patriarch was labeled a traitor, and his administration declared the worst since the patriarchate had been founded. By now it was already evident that the patriarch was having difficulties dealing with the situation he had found himself in. His valuable humanitarian and building initiatives had gone completely unnoticed. He was not accustomed to public gatherings and did not care to engage in controversy through the press, so he instead spent a considerable amount of time in Budapest between 1910 and 1912. His frequent absences from Karlovci were interpreted as wanting to move the seat of the patriarchate to Budapest. There was no evidence to substantiate this, but it was nevertheless mentioned regularly in the Serbian press.²¹

Patriarch Lukijan's attempts to put the patriarchate's finances in order were ultimately unsuccessful, but some important progress was still made. When securing pensions for the clergy, Patriarch Lukijan promised to make a permanent yearly contribution from his personal funds, and when the Pension Decree for Serbian Orthodox Clergy in the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate of Karlovci was adopted, he donated 20 percent of his net income to the fund for clergy and their widows. In 1909 he founded the *Synod Fund*, to which he contributed 50,000 crowns annually for the Synod and religious education. On his initiative, the Holy Synod passed the Decree for the Court Monastic Clergy in the Orthodox Patriarchate of Karlovci in 1911. Only a young man with a formal education and who was of the Orthodox faith and Serbian ethnicity could be admitted as a novitiate. This was a school where young monks were trained for higher positions in the Church. At the end of January 1909, when the government in Zagreb revoked the rights for a Serbian teachers' college in Pakrac, Patriarch Lukijan took the necessary steps and the school was allowed to reopen. With the patriarch's initiative *The Blessing of Metropolitan Stefan (Stratimirović)*, it was reopened as the Stefaneum, a modern residential gymnasium where around forty students received free room and board. As a result of Patriarch Lukijan's beneficence, the fully renovated Church of Saint Nicholas was reconsecrated in 1910, as is evidenced by a memorial plaque inside the church. At the initiative of the patriarch, Uroš Predić's famous painting *The Turbulent Sea*, which depicts Saint Nicholas blessing Patriarch Lukijan as he kneels before him, asking for a blessing for the salvation of the church. The painting is now kept at the Serbian Patriarchate in Belgrade.²² These important accomplishments, achieved over a relatively short period, were never given enough attention, and the negative image of him created in the Serbian press endured for many years after his death.

The Balkan Wars were the final turning point in relations between the Kingdom of Serbia and Austro-Hungary, but they were also crucial for the Serbs in the monarchy. The loyal Serbian population was viewed with mistrust. As tensions grew, the Serbs collectively became a people to be viewed with suspicion and antipathy. This was particularly evident in the fall of 1914, but the groundwork for this had already been laid earlier. The patriarch did not navigate this well. The Serbian army's victories in October and November 1912 were met with suspicion at Ballhausplatz. The Serbian advance on the Albanian coast, which

²¹ Vasin 2015: 727–739.

²² Vuković 1996: 345–346.

was condemned by the monarchy, was met with echoing salvos in Belgrade. Patriarch Lukijan's speech at the Hungarian Parliament in November 1912, during which he expressed loyalty to the dual monarchy and support for Count von Berchtold's policy in Albania was interpreted as being tantamount to treason. Criticism and insults were directed at him at every turn. The Radicals openly claimed the patriarch was supporting the Albanians over the Serbs.²³

At the beginning of 1913, relations between Austria-Hungary and the Kingdom of Serbia were poor, as was the patriarch's health. The political parties quickly began calling for his replacement or resignation. After fifteen years of daily political and Church struggles and the attacks that culminated in the events at the end of 1912, it is no wonder the patriarch's health began to decline. His associates began saying that the patriarch had fallen into a depression and no longer had any interest in carrying out his daily responsibilities.

In July 1913, it was announced that the fall session of the Synod would be postponed, and that Patriarch Lukijan would be leaving for Bad Gastein for medical treatment and recuperation. It was the last time there was any news about his health or his whereabouts. The Synod announced to the public in early September 1913 that the patriarch had disappeared during his treatment at Bad Gastein. He had last been seen on 1 September 1913. Jaša Tomić quickly claimed that derangement and mental disorder had caused his death. He rejected the theory he had been murdered. The leader of the Liberal party, Mihailo Polić Desančić, was of a similar opinion that the patriarch was feeble, mentally ill, and personal weakness and inadequacies had caused him to make mistakes. For weeks, the Serbian elite in the monarchy recounted the details of his life, his disappearance, and later death, which was confirmed when his body was discovered in waters of the Gasteiner Ache on 26 October.

Descriptions of his mutilated body that had been in the Ache for several weeks cast a pall over his funeral, held a few days later on 3 November 1913.²⁴ It seemed like a bad omen indicating that religious and educational autonomy was now out of reach. Patriarch Lukijan's death exacerbated the already tense atmosphere between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. It was now clear that Serbian political and Church elites had neither the strength nor imagination to overcome crisis that had arose from the events of 1912–1913.²⁵

The patriarch's death did not become a topic of discussion until several years later. Only in the 1920s a theory began to emerge in ecclesiastical circles that he had been murdered. A full century later, there was repeated speculation that informal groups in Vienna and Pest had somehow been behind it. A police report taken at the scene was inconclusive. There were no signs of struggle, and based on the evidence, it seemed the patriarch had gone for a walk at night and fallen from an unmarked part of a cliff over the Ache. There was no benefit from his death for the government in Budapest, which had found him to be a loyal partner, one who did not provoke incidents to undermine the state or rally the opposition to his cause. The young patriarch's health had deteriorated under the weight of problems, struggles, attacks, and slander. Misunderstood by those around him, he was a man who, by all accounts, should have been one of the most effective patriarchs, yet he had fallen prey

²³ Vasin 2020: 205–222.

²⁴ ASANUK, MPA, A, 366/1913

²⁵ Vasin 2013: 285–303.

to mental anguish and, in the end, the Ache. A century later, his death stands as a stark reminder of the fall from grace of the Serbian church and political elites in the monarchy, who had been torn between reality and nationalism, and by attempts to strengthen, transform, and integrate into a state system they were an integral part of, yet whose policies they no longer had any real influence over.

Translated by *Elizabeth Salmore*

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ГОРАН ВАСИН

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***ОД РЕНЕСАНСЕ ДО ПОНОРА АХЕ:* ПАТРИЈАРХ ЛУКИЈАН БОГДАНОВИЋ**

Резиме

Патријарх Лукијан Богдановић, последњи Карловачки првојерарх био је изузетна личност на трону најважније српске институције. Талентован, благ и одмерен имао је ставове који су импоновали елитама центра Угарске и на тај начин је добио подршку за изборе у црквена звања. Српска средина га није разумела. Управо у том односу крио се кључ његових проблема и великог број тешкоћа са којима се сусретао најпре као епископ, а потом и као патријарх. Његова блага природа није одговарала прохтевима српских политичких елита са периферије Монархије. Век касније после смрти, поново се актуелизовало питање о његовом убиству, али не и о његовом животу. Патријарх Лукијан Богдановић био је ренесансна појава последњег пламсаја Карловачке митрополије.

Кључне речи: Карловачка патријаршија, Лукијан Богдановић, радикали, Јаша Томић, Михајло Полит Десанчић.

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THE ALBANIAN GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO SECURE A FINANCIAL ADVISOR TO ALBANIA FROM THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1921–1922)

Abstract: This paper presents the economic and financial situation in Albania during 1921–1922, the difficulties faced by the Albanian government overcoming issues related to this and the efforts made to fulfill the Albanian government's request to the League of Nations for an appointment of an outside financial advisor. It will also present the circumstances around the possibility being raised once again for the League to appoint a British financial. It addresses the motivations behind the Albanian government turning to the League of Nations for support, and the reasons why it could not seek help in this matter from Italy or the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS). This paper also reflects on the potential candidates discussed at the League of Nations and considers the discussions that took place regarding the procedures, competencies and criteria for selecting candidates for this task. The position held by the British and Italian governments regarding Albania's request for assistance and the arguments on which their political lines were based. The paper considers in detail the position held by the British Foreign Office regarding the candidates submitted for this position in Albania.

Keywords: Albania, financial advisor, Albanian government, League of Nations, Great Britain, Foreign Office, Treasure of Chambers, Interim Economic and Financial Committee.

1. The Economic and Financial Situation in Albania in the early 1920s

In the early 1920s, the Albanians began the process of rebuilding their state, which had been interrupted by the outbreak of World War I. In addition to political issues, the leaders of the Albanian state faced economic and financial difficulties. Economically, Albania at this time continued to be in a situation similar to that of the Balkan countries after their liberation from Ottoman rule. The socioeconomic organization of the country according to the western model was still in its infancy.¹

The Albanian government needed financial resources to maintain the government and the military, to build roads and bridges, to open schools and exploit the country's natural

¹ Fischer 2004: 55–56.

resources. However, at this time Albania did not have even the most basic economic and financial structure from which the foundations of a modern state could be built.²

In 1921, one of the main issues connected to finances and the economy was the state budget deficit. The Albanian state had created a debt amounting to more than five million gold francs.³ This debt grew in 1921 due to military operations the government was forced to undertake to suppress an uprising in the Mirdita region. This uprising disrupted Albania's finances and added an additional one million gold francs in the state budget deficit, which brought Albania's debt to about seven million gold francs.⁴ According to the exchange rate set in 1921 by Prime Minister Iljaz Vrioni's government, one British pound was equivalent to twenty-five gold francs, one Turkish lira to twenty-two gold francs, and one US dollar to five gold francs.⁵

The increase in the Albanian state's deficit was also influenced by numerous abuses perpetrated by inexperienced officials managing the state's finances.⁶

A negative trade balance had also worsened Albania's economic and financial situation. In 1921, the value of imports increased significantly in comparison to exports, and Albania exported about two million gold francs and imported about fifteen million. The trade deficit was accompanied by a reduction in domestic gold reserves. As a result, working capital was limited and the state budget revenues were reduced.⁷

Another major hindrance to Albania's economy and finances was the lack of a national currency. The presence of several types of foreign currencies in the country caused confusion for the economy, a loss of trade due to sudden exchange rate devaluations, and a loss of national wealth due to an outflow of gold reserves for exchanges in foreign trade.⁸ On June 25, 1921, the Albanian government issued a decision that the extraction of state revenues would be done on the basis of the gold franc.⁹ The Albanian government began to intervene in the regulation of exchange rates based on the gold franc established by the Latin Monetary Union.¹⁰ An act for issuing Albanian banknotes was not implemented because the Albanian government had tried to enter into agreements with foreign financial groups to secure a loan to establish an Albanian national bank.¹¹

The lack of a national bank in Albania was another major stumbling block for the country's economic and financial development. The creation of a national bank that could

² Swire 2005: 310.

³ *The British National Archives*, (hereinafter: *TNA*), Foreign Office (hereinafter: FO) 371/ 7332, Annual report on Albania during 1921 drafted by the British minister H. C. A. Eyres to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Durrës, May 1, 1922.

⁴ *TNA*, FO 371/ 7328, 'An Albanian Republic - Ahmed Bey as President' - By the correspondent in Belgrade, *Morning Post*, October 3, 1922; Swire, J. 2005: 298; *Official Journal of the League of Nations*, Geneva: December 1921: 1187–1188.

⁵ Fishta, Toçi 1983: 35; Dervishi 2006: 136.

⁶ *Ibid.* FO 371/ 7332, Annual report on Albania during 1921 drafted by the British minister H. C. A. Eyres to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Durrës, May 1, 1922.

⁷ Vllamasi 2000: 288–289.

⁸ *Ibid.* 290–291.

⁹ Shkoza 1935: 213–214; Duka 1997: 80.

¹⁰ *Monetary policy in Albania: from the past to the present*, 2012: 51.

¹¹ Selenica 1928: XLIII–XLIV.

issue a national currency had become a necessity because foreign capital had begun to penetrate the local economy, mainly in the agricultural, forestry, mining and transport network sectors.¹² The main positive factor in this regard was that during the First World War, the quantity of gold and silver collected by Albanians estimated to be approximately one hundred million gold francs, which could serve as a guarantee for the issue of Albanian banknotes.¹³

The Albanian government entered into negotiations with foreign joint-stock companies such as the Banque du Brabant in Brussels, Société Nationale de Banque de Change and the French Raymon et Cie-Paris. The conditions they offered were not suitable for establishing a national bank.¹⁴ Kol Thaçi, the finance minister, consulted two impartial experts regarding the Banque du Brabant but they were reluctant to give a positive opinion based on the argument that they had no information about the true state of the Albanian economy.¹⁵

2. The Albanian government requests assistance of Great Britain in appointing a British financial advisor

In the early 1920s, Albania did not have the necessary opportunities or capacities to build an effective financial management system. For this reason, the newspaper *Koha*, published in the city of Korça, Albania¹⁶ wrote that the Albanian government should not hesitate to employ foreign organizers or advisors. The newspaper proposed that the government initially turn to the United States for support; but if the US declined to offer assistance, then this request should be addressed to Great Britain. If the British government did not accept this request, then Albania would have to seek advisors from the League of Nations.¹⁷

In 1921 the Albanian government came to the conclusion that due to a lack of specialists in these fields, foreign experts would have to be employed in order to overcome the country's considerable infrastructure, economic, and financial problems.¹⁸ In February 1922, the Albanian government decided to bring in and nominate foreign organizers for each ministry. It was thought that these should primarily be Austrians, but British or American advisors should be found for the Ministry of Finance.¹⁹

In mid-January 1922, the Albanian government issued an official request to the British legation in Durrës requesting the appointment of a financial advisor from Great Britain. The Albanian government's desire to entrust the task of organizing Albanian state finances to a British expert was due to the fact that Great Britain had no direct interests in Albania.²⁰ It was also a result of friendly relations established at the beginning of 1920's

¹² Toçi 1974: 100; Zavalani 1998: 274–275.

¹³ *Dielli*, no. 2575 – (118), Boston Mass., 18 prill 1923, 3.

¹⁴ Shkoza 1935: 781–782; Duka 1997: 79.

¹⁵ Vllamasi 2000: 291.

¹⁶ A city in southeastern Albania, from which a large number of Albanian emigrated to the United States.

¹⁷ 'A mundet te qeverisemi vete?' [Can we govern ourselves?], *Koha*, no.15, Korçë, 16 tetor 1920, 1.

¹⁸ Swire 2005: 311.

¹⁹ 'Shenja gëzimi' [Signs of joy], *Koha*, no. 71, Korçë, 25 shkurt 1922, 2.

²⁰ *TNA*, FO 371/ 7328, Diplomatic note of the "ad interim" Albanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Spiro G. Koleka to the British diplomatic mission in Durrës, Tiranë, January 12, 1922.

between a group of influential British citizens in London's political circles²¹ and the Albanian political leaders who had come to power. Thanks to the support of the Albanian cause from the representatives of the British dominions such as Lord Robert Cecil of South Africa, Canada's Newton W. Rowell and Ali Imam of India, Albania was admitted to the League of Nations in December 1920.²²

The British foreign secretary, Lord Curzon, after a careful consideration of the appointment of a British financial advisor to Albania, concluded that this request could not be honored due to political reasons. In his estimation, the appointment of a British advisor would not only raise suspicions and dissatisfaction among the other powers, and Italy in particular, but this political move would also raise concerns in Albania's neighboring countries. For this reason, he sought to discourage the proposal and to amicably inform the Albanian government that the British government's position was that it should seek a financial advisor from elsewhere.²³

British diplomats in the Balkans remained concerned about Great Britain's economic absence in Albania. They felt Britain's place could be taken over by France, Italy, or another country. The British minister in Belgrade, Alban Young, informed London that he had information regarding the possibility of setting up a Serbian-Albanian bank with ten million dinars in capital, which was being instituted in Cetinje by a Montenegrin citizen named Zuber, with the British Trading Corporation as its agent in Belgrade.²⁴

The British minister in Albania, Harry C. A. Eyres, reported to the Foreign Office that during his second visit to Albania, the well-known French politician Justin Godart²⁵ to Albania had arrived unaccompanied by engineers or any other experts. This was a great disappointment for the Albanians, who had high hopes for financial and trade assistance.²⁶

Despite a strong desire among British diplomats in the region for a greater British presence in Albania, Miles W. Lampson, an official at the Foreign Office, insisted that the British government avoid engagements or entanglements in Albania, as the British government clearly felt it was in their political interest to avoid friction between Great Britain and Italy over Albania.²⁷

²¹ This British group included General George Fraser Phillips, Colonel Aubrey Herbert, British Consul and Intelligence Services Officer William Morton Eden, Major Harold Temperley, and Miss Edith Durham.

²² "Si u pranua Shqipëria në Ligen e Kombeve" [How Albania was admitted to the League of Nations], *Drita*, no. 39, Gjirokastër, 17 mars 1921, 3; "Në Kuvendin e Ligës së Kombeve" [In the League of Nations' Assembly], *Drita*, no. 41, Gjirokastër, 3 prill 1921, 2-3; Vllamasi 2000: 177; Puto 2010: 319.

²³ *TNA*, FO 371/7328, Letter of Lord Curzon to George Young M.V.O., F. O., April 5, 1922; *Ibid.*, FO 371/7328, Letter of Lord Curzon to Lieutenant Commander E. Hilton Young, D.S.C, M.P., F. O. April 7, 1922.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, FO 371/7331, Sir Alban Young to Earl of Balfour, Beograd, June 15, 1922.

²⁵ In 1904, Justin Godart was elected the sixth deputy mayor of Lyon as a member of the Radical Party. In 1906, he became a Deputy of the French National Assembly, representing Lyon. From 1915 to 1918, Godart served as the Undersecretary of State for War in charge of the armed forces medical service. When Edouard Herriot became Prime Minister of France in 1924, Godart was appointed Minister for Labor, Hygiene, Welfare Work, and Social Security Provisions. Godart's time in this position came to an end with Herriot's ouster the next year. In 1926, he became a Senator, representing the department of Rhone. In 1932, Godart became for a short time Minister of Public Health, again under Herriot.

²⁶ *TNA*, FO 371/7331, H. C. A. Eyres to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Durrës, June 15, 1922.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, FO 371/7332, Thoughts of Miles W. Lampson reflected in the Foreign Office minutes, F. O., April 27, 1922.

3. Why Albania did not ask Italy or the Kingdom of SCS to provide a financial advisor

Albanian-Italian relations had remained tense ever since the 1920 Vlora War, when Albanian insurgents forced Italian troops to withdraw from Albania. After an armistice agreement was signed on August 2, 1920 by representatives of the Albanian and Italian governments, the Italian state changed its tactics regarding Albania²⁸. What Italy had failed to win in Albania through war, it now aimed to achieve through political and economic pressure. Between 1920 and 1922, there were a number of incidents between two countries.²⁹ These incidents were transitory and not significant enough to spark armed conflict, but the clashes were essentially about Italy's political aim to dominate Albania.

Albania could not even turn to the Kingdom of SCS for help. The expulsion of Italy from Albania and the Balkan Peninsula would have been in the interests of Albania and the Kingdom of SCS. In the spring of 1920, the Albanian government sent MP Sejfi Vllamasi on a secret mission to Belgrade with the aim of improving bilateral relations.³⁰ Although the Albanians had hoped for an improvement in relations between the two countries, this did not happen.

In addition to the issue of Kosovo and the rights of the Albanian population living in the Kingdom of SCS, another factor preventing the normalization of Albanian-Yugoslav relations was the Yugoslav army's occupation of a part of northern Albania up to the Drin River, named the Franchet D'Esperey Strategic Line. This area which encompassed one-sixth of Albanian territory in 1913 and nearly 126,000 Albanians. The Yugoslavs claimed the Strategic Line was an area in need of protection from attacks by Albanian insurgents, while in fact the occupation was a political maneuver.³¹

Despite efforts by Albanian leaders to establish a rapprochement with the Kingdom of SCS, during the years 1920–1921, the Yugoslav government tried to gradually extend out from the eastern Albanian border provinces into the Mirdita region, which would serve as a strategic base. The final objective was to reach the Albanian coast and eventually annex all of northern Albania.³² The Yugoslav government tried to achieve this political goal by way of the head of the Mirdita province, Marka Gjoni, who was known to be friendly to the Serbs.³³

At the end of October 1921, the Yugoslav troops undertook a military operation inside the Albanian territory to support the Albanian mercenary forces occupying Lura, Orosh and Shëngjin (San Giovanni di Medua). They made it to about sixty kilometers away from the

²⁸ *The New Europe*, London: August 26, 1920.

²⁹ *TNA*, FO 371/ 7331, Note of Mid'hat Frashëri, head of the Albanian delegation to Jules Cambon, head of the Conference of Ambassadors, Paris, February 13, 1922; *Ibid.*, H. C. A. Eyres to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Durrës, February 20, 1922; *Ibid.*, FO 371/8531, Report of the League of Nations' Secretary-General on the activity of the Committee of Inquiry for Albania for the period from June to December 18, 1922, Geneva, January 6, 1923.

³⁰ Vllamasi 2000: 106–107.

³¹ Swire 2005: 265, 267; By an Australian [Morton F. Eden]. 1921: 4; Mehmeti 2020: 111.

³² Bakić 2016: 302.

³³ *TNA*, FO 371/ 5726, Telegram of H. C. A. Eyres to Foreign Office, Durrës, May 13, 1921; *Ibid.*, FO 371/ 5727, H. C. A. Eyres to Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Durrës, June 16, 1921; Mousset, A. 2004: 35.

Albanian capital of Tirana, and Albania was in serious danger of losing northern territory.³⁴ However, due to the forceful intervention in Belgrade by the Great Powers, in December 1921, the Yugoslav government was forced to withdraw its troops from inside Albania.

The aggravation of Albanian-Yugoslav relations and the fierce rivalry between Italy and the Kingdom of SCS due to Italy's aspirations in Albania, prevented the Albanian government from seeking assistance in finding a capable financial advisor from either of these neighboring states.

4. The Albanian government's request to the League of Nations to appoint a financial advisor

In 1920, the British government promised Albania that it would assist it with admission to the League of Nations if the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was given the rights to search for oil in Albania according to certain conditions. The Albanian government headed by Iljaz Vrioni, accepted these conditions.³⁵

On December 17, 1920, Albania was admitted to the League of Nations, which made it possible for it to strengthen its position in international relations.³⁶ Albanians considered this a step further in consolidating Albania's sovereignty and territorial integrity of Albania and a necessary source of economic aid for the weak Albanian state.³⁷ Albania's admission to this international organization paved the way for it to receive good counsel and any kind of assistance that came as a benefit from its status as a member.

When the Albanian government realized that the British government had no intention of appointing a British financial advisor, it decided to change tactics. Apparently, at the suggestion of the Committee of Inquiry sent to Albania by the Council of the League of Nations, the Albanian government asked the League to expand its economic support for Albania. The Albanian government requested the appointment of experts by the League of Nations to assist with Albania's economic and financial affairs. These experts were to conduct field studies and make appropriate proposals regarding steps the Albanian government must take to attract foreign capital, which would help in the exploitation of the country's natural resources.³⁸ *Times* of London also reported that the Albanian government had asked the League to send experts to Albania to advise on the country's economic development.³⁹

During the proceedings of the Economic Conference in Genoa, Italy, representatives of the Albanian delegation, Mehdi Frashëri and Dr. Benoit Blinishti, met with Ralph Follett Wigram of the Foreign Office, a member of the British delegation who had accompanied

³⁴ Ibid., FO 371/ 5733, Colonel Liet. James M. Blair, Assistant Military Attaché to the British Legation in Belgrade, November 2, 1921.

³⁵ Smirnova 2004: 108.

³⁶ Schevill 2002: 416.

³⁷ Austin 2003: 49.

³⁸ *TNA*, FO 371/7328, Note of the League of Nations' Secretary-General, Geneva, March 31, 1922. This document is attached to the telegram of Xhafer Ypi, the Albanian Prime Minister and "ad interim" Foreign Affairs Minister to the League of Nations' Council members, Vlora, March 25, 1922.

³⁹ Ibid., FO 371/ 7328, Announcement published in *Times*, London: April 11, 1922.

the British Prime minister to the conference. They told him the Albanian government was intended in a foreign financial organizer to oversee securing a loan in international financial circles on behalf of the Albanian state. The British representative assured the Albanian delegation that this issue had already been presented to the League of Nations.⁴⁰ The memorandum of Frashëri presented to Wigram, which was sent later to Harold G. Nicolson, the chief expert of the British foreign undersecretary, stated that in order to enact financial reforms, the Albanian government was requesting the League of Nations provide a number of experts to advise on the country's financial and administrative issues.⁴¹

In April 1922, the Albanian government submitted two requests to the Council: The first was to extend the mandate of the Council's Committee of Inquiry in Albania; the second was for the League to assist the Albanian government by sending financial experts. Regarding the second request, the Foreign Office believed the British government would have no objection to the proposal as long as the experts' salaries and expenses were paid for by the Albanian government rather than by the League.⁴²

The requests submitted by the Albanian government and a review of the Committee of Inquiry's report on the work it had done so far would be on the agenda at the League's next meeting. The British representative Sir Arthur Balfour served as the rapporteur for Albanian affairs in the Council. The British foreign secretary, Lord Curzon thought that Balfour should wholeheartedly support the recommendations from the Committee during the meeting of the Council.⁴³

The Secretary-General of the League of Nations, Eric Drummond, requested that Marcus L. Wallenberg, Sr. from Sweden, Chairman of the League's Interim Economic and Financial Committee (IEFC) prepare a report for the Council regarding Albania's request for the League to appoint a financial advisor.⁴⁴

Wallenberg replied to Drummond that he would not be able to send this report because the IEFC would not meet before the next meeting of the Council, which was expected to be held on May 10 or 12, 1922. He said that Professor Jakob J. Sederhom from Finland could send updated information gleaned from field observation about Albania's economic and financial situation before the Committee's next meeting. The members of the IEFC would prepare a preliminary report on the situation in Albania based in this information. Wallenberg suggested that, at its next meeting, the Council should authorize the Committee to immediately send one or two experts to Albania to prepare a report on the problems presented by the Albanian government.⁴⁵

⁴⁰ Ibid., FO 371/7328, Memorandum of Ralf F. Wigram regarding the 'Visit of the Albanian delegation', Genoa, April 17, 1922.

⁴¹ Ibid., FO 371/7329, Memorandum of Mehdi Frashëri, head of the Albanian delegation, Nervi-Genoa, April 20, 1922. This document is attached to Ralf F. Wigram's letter to Nicholson, Genoa, April 27, 1922.

⁴² Ibid., FO 371/7328, Harold Nicolson, to the British Mission at the League of Nations, F. O., April 19, 1922.

⁴³ Ibid., FO 371/7329, The British foreign undersecretary to the British Cabinet Office, F.O., May 1, 1922.

⁴⁴ Ibid., FO 371/7329, Letter of Eric Drummond, Secretary-General of the League of Nations to the Interim Economic and Finance Committee's Chairman, Geneva, April 21, 1922; Ibid., FO 371/7329, Correspondence between the Secretary-General and the Interim Economic and Financial Committee's Chairman of the League of Nations attached to the League of Nations Secretary-General's note, Geneva, May 10, 1922.

⁴⁵ Ibid., FO 371/7329, The letter of the League of Nations' Economic and Financial Committee's Chairman, Wallenberg to the League of Nations' Secretary-General, May 6, 1922.

During conversations with Professor Sederholm regarding a path for economic development in Albania, members of the Albanian government demanded the League of Nations expand its valuable support for Albania, not only just to exploit its natural resources but to create a more effective administration in Albania. They hoped the League would make available to them the necessary technical bodies to advise the Albanian government. They expected the League to appoint impartial experts who would conduct fieldwork and then report back on the country's economic and financial situation, advise the Albanian government on what reforms were necessary, ensure the absorption of foreign capital and identify appropriate means for developing the agricultural and industrial sectors.

The Committee of Inquiry indicated that League of Nations could be of great help, if it selected experts for all branches of the administration who could act as advisors to the Albanian government regarding the implementation of necessary reforms. These advisors were necessary to create modern legal, taxation, and financial administrative systems and other bodies. The Albanian government stated that it would bear the financial cost if such a program were to be implemented. It also suggested that if the Council accepted its request for technical assistance, it would send a special representative to Geneva, who would need to decide, in consultation with the League of Nations Secretariat on the details for implementing this program.⁴⁶

During the meeting of the League of Nations, on May 12, 1922, Lord Balfour, the rapporteur for Albania, presented the issue of Albania to the members of the Council, during a short speech, and expressed his appreciation for the League's commitment to the Albanian cause. At the end of his speech, he proposed the adoption of a resolution on Albania. According to the draft resolution, the Council would keep a member and a secretary of the Committee of Inquiry in Albania. The Council adopted the resolution, which had been based on the Albanian government's request, and it was presented before the Council by the Albanian representative Mehdi Frashëri.⁴⁷

According to the resolution, the Council accepted with gratitude, Professor Sederholm's offer, to return to Albania as a member of the Committee of Inquiry, and to remain there until the financial advisor arrived.⁴⁸ The Council decided to communicate to the IEFCA the Albanian government request to send experts to Albania, to prepare a report on necessary measures to be taken, and to encourage the investment of foreign capital in Albania. The Council also decided that the Committee should review Albania's application for a financial advisor at its next session. The Council authorized the Secretary-General and its technical bodies to enter into negotiations with representatives of the Albanian government to find an appropriate method for appointing the advisers.⁴⁹

During the meeting of the Council, the Albanian government insisted on the appointment of a British financial advisor; however, the Italian government opposed this.⁵⁰ The representative of the British delegation, Charles H. Tufton, informed the Foreign Office

⁴⁶ Ibid., FO 371/ 7329, Additional Report of the Committee of Inquiry for Albania to the League of Nations' Council, Geneva, May 9, 1922.

⁴⁷ Swire 2005: 306; *Official Journal of the League of Nations*, Geneva: June 1922: 521–523.

⁴⁸ *Official Journal of the League of Nations*, Geneva: June 1922: 535.

⁴⁹ TNA, FO 371/ 7329, Draft resolution on Albania submitted for approval to the League of Nations' Council [undated]; Swire 2005: 306.

⁵⁰ Dielli, no. 2434, Boston Mass., 13 maj 1922, 1.

that an “incident” had taken place shortly before the start of the meeting: The Italian representative had approached Tufton and told him that the Italian government would not accept the League’s technical bodies making decisions about appointing advisors to Albania. The Italian government would not recognize any decision unless it received assurances that one of the advisors would be an Italian national.⁵¹

The Council decided to discuss the content of the draft resolution in a closed meeting held after the public meeting. During this meeting, two important conclusions were reached: First, IEFC would be entrusted with drafting the third paragraph of the resolution, which would propose to the Council a list of candidates for the advisor to the Albanian government, and the names of the candidates presented in this list would be discussed during its next session; and second, the Council reserved the right to review and select technical advisors over the course of further sessions.⁵²

During the meeting, the Italian representative said he would not object to an advisor who was not Italian only if there was only advisor appointed. However, he made it that if a larger number of foreign advisors were appointed, the Italian government would insisted that at least one of them be an Italian citizen. The Italian representative’s position on this matter demonstrated that Italy still viewed Albania as a country under its protection.⁵³

Due to these circumstances, the British delegation announced that the British government would seek the appointment of an Italian would cause a stalemate by drawing opposition from the Albanian government.⁵⁴ The Foreign Office also officially made it known to the Italian ambassador in London that the British government did not intend to appoint a British citizen either.⁵⁵

Professor Sederholm informed the Secretary-General that he and the Committee secretary, Horace de Pourtales from Switzerland intended to continue their work in Albania starting in the mid-April 1921. Professor Sederholm assured him that he would return to Geneva in time for the next meeting of the Council.⁵⁶ In accordance with the resolution, Professor Sederholm returned to Albania in June 1922 with H. de Pourtales.⁵⁷

5. Revisiting the possibility of appointing a British financial advisor

The question of appointing a British financial advisor resurfaced in the spring of 1922. At the beginning of April that year, George Young was presented to League as a candidate for the position of financial advisor. He had previously worked in the British

⁵¹ *TNA*, FO 371/ 7329, Charles H. Tufton, the representative of the British delegation to Miles W. Lampson at the Central European Department - Foreign Office, Geneva, May 13, 1922.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, FO 371/ 7329, Letter of E. H. Abraham, the British delegation’s member at the League of Nations to Harold Nicolson at the Foreign Office, Geneva, May 26, 1922.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, FO 371/ 7329, Letter of Sir Eyre A. Crowe to Sir Basil P. Blackett at the Treasury Chambers in London, F.O., June 30, 1922.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, FO 371/ 7329, General Report of the League of Nations Council’s Committee of Inquiry for Albania distributed through a note of the League of Nations’ Secretary-General including the letter of J. J. Sederholm on behalf of the Committee to the League of Nations Secretary-General, Geneva, April 12, 1922.

⁵⁷ Swire 2005: 307.

Treasury dealing with British loans in Austria. On April 5, 1922, a member of the British delegation to the League of Nations, E. H. Abraham, privately informed Harold Nicolson at the Foreign Office of Young's candidacy. This announcement initially created confusion in the Foreign Office because he had been rejected at an earlier point in time. On April 12, 1922, the Foreign Office replied to Abraham saying it had no intention of appointing a British citizen as Albania's financial advisor.⁵⁸

On May 24, 1922, Sir Basil Blackett of the Treasury, formally notified the British foreign undersecretary, Sir Eyre Crowe about a letter from the League of Nations asking Blackett to serve as a member of the IEFEC to deal with selecting a British financial advisor for Albania.⁵⁹ Blackett was aware of the refusal of the Foreign Office, which had sought to discourage the Albanian government's request for a British financial advisor.⁶⁰

The Secretariat informed the British government in late May 1922 that the League intended to recommend George Young for the post of financial advisor. Miles W. Lampson thought that this recommendation coming from the League of Nations was something of a difference compared to the previous situation. However, he insisted that the new proposal would not change the reluctant position taken so far by the British government about appointing a British financial. Therefore, he concluded that the matter had been settled as early as April with Lord Curzon's final answer.⁶¹

The question of appointing a financial advisor to Albania was expected to be discussed at the beginning of June 1922, during a meeting of the IEFEC. Blackett sought the Foreign Office's opinion on questions: First, was this simply a matter of appointing a financial advisor, and the second, was an appointment of a British financial advisor.⁶²

Blackett intended to send Otto Ernst Niemeyer, controller of finance at the Treasury Chamber, as his representative to the meeting of the League's Interim Economic and Financial Committee. Foreign Office officials informed him that if the option of simply choosing a financial advisor arose, it would be better if the appointee were American rather than British.⁶³

Sir E. Crowe replied to Blackett that, in regard to the first question, the matter had already been decided by the Council, so it was not expected to seek a British opinion. However, he stressed that the Foreign Office had no objections to this appointment. Regarding the second question, Lord Curzon had already stated in writing that His Majesty's government was opposed to a British financial advisor in Albania. Therefore, it was asked of Blackett to adhere to this position.⁶⁴

⁵⁸ *TNA*, FO 371/ 7329, Letter of E. H. Abraham, the British delegation's member at the League of Nations to Harold Nicolson at the Foreign Office, Geneva, May 26, 1922.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, FO 371/ 7329, Letter of Sir B. Blackett at the Treasury Chambers to Sir E. Crowe at the Foreign Office, May 24, 1922.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, FO 371/ 7329, Opinions presented by Miles W. Lampson on the Foreign Office minutes regarding the proposals submitted by Sir B. Blackett to Sir E. Crowe, May 31, 1922.

⁶² *Ibid.*, FO 371/ 7329, Letter of Sir B. Blackett at the Treasury Chambers to Sir E. Crowe at the Foreign Office, May 24, 1922.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, FO 371/ 7329, Information of Wathlow executive at the Foreign Office regarding the telephone conversation with Sir B. Blackett, F. O., May 31, 1922.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, FO 371/ 7329, Letter of Sir Eyre A. Crowe to Sir B. Blackett at the Treasury Chambers, F. O., June 1, 1922.

E. H. Abraham, a member of the British delegation to the League of Nations, informed Harold Nicolson in the Foreign Office that the situation had evolved since the end of February 1922, when the British government had opposed the appointment of a British candidate. The Italian government seemed to agree with the principle that if there was only one financial advisor appointed for Albania, he could be of a nationality other than Italian. Abraham said there was reason to believe an English adviser would be acceptable to Italy.⁶⁵

Abraham also tried to clarify for Nicolson a potential issue about George Young as a candidate. He pointed out that Young, who had worked in the British diplomatic service in Constantinople, was not the same George Young who was currently in Vienna.⁶⁶ In Nicolson's absence, another official, Alexander M. G. Cadogan, the head of the League of Nations section of the Foreign Office, replied to Abraham that he was aware that the George Young in Vienna was not the same person mentioned in the letter Nicolson had set to Abraham, on April 5, 1922. He clarified that Young was currently in Vienna serving as the director of the new Anglo-Austrian Bank. Consequently, Cadogan thought that even if this George Young were offered the post, it would be completely impossible for him to accept it.⁶⁷

The IEFEC asked the British government to send names of potential financial experts from countries mainly neutral ones - with no direct interest in Albania by July 5, 1922. This expert would travel to Albania during the summer of 1922 to study the country's general economic and financial situation. The financial advisor had to be someone reputable if he was to work on attracting foreign capital. The specialists of the IEFEC thought the main issue for Albania was still the government's handling of public finances and expenditures. The financial expert would also be faced with the issue of regulating the tax system, as the Albanian tax administration was still in its infancy. In their estimation, the Albanian government had not taken any significant measures to establish an efficient administration, collect taxes, or regulate the question of concessions.⁶⁸

Abraham informed the Foreign Office that the Committee's goal was for the expert to be sent to Albania before the end of July 1922. The League's Council had tasked Wallenberg, the chairman of the Committee, with choosing the expert, and a candidate was being sought from Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries, as well as from among American citizens currently in Europe.⁶⁹

British diplomats expressed their conviction that the League could not find a region more suitable than the Balkans for which this organization could be more useful. Balkan affairs had always been complicated by the Great Powers' presence and actions done according to their own interests, or their intentions to act according to these interests. The British hoped that if the League continued to act toward Albania in the same way it already

⁶⁵ Ibid., FO 371/ 7329, Letter of E. H. Abraham, the British delegation's member at the League of Nations to Harold Nicolson at the Foreign Office, Geneva, May 26, 1922.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid., FO 371/ 7329, Letter of A. Cadogan executive at the Foreign Office to E. H. Abraham in Geneva, F. O., May 29, 1922.

⁶⁸ Ibid., FO 371/ 7329, F. H. Nixon to Otto E. Niemeyer at London's Chamber of Commerce, Geneva, June 16, 1922.

⁶⁹ Ibid., FO 371/ 7329, Letter from E. H. Abraham to Harold G. Nicolson at the Foreign Office, Geneva, June 23, 1922.

had, its influence would remain in Albania for a long time. This influence could help pacify the country, which was in everyone's best interests.⁷⁰

The head of the IEFC thought that no positive results for Albania would come from simply studying the country's natural resources or from the investment of foreign capital. The Committee felt efforts should first be directed at improving Albania's administration, finances, and economy. It was under these circumstances that the Committee decided to send an expert with general knowledge of fiscal, financial, and economic organization for a period of about two months at the Albanian government's expense. This expert would discuss the most important issues with the Albanian government and then report to the IEFC regarding the conditions and procedures needed to appoint a financial advisor and supervise his work. The advisor had to liaise with the Council's Committee of Inquiry, already located in Albania.⁷¹

The head of the Economic and Financial Section at the Secretariat of the League of Nations, F. H. Nixon, informed the British representative on the IEFC that the Albanian government had requested that the advisor would remain in the country for a term of three or four years. However, the IEFC had decided that an expert would stay for only six weeks to two months, and the Committee would then review his report before a permanent financial advisor was appointed. According to Nixon, during the advisor's tenure, he would be expected to perform several tasks related to financial and administrative operations: First, he would deal with technical financial problems, since the Albanian government intended for him to help attract foreign capital. Second, he would set up a national banking and currency system, which did not yet exist. The country's national administration was still in its infancy, so the financial issues were not so difficult or complicated as was its internal administration. The country's political system was not yet centralized, so the financial advisor's third task would be to establish from the outset a tax system and a tax administration, and to manage the oversight of all public expenditures.⁷²

The IEFC concluded that, for the time being, the third task was the most important. That meant the financial advisor had to be an expert with experience in dealing with countries that had encountered similar problems and difficulties. For this reason, the IEFC was reluctant to present the criteria or procedure for the appointing the advisor, until it received first-hand information from Albania. It was necessary to find someone intelligent, and experienced, but who also had broad cultural knowledge and would be able to spend several weeks in the country so as to form a general opinion about the situation on the ground. To complete the study, the expert would receive a payment of eighty to one hundred Swiss francs per diem, which would cover all travel and living expenses.

F. H. Nixon asked the British representative on the Committee, Otto E. Niemeyer, to send him the name of a potential candidate from his country. This was very urgent, as he needed to have a list of candidates for the IEFC to make its selection.⁷³

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid., FO 371/ 7329, Resolution of the Interim Economic and Financial Committee regarding the financial advisor of Albania, June 1922.

⁷² Ibid., FO 371/ 7329, Letter of F. H. Nixon to Otto Ernst Niemeyer at the Treasury Chambers in London, Geneva, June 16, 1922.

⁷³ Ibid.

Because of this, Blackett sought from Sir Eyre Crowe the political course the Foreign Office would take regarding this request. If there were to be a change in the British position, he felt a former British civil servant who had served in India would be a better choice than a finance specialist. Blackett proposed the names of some who seemed most suitable for the task: Archibald Y. G. Campbell, who had served in the Indian Civil Service; F. H. Nixon, who was currently acting head of the Secretariat's Economic and Financial Section was expected to be replaced soon by Sir Arthur Salter, member of the League of Nations' Economic and Financial Section; and Sir Percy Thompson, who was on the Board of Inland Revenue.⁷⁴

A British colonel, Aubrey Herbert, who was publicly known as a "friend of the Albanians" informed Lord Balfour, the head of the League's British delegation, that the Albanians were looking for at least one capable and reputable British advisor. From the information available, it appeared that Colonel Charles Schaefer of Luxembourg was interested in taking on the position. According to Herbert, the Albanians were worried about Schaefer being appointed because they suspected that, coming from a very small country like Luxembourg, he could end up under the control of France or Germany, and they were concerned about these powerful countries possibly interfering in their internal affairs. Also, Herbert thought that Colonel Schaefer was not someone with the proper access and reputation for this task.⁷⁵

Facing the possibility of Colonel Schaefer being appointed, at the end of July 1922, the Albanian minister in London, Mehmet Konica, had a conversation with Lord Balfour, during which he again raised the possibility of a British financial advisor. The Albanian diplomat openly stated that the Albanians wanted Sir Henry P. Maybury, Director General of the Roads in the Transport Department, to be the advisor. However, the Foreign Office officials had no information about him.⁷⁶

The appearance of Schaefer's name as a possible candidate set British diplomacy in motion. Charles Tufton from the British Cabinet Office briefed Miles W. Lampson on the conversation he had with the Secretary-General, Eric Drummond. Drummond was well informed about the Albanians' desire to have an English adviser, and that he had discussed the matter with Herbert personally. Even Drummond felt Colonel Schaefer was not a good choice. However, he had informed Tufton that Professor Albert Calmes of Luxembourg had just applied for the post. He was known to be a highly reputable banker and was expected to travel to Albania the following week and remain there for two months.⁷⁷

Sederholm had been in Albania serving as the head of the Committee of Inquiry since June 1922. During his time in Albania, he concluded that the Albanian administration was generally was inefficient and in some cases corrupt. He thought the best way to complete the

⁷⁴ Ibid., FO 371/ 7329, Letter of Sir B. Blackett at the Treasury Chambers to Sir Eyre Crowe at the Foreign Office, June 27, 1922.

⁷⁵ Ibid., FO 371/ 7329, Letter of Colonel Aubrey Herbert to Lord Balfour, July 14, 1922.

⁷⁶ Ibid., FO 371/ 7329, Notes written by Robert G. Vansittart during the interview of the Minister of Albania in London with Lord Balfour, F. O., July 26, 1922.

⁷⁷ Ibid., FO 371/ 7329, Letter of Charles Tufton at the British Cabinet Office to M. W. Lampson at the Foreign Office, July 21, 1922.

study was for him to leave no room for any possible future interpretations. He acknowledged the Albanian question had not been fully investigated and was not able to finalize his report.⁷⁸

At the beginning of August 1922, the British legation in Durrës informed the Foreign Office of Calmes arrival in Albania. He was accompanied by Ansgar Rosenborg from Sweden, who worked in the League's Secretariat, and his private secretary Luich from Luxembourg.⁷⁹

No sooner had Sederholm arrived in Albania when he was forced to leave due to the deteriorating health. On September 20, 1922, the secretary of the Committee of Inquiry, Count Frederik Moltke, sent a telegram to the League requesting Sederholm's immediate replacement.⁸⁰

The Albanian government addressed Moltke with an official request for the League's assistance in securing a loan on the international financial markets. The government was ready to provide any kind of guarantee that was within its capacity and agreed to oversight by the League. Moltke acknowledged that the economic and financial situation in Albania was becoming increasingly grim. He announced that a financial collapse would surely be accompanied by considerable political unrest, which would not only endanger the future of the Albanian state, but would also politically destabilize the Balkans in general. Given Albania's financial state, Drummond was not sure how the League of Nations could help the country secure a loan. What could be done, however, was for the Council to request the IEFEC to expedite its selection of a financial advisor to counsel the Albanian government on what steps could be taken to move beyond this difficult economic and financial situation.⁸¹

On September 27, 1922, Wallenberg, the chairman of the IEFEC, informed the Secretary-General and the Council that he had received the first applications for the advisor to Albania. Wallenberg proposed that the Council authorize him to approve the candidate and to make the appropriate adjustments to the Albanian government regarding his terms of employment.⁸² The Council authorized Wallenberg accordingly, but on the condition that the IEFEC demonstrate that this candidate was suitable.⁸³

⁷⁸ Ibid., FO 371/ 7329, Letter of the British consul, Robert Parr to the Earl of Balfour, Durrës, September 2, 1922.

⁷⁹ Ibid., FO 371/ 7329, Letter of the British consul, Robert Parr, on behalf of the British minister H. C. A. Eyres to the Earl of Balfour, Durrës, August 2, 1922.

⁸⁰ Ibid., FO 371/ 7329, Letter of the British consul Robert Parr to the Earl of Balfour, Durrës, September 2, 1922.

⁸¹ Ibid., FO 371/ 7329, Letter of the British delegation at the League of Nations in Geneva, October 2, 1922. This document is attached to the letter of Lord Balfour, British foreign secretary to the Secretariat of the British Cabinet, Colonial Office, Treasury Chambers, Board of Commerce and Department of Overseas Trade received from Cabinet Secretariat, October 6, 1922.

⁸² Ibid., FO 371/ 7329, Letter of the League of Nations' Secretary-General and the extract of the telegram which the League of Nations' Interim Economic and Financial Committee's Chairman addressed to the Secretary-General and the League of Nations' Council, Geneva, September 27, 1922. This document is attached to the letter of Lord Balfour, the British foreign secretary to the Secretariat of the British Cabinet, Colonial Office, Treasury Chambers, Board of Commerce and Department of Overseas Trade received from the Secretariat of the Cabinet, October 6, 1922.

⁸³ Ibid., FO 371/ 7329, Letter of the British delegation at the League of Nations, Geneva, October 2, 1922. This document is attached to the letter of Lord Balfour, the British foreign secretary to the Secretariat of the British Cabinet, Colonial Office, Treasury Chambers, Board of Commerce and Department of Overseas Trade received from the Secretariat Cabinet, October 6, 1922; Ibid., FO 371/7329, Summary of the "Financial Advisor to Albania,, drafted by the officials Troutberg, A. Cadogan, and W. Tyrrell at the Foreign Office, F. O., October 17, 1922.

Experts from the League's technical bodies had recently dealt extensively with the criteria for selecting candidates. Given the situation in Albania, it was concluded that the advisor should focus on establishing a stable and effective administration, particularly to handle the state of public finances. The future advisor's practical experience and personal qualities were of paramount importance. Wallenberg thought the most suitable people for this task would be British officials who had worked in the colonial service of the British Empire. Also, agreements had to be made with the Albanian government.⁸⁴

The Albanian question was discussed at length during the interviews Wallenberg and Nixon conducted in Geneva with two candidates, Paul G. van Zeeland and Lincoln Hutchinson. At the end of the interview, Wallenberg declined to appoint Van Zeeland, even though he was very familiar with the banking system. His reasoning was that, in the case of Albania, it was not necessary to investigate the Albanian banking system because the scope of the financial advisor's work required him to focus more on administrative matters and to negotiate and cooperate closely with the Albanian government. Van Zeeland had the advantage of having worked at the National Bank of Belgium, which could have facilitated the establishment of an Albanian national bank, but this was not taken into account. In this regard, Wallenberg thought that a serious banking group should not be involved in establishing a national bank in Albania simply because one of their representatives had been nominated for this position.

The other candidate, Hutchinson, had served on the London-based US War Industry Board for a short time during the First World War. During the interview, Hutchinson stated he had not intended to apply for the post. He had come to Geneva with limited information about his role in Albania. Nixon thought that Hutchinson seemed to want the request for his appointment to come from the British government. By the end of the interview, Hutchinson had left a good impressions, but nevertheless he was not considered to be a suitable candidate. At this point, even though Wallenberg felt Hutchinson was the best choice, he continued to look for someone with experience in British colonial administration. However, this was expected to be opposed by the Council, which had initially stated that only candidates from other countries should be sought.

The question of a financial advisor for Albania was widely discussed at a meeting held at the Foreign Office on October 17, 1922.⁸⁵ The memorandum prepared after this meeting by experts from the Foreign Office stated that His Majesty's government had come to a decision in the end to discourage the appointment of a British advisor, because it had officially assured the Italian government in June 1922 that this was its position. Those in London diplomatic circles believed a British presence in Albania would inevitably create tensions between Great Britain and Italy.⁸⁶

Despite the League's extensive efforts, which have been detailed here, the League of Nations failed to appoint a financial advisor for Albania due to conflicts among the Great Powers. This was later rectified on April 17, 1923, when the Council finally appointed Jan

⁸⁴ Ibid., FO 371/ 7329, Letter of F. H. Nixon to Sir Basil Blackett at the Treasury Chambers in London, Geneva, October 12, 1922.

⁸⁵ Ibid., FO 371/ 7329, Summary of I. H. Le Ronquetel on the progress of the financial advisor for Albania's case, January 4, 1923.

⁸⁶ Ibid., FO 371/ 7329, Memorandum of Miles W. Lampson on the appointment of a financial advisor for Albania, F. O., January 16, 1923.

D. Hunger from the Netherlands as financial advisor. Hunger would then attempt to lay the foundations for Albania's further financial and economic development.⁸⁷

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САЛИ КАДРИА

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НАСТОЈАЊА ВЛАДЕ АЛБАНИЈЕ ДА ОБЕЗБЕДИ ФИНАНСИЈСКОГ САВЕТНИКА ОД ЛИГЕ НАРОДА (1921–1922)

Резиме

Рад се бави економским и финансијским потешкоћама са којима се суочавала Влада Албаније у раним 1920-тим годинама. У пролеће 1922. Влада Албаније је затражила од Лиге народа да јој обезбеди спољашње експерте за финансије. Сврха овога била је да спољашњем саветнику за финансије повери задатак да у име албанске државе обезбеди зајам у међународним финансијским круговима.

Генерални секретар Лиге народа, Ерик Друмонд, задужио је Привремени економски и финансијски савет да проучи ситуацију у Албанији, установи критеријуме за избор кандидата, одреди обим саветниковог рада и процедуре за надгледање овог посла. Комитет је сматрао да економска и финансијска администрација Албаније мора бити приоритет саветника, а кандидати за овај положај су морали бити из неутралних држава, али је такође био заинтересован за експерта који је служио у Британској цивилној служби у Индији.

Неколико кандидата је било разматрано у Лиги народа и британском Министарству спољних послова, укључујући Џорџа Јанга, сер Персија Томсона, Г. А. Кембела, Ф. Х. Никсона, сер Хенрија Мабурија, пуковника Шефера, Алберта Калмса, Ван Зиланда и Хачинсона.

Упркос многим напорима, током 1922. Лига народа није успела да одобри финансијског саветника за Албанију.

Кључне речи: Албанија, финансијски саветник, Влада Албаније, Лига народа, Велика Британије, Форин офис, Британски трезор, Привремени економски и финансијски савет.

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AGRARIAN REFORM IN YUGOSLAVIA 1945–1948: THE AGRO-POLITICAL ASPECT

Abstract: This paper presents a general overview of agrarian reform implemented in Yugoslavia between 1945 and 1948. It also lays out the norms and agrarian policies on which it was based. Agrarian reform was enacted in Yugoslavia in harmony with the specific nature of the Yugoslav context and the lauded union of workers and peasants. This context widely differed from that of the USSR, which is why the nationalization of arable land was not considered in Yugoslavia. In fact, at the beginning of the reform process, private property was given stronger protections. This included issuing deeds of ownership in the names of individuals but with certain limitations, of which the most significant was a twenty-year moratorium on the alienation of property obtained from the reforms.

Keywords: Yugoslavia 1945–1948, agrarian reform, union of workers and peasants, nationalization.

1. Introduction

Agrarian reform, according to an ideologically neutral definition from a United Nations document, is “an integrated programme of measures designed to eliminate obstacles to economic and social development arising out of defects in the agrarian structure.”¹ According to another definition, agrarian reform is defined as “the redistribution of property in land for the benefit of agricultural workers.”² However, agrarian reform can also be a much more radical measure that requires “compulsory, drastic, and rapid” changes in land ownership, since a program based on “moderate, and gradual tenurial adjustments” would inevitably be “perfunctory and ineffectual.”³

It is impossible to understand agrarian reform and colonization in Yugoslavia after its liberation in 1945 outside the context of interwar agrarian reform, the experience of World War II in Yugoslavia, and the successfully created “union of workers and peasants.”

¹ *Progress in Land Reform*, Third Report, UN, 1962, vi.

² Warriner 1969: xiv.

³ Hung-chao Tai 1974: 11, 19.

It also cannot be understood in isolation from the Yugoslav communists' specific theoretical and ideological concepts, which evolved between 1919 and 1945.

There were a series of unresolved issues left over from the agrarian reform enacted during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1919–1941). The biggest impact for its interested parties was being denied the right to register land ownership until the former owner had been paid for the land in full. In many cases, the outbreak of World War II put this on hold. The kingdom's reforms were the very image of inconsistency and appeasement of landowners who were "impacted" by it (concessions were even made to owners with holdings of feudal origins that was meant to be distributed entirely to the peasants). It had been full of various abuses, legal chaos, and ethnic inequality (Serbs were the most privileged, as were other south Slavs, albeit to a lesser extent, while Albanians and Germans were the most harshly discriminated against).⁴ Its relatively modest results, however, were utterly erased during World War II (especially by the forced eviction and slaughter of Serbs who had voluntarily resettled in Croatia, Vojvodina, Macedonia, and Kosovo during the interwar period), and they even resulted in a kind of re-feudalization in certain occupied areas (Kosovo and Macedonia).⁵

Considering the communists' position regarding the interwar agrarian reforms, one could make a strong argument that if the communists had adhered to their own principles and promises when they came to power, and land had been given to the peasants, the great estates would not have been able to survive.⁶ But precisely how the peasants would be allocated land after the communists took over had yet to be defined. In this respect, the peasantry's mass participation in the war within Yugoslav territory was significant: The communists were now obligated to fulfill the aspirations of a wide swath of the population consisting, to a large extent, of partisans who had fought a guerrilla war for liberation from fascism.⁷ Furthermore, changes in property relations in rural areas had begun during the war, when peasants refused to pay rent and some landowners abandoned their estates that were then taken over by the peasants.⁸

2. Agrarian reform as a measure of agrarian policy: A normative framework

A new agrarian reform⁹ was announced in March 1945 in a declaration by the provisional government of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia (DFJ), but it is telling that the peasants were promised in the declaration "the right to use" the land and its inventory.¹⁰ Transferring the land to private ownership was not mentioned, nor was anything else more specific. This was due to both domestic and international politics; circumstances were not

⁴ Erić 1958: 281–290; Petranović 1988: 63; Janjetović 2005: 234–246.

⁵ Milošević 2015a: 253–279.

⁶ Milošević 2015b: 101–127.

⁷ Milošević 2016: 180–190.

⁸ Stipetić 1954: 431.

⁹ More details: Gaćeša 1984; Radaković 1953: 18–26; Rašić 1955; Petranović 1964: 56–70; see also 1969: 397–411; Gudac-Dodić 1999: 21–36; Lekić 1997; Bokovoy 1998: 29–54; Klein & Klein: 25–38.

¹⁰ *Borba*, March 10, 1945: 1.

favorable to any kind of radical solutions¹¹ and the communists themselves were uncertain as to what they intended to do. Defining, let alone promulgating, the principles on which the reforms would be based would need to wait at least until the war ended, as would establishing a legal basis for them.¹²

In any case, the upcoming agrarian reform would be one of the primary embodiments of a “union of workers and peasants” in Yugoslavia through which the party would fulfill its part.¹³ During a debate within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) on agrarian reform in April 1945, one of the party’s main authorities on theory, Moša Pijade, argued that part of the land should be given to the peasants outright, and they should also be granted use of state-owned land in perpetuity and without charge.¹⁴ Historiography has already acknowledged the originality of such a duality in land ownership,¹⁵ but it should be noted here that Pijade’s position was clearly a reflection of the Soviet Union’s experience. In fact, Pijade had explicitly said that state land should be for use in perpetuity, just as it was in the USSR. However, there is also a misconception that Pijade was the main advocate of an agrarian reform that would distribute land to the peasants.¹⁶ It is true that he was one of the first to speak about it publicly, and that he promoted the party’s positions on the issue according to the principles of democratic centralism, but initially he had held a different position.

The dilemma of whether peasants should be given land in private ownership or land should be nationalized and peasants given the right of use did not last long. The prevailing view among the party leadership was that land should be given over to private ownership and properly recorded in the land registry. This was first put forward by Edvard Kardelj, another of the leading Yugoslav party theorists, who openly criticized any other solution.¹⁷ It is also important to note that this solution was adopted against the advice of Soviet experts to nationalize land ownership.¹⁸

As Boris Kidrič later explained, during the Cominform conflict, the peasantry in Yugoslavia was not only the main component of the National Liberation Movement (NOP), but was already socially and economically territorialized, which presented an obstacle to nationalization. According to Marx, nationalizing land is, in fact, a radical, revolutionary, bourgeois measure because it removed landowners (usually of feudal origin) from the production equation. The landowner (who only collects rent and is not a producer) is completely unnecessary in a capitalist system. “That is why in theory the radical bourgeoisie arrives at the repudiation of private landed property... In practice however, since the attack on one form of property, private property in relation to the conditions of labor, would be very dangerous for the other form. Moreover, the bourgeoisie has territorialized itself.”¹⁹ (Here, territorialization refers to possession of the land by the capitalists themselves).

¹¹ Gaćeša 1984: 85–91.

¹² Petranović 1969: 56.

¹³ Šuvar 1969: 1017.

¹⁴ Pijade 1965: 230.

¹⁵ Gaćeša 1984: 98.

¹⁶ Bokovoy 1998: 36–37.

¹⁷ Gaćeša 1984: 98; Gudac-Dodić 1999: 22–23.

¹⁸ Mates 1976: 98–99.

¹⁹ Marx, Engels 1972: 33.

Lenin saw such a “radical bourgeoisie” in the Russian peasantry, who were not territorialized (meaning they did not own the land they cultivated), and therefore rather than being opposed to the nationalization of land, were instead quite interested by it (provided that they obtain use of it in some form).²⁰ In Yugoslavia, however, the peasantry was already territorialized and would thus not be interested in nationalizing the land. This meant there needed to be a strong emphasis on agrarian reform as a revolutionary bourgeois measure because it would reinforce the working peasantry’s ownership over the land. As Kidrič said, when summarizing the development of capitalism in the Yugoslav countryside, “There is no doubt that during these processes, which lasted a hundred and fifty years in some regions of modern-day Yugoslavia, our peasant is firmly ‘territorialized’... This means that the small and middle peasant in our country is not only a commodity producer but also a landowner, an owner of labor and the means of productions, in this case the land... Both the Russian peasant in 1917 and the Yugoslav peasant in 1945 are small commodity producers. But while the former was primarily an *arendator* (lease holder), the latter owned the land but was in constant danger of losing it or being robbed, exploited, indebted, or burdened with mortgages often worth more than the price of his land. But *he owns it and defends it*, and this is necessarily reflected in his psychology.” Under these circumstances, nationalizing the land would constitute a “disaster for the Yugoslav people’s revolution” and turn small and middle peasants from allies to an “active reserve for the bourgeoisie.”²¹ These subsequent explanations were not initially offered in 1945, but there is no reason to doubt they were known at the time.

In June 1945, when the prevailing position within the party was that land should be distributed to the peasants, the leader of the Yugoslav communists, Prime Minister Josip Broz Tito, announced that the new government was preparing for agrarian reform, and emphasized it was ready to execute it “very radically, so the issue would not come up again, as it had in the twenty-five years preceding the war.” At the time, however, Tito also indicated that he still could not say how the issue would be resolved, and that it would “probably” be dealt with “in the Constituent Assembly.”²²

However, working out the legal basis for agrarian reform could not wait for the Constituent Assembly and was addressed earlier. The entire legislative process was completed during July and August of 1945. However, before passing the law that would lay out the reform, some previous issues needed to be dealt with. Regardless of what form the agrarian reform took, any potential malfeasance that would compromise it need to be averted. Thus a regulation was passed preventing the future targets of agrarian reform from buying or selling or going into debt. If this regulation was violated, penalties laid out in the Law on the Suppression of Unlawful Speculation would apply.²³ This solution was the first post-liberation legal limitation on the right to dispose of property that applied to all citizens. Trade in real estate would not be reintroduced until 1954.²⁴

²⁰ Lenin 1972: 320.

²¹ Kidrič 1985b: 186–188.

²² Tito 1959a: 331.

²³ *Official Gazette of DFJ*, No. 48, 1945.

²⁴ Božić 1974: 465.

The feudal relations re-established during the war were abolished by the Law on Revision of Land Allotments to Colonists and Agrarian Interests in Macedonia and Kosovo-Metohija. This law was also significant because it allowed land to be confiscated from a number of interwar colonists, mostly Serbs, in these areas. They had been settled in Kosovo and Macedonia according to a policy during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia that was meant to increase the number of Yugoslavs, and especially Serbs, in the area. After World War II, these colonists were not allowed to return to Kosovo or Macedonia. Specifically, the law stipulated that those who did not farm the land themselves or who had been awarded land unjustly confiscated from the local population could not return to the land they had been previously allocated. In fact, most of the law's provisions were identical to those of legislation introduced by the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which also stipulated that land could not be obtained by, or would be removed from, any who did not farm it themselves. The only important new item in the 1945 law was a ban on former colonists returning to land that had belonged to political emigres from Macedonia and Kosovo.²⁵ The law was later confirmed with amendments that did not apply to the terms under which the right to formerly allocated land was revoked, but unlike the previous version, the amended law granted the right to file an appeal with an appellate court.²⁶

An important issue also raised in connection to agrarian reform was that of the agrarian maximum. It was evident from a July 1945 report from the minister of agriculture, Vasa Čubrilović, that there was no existing resolution for the issue. In the report, the minister defined mid-sized holdings as ranging between five and fifty hectares, but allowed for the possibility for them to be reduced to thirty hectares. Moreover, Čubrilović also allowed for a “larger peasant” category with holdings ranging between fifty and one hundred hectares. He suggested that the lowest acceptable maximum was 50 hectares, but “if the maximum were to be decreased from fifty to thirty hectares...it would cut into the mid-sized peasant property,” and because of this, the issue “should be fully investigated beforehand.”²⁷

Certainly, the appointment of a bourgeois politician as the minister of agriculture is difficult to explain beyond an assumption that the important agriculture portfolio was assigned to him to send a message that no radical measures in this area would be planned. Also, in July 1945, the deputy minister of agriculture, Maksim Goranović, when speaking about agrarian reform at a conference of agricultural administrators, pointed out that the reform would only be carried out in accordance with the principle that land belonged to the peasantry, but “considering the Law on Agrarian Reform and Colonization would be passed soon,” he gave no further details.²⁸

Čubrilović officially provided the rationale behind the draft version of the Law on Agrarian Reform and Colonization for the first time on 11 August 1945 at a session of the Legislative Committee of the National Assembly. This proposed legislation was something that could be endorsed by a number of bourgeois politicians and leftwing intellectuals—and especially by those more sensitive to the peasantry's difficult position during the interwar

²⁵ *Official Gazette of DFJ*, No. 56, 1945; Obradović 1974.

²⁶ *Official Gazette of DFJ*, No. 89, 1946.

²⁷ AJ, KMJ, III – 2 – b/8.

²⁸ AJ, SPŠ, 2, 25.

period. One of these was Minister Čubrilović. He criticized the practices during this period of “merchants and industrialists, public employees” buying land and renting it out, along with keeping large swaths of land “in the cold hands of churches, trusts, and other institutions,” which left less land for the peasantry. This was why the minister announced that the time had come to implement the principle that “the land belongs to those who till it.”²⁹ He was convinced agrarian reform would be “one of the most popular and just measures enacted by the new Yugoslavia,” and it should “take the land away from the old owners because they do not till it, and then distribute it among the peasants.”³⁰

Moša Pijade also joined in explaining the principles behind the law. He pointed to the fact that the draft law did not collectivize land but instead gave ownership to the peasantry that had participated in the war in droves. However, it also allowed for the possibility “that people who receive the land could voluntarily express a desire to band together and farm the land as a group according to a long-term contract they would agree together.”³¹

Some bourgeois politicians voiced general concerns about this reform being enacted too quickly and without sufficient preparation. Milan Grol, the vice president of the provisional government and one of the main representatives of the bourgeois faction, claimed that not only was the law being pushed through “in one fell swoop,” there were other fundamental shortcomings. Grol paradoxically expressed the regret that “collectivists in this case are not collectivist enough,” while also taking a stand against dismantling large estates that comprised an “organic whole,” suggesting that, in these cases, they should “start with property rather interested parties,” and that land should be farmed “on a cooperative basis.” Grol also criticized the first steps taken toward collectivizing existing individual peasant households, and especially smallholders banding together into collective peasant labor cooperatives (SRZ). He pointed out that the “big question” was whether becoming part of an SRZ would be voluntary. Finally, in terms of land ownership, he claimed it would be wrong to seize land from non-farmers who proved to be good organizers, “who are capable of perfecting agricultural production, and who enjoy this work.”³²

The draft of the Law on Agrarian Reform adopted by the legislative committee was sent to the provisional parliament, which adopted it on 23 August 1945. In a speech given before the parliament, Moša Pijade summarized these aspects and explained the reasoning behind the proposal. He criticized the interwar agrarian reform, pointed to the unity among workers and peasants during the war, and noted that the country simply did not have enough land to satisfy all of the peasants’ needs. The law would therefore return “only part of the debt” owed to them for their efforts during the war. He specifically pointed out that land given to the peasants as property would be recorded in the land register, but alienation of property would be prohibited for a period of twenty years. He also reminded them of the hard times during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, when a peasant’s land ownership was not recorded in the land register, and as “an unofficial owner... did not have a sense of certainty that he had truly become the owner of the land allocated to him.”³³

²⁹ Nešović 1952: 251.

³⁰ AJ, KMJ, III – 2 – b/8.

³¹ Nešović 1952: 254.

³² *Ibid.*: 255–56.

³³ FNRJ National Assembly 1946: 202–211.

The adopted law stipulated that all landholdings greater than forty-five hectares or with twenty-five to thirty-five hectares of arable land should be expropriated if it was farmed by hired labor. It would then be added to the land fund created for agrarian reform and colonization. This defined an agrarian maximum of forty-five hectares, or a range of twenty-five to thirty-five hectares, depending on the quality of the land. Landholdings owned by banks, businesses, joint stock companies, and other legal entities were also incorporated into the land fund. The same applied to properties belonging to churches and monasteries. These would be allowed to retain up to ten hectares, and up to thirty the land was of historical significance. In the interest of agrarian reform, all properties over three to five hectares were also confiscated unless they were farmed by the owners themselves and their families. In the end, the land fund would also include landholdings that had been abandoned during the war.³⁴

The Agrarian Council for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FNRJ) was created to implement the reform, and Pijade was quickly placed at its head. The other members were ministers in charge of agriculture and colonization and several other government officials.³⁵ The following year, the council was reorganized into the Commission for Agrarian Reform and Colonization.³⁶ The Ministry for Colonization, headed by Sreten Vukosavljević, whose views were becoming increasingly dissonant with those of his colleagues, was abolished.³⁷ Pijade had told the National Assembly that agrarian reform and colonization needed to be consolidated because “up until now it being done on two tracks,” which was the impetus for the reorganization.³⁸

Even though the interested party was registered as the owner (as opposed to standard practice in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia), land obtained through agrarian reform could not be alienated for twenty years, used as collateral, leased, or parcelled. There would be no compensation for land expropriated from those who rented it out. Farmers with parcels exceeding the maximum that were expropriated would be compensated. A land fund for agrarian reform and colonization was created to allocate land to agrarian interests and colonists consisting of 1) land confiscated under the Law on Agrarian Reform and Colonization and 2) property confiscated from the German population by fiat in November 1944, which became state-owned property independently from agrarian reform.³⁹

The Law on Agrarian Reform and Colonization was harshly criticized by some individuals in the provisional parliament who believed the reform would drastically reduce agricultural production. Members of the clergy voiced their own objections, but this had no effect on the government’s resolve to implement the reform as the law had prescribed.⁴⁰ The Catholic clergy was particularly opposed to the reform, to which Marshal Tito laconically replied, “the state will not allow churches to have enormous holdings while the peasants starve.”⁴¹ Confiscating land from churches and congregations was a sensitive issue, however,

³⁴ Petranović 1969: 57; Gaćeša 1984: 233–234.

³⁵ *Official Gazette of DFJ*, No. 67, 1945.

³⁶ *Official Gazette of FNRJ* No. 15, 1946.

³⁷ Isić 2012:

³⁸ First special session 1946: 81.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Petranović 1969: 59–61; Gaćeša 1984: 111–112; Radić 2002: 179–188; AJ, PV FNRJ, 4, 11.

⁴¹ Tito 1948: 228–229, 233.

so a decision was made to give the land to the members of the congregation whose place of worship was part of the land being expropriated.⁴² Since Yugoslavia was inhabited by members of the Orthodox, Catholic, and Islamic faiths, and considering that the war in Yugoslavia in 1941–1945 also had some religious elements, this proved to be a pragmatic solution.

The normative framework this law established was not precise enough in some areas and thus needed some clarifications and amendments. For example, according to the law, landholdings farmed by hired labor would also fall under the agrarian reform. To avoid a radical backlash, it was specified at a meeting held at the Ministry of Agriculture on 25 August 1945 that using hired labor to farm these holdings would mean the land could only be farmed with hired labor, and not “partially by hired labor.” In addition, it was made clear that hired labor in rural areas such as “loaned and similar cannot in any way be included under this term.”⁴³ The category of labor exploiters who would be affected by the agrarian reform was in fact narrowed by this interpretation.

Furthermore, it was decided at this meeting that “land owned by those who had attended lower or secondary agricultural schools or had completed a university degree in agriculture would be considered an agricultural holding, even if it was farmed by temporary labor.”⁴⁴ This was because a different interpretation that would treat these holdings as property of non-farmers would reduce them to three to five hectares as required by the law. This interpretation was based on the position that the aim of the state’s agricultural policy was “to improve farmers’ general education regarding farming, and the ultimate goal of this policy was for all farmers complete at least a primary education in agriculture in order to cultivate their land more effectively.” It would therefore not be expedient to remove farmers from production who had already been trained.⁴⁵ The government’s Agrarian Council adopted and expanded this standpoint, and the guidelines for adopting the republic’s legislation for agrarian reform allowed for educated farmers’ holdings to be considered agricultural land, even if the land was farmed by permanent (that is, not temporary) hired labor.⁴⁶ In the same guidelines, the council adopted the view that, for farmers with a more advanced education, any holding cultivated by an owner whose primary profession was farming would not be considered a large holding “even if had a surface area large enough to be considered a large holding” and even if it was farmed with “temporary labor.”⁴⁷

Despite these discussions, some issues regarding land status remained unresolved, and among those were various types of joint ownership. For example, if someone owned an individual property and was also a joint owner of another property, there was no legal answer as to whether these should be considered a single property. The Agrarian Council, which handled these issues, said that it was. Also, the issue of two spouses who each owned an individual property was considered especially pressing. An interesting debate on this issue ensued, and the prevailing position that emerged was that these did not comprise a unified landholding and therefore were not affected by the agrarian reform. This view was

⁴² A.J., UARK, 1, 1.

⁴³ AJ, SPŠ, 2, 25.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid. 2, 25.

⁴⁶ AJ, UARK, 1, 1.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

supported by the claim that, under socialism, “women have gained a new position in society, such that the marital union cannot be understood in the same way as it was previously.”⁴⁸

Part of the problem also stemmed from the fact that, after World War II, Yugoslavia had been structured as a federation. Implementing agrarian reform and colonization was relegated to republics, who were now members of the federation. However, the Law on Agrarian Reform and Colonization did not specifically mention holdings located in one or multiple republics, so in February 1946 a binding decision was rendered regulating this matter. According to this decision, if the total area of a landholding constituted one large property, each republic would expropriate the portion located within its borders. If it was farmland, the owner/farmer would be allowed to keep the maximum number of hectares within the republic of his choosing. This decision also stipulated that the same would hold if the property was not agricultural.⁴⁹

Significant amendments to the law from 23 August 1945 were also made in February 1946. First, a very important amendment extended the right of ownership over property distributed as part of the agrarian reform was registered to all members of a household rather than just its head. Next, landowners whose land had been expropriated were allowed to retain up to five hectares if it could be demonstrated they had no other property or means of support. The amount of land in excess of the allotted three hectares expropriated from non-farmers would be allocated to his closest relatives who were also farmers, provided that this expansion to their holdings did not exceed the maximum prescribed by law.⁵⁰

The reasoning behind the first of these may have been connected to the creation of cooperatives and meant to enable family members wanting to join a cooperative to contribute their share of the landholding. The second provision, however, had a clear motive behind it related to social welfare. Finally, judging by Čubrilović’s previously mentioned August 1945 address, the third provision was initially part of the basis for the original decision. When explaining his position, the minister said, “The son of a peasant completes his schooling and becomes a doctor, lawyer, or professor. And according to inheritance law, he receives a patrimony—let’s say twenty hectares.” According to the new law, however, “he cannot keep those twenty hectares, and rather than being transferred to the land fund, those hectares revert to his family members, who are still farmers. There is a type of intellectual who has no regard for his brethren in the countryside once he completes his schooling, so a provision like this is fully justified. We also allow those with land in the countryside retain up to five hectares. This is a large enough amount of for a man with a love for working the land to have and maintain a respectable holding, an orchard, a garden, and so on, in addition to his work in the city.”⁵¹

For agrarian interests, this status was, at least in principle, somewhat simpler to determine than it was for the “objects” of agrarian reform. Farmers with little or no land, whose only or primary vocation was farming, had rights to the land. Priority was given to war veterans and to the families of those who had died in action, victims of fascist terror, those who had

⁴⁸ AJ, SPŠ, 2, 25.

⁴⁹ *Official Gazette of DFJ*, No. 16, 1946.

⁵⁰ *Official Gazette of DFJ*, No. 24, 1946.

⁵¹ Nešović 1952: 251–252.

been disabled in prior wars (1912–1918). According to Čubrilović, it was “beyond any doubt...that when distributing land, it is the duty of the government of the new Yugoslavia to be mindful of those who sacrificed the most for the national liberation movement.” Although he strongly emphasized this principle, he nevertheless insisted that they be only be afforded this advantage if they were prepared to farm the land, and if a participant in the war wanted land only “because he was a Partisan...he should be denied.”⁵² If, however, they did not own land or did not have enough of it, the NOP fighters would be given priority when land was allocated.⁵³ The Commission for Settling Veterans in Vojvodina was given a mandate to make decisions regarding the settlement of combatants in Vojvodina.⁵⁴

It was particularly significant that the law stipulated that the land fund would allocate a significant amount of land for the good of state-run agriculture.⁵⁵ The management of this fund was entrusted to the State Agricultural Commission for the Management of State Agricultural Holdings,⁵⁶ headed by Maksim Goranović. Once they had acquired land that had fallen under agrarian reform, landowners were required to farm it and would be fined if they did not do so.⁵⁷

In February 1946, when the Constitution of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was adopted, Article 19 of the constitution codified several important principles, some of which had already been implemented in practice: “The land belongs to those who till it. The law establishes whether and how much land an institution or an individual who is not a farmer can possess. Under no circumstances may large landholdings be held in private hands. The maximum size of a private landholding is determined by law. The state protects and assists the poor and middle peasant in particular with general economic policies, low credit rates, and the tax system.”⁵⁸

3. Implementation of agrarian reform

After the regulations for agrarian reform were decided upon, and it was clear that land would be distributed among the peasants, party leaders and lower-level cadres sought to present this resolution as the strongest validation of the union of workers and peasants. “We are strengthening and will be strengthening the economic potential of the small and middle peasant,” Boris Kidrič, president of the federal Economic Council, said, most certainly not without a hint of political opportunism. “That we do not implement the provisions of agrarian reform related to the land belonging to those who farm it... no one would ask that of us, for we are a government of the working people. The interests of the working peasant demand that both our small and middle peasants fully participate in the proper implementation of all our agrarian measures. And it is the duty of our activists to properly interpret these measures for the people and to fight against not only the vile slander

⁵² AJ, KMJ, III – 2 – b/8.

⁵³ *Official Gazette of DFJ*, No. 68, 1945.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* No. 71, 1945.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* No. 64, 1945.

⁵⁶ *Official Gazette of FNRJ* No. 10/1946.

⁵⁷ *Official Gazette of DFJ*, No. 74, 1945.

⁵⁸ *Official Gazette of FNRJ* No. 10/1946.

of reactionary forces but also any sectarian disfigurement.”⁵⁹ This last part was a warning of sorts to overly radical individuals to refrain from airing out their egalitarian enthusiasm. Kidrič, mindful that the law left a possibility open for agrarian interests to join together within cooperatives, stressed that it would nevertheless be wrong and dangerous to make labor cooperatives a condition for allocating land to the peasants. The goal of agrarian reform was for peasants to receive land unconditionally, and they would decide later about organizing. Yet it is evident from this that there were various conditions within the allocation process related to joining a cooperative. These were criticized, but the creation of peasant cooperatives was certainly promoted and encouraged—and even coerced—although, at the time, it was not a priority for the Yugoslav communist authorities.

Now that a legislative framework was in place, the systemic implementation of the agrarian reform could now begin. The agrarian commissions and courts in charge of implementing the reform were mostly staffed by representatives of the rural poor. They were the liveliest participants in the agrarian debates that decided the objectives of agrarian reform. This enabled the poor, working peasantry “to become the judge of the exploiters” and to manifest its “revolutionary will,” while also enabling the party to consolidate an alliance between the proletariat and the working peasantry. Although the legal maximum was thirty-five hectares, in practice the more affluent peasants were left with up to twenty hectares.⁶⁰ One person observed that, “in this struggle for land, it was not just the communists in the villages who were well schooled in class struggle. So too were the broader peasant masses who defended the Law on Agrarian Reform from its enemies.”⁶¹

The general political and social atmosphere in rural areas undoubtedly gave rise to radicalism. Such individuals could easily be found in the governmental bodies carrying out the agrarian reform. One of these, for example, was a veteran from Trstenik, a fighter in the struggle “against capitalism,” who was in fact disappointed in how the reform was being implemented because “it is not being done the way they said it would be,” and because “there are even bigger capitalists...many, many of them.” One of those, in his opinion, was a widow “who owns around ten hectares of land of the first order, and also has about fifty male sheep, several pairs of cattle, and a large number of pigs.” Despite these riches hidden in plain sight, this property clearly did not fall under agrarian reform, but this overzealous veteran was convinced that, in this case, “at least the property” should be confiscated. He concluded his letter with the eternal question asked by many disillusioned revolutionaries throughout history, justifiably or not: “Is *this* what we really fought for?”⁶²

Most of the work to implement the reform was carried out by the republics’ ministries of agriculture, by which “the harmful consequences of centralization” would be averted. Departments for agrarian reform and colonization were created within a Ministry of Agriculture and Colonization in each of the republics, with the exception of Serbia, which

⁵⁹ Kidrič 1985a: 172.

⁶⁰ *5th Congress* 1948: 728. This happened, for example, with a peasant from the Valjevo region who complained to Edvard Kardelj, the chairman of the federal Commission for State Oversight, because his family and those of his son and grandson had been left with the maximum of twenty hectares, but he claimed he was entitled to double the maximum. *AJ, PV FNRJ*, 4, 11.

⁶¹ *5th Congress* 1948: 740.

⁶² *AJ, SPS*, 111, 685.

had a separate ministry for this. The Agricultural Council of the Government of the DFJ/FPRJ, and later the Commission for Agrarian Reform along with the Economics Council, coordinated the republics' reform work at the federal level. Then cantonal or city commissions for agrarian reform and colonization were formed at the more local levels. Finally, local agrarian interest committees, usually made up of five members, were formed as advisory boards to these commissions to represent the area served by each local people's committee. A public debate about each landholding was held by the cantonal commission for agrarian reform and colonization.⁶³

The process of agrarian reform proceeded as follows: After gathering information about an estate that fell under agrarian reform, the District People's Committee (*Sreski narodni odbor*), would schedule an expropriation hearing, at which a representative of the Communal People's Committee (*Mesni narodni odbor*) would also be present. The discussion would be scheduled three days in advance and held at the seat of the communal committee with the landowner also present. A decision would be announced two days later. The owner had the right to file an appeal with the Agrarian Court before the District People's Committee within three days, and the Agrarian Court's decision could not be appealed. When the land was seized, an assembly of agrarian stakeholders was convened to decide who the land should be allocated to and how much they should receive. The MNO would again have two days to reach a decision, after which any of the interested parties could appeal to the Agrarian Court. Once a legally binding decision was reached regarding the distribution of land, the land was provisionally divided into parcels and provisionally distributed. Then if there were no further issues, the final parcellation was completed according to the MNO ruling, after which the MNO rendered a decision legally granting ownership of the parcels to the interested parties. The decision was presented to the recipients and the former owner, all of whom had eight days to file an appeal.⁶⁴

The reform also had an impact on some middle peasants who were "by no means subject to the Law on Agrarian Reform...Attempts were made to declare some slightly wealthier peasants as landowners," and "people were stripped of libraries and personal belongings that were in no way subject to the Law on Agrarian Reform." Some party leaders demanded that such "experiments," which were causing a great deal of harm, "must absolutely be stopped."⁶⁵ An examination of extant documents will not establish a clear picture of the extent to which governmental authorities on the ground went to correct these errors, but it can be established that some illegally seized property was returned.⁶⁶ In such an atmosphere, there is no way to know how much actual significance the state authorities' relatively flexible explanations carried regarding who could keep the maximum amount of land, or if landholdings exceeded the maximum. It seems almost idealistic that one of the most important criteria for implementing agrarian reform in Yugoslavia after World War II was the "owner's working relationship to the land," and that "every owner, or category of owner, will be approached not uniformly but individually, by first determining their relationship to the land.

⁶³ Stipetić 1954: 434.

⁶⁴ Babić 1946: 105.

⁶⁵ Kidrič 1985a: 190.

⁶⁶ AJ, PV FNRJ, 89, 188; *Ibid.*, 134, 277.

Only based on this will it be decided which landholdings should be expropriated and where only land exceeding the maximum should be taken and compensated.”⁶⁷

There is no doubt, however, that the explanations aimed at curbing radicalism prompted many of the larger landowners to flock to the competent authorities with various certificates and assurances of their alleged agricultural qualifications.⁶⁸ It is also true that some managed to hold on to relatively large estates. In a lecture for party cadres at the High Party School, participants were informed that “by limiting the maximum to thirty hectares,” the regulations from the reform had “struck a significant blow to capitalist elements,” but there were “capitalist elements who still had the maximum, and even some even had double the maximum.”⁶⁹ How widespread this was remains unknown.

A special order issued in October 1946 waived any fees for registering the ownership of land obtained through the agrarian reform in the land registry.⁷⁰ Beneficiaries of the agrarian reform would also be given assistance in farming the land, which would be provided by the agro-mechanical stations⁷¹ and the local people’s committees.⁷²

All in all, approximately 1.7 million hectares of land from agrarian reform went into the land fund. Of this, around 1.3 million hectares were arable (about 13 percent of the total amount of arable land) and around 0.4 million hectares were forested. By July 1946, the bulk of the land from the fund earmarked for agrarian interests had been assigned. By the time the implementation of the reform ended in 1948, about 0.8 million hectares had been distributed to the interested parties, while the remainder was being used for other purposes (state agricultural holdings, holdings for various institutions, etc.). Around 315,000 peasant families received land through the agrarian reform, either as complete parcels or as additions to existing landholdings. It was especially emphasized that, unlike in the old Yugoslavia, under the new agrarian reform “nationality, religion, etc. did not play any role,” which was undoubtedly true. Farmers were given both land and farming inventory.

At the same time, there was an awareness that the reform would also mean land fragmentation and an inevitable drop in production. Tito pointed out that the reform was detrimental to fiscal interests, but that this was not its primary focus, which was its social function. He expressed his expectation that production would increase as soon as possible, which was why assistance had been secured for the peasants and, above all, for those colonists who were inexperienced in farming.⁷³ This expectation was based on the peasants’ increased interest in production. Since the land was now theirs, they would have a lifelong interest “in increasing the land’s fertility [and] increasing the people’s income from the land.”⁷⁴

The twenty-year restriction on the alienation of land introduced into the Law on Agrarian Reform and Colonization was adopted, as it was claimed, “to protect the beneficiaries of agrarian reform from attacks by capitalist elements to seize their land when

⁶⁷ Stipetić 1954: 433.

⁶⁸ Petranović 1969: 399.

⁶⁹ AJ, VPŠ, 56, 1037.

⁷⁰ *Official Gazette of FNRJ* No. 82, 1946.

⁷¹ *Ibid.* No. 71, 1946.

⁷² *Ibid.* No. 13, 1947.

⁷³ Tito, “Conference with Members of the Press,” *Izgradnja*, I-1, 228–22.

⁷⁴ Burzevski, Goranović 1947: 11–14.

they are still economically weak.” Nevertheless, these restrictions turned out to be an obstacle not only for the recipients themselves, but also for some aspects of state agrarian policy. The state also allocated land from the agrarian reform fund to certain cooperatives to provide economic support, especially for constructing facilities for the cooperatives. Because the cooperatives were mainly established by beneficiaries of the reform, mortgages could not be taken out on the allocated land to finance the loans needed to build the commercial economic facilities necessary for the cooperatives. Independent peasants who were beneficiaries of agrarian reform also faced the same problem. Furthermore, the regulations prohibiting landholdings from being divided prevented the division of households. This was basically an inevitable process that could not be stopped, so it continued in practice without any formal sanctions, “from which various conflicts arose.”⁷⁵

To resolve these issues, the amendments to the Law on Agrarian Reform and Colonization from 1948 allowed for the division of households that had been created as a result of agrarian reform. This was possible only if the division created two agricultural households,⁷⁶ thereby fully affirming the law from February 1946, which extended the right of ownership of allocated land to all members of the household.

4. Conclusion

The country’s agrarian reform fund included 1.65 million hectares of land, of which 1.15 million hectares were distributed, and 400,000 hectares of forest and 100,000 hectares of other land remained undistributed. Some 709,000 hectares were distributed to the private sector across 334,117 households of various categories. The socialist sector (state agricultural holdings, peasant cooperatives, and various institutions and enterprises) received altogether about 434,000 hectares.⁷⁷

Officially, agrarian reform was executed in order to “liquidate the remains of feudalism, weaken and limit capitalist elements in rural areas, and strengthen the union between workers and peasants.”⁷⁸ According to the communists, its strong effect on capitalist elements in rural areas would also reduce their exploitative potential, and was thus “a major step for the democratization and social development of rural areas” in which small and medium peasants would become increasingly liberated from the country’s “last form of capitalist exploitation.”⁷⁹ By achieving this, agrarian reform “gave land to small and poor peasants, thereby fulfilling their centuries-old dream, while also laying down the initial foundations for the socialist sector in agriculture.”⁸⁰

The process of agrarian reform “equalized” the agrarian structure by transitioning affluent peasants into the middle class while simultaneously transitioning poor peasants into the same class.⁸¹ It was “the great dilemma of which path to take: the path of nationalization

⁷⁵ AJ, SPŠ, 119, 676.

⁷⁶ *Official Gazette of FNRJ* No. 105, 1948; Gaćeša 1984: 357–358.

⁷⁷ Gaćeša 1984: 367.

⁷⁸ *V. Kongres* 1949: 562.

⁷⁹ Begović 1949: 310.

⁸⁰ Kidrič 1985b: 197.

⁸¹ Vučković 1954: 37–45.

or the path of agrarian reform and agricultural cooperation. Under the given socioeconomic circumstances existing immediately after liberation, the latter along with this form of agrarian reform was the most appropriate solution.”⁸² The absence of a nationalization of land, as well as the ideological discomfort that arose from a kind of agrarian reform that put land into private ownership by consolidating small and medium-sized holdings, can be explained by the fact that this reform also equalized agricultural revenue with the level of wages and almost completely abolished land rent.⁸³ However, the socialist essence of the 1945 agrarian reform was reflected in the expansion of the socialist agricultural sector, which received more than 20 percent of the land in the agrarian reform fund.⁸⁴

Translated by *Elizabeth Salmore*

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**АГРАРНА РЕФОРМА У ЈУГОСЛАВИЈИ 1945-1948:
АГРАРНО-ПОЛИТИЧКИ АСПЕКТ**

Резиме

У овом раду представљен је првенствено нормативни оквир аграрне реформе која је изведена у Југославији после Другог светског рата, у периоду од 1945. до 1948. године. Она је на законску основу постављена августа 1945. године. Аграрна реформа била је, у основи, довршетак буржоаске револуције, подразумевајући учвршћивање ситног сељачког поседа као неопходну меру и последицу територијализације сељаштва у Југославији. Та чињеница је чинила готово немогућом национализацију земље, без сукоба са социјалном основом Народноослободилачког рата – сељаштвом. Нека важна питања (попут деобе имања добијених аграрном реформом, која се фактички неминовно дешавала) била су решена тек накнадно, новим законским интервенцијама. Пракса је омогућавала да поједина лица добију и два максимума, што је феномен који није оставио довољно извора, али сведочи о својеврсној прагматичности, а можебити и недоследности у извођењу реформе. Југословенска аграрна реформа је учврстила ситни сељачки посед и свакако није помогла преласку на „следећу фазу“ револуционарне интервенције у пољопривреди односно на колективизацију.

Кључне речи: Југославија 1945–1948, аграрна реформа, савез радника и сељака, национализација.

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YUGOSLAVIA AND DE GAULLE'S REVISION OF THE COLD WAR

Abstract: This paper will analyze France's attempted foreign policy strategy in Yugoslavia and in Eastern Europe during the 1960s, beginning with the various positions of de Gaulle's France and Tito's Yugoslavia and the numerous similarities in how the two countries' diplomacy functioned. In both countries, the course of foreign policy was determined according to the authoritarian characteristics of their systems and of their central figure—the president. Both countries were also interested in transcending the Cold War division of Europe, and they based their strategies on attempts to marginalize the United States and pacify the Soviet regime. De Gaulle's attempt at a détente, which Yugoslavia was very sympathetic toward and had also committed itself to similar goals, failed due to unrealistic illusions of overcoming this bipolarity by forging a middle way between the two opposing Cold War blocs. Faced with an overestimation of their own influence, along with the Warsaw Pact's aggression toward Czechoslovakia, Moscow's complete lack of interest in pacification, and the US's unwillingness to withdraw, end of de Gaulle's attempts at détente, in which Yugoslavia would play an important role, came to an end. Nevertheless, similar European and global policy goals brought France and Yugoslavia closer together, and this established the principles on which a cooling down period in the mid-1970s became possible.

Keywords: Yugoslavia, France, foreign policy, détente, Charles de Gaulle, Joseph Broz, Tito, Cold War.

1. Introduction

When the Cold War system was first taking shape in the West, France willingly became an integral part of its political and military structure. At the time it signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, Paris agreed that Soviet expansion in Europe posed an imminent threat, and for this reason it set about building all the structures needed

for a common security policy while letting Washington take on direct leadership of this. During this time, France's Fourth Republic was also experiencing difficulties in its recovery from the aftermath of the Second World War. Memories of its 1940 defeat and the creation of the Vichy regime had left deep scars in postwar French society, and the global process of decolonization was contributing to France's loss of status in the world as a great overseas empire. During the 1950s, the epilogue to these numerous disappointments and the unrealized ambitions of French policies, of which the most notable was the unsuccessful Algerian War (1954–1962), made the need to devise a different foreign policy strategy all the more pressing.¹ Charles de Gaulle's return to French politics in 1958 with the decisive support of the army represented a political and institutional break from the values of the Fourth Republic. For a French society divided and on the verge of civil war over Algeria's unresolved status, de Gaulle's new vision for the Fifth Republic offered strong presidential authority and a policy to return France to the ranks of the great European powers. Until 1969, French foreign policy carried de Gaulle's personal stamp that emphasized an authoritarian approach and the subordination of all French diplomacy to his authority. As Georges Pompidou, the French prime minister from 1962, stated, his political views were merely "a reflection of de Gaulle."²

Many authors agree that de Gaulle's foreign policy strategy was as much a result of the general's political philosophy as it was of changing international circumstances during the 1960s.³ Under the influence of the conservative French right of the interwar period, de Gaulle attributed less importance to the ideal of a strong and independent nation state in international relations and more to the influence of geostrategic interests and historical experience. In his view of the new postwar world, the order of the Cold War was an artificially constructed barrier between European nations that had disrupted the balance of power and established the hegemony of two superpowers over the continent. The so-called Yalta complex prevented France from fully exercising its interests and ensuring its own security beyond the framework of a bipolar world. In the early 1960s, de Gaulle considered the Cold War to be an outdated concept that did not correspond with the series of changes in international relations, and most of all with France's interests in Europe. First and foremost, the French president was firmly convinced the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern Europe no longer posed a threat to Western European security. The Cuban Missile Crisis, and especially the Sino-Soviet split, seemed to indicate that Moscow was vulnerable and willing to compromise. In de Gaulle's view, it was clear and indisputable that communism in Eastern Europe was transient and that, over time, an evolution in relations among the Soviet states would ease the bloc's subordination to the Soviet Union and affirm the distinctions between Eastern European nations. The first evidence of this was the actions taken by the Communist Party of Romania in its quest for greater autonomy in decision-making within the bloc (1963/1964). In response to changes in the East, Western Europe had to seek out another kind of political union that was distanced from American policies and grounded in a French-German partnership. This newly established balance would sweep

¹ Judt 2005: 282–292; Kershaw 2018: 90–97; Westad 2021: 280–285.

² Jackson 2018: 550.

³ Nester 2014: 11–34; Martin 2012: 91–94; Bozo 2010.

away all the assumptions of Cold War policy, initiate a policy of détente with Eastern Europe, and ultimately create a new concept for Europe (“From the Urals to the Atlantic Ocean”) and its security policy.⁴ As it was presented, de Gaulle’s alternative to the Cold War bore his purely personal signature, which had been secured by constitutional amendments in 1962 and was often implemented by elements of the general’s personal diplomacy.⁵

Unlike Franco–Yugoslav relations during the interwar period, research into Franco–Yugoslav postwar relations has not been a focus of independent studies or of otherwise extensive historiographies of Yugoslav foreign policy during the Cold War.⁶ Katarina Todić’s “A traditional friendship? France and Yugoslavia in the Cold War World” is the first comprehensive study of Franco–Yugoslav relations based on extensive primary sources.⁷ Beyond this, relations between Belgrade and Paris have been mentioned in general studies of Yugoslav foreign policy during the Cold War and Yugoslav relations with the West or the Third World (Algeria), as well as those dealing with issues related to knowledge transfer and cultural influences.⁸

Yugoslav diplomacy could not ignore Paris as an influential capital, despite France’s waning prestige as a great power in the postwar period. Founded on the principles of an active foreign policy orientation, Yugoslavia was interested in having a presence on the wider international political stage, especially during the turbulent 1960s, which was a time of significant political and cultural transformation. The emergence of de Gaulle’s strategy in Europe coincided with a general reassessment of postwar and Cold War hypotheses, which particularly resonated with Yugoslav strategic thinking. This paper will attempt to explain the emergence of de Gaulle’s vision of foreign policy from a Yugoslav perspective. It will also consider its range through the European perspective and the beginnings of the East–West détente, an important process in which Yugoslavia wanted to be as well-positioned as possible.

2. The Proximity of Opposing Visions: Tito and de Gaulle’s Attempt to Transcend the Cold War and the Beginnings of a Yugoslav Rapprochement (1962–1964)

De Gaulle’s critical relationship to the main hallmarks of the Cold War corresponded with the main objectives of Yugoslav foreign policy. Once it became an independent subject in international relations and after the rift with the Soviet Union in 1948, socialist Yugoslavia promoted principles that went against the European Cold War order. First and foremost, criticism of the political/military blocs was a constant in Yugoslav diplomacy. Its negative encounter with Stalin’s notion of a closed, monolithic Eastern bloc and the attempt to directly challenge the state’s independence had been more than enough for Yugoslav leadership. Even though cooperation with the West enabled Yugoslavia to establish a

⁴ Bozo 2010: 165–168.

⁵ Jackson 2018: 569–571; Berstein 1993: 83–100.

⁶ Kocić 2013.

⁷ Todić 2015.

⁸ Perišić 2008; Bogetić 2000; Bogetić 2006; Selinić 2012; Bogetić 2013; Bekić 1988; Dimić 2014; Čavoški 2013.

necessary balance and new possibilities for Yugoslav society, the North Atlantic Alliance, along with many other political organizations in the West, were seen as the primary instruments for fulfilling imperial and neo-colonial objectives. The 1958 program for the Yugoslav League of Communists (SKJ) ostensibly specified that any division of the world into blocs hindered the “realization of the idea of coexistence and stood in opposition to the full sovereignty and independence of peoples and states.”⁹ Asserting the concepts of active, peaceful coexistence and openness to cooperation with countries of various socio-political orders and opposition to the dominant Cold War logic of cooperation and alliances was seen as a vehicle for overcoming the division into blocs.¹⁰ Unlike de Gaulle, Yugoslavia gave precedence to ideology when making decisions. The Yugoslav communists remained faithful to the unbending laws of history that foresaw the lawful transformation of capitalist social and economic relations and permitted criticism of contemporary imperialism, and they believed the causes of the Cold War lay in the refusal of leading (capitalist) countries to accept processes of transformation in the modern world. According to the Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito, the affirmation of socialist social relations and the emergence of many newly liberated Afro-Asian countries was incontrovertible evidence of significant global progress.¹¹ Additionally, changes in the socialist sphere after Stalin’s death were sufficiently wide-ranging to provide Yugoslav strategy with enough room to maneuver to put this strategy into practice. In the Yugoslav estimation, Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin’s policies at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party (KPSS) and then the clash with the revolutionary radicalism of Mao’s China were positive signs favoring a policy of peace and a criticism of the negative Cold War legacy.¹²

As was the case for de Gaulle’s strategy, Yugoslav foreign policy was similarly represented through the political authority of one figure: Josip Broz Tito, the leader of the Yugoslav party and of the state. All the important elements of de Gaulle’s personal diplomacy were present in the Yugoslav president. Strong authority in internal politics along with the halo of a leader of a resistance movement during the Second World War gave both men enough confidence to take action in international relations. Inside the Élysée Palace, de Gaulle was known to bypass the opinions of the foreign ministry at the Quai d’Orsay, often personally giving instructions to the French ambassadors and representing French interests through direct contact with foreign statesmen.¹³ In some cases, de Gaulle’s famous press conferences were where policies, and especially strategic foreign policy, was inaugurated. In Yugoslavia, all the essential elements of the political system further ensured Tito’s sovereign position as the supreme arbiter of key issues in state (and party) policy. Foreign policy was a specially reserved area, so many Western diplomats had the impression that Tito himself could have been the minister of foreign affairs all on his own.¹⁴ This was particularly pronounced within the contours of the diplomatic summit Tito embarked on in

⁹ Program SKJ 1958: 75; for more on the SKJ program see Bešlin 2019: 11–33.

¹⁰ Jakovina 2017: 473–479.

¹¹ Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ), 837, Kabinet predsednika Republike (KPR), II-5-b-1, Zabeleške sa sastanka održanih u vezi sa izradom nacarta ekspozoea Predsednika Republike.

¹² AJ, 837, KIIP, I-5-b/99-10, 22. Kongres KPSS i neki naši neposredni zadaci.

¹³ Jackson 2019: 569–571.

¹⁴ Pirjevec 2012: 405.

the 1950s with the leaders of the newly liberated Afro-Asian countries, which allowed him to take on a prominent role in promoting an extra-bloc (unengaged) policy.¹⁵ At the opening of the conference of non-aligned countries in Belgrade on 1 September 1961, Tito condemned Cold War policy, which could “at any moment end in tragedy.”¹⁶ His speech at the conference made a big impression on foreign observers, primarily those from the West, who were displeased with Tito’s harsh assessment. Many reported his speech as being “pro-Soviet” for expressing sympathy for Soviet nuclear tests while simultaneously denouncing those by the French. The Yugoslav State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs (DSIP) had not been informed of Tito’s last-minute changes to his speech, which only further confirmed his position of authority. A year after the Belgrade conference, Tito began normalizing relations with the Soviet Union and stifling criticism of this decision within the country. In early 1963, party leaders condemned Yugoslav foreign policy’s “secretariat line,” that Tito believed was being promulgated by the DSIP and which was also out of step with the SKJ’s foreign policy orientation.¹⁷ Yugoslav diplomacy needed to stop being too pragmatic, rely more on the reality of Yugoslav socialism, and turn toward its proclaimed ideological objectives. In fact, it needed to be more in tune with Tito’s vision.

In the early 1960s, when both foreign policy strategies opposing the Cold War were being clearly represented, Franco–Yugoslav relations were experiencing significant difficulties. Ever since de Gaulle’s return to power in 1958, the question of Algeria had been an insurmountable obstacle in the development of stable international relations. Yugoslavia had actively supported the Algerian people’s struggle for independence and recognized the National Liberation Front as the only legitimate representative of Algeria. During two of Tito’s important appearances on the world stage—a speech given to the United Nations General Assembly in 1960 and another delivered at the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in 1961—his unequivocal support for the Algerian struggle was also followed by criticism of French policy. In a report sent while on his way back from New York in September 1960, Tito conveyed to the members of the Federal Executive Council (SIV) his personal impression that there had been considerable reservations and coldness on the part of the French diplomats, which had convinced him that relations between the two countries were poor.¹⁸ The messages at the Belgrade conference and Yugoslav recognition of the National Liberation Front led Paris to withdraw its ambassador to Belgrade in 1962 and relegated his responsibilities to the *chargé d'affaires*. Although de Gaulle had initiated a gradual end to the war in Algeria and a recognition of state autonomy, Yugoslavia’s actions were seen as direct challenges to his policies. De Gaulle resented this and made his feeling clear to Marko Nikezić during his visit as State Secretary for International Affairs in September 1967.¹⁹ Additionally, the disagreements between de

¹⁵ See Petrović 2010.

¹⁶ AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a, Govor predsednika republike J.B.Tita prilikom otvaranja konferencije neangažovanih zemalja, 1.9. 1961.

¹⁷ For more see Žarković 2017.

¹⁸ AJ, 837, KPR I-2/12 SAD, zasedanje OUN (20.09-4.10 1960); Izveštaj na sednici Saveznog izvršnog veća, 13. oktobar 1960.

¹⁹ Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije (DAMSPRS), Politička Arhiva (PA), 1967, Francuska, f-38, br. 432630.

Gaulle and Tito dated back to the Second World War when the French general expressed his support of Dragoljub “Draža” Mihailović, the commander of the Royalist forces, who had been convicted of war crimes and collaboration with the occupiers in 1946.²⁰ These two reasons were often considered to be a significant factor behind the somewhat strained relations between Paris and Belgrade. Yugoslav officials were also displeased by de Gaulle’s frequent expressions of anti-communism, especially when he referred to Belgrade as being similar to the “totalitarian regimes” in Eastern Europe during public appearances.²¹

The Évian Accords and Algeria’s independence on 1 July 1962 were crucial for the beginning of a new phase in Franco–Yugoslav relations. In August of the same year, Paris named Jean André Binoche as the new French ambassador to Belgrade. When presenting his accreditations to the Yugoslav president, Binoche gave center stage to their shared “brotherhood in arms” and the traditional friendship between their two countries.²² This emphasis on history and tradition in no way accidental. After the war, the French government had tried to make a connection through the continuity of cordial relations during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, even though a considerable number of influential figures from Yugoslav civil society, with whom the French ambassador had maintained close contact, had been eliminated from public life after 1945. The expectation that close political ties would quickly be established after so many difficult years of misunderstandings was not realistic, so a mutual agreement was reached to focus relations more closely on economics and culture.²³ However, the international context in Europe was rapidly changing, which provided both leaders with sufficient arguments that the postwar perquisites for Cold War policy were now in question. The conflict between Beijing and Moscow, which escalated in 1962/1963, became a central event in both French and Yugoslav foreign policy analyses. Yugoslav leadership viewed the conflict as a struggle between progressive (Khrushchev) and dogmatic (Mao Zedong) currents, and the consequences of these transcended the importance of the international workers’ movement. French analyses, however, viewed the Sino-Soviet split as something beyond strictly ideological norms and viewed it as being significant for Moscow’s intentions to pacify its belligerent Cold War policy in Europe. De Gaulle’s conclusion was that Beijing’s provocation of Moscow by challenging its central ideological authority could push the Soviets to be more inclined toward negotiations with the West.²⁴ Within certain shifts in the power constellation, which by 1963 had already resulted in meaningful changes

²⁰ Bešlin 2013: 83–142.

²¹ De Gaulle’s New Year’s message was delivered on 31 December 1963. Dušan Kveder lodged an official protest with the French ambassador before the DSIP, noting that “the message had left a distressing impression.” The French ambassador argued that de Gaulle had failed to “differentiate between Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia” due to the brevity of the message. A part of de Gaulle’s controversial message was: “Without falling prey to the illusions that soothe the weak but without losing hope that freedom and human dignity will prevail, we should ultimately say that we are thinking about the day when, perhaps in Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia, Belgrade, Tirana, and Moscow, totalitarian communist regimes, which still manage to keep their people under oppression, will gradually achieve an evolution that can reconcile them with their own transformation.” AJ, 837, KPR, I-5-b/28-4, Beleška o razgovoru sa francuskim ambasadorom g. Binoche-om; Antijugoslovenska izjava u novogodišnjoj poruci De Gola.

²² AJ, 837, KPR, I-3-a/27, Prijem francuskog ambasadora Jean Andre Binoche-a., 13.8.1962.

²³ DAMSPRS, PA, 1962, Francuska, f-29, br. 429836.

²⁴ Martin 2012: 95–96; Soutou 2004: 173–176

for Yugoslav interests (the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, new trends in German government policy, the Élysée Treaty, Tito's meeting with Kennedy, normalization with Eastern Europe), de Gaulle's policy seemed Belgrade to be part of the same unstoppable process. At the DSIP conference in October, Marko Nikezić, the Yugoslav deputy secretary for foreign affairs also suggested that Yugoslavia should establish a "tacit agreement" with France as part of its policy strategy. It should then engage in a more "subtle policy" and observe where the two had common ground in any issue related to foreign policy.²⁵

Until 1964, Yugoslavia's open-door policy toward France succeeded in working out some of the more important elements of de Gaulle's foreign policy strategy and then orienting Yugoslav policy accordingly. Reports from Mito Miljković, the Yugoslav ambassador to Paris, were an important benchmark at the DSIP for assessing French policy. In addition to regular monthly and yearly reports, the ambassador directly related elements of French policy at the DSIP conferences in 1963 and 1964. In his findings, he claimed that French foreign policy had been crafted according to de Gaulle's personal traits, and its intention was for France to have a special role in a future united Europe. De Gaulle's criticism of American policy and its role in NATO was seen as a policy aimed at the "disintegration" of the Western bloc. Constant insistence on the affirmation of national policies was interpreted as de Gaulle's intention to remove European countries from the zone of influence of the two superpowers (Moscow and Washington) and thereby mitigate the militant, Manichean Cold War policy. Despite many positive examples, Miljković warned Yugoslavia not to count on any rapid development in relations with France, mainly because of de Gaulle, who was the personification of this sort of policy and personally was not particularly well-disposed toward Yugoslavia.²⁶ Nevertheless, the leadership of the DSIP continued to focus on the importance of the French example, which in its view contributed to the strengthening of positive processes in the world.²⁷ This view of France fit in well with the beginning of a new strategy for Yugoslav policy toward Western Europe, which the DSIP had begun proposing to state leadership in 1963. Apart from the obvious economic benefits for Yugoslav interests that would come from cooperation with the West, and primarily with the European Economic Community (EEC), from the DSIP's perspective, Yugoslav policy should seek to counteract the negative image that it was too much in collusion with Moscow after relations were normalized. Interesting developments in French foreign policy were recognized as opportunities for expanding political cooperation between the two countries, which would then result in the practical achievement of the active and peaceful coexistence that had been proclaimed. Apart from the DSIP, other actors in Yugoslav foreign policy (SIV, the Federal

²⁵ DAMSPRS, PA, 1962, Kabinet državnog sekretara za spoljne poslove, k-178/35, Zapisnik sa sastanka Kolegijuma DSIP-a, održanog 3. oktobra 1962.

²⁶ DAMSPRS, PA, 1964, Kabinet državnog sekretara za spoljne poslove, Zapisnik sa Kolegijuma DSIP-a kod zamenika državnog sekretara Marka Nikezića održanog 27. Aprila 1964. (nesređena građa).

²⁷ On 26 March 1964, the Collegium of the DSIP presented some basic ideas for how to respond to France. Of the more important examples of French policies, the following results were highlighted: support for Algeria, recognition of the People's Republic of China, a position on Cuba, recommendations for neutralizing Southeast Asia, recognition of a policy of non-alignment as a significant international factor, action plans to assist developing countries, opposition to the creation of a multilateral NATO nuclear force, recognition of the Odra-Neisse line, and strengthening commercial ties and contacts with East Germany. AJ, 837, KPR, I-5-b/28-4, Neke teze Kolegijuma DSIP za aktivniji nastup prema Francuskoj.

Assembly, the International Relations Commission of the SKJ) began addressing the issue of France with all of them pointing equally to the need for much greater Yugoslav engagement with France and de Gaulle's strategy.²⁸

The French minister Louis Joxe's visit to Yugoslavia on 20 June 1964 was the first postwar visit to Belgrade by a member of the French government. Joxe was believed to someone in whom de Gaulle had a great deal of confidence, which gave a special weight to these discussions. His trip to Yugoslavia was organized as part of the signing of a cultural convention between the two countries, but the discussions with Tito were focused exclusively on international politics. The Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Cairo was scheduled for the end of 1964, so the main focus of Yugoslav interests included French views on various unresolved issues such as those of Laos, Cambodia, Cyprus, and the newly liberated countries in general. In his discussion with Joxe, Tito praised French policy and welcomed its recognition of China.²⁹ The very direction of these talks demonstrated that the differences between them were minuscule in comparison to the general state of the world, which further convinced Tito that French politics were definitely evolving, and that he could use this as a positive example during talks with other world leaders.³⁰ For France, however, Joxe's visit was just one of a series of initial general consultations it had begun with Eastern European countries in 1964. A visit to Paris by the Romanian prime minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer in July convinced de Gaulle that relations within the Communist bloc had changed due to Russia's evolution and split with China.³¹ By the end of the year, foreign ministers from Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia had also made visits to Paris, followed by one from Hungary in early 1965.

The Yugoslav minister Konstantin Koča Popović made an unofficial visit to Paris around the same time on 25–27 November but had two meetings with the French foreign minister Maurice Couve de Murville. The additional second meeting with Murville was later interpreted as an indication of France wanting to give Yugoslavia special consideration beyond what it had given other Eastern European representatives.³² Talks between Koča Popović and Murville once again demonstrated similarities in how they viewed many issues in Europe and the Third World. Shared criticism of the military blocs and certain aspects of American policies and European issues provided confirmation for both sides about their perceived need for meetings and consultations. Popović conveyed to Murville Yugoslavia's support for an "independent Europe," and that "this Europe should enable further

²⁸ On 21 May 19, Petar Stambolić, the president of SIV, held a meeting about Franco–Yugoslav relations; on 3 December 1965, the Federal Assembly's Committee on Foreign Affairs International Relations discussed France's international and European policies. AJ, 837, KPR, I-5-b/28-5; 7. Februara 1966 ambasador M.Miljković je prisustvoao sastanku Komisije za međunarodne veze CK SKJ, DAMSPRS,PA, 1966, Francuska, f-35, br. 445516.

²⁹ AJ, 837, KPR, I-3-a/27-30, Prijem ministra u vladi Republike Francuske, Louis Joxe, 20.6.1964.

³⁰ Tito had already done so during talks with the new Soviet leadership between 18 June and 1 July 1965 when he emphasized the importance of de Gaulle's block disintegration for the West. AJ, 837, KPR I-2/26-3; That same year during a visit by the Polish state party delegation on 15–20 November, the Polish leader Gomulka conveyed to Tito the view that "de Gaulle is on our line" and that the Eastern European countries should work toward consolidating the trends in France. AJ, 837, KPR, I-3-a/94-14.

³¹ Martin 2013: 59–60.

³² AJ, 837, KPR, I-5-b/28-4, Kratka ocena posete Koče Popovića Francuskoj (od 25 do 29.11.1964).

unimpeded development of relations between our two countries and their rapprochement, and it would not become a source of new complications.”³³ Not to be outdone by his Yugoslav colleague, Murville specifically emphasized that Franco–Yugoslav cooperation would be based on each country’s independent policies.³⁴ Both ministers agreed that peace in Europe could only be secured outside of the existing blocs.

Koče Popović’s visit to France, although unofficial and arranged without a meeting with de Gaulle, was still a step forward in Franco–Yugoslav relations. First and foremost, for the French, Yugoslav views of relations within Eastern Europe were valuable extra-block insights into the possible evolution of the Eastern European Communist parties while de Gaulle’s Eastern policy of détente was being fleshed out. Popović’s report when he returned to Belgrade was not optimistic, and he recognized that the French had overly strong reservations stemming from, in his opinion, de Gaulle’s unwillingness to approach Yugoslavia more openly or as its equal. “For de Gaulle it is inconceivable, far-fetched even, how a small Balkan country would be able to take on such an important role on the world stage,” was Popović’s conclusion. Nevertheless, a French impression of the “individuality” of Yugoslav foreign policy had been achieved.³⁵ The reform oriented Eighth Congress of the SKJ in 1964 only added to Western observers’ impression that Yugoslavia was ready for a democratic transformation and therefore ready to become more open to the West and more distanced from Moscow.³⁶

For the first time, President de Gaulle conveyed his personal greetings to President Tito and the Yugoslav peoples at a traditional New Year’s reception on 1 January 1965.³⁷ The previously harsh criticism of Eastern European regimes was replaced by a call for cooperation for the sake of Europe’s future security. The extent to which Belgrade had changed its view of de Gaulle’s France was also discussed in Ljubomir Radovanović’s pamphlet “France and de Gaulle” published by *Komunist* in August 1964. Radovanović, a prominent jurist and longtime member of the DSIP (1948–1963) who had been educated in prewar Paris, presented to his Yugoslav readership the political concept of Gaullism along with a broad historical perspective. Radovanović’s ultimate conclusion was that “France, by virtue of its tradition and prestige, its concept of international relations, its realistic assessment of European interests, and its opportunities in international relations, had the standing and was in the right position to contribute to the renewal of a general European policy. France’s basic concept had been freed from shackles of the principle of blocs, ideological narrow-mindedness, Cold War antagonism, and the bloc-based division that has hampered every initiative for general European cooperation.”³⁸ For Yugoslav interests, France seemed to be a desirable international partner in the West, even though the structures of this cooperation were not yet certain.

³³ AJ, 837, KPR, I-5-b/28-4, Zabeleška o razgovoru državnog sekretara za inostrane poslove Koče Popovića sa Ministrom spoljnih poslova francuske vlade, Kuv de Mirvilom, koji je održan 25.11.1964 u Q.Q.

³⁴ AJ, 837, KPR, I-5-b/28-4, Drugi razgovor Kuv de Mirvila i Koče Popovića, održan 27. novembra.

³⁵ AJ, 837, KPR, I-5-b/28-4, Kratka ocena posete Koče Popovića Francuskoj (od 25 do 29.11.1964).

³⁶ Rusinow 1978: 163–170.

³⁷ DAMSPRS, PA, 1965, Francuska, f-38, br.4218.

³⁸ Radovanović 1964: 86.

3. Yugoslavia and de Gaulle's Eastern Policy as the Pinnacle of Gaullist Strategy, 1965–1967

Of de Gaulle's many public appearances, the press conference held on 4 February 1965 is considered the crucial moment when France made known its policy of détente toward Eastern Europe. Speaking to television cameras, the French president presented avenues for a resolution to the German question, which would involve formulating a long-term policy of pan-European cooperation beyond the limitations of the bloc structures. In de Gaulle's opinion, the issue of a unified Germany could be resolved not through conflicts of differing ideologies or by the efforts of the two blocs, but solely through the cooperation of all European countries and by promoting a policy of détente.³⁹ He then outlined three key prerequisites that needed to be fulfilled before Germany's final unification. First, the evolution of the Eastern Bloc had to include the abandonment of the Soviet regime's "totalitarian" aspects, further liberalization of relations between the socialist countries, and greater independence from Moscow. Second, it would be preferable for Western European integration (the EEC) to achieve a common policy and defense in addition to the already existing economic integration among its members. Finally, West Germany would have to make significant concessions in its policies and change its position on prewar borders (the Oder–Neisse line) and the possession of nuclear weapons.⁴⁰

De Gaulle's envisioned process of détente would come to fruition through a Paris–Bonn–Moscow axis that would restore the old European equilibrium and balance of power. This would be done without any influence from US policy, which by the mid-1960s and after a series of incidents (Vietnam, the Dominican Republic), Paris considered to be the primary disruptive factor in international relations. In order to free the government in Bonn from Washington's embrace, de Gaulle was prepared to serve as mediator between West Germany and Eastern Europe, especially since West Germany's new coalition government had embarked on an Eastern policy in 1966. A week before the February press conference, Etienne Burin des Rozières, the head of de Gaulle's cabinet, had met with the Yugoslav ambassador Mito Miljković and laid out for him how identical the two countries' objectives were regarding a resolution to the German question. Despite the obvious differences in the two country's views on the existence of East Germany, France nevertheless insisted Belgrade's and Paris's policies were similar but also criticized Yugoslavia for being overly passive about European issues.⁴¹

Yugoslavia's policy toward the socialist countries of Eastern Europe had preceded de Gaulle's Eastern policy and had been adapted to suit the objectives of a global strategy and the needs of non-aligned countries in the Third World. Some of the main features of this policy had come about during the 1950s when Yugoslavia was in the first stages of normalizing relations with Russia, primarily through dialog with the post-Stalinist leadership in Moscow. At that time, clear principles for new relations were established by the Belgrade

³⁹ Martin 2012: 97–98; Bozo 2015: 119–120.

⁴⁰ Martin 2012: 98–99; Soutou 1996.

⁴¹ DAMSPRS, PA, 1965, f-37, br.43677, Razgovor sa Biren de Rozijeom, generalnim sekretarom (direktorom kabineta) De Gola.

and Moscow Declarations.⁴² After a period of strained relations stemming from the Yugoslav party leadership's refusal to sign the 1957 Declaration and the adoption of the SKJ's new 1958 program, Yugoslav leadership began another process of normalizing relations within the context of the Sino-Soviet split, but this time with much broader objectives and expectations.⁴³ At the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee (CK) of the SKJ on 18 May 1963, Tito outlined for the party membership the Yugoslav strategy for Eastern Europe and curbed previously hidden resistance within the DSIP.⁴⁴ Tito attributed the significance of the Sino-Soviet split to "all of mankind" by invoking the concept of proletarian internationalism.⁴⁵ Siding with Moscow in this dispute with Beijing meant supporting a process of de-Stalinization and strengthening the principles of peaceful coexistence and the struggle for peace on a global scale. Tito warned that Yugoslav policy must not "end up being detrimental to the socialist countries or the workers' movement." Up until 1968, Yugoslav strategy relied on joint action against the Cold War by all "peaceful forces" within the international community, which, in the Yugoslav interpretation, consisted primarily of the socialist and non-aligned Afro-Asian states. This was one of the reasons why, up until 1970, Tito's foreign policy actions were primarily focused on these areas and bypassed Western European capitals.⁴⁶ Unlike de Gaulle's predictions, the Yugoslav communists expected the evolution of Eastern Europe to raise the possibility of socialist countries having greater autonomy, which could strengthen socialist social relations if paired with an appropriate policy of reform. Greater contact with Eastern European party leaders would also enable Yugoslavia to popularize greater engagement of socialist countries with those of the Third World, economic assistance for developing countries, and general support for the UN's efforts to establish itself as the most important institution for promoting a policy of peace. The emergence of de Gaulle's vision was in some ways unexpected, yet it was certainly in line with the sufficient openness of Yugoslav diplomacy, which also interpreted changes in the West as an identical process of dismantling the Cold War movement.⁴⁷ Starting in the 1960s, given the changes in the West and its need to satisfy its own economic interests, Yugoslav policy started becoming more engaged in issues of European security.⁴⁸

De Gaulle's Eastern policy drew even more attention in March 1966 when he wrote to Lyndon Johnson to inform him of France's desire for full sovereignty over its territories and its intention to withdraw from the integrated NATO command. At the end of March, an aide-mémoire from the French government informed its Western allies of France's intention to withdraw French troops from West Germany and its military personnel from NATO's integrated command structures, along with a request for all foreign troops to be removed from French soil by 1 April 1967.⁴⁹ Suddenly France's future status in the alliance was in doubt because the 1949 agreement on accession was set to expire in 1969. But what the French president wanted most

⁴² Videti Trpković 2013; Rajak 2010.

⁴³ Žarković 2017: 104–105; Trpković 2013: 130–141.

⁴⁴ Žarković 2017: 104–117.

⁴⁵ AJ, 507, AIJK CKJ, II/23, Stenografske beleške sa Petog plenuma CK SKJ, održanog 18.5.1963.

⁴⁶ Tito made his final official visit to a western European capital from 7 to 12 May 1956 in Paris.

⁴⁷ DAMSPRS, PA, 1966, Regionalno, f-154, br. 445609.

⁴⁸ See Dimić 2016.

⁴⁹ Martin 2013:100–101.

of all was to show that this decision about NATO was an integral part of his Eastern policy. This policy was clearly presented during an extensive Eastern European diplomatic tour Murville went on between April and July of 1966 (Bucharest, Sofia, Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest) and during de Gaulle's first official visit to the Soviet Union in July of that year.⁵⁰

During this visit, de Gaulle invited Soviet leadership to participate in a joint effort to resolve European security issues of European security through agreed-upon action. France's efforts were also aimed at softening the Soviets' negative view of Bonn's policies, and it insisted on better models of communication. De Gaulle's message to Moscow was that if Soviet policies did not evolve, neither would Germany's and vice versa.⁵¹ Paris was satisfied with the outcomes of the visit, and the signing of a joint declaration and establishment of a direct line of communication had created an expectation that concrete moves in French foreign policy toward the West would influence similar changes within the Eastern bloc. The Bucharest Declaration was adopted on 6 July 1966 at a meeting of the Warsaw Pact and included some of the suggestions made by the Romanian representatives. It also legalized a path for negotiation and détente with the West.⁵² At the end of the year, a declaration by the new West German coalition government (Kissinger–Brandt) announced a new policy of normalizing relations with the Eastern European countries, and this provided Paris with enough certainty that its vision for overcoming the Cold War in Europe could not be halted.⁵³

The role of Yugoslavia in de Gaulle's strategy for Eastern Europe was distinct. There was categorical support for Yugoslavia's international position, its independence, and its independent internal development. Ministers in Georges Pompidou's government (Peyrefitte, Joxe, Murville) rushed to express their sympathies for Yugoslav policy.⁵⁴ Yugoslavia was referred to as a "champion of independence" whose views were more closely aligned with those of France than of other socialist countries.⁵⁵ Judging by a statement from the French prime minister Georges Pompidou on 29 November 1965, Yugoslavia was viewed as an example of how to conduct policies independently, outside of the blocs, and without retreating into isolation.⁵⁶ An official visit by the French foreign minister Couve de Murville on 13 September 1966 and Marko Nikezić's reciprocal visit to Paris in September 1967 only served to confirm the high degree to which two countries agreed about the most pressing international issues. Various kinds of information from the Yugoslav ambassador to Paris seemed to indicate there had been a significant "softening" in de Gaulle's attitude toward Yugoslavia, as evidenced by the new French ambassador to Belgrade, Alan Frankfort.⁵⁷

⁵⁰ Martin 2013: 105–108.

⁵¹ Jackson 2018: 657.

⁵² Crump 2015: 152–156.

⁵³ Martin 2013: 119.

⁵⁴ Troude 2009: 178–179.

⁵⁵ AJ, 837, KPR, I-5-b/28-5, Zabeleška o poseti ministra za informacije Francuske Aleina Pezrefittea, državnom sekretaru za inostrane poslove Marku Nikeziću.

⁵⁶ "Independence does not lead to isolation. Look to our predecessors. Take Yugoslavia. It has found a way to defy Stalin without crossing over to the opposing bloc and finally chose its own independence. What are the results of that now? The Russian have accepted it; the satellite countries have accepted it; the West has accepted it." DAMSPRS, PA, 1965, Francuska, f-36, br. 444491.

⁵⁷ DAMSPRS, PA, 1965, Francuska, f-40, br.433677, Razgovor sa Žoksom o francusko-jugoslovenskim odnosima.

On the other hand, concrete proposals from the French government for possible models of coordination and cooperation regarding the two countries' European policies were regularly omitted, notwithstanding their officially close positions. Despite being the only socialist country outside of the Soviet sphere of influence, Yugoslavia nevertheless had a second-class role in De Gaulle's Eastern policy. Many Yugoslav analyses investigating the rationale behind France's reasoning often attributed much of it to de Gaulle and his negative attitude toward the regime in Belgrade.

A great deal of clarity on the issue came from the new Yugoslav ambassador to Paris, Ivo Vejvoda, was sent to France in June 1967, shortly after the Brioni Plenum and the former ambassador Mito Miljković was recalled for political reasons. Before arriving in France, Tito gave Vejvoda specific instructions for how Yugoslav representatives should conduct themselves in diplomatic circles and in front of de Gaulle. He particularly emphasized they should focus "maximum effort" toward strengthening relations with France. Tito advised him that "Yugoslavia has no intention of letting its policy of non-alignment "hinder" French efforts to bring all European countries closer together and unite them on new grounds, and if the French have any such reservations, they should be neutralized."⁵⁸

In early August 1967, the Yugoslav ambassador tried to put forward in a comprehensive report on French foreign policy the main reasons for the conflicts between de Gaulle's and Yugoslavia's strategies. In addition to noting that France had been avoiding any event within their mutual relations that might be interpreted as resulting from "the two countries' mutual extra-bloc position," the ambassador specifically emphasized that France did not need Yugoslavia for its policy of "disintegration of the Eastern bloc."⁵⁹ One important reason for this attitude was that, for the sake of good relations with the Soviet Union, Paris did not want to overstate Yugoslavia as an example, especially considering Moscow's reservations about Yugoslavia's internal reforms.⁶⁰ Similarly, French pretensions to becoming "a patron of the Third World" were not reconcilable with Yugoslavia's policy of non-alignment and independent development of underdeveloped countries. De Gaulle was counting on France's high rank as an equally great power in the multilateral world he envisioned. Yugoslav policy, however, was critical of the former colonial power's "neo-colonial" intentions and did not exclude Paris's negative influence on the francophone countries in Africa.⁶¹ The Yugoslav's open invitation to de Gaulle to participate in the Non-Aligned Conference, which would be in line with the increasingly pronounced extra-bloc tendencies within French policy, was not successful.⁶² The French president's response was that if war were to break out, France would side with the West.⁶³

The absence of more active Franco–Yugoslav cooperation around the disintegration of the European blocs and a disregard of Yugoslav leadership in extra-bloc politics did not mean that Paris intended to completely ignore Belgrade's influence. The Yugoslav contribution to two aspects of de Gaulle's strategy—opposition to American global policy

⁵⁸ DAMSPRS, PA, 1967, Francuska, f-35, br. 420283.

⁵⁹ DAMSPRS, PA, 1967, Francuska, f-38, 428879.

⁶⁰ Bešlin 2022: 83–127.

⁶¹ DAMSPRS, PA, 1967, Francuska, f-38, 428879.

⁶² AJ, KPR, I-1/236, Pismo Tita De Golu, 07.03.1968.

⁶³ Berić 2013: 158.

and support for Bonn's Eastern policy—was considered highly important. Criticism of US policy was an invariable part of Yugoslav engagement during the 1960s, even though stable relations with the United States were not questioned.⁶⁴ As Tito said to Mito Miljković, the Yugoslav ambassador to Paris, “No matter how angry they are at our policies, we have to criticize them because doing so is in the interest of our country and the countries we are linked to.”⁶⁵ In Belgrade, American military interventions (Vietnam, the Dominican Republic) were considered the result of reactionary and conservative Cold War advocates in Washington, while a significant number of civil and military coups and international crises in the Afro-Asian sphere were attributed to the work of US secret services. Whether it was driven by ideological reasons (imperialism as a higher state of capitalism) or by the practical needs of the Yugoslav non-aligned policy (protecting its extra-bloc position in the Third World), Yugoslav criticism of US policy coincided with de Gaulle's efforts to suppress American hegemony in Europe.⁶⁶

During his talks with Tito, Couve de Murville, the French minister of foreign affairs, conveyed to him his positive impressions of de Gaulle's trip to the Soviet Union while also drawing a clear distinction between Soviet and American policies. Murville believed that the Soviet Union did not have expansionist intents, and that American policy was far more dangerous for provoking armed conflict.⁶⁷ The pinnacle of Franco–Yugoslav cooperation in opposition to American policies came during the 1967 Middle East crisis triggered by the Six Day War between Israel and the Arab states. France had no objections to Tito's decision to support the Arab states desire to seek cooperation with the Eastern bloc; in fact, it wholeheartedly supported the Yugoslav initiative. At the United Nations General Assembly held in June 1967 to discuss the Middle East crisis, the French representatives voted in favor of a resolution put forward by Yugoslavia demanding the withdrawal of Israeli troops to the pre-5 June borders.⁶⁸ During the crisis, Koča Popović and Marko Nikezić were sent to Paris for necessary consultations at the highest level, and in a separate letter, Tito also sought French support for Yugoslavia's five-point proposal.⁶⁹ The Yugoslav and French presidents had almost identical views of the war. They both viewed Israel as responsible for escalating the conflict and the American government as the primary sponsor of such policies. However, the Middle East crisis revealed the limitations of French and Yugoslav influence over the course of events and key actors, and it questioned whether it was even possible to resolve acute international crises without involvement from Moscow or Washington.

De Gaulle's European policy was of particular interest to Belgrade in so far as how successful it was in putting forward a different resolution for the German question, and so help develop Yugoslav–German relations. As was previous mentioned, de Gaulle saw his West German policy as an important pillar for his strategy and a Franco-German partnership as a foundation from which his vision of a united Europe could be built. None of the accompanying elements of Cold War policy, of which the most obvious were militancy and

⁶⁴ See Bogetić 2012.

⁶⁵ AJ, 837, KPR, I-5-b/28-5, Zabeleška o prijemu kod druga Predsednika, 31.5.1965.

⁶⁶ See Davidson 2010.

⁶⁷ AJ; 837, KPR, I-3-a/27-35, Prijem ministra inostranih poslova Francuske Couve de Murville-a.

⁶⁸ More in Bogetić, Životić 2007.

⁶⁹ AJ, 507, SKJ, Međunarodna komisija, Francuska, IX, 30/V-119, Pismo druga Tita upućeno Šarlu de Golu.

ideological exclusivity, were appropriate for any attempt to resolve the issue of a divided, postwar Germany. Time and again, contentious issues around the German question, such as the status of West Berlin, were at the root of major crises and potential armed conflicts between the two blocs (the Berlin crisis, Khrushchev's ultimatum, the Berlin Wall). Along with supporting the new French policy, de Gaulle envisioned freeing West Germany from the burdens of the past and creating a different approach to relations with the East European countries, in particular by abandoning rigid framework of Halstein Doctrine. It was Yugoslavia who had paid a high price in 1957 for applying the doctrine after recognizing East Germany and severing diplomatic relations with Bonn.

Once Ambassador Binoche arrived in Yugoslavia in 1962, the French embassy began investing considerable effort into supporting Yugoslavia's officials in the process of normalizing relations with West Germany. They made similar interventions with the government in Bonn. In the spring of 1963, Binoche passed on confidential information to Belgrade that a current in the West German government favoring Yugoslavia had prevailed. A gradual reorientation in official German policy was anticipated, as was an abandonment the Halstein Doctrine. Yugoslav officials were made aware that the reversal had been the result of "considerable efforts in this direction recently made by France with the government in Bonn."⁷⁰ Binoche expressed France's willingness to use its influence with West Germany to Yugoslavia's advantage regarding any issues of interest to it. An agreement between Marko Nikezić and Rolf Otto Lahr in September 1964 laid out the basis for better communication between Belgrade and Bonn, which was reflected in reports by German diplomats from the French embassy in Belgrade during 1965 about positive changes in Yugoslav politics.⁷¹

Although their views regarding the existence of East Germany differed, Yugoslavia found the important elements of de Gaulle's policy to be acceptable. A West German policy that renounced nuclear weapons, recognized postwar borders, and was open to resolving contentious issues related to the Eastern European countries corresponded with Yugoslav interests— especially since de Gaulle's strategy was a product of France's independent assessment, which was free from American tutelage and the limitations of blocs. Paris's promotion of the Kiesinger–Brandt government's new Eastern policy gave the Yugoslav government additional assurances that these new trends in West German policy were authentic and less inclined toward revanchism, as Moscow had negatively portrayed them. In February 1967, information from the French ministry of foreign affairs indicated to Belgrade that new government in Bonn was planning to be "more flexible in its relations with Yugoslavia" and was ready to tamp down on emigrant organizations and to resolve the issue of reparations.⁷² However, this same information also included Soviet dissatisfaction with the French assessments of the Kiesinger government and Paris's support for this sort of policy toward the East. Moscow viewed these moves by the Kiesinger government as part of a strategy to divide the Eastern bloc and intentionally isolate East Germany.

⁷⁰ AJ, 837, KPR, I-5-b/28-4, Iz zabeleške razgovora pomoćnika državnog sekretara Mihajla Javorskog sa francuskim ambasadorom Binoche-om na večeri kod turskog ambasadora Eralp-a.

⁷¹ Nečak 2015: 113.

⁷² DAMSPRS, PA, 1967, Francuska, f-35, br.45723.

However, all Soviet attempts to align Yugoslav policy with the policies of the Eastern bloc were unsuccessful. On 23 January 1968, Yugoslavia began its first round of negotiations in Paris with representatives of West Germany, which eventually resulted in renewed diplomatic relations. After Romania, this was the second positive response to the Keisinger government's Eastern policy and to the generally stated goals of de Gaulle's strategy. Ivo Vejevoda reported from Paris in December 1967 that de Gaulle's mentions of Europe in his addresses were becoming increasingly infrequent due to the poor results of his policy in Eastern Europe. With its influence on East and West limited, France's overly ambitious policy goals could not be achieved in a way that would bolster an overhaul of an entire international system. In Vejevoda's opinion, European countries needed a less "ambitious and spectacular" form of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.⁷³ As Murville put it, in order to achieve a European security policy, détente had to be approached without any illusions.⁷⁴ The events that unfolded in 1968 provided a chance to let go of some these illusions.

4. Conclusion

Along with the violence that prevented a democratic evolution in Czechoslovakian socialism, the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact troops on 20–21 August 1968 essentially brought an end to de Gaulle's European policy and attempts to revise the bipolar Cold War system. The basic prerequisites set during de Gaulle's press conference in February 1965 were no longer achievable within the context of a Soviet doctrine of "limited sovereignty." The overly high expectations for evolution in the eastern European countries, and especially for the Soviet Union's policies, had dissipated during de Gaulle's official visits to Poland and Romania. No matter how strongly French policy raised the issues of political, military, and economic alliances in the West, similar trends simply could not be achieved in Eastern Europe. Military intervention in Czechoslovakia demonstrated the Soviets' willingness to use violence in defense of the European political status quo, which served as the basis for any discussion about European security. De Gaulle's policies had considerably more resonance in the West, and especially in Bonn, than it had influence to reshape relations in the Eastern bloc. Furthermore, France's exit from NATO in 1966 did not contribute to the kind of reorganization of alliances that de Gaulle had hoped for, but it did contribute to homogenizing the rest of its members in their response to de Gaulle's challenge. Harmel's December 1967 report put forward a policy of détente as an integral part of NATO's strategy in which the détente would be more "Atlantic" than "Gaullist." As the crisis in the Middle East demonstrated, communication between Washington and Moscow was crucial for easing tensions, and it would later be a significant contribution in the achievement of a policy of détente after the Czechoslovak crisis. As Marc Trachtenberg concluded, bipolarity prevailed, and in the end, the many intentions behind de Gaulle's strategy were only well-conceived rhetoric without any solid grounding in reality.⁷⁵

The fate of the Prague Spring contributed to a correction in Tito's foreign policy

⁷³ DAMSPRS, PA, 1967, Francuska, f-35, br.41423.

⁷⁴ Martin 2013:108.

⁷⁵ Trachtenberg 2012: 88.

strategy, which in 1968 proved to be much more one-sided than initial ideological expectations had thought it was. Democratic evolution within the worker's movement was curtailed by Moscow's interventions and strictly limited to intra-bloc agreements. In addition to demonstrating repeated attributes of a hegemonic policy in Eastern Europe, military intervention ensured a conservative ideological trend toward re-Stalinization shaped according to the notion of "real socialism." Moscow harshly criticized the directions Yugoslav economic and social reforms took in the mid-1960s for being a significant departure from ideological cannon, and in the context of the Prague Spring this exerted direct external pressure on the main trends in Yugoslav democratic transformation.⁷⁶ After the clash with Chinese dogmatism, all of Tito's initial hypotheses from the Fifth Plenum of the CK SKJ about the KPSS's "progressiveness" were called in question, as much by the aggressiveness of Soviet policy as they were by a differing view of China's role. Indirect criticism of this sort of policy of "irreplaceable allies" was lodged at the highest Yugoslav plenary immediately after the collapse of the Prague Spring. As with de Gaulle's foreign policy strategy, the authoritarian political system in Yugoslavia revealed flaws in the final formulation of foreign policy and often ignored the opinions of other actors within the decision-making structure. The French Quai d'Orsay and the Yugoslav DSIP had the fewest illusions about possibilities for an evolution in Soviet policy, although their suggestions failed to dispel the political weight of the two presidents' brands of personal diplomacy. The Yugoslav analysis of de Gaulle's political fall pointed to the degeneration of his personal authority as a deciding factor. The effect of this was that his personal assessments of the situation in the world and in his country contributing to a "loss of reality" and with that his inevitable defeat.⁷⁷

Despite its overly ambitious goals and lack of specificity in its strategic commitments, de Gaulle's revision of the Cold War was an authentic expression of the spirit of the 1960s and the aspirations for alternative conceptions of international policies. According to de Gaulle's thinking, the bipolar order did not undergo a transformation, but numerous variations of a European détente (German, French, American, Soviet, Yugoslav) allowed for different kinds of communication within the European space and the beginning of a process that would eventually lead to the 1975 Helsinki Conference. De Gaulle's political fall in 1969 did not mean a there was a complete renunciation of the Gaullist strategy in French foreign policy. As Frédéric Bozo noted, the "Gaullist legacy" significantly influenced policy formation during the presidencies of Georges Pompidou (1969–1974) and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (1974–1981).⁷⁸ In the somewhat altered circumstances that came after 1968, France continued to insist on an independent and extra-bloc policy, criticize the bipolar system, and support contacts with Soviet leadership and Eastern European leaders.

Yugoslav policy, however, viewed de Gaulle's revisionism as significant evidence of changes in the global framework, and especially in the suppression of bloc policy and the

⁷⁶ Bešlin 2022: 55–127.

⁷⁷ AJ, 507, SKJ, Međunarodna komisija, Francuska, IX, Informacija Ambasade SFRJ u Parizu o Francuskoj posle referenduma.

⁷⁸ Bozo 2010: 175–178.

hegemony of superpowers. Despite a greater reliance on socialist countries in Eastern Europe and non-aligned countries in the Afro-Asian sphere, Yugoslav foreign policy built its European policy in accordance with its own assessments and strategic positions while also remaining open to cooperation with various international partners. Although de Gaulle's strategy appeared to be problematic for Yugoslav interests related to disarmament and its relations with former colonies and the UN, it allowed Franco-Yugoslav relations to be established on a different basis that allowed for cooperation to continue, even after de Gaulle's political downfall, and especially in a joint effort beginning in 1970 to support a new phase of détente in Europe.

Translated by *Elizabeth Salmore*

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Fond Kabinet Predsednika Republike (KPR)

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ЈУГОСЛАВИЈА И ГАЛИСТИЧКА РЕВИЗИЈА ХЛАДНОГ РАТА

Резиме

Француска политика након повратка Де Гола (1958) и социјалистичка Југославија под Титовим вођством, упркос разликама и послератној дистанци у односима, имале су и бројне сличности на којима су функционисале дипломатије две земље. У обема земљама спољнополитички курс је био детерминисан ауторитарним карактеристикама система и њеном средишњом личношћу – председником. Такође, обе државе су биле заинтересоване за превазилажење хладноратовске поделе Европе, а своју су стратегију заснивале на покушајима маргинализације САД и пацификације совјетског режима. Утолико је француска спољнополитичка стратегија била не само компатибилна са Титовим глобалним стремљењима, већ је управо Југославији припадало посебно место у покушајима политичке пацификације и потенцијалне интеграције Европе. Де Голов покушај детанта за који је Југославија показивала велико разумевање и сама посвећена сличним циљевима, доживео је неуспех услед суфицита илузија о могућности да се биполарност превазиђе конституисањем средњег пута између два супротстављена хладноратовска блока. Суочавање са прецењивањем властитог утицаја, али и агресија Варшавског пакта на Чехословачку и потпуна незаинтересованост Москве на пацификацију, као и неспремност САД на повлачење, означили су крај Де Головог покушаја детанта ка мултилетарном поретку. Ипак, слични циљеви европске и глобалне политике, приближили су односе Југославије и Француске, остављајући принципе на којима ће током 1970-их попуштање затегнутости постати могуће. Као и у случају Де Голове спољнополитичке стратегије, ауторитарни модел политичког система у Југославији показивао је недостатке у коначној формулацији спољне политике која је често игнорисала мишљења других актера унутар структуре доносиоца одлука. Француски Кеј Д'Орсе и југословенски ДСИП имали су најмање илузија о могућностима еволуције совјетске политике, иако њихове сугестије нису успевале да поремете политичку тежину „личне дипломатије“ двојице председника. Де Голова ревизија Хладног рата, иако амбициозна у прокламованим циљевима и недовољно конкретна у коначним стратешким опредељењима, била је аутентични израз духа времена 1960-тих и тежњи ка алтернативним концепцијама у међународној политици. По замислима Де Гола биполарни поредак није доживео трансформацију, али су многобројне варијанте европског детанта (немачка, француска, америчка, совјетска, југословенска) омогућавале другачију комуникацију на европском простору, и започињање процеса преговарања, а који ће коначно водити ка Конференцији у Хелсинкију 1975. године. Са друге стране, југословенска политика је Де Голову ревизију доживљавала значајним доказом промена у светским оквирима, нарочито у сузбијању блоковске политике и хегемоније суперсила. Упркос већем ослоњу на

социјалистичке државе Источне Европе и несврстане државе афро-азијског света, југословенска спољна политика је градила своју европску политику у складу са сопственим проценама и стратешким позицијама, остајући отворена за сарадњу према различитим међународним партнерима.

Кључне речи: Југославија, Француска, спољна политика, детант, Шарл де Гол, Јосип Броз Тито, Хладни рат.

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HUNGARIAN DIPLOMACY AND THE DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA 1990–1991

Abstract: This study aims to explore Hungarian–Yugoslav diplomatic relations in the first phase of the disintegration of the second Yugoslav state through relevant documents from the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and accounts from the contemporary Hungarian press. The study mainly focuses on relations between the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Except for Serbia, diplomatic relations between Hungary and the other Yugoslav republics were not taken into consideration due to length constraints. The study also examines Budapest’s diplomatic activities with the great powers regarding the Yugoslav question. The documents used in this study can be found in XIX-J-1-j records at the Department of Political Government and Party Authorities of the Hungarian National Archives after 1945 (Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára 1945 utáni Politikai Kormányiszervek és Pártiratok Főosztálya, MNL OL).

Keywords: Yugoslavia, Serbia, Vojvodina, Hungary, disintegration, Antall József, Ante Marković, Hungarian minority, Kalashnikov case.

After the death of Josip Broz Tito, the president for life of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in 1980, national and ethnic differences that had been severely suppressed until then came to the fore with elemental force. A clear sign of this was the 1981 uprising of Kosovo Albanians who were demanding the province be given the status of a republic. In the first days of April 1981, a state of emergency was declared in Kosovo, and the protests were eventually crushed. In parallel with the onset of economic difficulties, national trends intensified across the country. In the second half of the 1980s, Yugoslav domestic political tensions intensified in parallel with the changes in the great power arena.

The Antall government was formed after Hungary’s first free elections in 1990,¹ and although aware of Yugoslavia’s internal problems, it did not anticipate the disintegration of the federal state. As part of a new national policy, Hungarian foreign policy could not and

¹ The Antall government was formed on 23 May 1990.

did not circumvent the minority issue. Accordingly, and in the spirit of what had been announced in the government program, Hungarian foreign policy, which had been placed on new footing with neighboring countries that had a significant Hungarian minority, began to be enforced.²

On 29 May, István Ószi, the Hungarian ambassador to Belgrade, held talks with Milivoje Maksić, the first deputy minister of foreign affairs, in Belgrade. During the talks, the processes of political and economic transformations in Hungary and Hungary's policy toward Hungarians living abroad were discussed.³

At the invitation of Budimir Lončar, the Yugoslav federal foreign minister, Géza Jeszenszky, the Hungarian foreign minister, paid a two-day visit to Yugoslavia between 21 and 22 June 1990, during which he held talks with Serbian, Croatian, and Vojvodinian leaders in addition to the federal government. The focus of the discussions was the main issues of international politics, bilateral relations, and Yugoslav domestic political developments, but the issue of minorities was also raised several times. Slobodan Milošević, president of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, said at a meeting with that the integrity of Serbia was not threatened by the relationship between the Hungarian minority and Hungary. He also said that although there was no discrimination against the Hungarian minority in Serbia, the reality of this could not be ruled out in the event of an opposition party coming to power. During the negotiations about minorities, federal foreign minister Budimir Lončar claimed they had been provided with education in their mother tongue even at the university level. However, he did not deny the rise of anti-minority impatience and nationalism. The president of the Republic of Croatia, Franjo Tuđman, approached the question from a different perspective: He understood Hungary's interest in the fate of Vojvodinian Hungarians in Croatia, if only because the Croats in Vojvodina were in a worse position than the Hungarians.⁴

A few days later, on 27–28 June 1990, Serbian foreign minister Aleksandar Prlja visited Budapest to meet with, among others, Ferenc Mádl, a minister without portfolio, and Ferenc Somogyi, the secretary of state for foreign affairs. During the meeting, the domestic political situation in Yugoslavia was reviewed, but the issue of minorities was also discussed. Regarding the latter, the Serbian foreign minister then said that minorities living in Serbia had been granted all rights except statehood and then denied any news that minority rights had been violated.⁵

On 12 October, Prlja traveled to Budapest again as part of a ceremony to mark the three-hundredth anniversary of the Serbs' settlement in Hungary.⁶ At that time, Serbian president Slobodan Milošević was originally supposed to visit the Hungarian capital, but he canceled the trip without explanation on 3 September. The Serbian foreign minister met

² Jeszenszky 2011: 44–45.

³ *Rejtjeltávirat Belgrádból. Ószi István belgrádi nagykövet megbeszélése Milivoje Maksićtyal, a jugoszláv szövetségi Külügyminisztérium titkárával. 1990. május 29.* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 38. d.

⁴ *Jeszenszky Géza jelentése a Kormánynak a jugoszláviai látogatásáról. 1990. június 27.* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 37. d.

⁵ *Kristóf Lázárnak, a 4. Területi Főosztály tanácsosának feljegyzése Aleksandar Prlja szerb külügyminiszter magyarországi látogatásáról. 1990. július 3.* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 37. d.

⁶ In 1690, under the leadership of Patriarch Arsenije Černojević, some 40–60 thousand Kosovo Serbs settled in historic Hungary.

with the Hungarian foreign minister, Géza Jeszenszky. During the meeting, the Hungarians discussed the cadre changes at the daily newspaper *Magyar Szó* in Novi Sad and at the weekly *Hét Nap* in Subotica that had caused great controversy among the Hungarians in Vojvodina. Prlja called the change at the head of the media a standard procedure, and in response to the outrage over it, he asked the Hungarian side for patience and understanding.⁷

On 7 December, prime minister József Antall met with the federal prime minister Ante Marković in Budapest. Following face-to-face discussions between the two prime ministers, the two sides reviewed topical issues in relations between their countries as well as key international issues. Regarding the transformations taking place throughout the region, the Hungarian prime minister made it clear that Hungary had no interest in destabilizing the region. The Yugoslav prime minister reported on economic reforms in the country. However, given the Yugoslav domestic political situation and the multi-party elections, he did not ignore the growing nationalist overtones in the country.⁸

Following Marković's visit, relations between the federal government, and especially Serbia and Hungary, clearly turned negative. A key factor in this was the so-called Kalashnikov case, an arms transport scandal that had erupted during the first weeks of January. The first news about arms transfers to Croatia came to light in October 1990. On 30 October 1990, the Yugoslav minister of defense Veljko Kadijević requested information on the developments from the Hungarian minister of defense, Lajos Für, who replied to him the following day. Due to the sensitivity of the case, it was not discussed by prime ministers József Antall and Ante Marković in Budapest on 7 December.

In the Marković–Antall negotiations, this sensitive issue was not on the agenda despite the fact that the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) had essentially complete information about the Croatian arms purchases already in the first days of November. Given this, on 3 December 1990, the Yugoslav security council evaluated information claiming the Croatian minister of national defense Martin Špegelj and the minister of the interior Josip Boljkovac had traveled to Hungary to purchase weapons, even though the defense laws in force at the time did not allow it. It was said at the meeting that the weapons had been purchased through the Astra company in Zagreb, and over the previous two months, under the direction of the Croatian Minister of Interior and Defense, ten trucks loaded with weapons had crossed the Hungarian–Croatian border carrying more than ten thousand Kalashnikov machine guns and millions of rounds of ammunition. The weapons were distributed exclusively among trusted members of the Croatian ruling party. At the same time, complex plans were being created that targeted the deployment of weapons against the JNA stationed in Croatia. Because of this, those at the security council meeting also discussed reports that Croatia was preparing to set up special units that, in addition to subversive acts, would have carried out assassinations of officers in the JNA according to previously prepared lists.⁹

On 26 January 1991, deputy federal minister Dušan Rodić called a meeting with the Hungarian chargé d'affaires in Belgrade. He stated that, according to his government's

⁷ *Megbeszélés Prlja Alekszandar szerb külügyminiszterrel. 1990. október 13.* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 37. d.

⁸ Markovics Budapestben. Cseretapasztalat. *Népszabadság*, 1990. december 8. 1., 3.

⁹ For more on this, see Nikolić 2018: 297–303.

assessment, there had been no cooperation from the Hungarian side despite the seriousness of the situation. On 2 February, foreign minister Géza Jeszenszky requested a meeting with the Yugoslav ambassador Rudi Sova. Jeszenszky said his government was ready to clarify any details that might arise in the case, and then expressed the view that the emphasis should be on cooperation between the two countries in the future. Linking the issue of arms transfers to terrorism, Sova reiterated that his government viewed the events as an interference in internal affairs, and he therefore expected the Hungarian side to conduct a proper investigation and find a clear resolution in order to maintain good neighborly relations. Two days later, Rodić handed over another letter of protest to the Hungarian embassy in Belgrade, again accusing Hungary of violating Yugoslavia's sovereign rights and interfering in its internal affairs. He expressed his dissatisfaction with statements from the Hungarian government and its Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 1 February and with views Jeszenszky expressed to Sova, whose assessment was that they "bypassed the problem, minimized its magnitude, and even tried to justify it." The Yugoslav letter of protest handed over at that time demanded that the Hungarians continue the investigation, take further action, and take appropriate measures.

Following a closed meeting of the Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Foreign Affairs on 7 February, Antall briefed Marković on the results of the investigation in a telephone conversation lasting more than half an hour. Antall also reported to the Yugoslav prime minister about legal errors in authorizing arms sales and then expressed regret over the arms transfer case. Tamás Katona, the political state secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Imre Szokai, the deputy state secretary, met with foreign minister Budimir Lončar and deputy foreign minister Milivoje Maksić in Belgrade on 11 February 1991 and handed over the Hungarian government's manifesto. Katona then provided detailed information on the results of the investigation ordered by Antall in connection with the arms transaction.¹⁰ At the meeting, Lončar drew the Hungarians' attention to the fact that the Hungary had approved the arms shipments despite the agreements concluded with the Yugoslav federal government at a time when major changes were taking place in the country. He also pointed out that several ideas about the future of the country and the

¹⁰ For the sale of arms in Croatia and the related explanations below, we relied on the following archival documents: *Jeszenszky Géza bekérte Rudi Sova budapesti jugoszláv nagykövetet a magyar–horvát fegyverszállítás ügyében.* 1991. február 5. MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 37. d; *Rejtjeltávirat Pekingből. Ilija Đukić pekingi jugoszláv nagykövet véleménye a magyar–jugoszláv kapcsolatokról.* 1991. február 7. MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 34. d; *A 4. Területi Főosztály összefoglalója a horvátországi fegyvereladás következményeiről.* 1991. február 14. MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 37. d; *Svraka Istvánnak, a belgrádi Nagykövetség első beosztottjának feljegyzése a Szövetségi Külügyi Titkárság véleményéről a magyar–jugoszláv kapcsolatokat illetően.* 1991. február 28. MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 37. d; *Rusz Boriszlávnak, a belgrádi Nagykövetség beosztott diplomatájának összefoglalója Jeszenszky Gézának a horvátországi magyar fegyverszállításról a jugoszláv médiában.* 1991. március 4. MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 37. d; *Szokai Imre, a Külügyminisztérium helyettes államtitkár bekérte Rudi Sova budapesti jugoszláv nagykövetet a magyar–jugoszláv együttműködés lehetőségeinek ügyében.* 1991. március 5. MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 34. d; *Bagi Gábor zágrábi főkonzul főnöki levele Jeszenszky Gézának a magyar–horvát fegyverügylet horvát megítéléséről.* 1991. február 27. MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 37. d; *A külügyminisztérium közleménye a Magyar diplomáciai lépésekről Jugoszlávia felé a Magyar–horvát fegyvereladás kapcsán,* 1991. január 26. In Sáringer 2018: 744–745; *A Magyar kormány nyilatkozata a horvátországi Magyar fegyverszállítás ügyéről,* 1991. február 2, in Sáringer 2018: 749–750.

relationship between the republics had been formulated in connection with the transformation; however, in addition to the concept of preserving a unified state, there were also extreme positions that could result in the disintegration of the country. In this situation, the Yugoslav government had judged the weapons shipment to Croatia to be a diversion. In the interests of good neighborly relations, the Yugoslavs therefore requested a full investigation of what had happened, and for the federal government to be informed of the responsibility of the Hungarian ministers who had played a role in it.¹¹

On 12 February, the Antall informed the National Assembly about the content of the manifesto handed over to the Yugoslav side.¹² The arms transport scandal did not influence international judgment of Hungary. The United States Department of State stated that it appreciated the Hungarian government's efforts to clarify the matter in detail. It also made clear that it had accepted the Hungarian position and did not doubt the good intentions of

¹¹ See: United Nations ICTY Court Records. Unified Court Records, https://ucrimct.org/_Case IT-02-054-Slobodan Milošević. Exhibit D338.5.

¹² Following appeared in the Hungarian daily *Magyar Nemzet*: "On February 11, 1991, prime minister József Antall informed the Parliament about secretary of state Tamás Katona's trip to Belgrade. Explaining the main points of the manifesto, the Prime Minister emphasized the following: Hungary regrets that tensions in the two countries' successfully developing relations have arisen in connection with arms sales. It is in Hungary's fundamental interest for the problem to be resolved as soon as possible, and for relations with Yugoslavia to develop again based on mutual trust. Another important finding is that the arms deal and the licensing of transfers had no political background; it was done solely for business reasons. The Hungarian government had no reason to doubt the good faith of the supplier or the buyer or to question the company's right to make a purchase. However, it was found that there was a procedural irregularity at the time the license was issued; only three of the five members of the Licensing Division of the Secretary of State Committee approved the shipment. Stakeholders have acknowledged their own partial responsibility for the mismanagement of the arms deal, with an emphasis on their good faith. Citing the manifesto, József Antall emphasized that the government would draw the appropriate conclusions and tighten the order of arms sales in order to settle the matter completely. The Hungarian government appreciates the fact that the Yugoslav government firmly rejects any unfounded assumptions linking the arms issue to Hungarians living in Yugoslavia. Speaking about the Yugoslav reaction to the manifesto, the prime minister emphasized that the Yugoslav government had assessed the Hungarian government's readiness to resolve the problem, and expected Hungary would clearly explain its relationship and behavior toward Yugoslavia. József Antall also pointed out that, in the opinion of the Yugoslavs, the minority issue cannot be viewed in terms of the problems that have arisen. Now knowing the Yugoslav position, József Antall made t statement before the plenary session of the Parliament. According to this, the prime minister expressed his regret that tensions had arisen in connection with the matter in the successfully developing Hungarian–Yugoslav relations. It is in Hungary's fundamental interest for the issue to be resolved reassuringly; Hungarian–Yugoslav relations should once again be based on mutual trust. Within the framework of the cooperation, the Hungarian government is ready to provide adequate guarantees that a similar case will not occur in the future. The government approved a new, stricter regime for licensing arms trades back in February. Hungary seeks a mutually beneficial, lasting, and good relationship with friendly Yugoslavia. It appreciates the progress made so far in all areas of cooperation and is interested in its continued growth, both with the federal authorities and with the Republics of Yugoslavia. In its relations with Yugoslavia, Hungary assumes that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal union of several nations. Yugoslavia's borders are guaranteed by valid international documents; its statehood is part of the European status quo on which the peace, security, and cooperation of the continent rests. Hungary has no interest in destabilizing Yugoslavia. József Antall expressed the hope that the case, which had temporarily overshadowed relations, could be closed once and for all." Incidentally, the Yugoslav government has also expressed its readiness to do so. See: Antall József: A jugoszláv kormány értékeli a fegyverügyrendezésére tett magyar erőfeszítéseket. *Magyar Nemzet*, 1991. február 13. 3.

the Hungarian government. German political circles also did not attach any particular importance to the case, where the less fortunate and ill-considered handling of the case had come as a surprise. Similar statements came from the United Kingdom,¹³ and the European director of the French foreign office said that “the arms sales scandal is a completely negligible phenomenon that the French foreign ministry does not want to address at all.”¹⁴

Meanwhile, internal destabilization in Yugoslavia continued. A ministerial meeting of the Conference on Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe was held in Berlin on 19 and 20 June 1991. At the conference, clear support was given for preserving the integrity of Yugoslavia along with a request to quickly resolve the constitutional crisis and reach an agreement on a peaceful and democratic transformation for the Yugoslav state and social community.¹⁵ In this context in Berlin, at the initiative of US Secretary of State James Baker, the Austrian, Luxembourg, and Hungarian foreign ministers, held a consultation with Frans Andriessen, the EC commissioner in charge of foreign affairs. The talks focused on discussing a common position to be reached regarding Croatia and Slovenia’s declarations of independence. However, there were significant differences in emphasis and priority among the parties present. While the Luxembourg and EC foreign ministers emphasized the need to preserve territorial integrity and the integrity of Yugoslavia, the Austrian and Hungarian foreign ministers emphasized the need to preserve the democratic, constitutional, and nonviolent nature of the Yugoslav process and the need for a peaceful solution to the conflict. In the end, despite Baker’s pressure, no unanimity was reached, and the parties in Berlin could only agree that Washington would urge Serbia to refrain from violence and use democratic, constitutional, and peaceful means while also respecting human rights.¹⁶

The next day, Baker traveled to Yugoslavia. Baker held a total of nine separate meetings: one meeting with Albanian leaders from Kosovo, six with the presidents of the Yugoslav republics, and two with Marković. His general approach to the Yugoslav crisis was completely in line with European policy—Slovenia and Croatia should not be allowed to secede, and federal authorities should not use force. He conveyed the messages of his government, that they supported unity, reform, human rights, and a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis. He promised “significant economic assistance” from the US and confirmed that the European Union still stood by its offer of assistance in the event of a peaceful settlement. He also raised the issue of respect for the human rights of Albanians in Kosovo, Hungarians in Vojvodina, and Serbs in Croatia.¹⁷

On 25 June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, thus triggering JNA

¹³ *A 4. területi Főosztály összefoglaló a horvátországi fegyverszállítással kapcsolatos távirati jelentésekről. 1991. február 28.* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 37. d.

¹⁴ *Szávai János párizsi nagykövet összefoglaló jelentése a jugoszláv helyzet francia megítéléséről. 1991. június 3.* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 35. d.

¹⁵ Nikolić 2018: 473.

¹⁶ *Bába Ivánnak, a Politikai Elemző és Tájékoztató Főosztály vezetőjének összefoglaló jelentése Antall Józsefnek a magyar, az amerikai, az osztrák, a luxemburgi külügyminiszterek és Frans Andriessen, az Európai Közösségek „külügyminisztere” közötti megbeszéléséről Berlinben. 1991. június 20.* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 35. d.

¹⁷ Nikolić 2018: 475, 481. It should be added that Baker gave different messages to all the presidents of the Yugoslav republics and to prime minister Marković. See more in Nikolić 2018: 481–483.

to intervene in the conflict. Two days later, on 27 June 1991, the Hungarian government held an extraordinary meeting on the Yugoslav crisis. At this meeting, Jeszenszky announced that Slovenia had asked Hungary to recognize its independence. Antall then warned against taking any hasty steps and drew the attention of the members of the government to the fact that the four hundred thousand Hungarians in Vojvodina were essentially hostages of Serbia.¹⁸

On the same day, Imre Szokai informed the US, German, Austrian, and Italian ambassadors about the Hungarian government's official position regarding these events while also clarifying that Hungary respected the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia but was also interested in the situation, rights, and institutions of the Hungarian national minority, which should not be adversely affected by these events.¹⁹

On 29 June, prime minister József Antall informed federal prime minister Ante Marković of the Hungarian position that the unity of the South Slavic state should be preserved. The following day, he also informed the presidents of the European Community, the United States, and the Soviet Union. At the same time, he considered it desirable to reshape the country's constitutional and political system in line with a proposal for a confederation from the sovereign states of Macedonia and Bosnia.²⁰

On 30 June 1991, the Hungarian prime minister wrote a letter to Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev expressing his deep concern about the culminating Yugoslav crisis and informing him of his telephone conversation with Ante Marković the previous day.²¹

Concerning the Yugoslav crisis, the Soviet ambassador Ivan Pavlovich Aboimov requested a meeting with the Hungarian foreign minister Géza Jeszenszky on 5 July 1991. Aboimov then handed over a letter to Soviet foreign minister Alexander Bessmertnykh in which Moscow essentially warned Hungary against intervening, formally or informally, in the crisis. In his reply to the Soviet ambassador, the Hungarian foreign minister said that, taking into account the realities, his government supported the survival of Yugoslavia as a confederation of sovereign states, and it would accept any agreement that would stop the bloodshed and contribute to a peaceful solution. Jeszenszky also emphasized that Budapest was following the situation of Hungarians in Vojvodina with great concern, and then, reflecting in part on Bessmertnykh's suggestion, spoke in detail about the Croatian arms sales scandal that had erupted earlier that year. He stressed that his government supported the US proposal to ban arms sales to Yugoslavia.²²

On 10 July 1991, Tamás Katona, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, met with Yugoslav ambassador Rudi Sova. The Yugoslav ambassador had requested the visit due to Hungarian statements, newspaper reports, and other allegations related to the crisis. The

¹⁸ *Részlet a Magyar kormányülés jegyzőkönyvéből a délszláv válság témájában, 1991. június 27.* In: Sáringer 2018: 756–766.

¹⁹ *Amerikai, osztrák, olasz, német nagykövetek bekérése. 1991. június 27.* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 36. d.

²⁰ Jeszenszky 2011: 52.

²¹ *Antall József levele Mihail Gorbacsovnak az Ante Marković szövetségi kormányfővel folytatott telefonbeszélgetéséről. 1991. június 30.* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 35. d.

²² *Jeszenszky Géza emlékeztetője Ivan Pavlovics Abimov szovjet nagykövet látogatásáról a Külügyminisztériumban. 1991. július 5.; 346. Jeszenszky Géza és Alekszandr Bessmertnih szovjet külügyminiszter levélváltása Jugoszláviáról. 1991. július 5. – 1991. július 8.* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 35. d.

Yugoslav ambassador quoted a statement from Antall that the Treaty of Trianon defined the border between Hungary and Yugoslavia, not the one between Hungary and Serbia.²³ The ambassador indicated that Belgrade considered these statements to be the opening of a border audit. He also attacked Jeszenszky's statement from 9 July, in which spoke about settling the autonomy of Vojvodina. In his reply, Katona stated that Hungary was interested in a peaceful resolution to the Yugoslav crisis and had no interest in Yugoslavia disintegrating into separate nation-states. There was no intention to revise the statements about Vojvodina that had mentioned Trianon and Paris, but only to record the facts and shed light on the complicated situation. He also stressed that his government had not addressed the idea of border revision and had not ordered the mobilization and reinforcement of border forces, but he also indicated that Hungary was not happy that the JNA had stated its intention to play a role in resolving the crisis.²⁴

A week later, Katona had a meeting with Sova. The tense conversation took place after Belgrade had flooded Hungary with new accusations through direct and indirect channels. A press war had then broken out between the two countries after reports insulting Hungarian politicians appeared in the Serbian media, which the press commentators described in an ambiguous, sometimes harsh, and distorted manner. Katona made it clear that his government had never questioned Yugoslavia's external and internal borders, and he did not want to have a say in the future, which is why the Yugoslav claims to the contrary completely incomprehensible to him. Katona also protested the federal foreign office issuing a *démarche* to the Hungarian chargé d'affaires ad interim in Belgrade on 12 July. The secretary of state warned that such actions by the Yugoslavs and the press campaign against Hungary could lead to a deterioration of bilateral relations. In his response, Sova referred to József Antall's statements about Trianon, to which Katona responded that the Hungarian prime minister had never referred to historical rights and the government did not consider it part of its foreign policy, if only because he considered a unified Europe to be the future, not nation-states. Katona also indicated that his government wanted Vojvodina to regain the autonomy it had lost due to Kosovo. The ambassador responded that this was unacceptable for Belgrade, but at the same time offered to suggest a higher level of bilateral contact with his headquarters than his ambassador.²⁵

On 18–19 July 1991, Géza Jeszenszky discussed the Yugoslav issue in Washington with US Vice President Dan Quayle and acting secretary of state Lawrence Eagleburger. Quayle accepted Hungary's view that the starting point for the crisis was the status of the

²³ In his exposition to trade advisers on July 8, 1991, the Hungarian prime minister welcomed the results of the Brijuni talks and the quarterly moratorium, underlining that if the nations of Yugoslavia accepted, Budapest would consider the confederation of sovereign republics to be the best solution. The prime minister also stated at the time that "it is legal and necessary to mention: If the 1947 Treaty of Paris restored the 1920 (Trianon) borders, it was legal for Vojvodina to not become part of the Serbian state but to be annexed by the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (after 1929 to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia)." This does not cover any revisionist, irredentist remarks, the prime minister emphasized—just a statement of fact, not a message. He then stated that "Budapest respects Helsinki, the Paris Charter, and European standards. We hope that these problems will be resolved within the Yugoslav federal borders," he concluded, moving on to the situation in the region. See Antall József: *Tiszteletben tartjuk Helsinkit. Népszabadság*, 1991. július 9. 1.

²⁴ *Rudi Sova jugoszláv nagykövet látogatása. 1991. július 11.* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 35. d.

²⁵ *Rudi Sova bekérése. 1991. július 22.* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 34. d.

Serb minority in Croatia, which should be settled in a reassuring and fair way, while also guaranteeing minority rights for Albanians in Kosovo and Hungarians in Vojvodina.²⁶

Following the agreement reached on the island of Brijuni on 7 July 1991, which declared a three-month moratorium on the independence of Slovenia and Croatia entering into force, the Hexagonale summit was held in Dubrovnik on 26–27 July 1991. In a constructive speech on the dramatic situation, Antall expressed his concerns and the interests of Hungary and the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina.²⁷

In a letter to French president François Mitterrand on 1 August, the Hungarian prime minister reiterated the main points of his speech in Dubrovnik, warning that political control over the JNA and irregular Serb forces should be restored during the three-month moratorium; for this and a fruitful dialogue between the republics, strong pressure must be brought to bear on the Serbian leaders in Belgrade. A similar letter was sent to US President George Bush the same day.²⁸

The next day, in a letter to Dutch foreign minister Hans Van den Broek, Jeszszky summarized the main points of the Hungarian prime minister's correspondence from the previous day. Jeszszky also informed Broek that he had received a delegation of Hungarian mayors from Croatia in Budapest a few days earlier, and they had told him local Serb forces were changing the ethnic composition of the area by forcing out the Hungarian and Croat populations and replacing them with Serb settlers.²⁹

After lengthy preparations and consultations, on 3 September 1991, Antall met with Marković in Subotica. The two heads of government held a two-hour face-to-face meeting at Subotica's city hall while their entourages held separate talks and the two sides attended a plenary session. The talks focused on the Yugoslav war situation, the country's economic situation, the fighting in Baranya and the related issue of refugees in Hungary, and the situation of the Hungarian minority.³⁰

Serbian foreign minister Vladislav Jovanović met with the Hungarian ambassador in Belgrade on 4 September and announced he was ready to accept an invitation from Hungarian foreign minister Géza Jeszszky in the middle of the month. He acknowledged that communism had finally failed and said that Serbia had recognized this in the changing geopolitical situation. He said that Hungary had a direct connection with Europe, and that it was also interested in developing relations for economic reasons. He interpreted Belgrade's expectation that Hungary would show neutrality in the culminating Yugoslav crisis. Turning to the issue of the Hungarian minority, he pointed out that it had, by far, the most rights in Serbia.³¹

Although the meeting between Jeszszky and Jovanović in Budapest had already been announced by the press, in the end it did not take place. On 12 September, Yugoslavia's

²⁶ Jeszszky 2011: 54.

²⁷ Jeszszky 2011: 54–55.

²⁸ Jeszszky 2011: 55–56.

²⁹ Jeszszky 2011: 56.

³⁰ *A Miniszterelnöki Titkárság jelentése Antall József-szabadkai látogatásáról, 1991. szeptember 24.* In: Sáringer 2018: 766–772.

³¹ *Rejtjeltávirat Belgrádból. A magyar–szerb külügyminiszeri találkozó előkészítése. 1991. szeptember 5.* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 33. d.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused Hungary of making another arms transfer.³² By then relations between Belgrade and Budapest had become extremely tense and intimidation of the Hungarians in Vojvodina even more entrenched, and an increasing number of Hungarian reservists in Vojvodina were being called up.³³

On 5 September, German chancellor Helmut Kohl and prime minister József Antall spoke by telephone about the war in Yugoslavia. In his introduction, Antall gave a brief overview of his talks with the Yugoslav prime minister in Subotica, and then reported on Hungary's assessment of the crisis. Kohl agreed with Antall's views and expressed his view that, due to conflicts of interest and differing views, it was a very real possibility that the Yugoslav peace conference convened on 7 September would fail. He said that if this happened, Germany would be forced to take the position that the only way out of the crisis would be to recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia. Antall interjected that, although Budapest was leaning toward recognition, German and Hungarian recognition would not be enough to deal with the crisis. In response, Kohl replied that Bonn did not want to take this step alone, and indicated that, according to a German assessment, half of the EC member states were already in favor of recognition. He indicated that Paris had essentially also moved in this direction, but as London continued to fluctuate on the issue, it seemed necessary to hold a personal consultation with the British prime minister.³⁴

The increasingly critical situation for the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina was one of the main topics of a telephone conversation between the Antall and German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on 16 September 1991. Antall drew Genscher's attention to the fact that the JNA had mobilized and that increasing numbers of Hungarians in Vojvodina were involved, but at the same time the psychological pressure on Hungarians in Vojvodina was also increasing. Although Antall agreed on the need to recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia, he also warned that Hungary could not be the first to do so because the Serbs considered his homeland, as well as Germany, to be the enemy. He also reported that he had shared similar thoughts a few days earlier with French president François Mitterrand, who was then urged to take decisive action, as were the British and the Russians.³⁵

Antall also consulted with the Italian deputy prime minister Claudio Martelli the same day. During a phone call initiated from the Italian side, Antall spoke about the details of a conversation with Genscher and then stressed that the EC and the G7 states³⁶ should take action against the Serbs, which should include tough economic sanctions. Martelli objected, saying that an embargo could only be enforced against Yugoslavia as a whole and not only Belgrade specifically. Antall then urged an expression of clear and unambiguous

³² *Rejtjeltávirat Belgrádból. A jugoszláv Külügyminisztérium illegális fegyverszállítással vádolja a magyar kormányt. 1991. szeptember 12* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 37. d.; *A Külügyminisztérium közleménye a fegyverszállítás vádjáról. 1991. szeptember 12.* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 37. d.

³³ Aggodalom a vajdasági magyarság helyzete miatt. Jeszenszky Géza magyar külügyminiszter rendkívüli sajtótájékoztatója. *Magyar Szó*, 1991. szeptember 21. 20.

³⁴ *A Miniszterelnöki Titkárság emlékeztetője Antall József és Helmut Kohl kancellár telefonbeszélgetéséről. 1991. szeptember 5.* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 35. d.

³⁵ *A Miniszterelnöki Titkárság emlékeztetője Antall József és Hans-Dietrich Genscher német külügyminiszter telefonbeszélgetéséről. 1991. szeptember 16.* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 36. d.

³⁶ The G7 countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

political intention. He pointed out that such hesitation from the West only served as confirmation for the Serbs that they could achieve their goals through violent and aggressive action. When asked by Martelli whether it would be necessary to convene the UN Security Council, Antall answered in the affirmative.³⁷

In a telephone conversation with US President George W. Bush on 20 September, the Hungarian prime minister reported on the gravity of the military situation and said that the Serbs could only be influenced by joint action from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia.³⁸

Three days later, Antall had a telephone conversation with Marković, who reported in detail on the situation at the front, stating unequivocally that there was increasingly more room for maneuver for those no longer working to preserve Yugoslavia and instead actively working to create a Greater Serbia. Antall said that the government could only recognize the sovereignty of the member republics if countries other than those of the European Community were also committed to this step. Antall also asked his Yugoslav counterpart to stop the enlistment of Hungarians in Vojvodina into the JNA if he had the opportunity to do so.³⁹

On 3 October 3, Antall wrote a letter to Lord Carrington, president of The Hague Peace Conference, requesting that his authority be used to enable the Hungarian minority to be represented at the peace conference.⁴⁰

On 11 October, the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest requested that Hungary allow the movement of JNA troops stationed in Slovenia.⁴¹ In response, Imre Szokai informed the Yugoslav ambassador that guarantees given by the embassy were not sufficient for the JNA to cross through Hungarian territory. This would require adequate guarantees from the federal government or the presidency, and specifically that any munitions transferred from Slovenia to Croatia would not be used in armed conflict.⁴²

The Hungarian ambassador was summoned by the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 18 October 1991. This was due to a document the Hungarian government had published on the political and ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia among the countries participating in the CSCE process. The Yugoslav government protested the findings on religious, socioeconomic, developmental, and ethnic differences contained therein.⁴³ At that time,

³⁷ *A Miniszterelnöki Titkárság emlékeztetője Antall József és Claudio Martelli olasz miniszterelnök-helyettes telefonbeszélgetéséről. 1991. szeptember 16.* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 36. d.

³⁸ Jeszenszky 2011: 60.

³⁹ *Összefoglaló és sajtóközlemény Antall József és Ante Marković jugoszláv kormányfő 1991. szeptember 23-i telefonbeszélgetéséről. 1991. szeptember 23.* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 35. d.

⁴⁰ *Antall József levele Lord Carringtonnak, a hágai békekonferencia elnökének. 1991. október 3.* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 35. d.

⁴¹ This is referring to the withdrawal of JNA units from Slovenia after a decision by the Presidency of Yugoslavia on 18 July 1991.

⁴² *A budapesti jugoszláv Nagykövetség jegyzékben kéri, Magyarország engedélyezze a Jugoszláv Néphadsereg Szlovéniában állomásozó csapatainak átvonulását Magyarország területén. 1991. október 11.* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 37. d.; *Szokai Imrénének, a Külügyminisztérium helyettes államtitkárának válasza Rudi Sova budapesti jugoszláv nagykövetnek a belgrádi kormány kérésére, a Jugoszláv Néphadsereg Szlovéniában állomásozó csapatainak szabad átvonulására Magyarország területén. 1991. október 14.* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 37. d.

⁴³ In mid-October, the Hungarian government summarized its proposals for a solution in a non-paper handed over to the governments interested in resolving the South Slavic crisis, see Jeszenszky 2011: 67.

deputy foreign Minister Milan Vereš told Ambassador István Ószi in a sharp *démarche* that this document was unacceptable to Belgrade and identified it directly with Hungarian territorial claims. Vereš also added that Hungary's aim was to persuade the countries participating in the CSCE process to provide a biased explanation, and again accused Hungary of continuing to supply arms to Croatia. The Hungarian ambassador firmly rejected the allegations of further arms transfers and stated that Belgrade had been campaigning against Hungary for some time without supporting facts or documents, and in this situation, it would be increasingly difficult for his government to maintain its generous behavior.⁴⁴

On 27 October 1991, at 8:51 p.m., the JNA dropped two cluster bombs on the town of Barcs that exploded in a remote part of the city.⁴⁵ There were no injuries, but several buildings were damaged. During negotiations in Subotica concerning the incident, the Yugoslav side denied it had been intentional.⁴⁶ Serbian foreign minister Vladislav Jovanović visited Budapest on 28 October, the day after the bombing in Barcs. Jovanović then explained the position of the Serbian leadership on the Yugoslav crisis: war had broken out due to the Croats' efforts to break away, and Serbia had essentially been forced to act. He reiterated that Serbia expected neutrality from Hungary in connection with the Yugoslav crisis, but also added that Belgrade was of the opinion that Hungary was not in fact neutral. Despite all this, the Serbian foreign minister considered improvement in relations between the two countries to be particularly important and outlined a number of possibilities for this. The Hungarian foreign minister referred to a series of negative statements made by prime minister of Vojvodina Radovan Božović regarding Hungary and the Hungarian leaders. He then discussed restrictions on the Hungarians' cultural and educational institutional system in Vojvodina, redundancies in the workplace, military mobilizations, and that about 20,000 Hungarians had already fled. Jeszenkszy called on the Serbian leadership not to involve Hungarians in the fighting, to exempt Vojvodinian students admitted to Hungarian schools and universities from military service, and to provide an opportunity to refuse military service to anyone who requested it based on their conscience. The Hungarian view was also expressed that the Serbian political elite and the representatives of the Hungarians in Vojvodina should find a solution to the existing problems through political dialogue. Jovanović refused the requests for enlistment, saying that there was no disproportionate enlistment of Hungarians. According to him, Hungarians in Vojvodina had fled due to a mass psychosis brought on by the Hungarian media. He disregarded all the restrictions related to culture and education, and then added that even if there were any shortcomings, they were due solely to a lack of financial resources. Finally, he said that the situation for Hungarians in Vojvodina was the best among the Hungarian minorities living in neighboring states, so there was no cause for complaints about Hungarians living in Serbia. Finally, in a threatening tone, he stated that "the aspirations of minorities for disintegration and separatism cannot be

⁴⁴ *Rejtjeltávirat Belgrádból. Milan Vereš belgrádi külügyminiszter-helyettes demarsa Ószi István belgrádi nagykövetnek Magyarország előterjesztése miatt az Európai Biztonsági és Együttműködési Értekezlet részes államainak a jugoszláv politikai és etnikai konfliktusról. 1991. október 18. MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 34. d.*

⁴⁵ Gránátok hullottak Barcsra. Navigációs hiba okozta az incidenst – állítja a HM. Szóvivője. *Magyar Nemzet*, 1991. október 29. 1., 4.

⁴⁶ *Tárgyalások a Magyar Honvédség és a Jugoszláv Néphadsereg légi- és légvédelmi főparancsnokai között Szabadkán. 1991. november 13. MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 37. d.*

tolerated, and indeed minorities must show loyalty to the country they live in.⁴⁷

In a letter to US President George Bush later that month, the Hungarian prime minister called for an immediate solution to the Yugoslav crisis. Antall warned the US president that if this did not happen in the short term, war would spread to Kosovo, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, now accompanied by religious differences, also carried the danger of an international conflict through the Bosnian Muslims. The Hungarian prime minister took the position that the great powers should achieve a permanent ceasefire as soon as possible, summarized his proposals connected to this in seven points. He also indicated that his government would coordinate the recognition of member republics with the decisions of the European Community and other states. Finally, he mentioned the disarray among national minorities and drew the president's attention to the dangers the minority issue posed to European stability.⁴⁸

In a letter to the UN Secretary-General, Pérez de Cuellar, Hungarian foreign minister Géza Jeszenszky presented the Hungarian government's assessment of the Yugoslav crisis and the main elements of related Hungarian policy. The letter came immediately after the Yugoslav airstrike against Barcs.⁴⁹ Jeszenszky noted that his government had pursued a consistent policy from the outset and in many cases had shown a calm, balanced intention to restore peace. In connection with the Yugoslav crisis, the Hungarian government had repeatedly stated in multilateral forums and in bilateral contacts that the right of all peoples to self-determination must be respected, the crisis could not be resolved by violent internal border changes, and national minorities must be involved in developing a lasting solution. He stressed that the Hungarian government was deeply concerned about military activity in the immediate vicinity of its borders, Yugoslav military invasions seriously violating the sovereignty of the Hungarian state, Yugoslav fighting from Hungarian airspace, and the Yugoslav aggression against Hungary with the bombing of Barcs. On behalf of his government, the Hungarian foreign minister called on the UN Secretary-General to use his authority to put an immediate and permanent end to the bombings that were threatening the security of the Hungarian population and the sovereignty of the Hungarian state. He also called on the relevant UN organizations to provide increased support to Hungary to help refugees arriving there.⁵⁰

The next day, the Hungarian prime minister wrote a letter to Dutch prime minister Ruud Lubbers. He summarized his position on the Yugoslav crisis. He pointed out that the escalation of hostilities now threatened to spread not only to Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, but also to Vojvodina.⁵¹

A few weeks later, Dojčilo Maslovarić, Serbia's deputy minister for national affairs,

⁴⁷ *Jeszenszky Géza jelentése a Kormányynak Vladislav Jovanović szerb külügyminiszter hivatalos magyarországi látogatásáról. 1991. október 30.* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 33. d.

⁴⁸ *Antall József levele George Bush amerikai elnöknek. 1991. október 26.* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 36. d.

⁴⁹ After the bombing of Barcs, Washington, through the first deputy of the US Embassy in Belgrade, also warned the Serbian government not to provoke Hungary or further worsen the relationship. See: *Michael Gable-nek, a budapesti amerikai Nagykövetség diplomatájának közlései Timotity Miklósnak, a 4. Területi Főosztály munkatársának Barcs szerb bombázása ügyében. 1991. november 22.* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 36. d.

⁵⁰ *Jeszenszky Géza levele Pérez de Cuellar ENSZ főtitkárnak. 1991. október 31.* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 36. d.

⁵¹ *Antall József levele Ruud Lubbers holland miniszterelnöknek. 1991. november 1.* MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 36. d.

sharply criticized the Hungarian government's policy toward Serbia during a conversation with the Hungarian ambassador. He brought up the Kalashnikov case, said he considered the statements of Hungarian politicians to be unfriendly, and accused the government of inciting the Hungarians in Vojvodina against the Serbian leadership. Maslovarić accused the Hungarian media engaging in anti-Serb propaganda. Finally, he accused Hungary of "training Croatian terrorists" within its territory. In his reply, the Hungarian ambassador confronted Maslovarić about the Hungarian gestures made to Serbia regarding shipping, transportation, and communications, and then gave him a detailed account of the Hungarian efforts made on behalf of Serbian refugees.⁵²

On 7 November 7 1991, former US secretary of state Cyrus Vance⁵³ met with Prime Minister József Antall and Foreign Minister Géza Jeszenszky in Budapest. During the talks, Vance stressed that the situation in Yugoslavia was only getting worse with the federal government essentially disbanded since 3 October.⁵⁴ Vance was particularly concerned that at any time the war in Croatia could spill over into Bosnia. Antall informed his guest of the incident in Barcs and the series of violations of Hungarian airspace. He then pointed out that, if the international community could not urgently and effectively address the Yugoslav issue, its effects could trigger a chain reaction that could destabilize all of Central and Eastern Europe. Antall also pointed out that there was a psychological war in Yugoslavia to persecute certain ethnic groups. He also emphasized that a disproportionate number of ethnic Hungarians were being enlisted in the JNA. Jeszenszky said that tougher measures should be taken against Yugoslavia than previously had been, and that the international community should make it clear to the opposing parties that the world would not tolerate this war.⁵⁵

On 13 November, Alexander Arnot, German ambassador to Budapest, requested a reception from the Hungarian foreign minister. At that time, he officially informed Budapest of his government's decision to recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. He also announced that Germany would now be ready to take this step alone. He then clarified his government's call for Hungary to put pressure on Slovenia and Croatia over minority issues to prevent possible revenge against Serbia. In his reply, Jeszenszky explained that his government attached great importance to guaranteeing the fate of national minorities, which he expected not only for Hungarians living in Yugoslavia but also for all ethnic groups.⁵⁶

On 2 December, state secretary Tamás Katona requested a meeting with ambassador

⁵² Ószi István belgrádi nagykövet főnöki levele Jeszenszky Gézának Dojčilo Maslovarić-tyal, a nemzetiségi ügyekért felelős szerb miniszter-helyetessel folytatott megbeszéléséről. 1991. november 26. MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 34. d.

⁵³ At the time, Vance was the UN Secretary-General's special envoy for Yugoslavia.

⁵⁴ It refers to the decision of four members of the Presidency of the SFRY from Serbia and Montenegro from October 3 on the work of the Presidency in conditions of imminent danger of war. The Presidency also took over the function of the Assembly of Yugoslavia, and Janez Drnovšek, the representative of Slovenia, was expelled from the Presidency. The presidency was thus unconstitutionally reduced by one member, so that the „legal” majority for the decisions made was four votes - Nikolić 2020: 207–208.

⁵⁵ A magyar kormányfő fogadta az ENSZ-főtitkár megbízottját. A jugoszláv válság destabilizálja a kelet-közép-európai térséget. Magyar Nemzet, 1991. november 8. 3; Veszélyes helyzet. Jeszenszky Géza magyar külügyminiszter és Cyrus Vance nyilatkozata a jugoszláviai háborúról. Magyar Szó, 1991. november 9. 2; Vance-interjú. Tisztában látok. Népszabadság, 1991. november 8. 1, 2.

⁵⁶ Jeszenszky Géza fogadta Alexander Arnot budapesti német nagykövetet a Külügyminisztériumban Horvátország és Szlovénia függetlenségének német elismerése ügyében. 1991. november 13. MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 33. d.

Rudi Sova. He informed him that a Yugoslav anti-aircraft missile had crashed into Hungarian territory 4.5 kilometers from the border. The Yugoslavs had refrained from investigating the case, so Hungary was forced to express its resentment without widely announcing it, and the same was expected of the Yugoslavs, especially for the sake of the Hungarians living there. Katona also reflected on the Serbian foreign minister's speech in Subotica, in which Jovanović mentioned Croatian mercenary training centers and refugee camps in Hungary. In response, he said that there were no training centers in Hungary and the assumption was pure fantasy. The establishment of refugee camps, however, was necessary due to the deterioration of events, and maintaining them had placed a heavy financial burden on the country.⁵⁷

Following an agreement reached at the EC Council of Foreign Ministers on 16 December 1991 about recognizing the Yugoslav republics, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a related written government proposal two days later. The document proposed a decision by which the Hungarian government would recognize all Yugoslav republics that requested it in the manner and under the conditions set by the EC, and they would be recognized by the EC member states, or by most of them, on 15 January. This presentation prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also stipulated that the government coordinate its recognition with the EC member states and with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Bulgaria, and the United States. Finally, it stated that the notification of Hungarian recognition would take place on 16 January, twenty-four hours after recognition by the EC member states. The plan included the possibility of limited Serbian armed action against Hungary, a terrorist attack on Yugoslav refugees in Hungary, violent attacks on Hungarians in Vojvodina, and another wave of refugees.⁵⁸

On 28 December, the Fourth Regional Department's proposals for the recognition of member republics and protection for the Hungarians in Vojvodina were spelled out. Accordingly, Hungary would recognize the Yugoslav republics after they were officially recognized by the EC member states, provided that they negotiated this with Poland and Czechoslovakia. The proposal also stated that Hungary should not take a public position on the issue of legal succession, and that the embassy in Belgrade should be headed by a temporary administrator until the status of the Serbian state was settled. To protect the Hungarians in Vojvodina, the proposal suggested that the Hungarian government make it clear to Serbia that if there were no change in its hostile behavior toward Hungarians living in Vojvodina, and if Serbia refused to guarantee the security of the Vojvodinian Hungarians, the Republic of Hungary would be ready to use restrictive measures against Serbia.⁵⁹

The independence of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognized by the international community in early 1992.⁶⁰ However, the Federal Republic of

⁵⁷ *Katona Tamás, a Külügyminisztérium politikai államtitkára bekérte Rudi Sova budapesti jugoszláv nagykövetet a szerb rakéták magyarországi becsapódása és a délszláv háború kiterjedése ügyében. 1991. december 2. MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 34. d.*

⁵⁸ *A Külügyminisztérium előterjesztése a Kormánynak a volt jugoszláv tagköztársaságok függetlenségének elismerésére. 1991. december 18, in Sáringer 2018: 790–793.*

⁵⁹ *A 4. Területi Főosztály javaslatai a tagköztársaságok elismerésére és a vajdasági magyarság védelmére. 1991. december 28. MNL OL XIX-J-1-j 33. d.*

⁶⁰ The Arbitration Commission (the so-called Badinter Commission) of The Hague Peace Conference announced

Yugoslavia (FRJ), which consisted only of Serbia and Montenegro after 27 April 1992, was not considered the successor to the former Yugoslavia. Thus, Hungary did not recognize the FRJ's international legal personality de jure, so bilateral relations were based on de facto recognition instead. These relations will be the subject of a later study.

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Sáringér J. *Iratok a az Antall-kormány külpolitikájához és diplomáciájához II. (1991. január–1992. december)*, Budapest: VERITAS Történetkutató Intézet/Magyar Napló, 2018.

its views on the recognition of the Yugoslav republics on January 11, 1992. The commission concluded that only Slovenia and Macedonia meet the criteria and recommended that their independence be recognized. The Arbitration Commission recommended that Croatia's independence be recognized, but with the significant remark that it did not legalize the agreement on guaranteeing minority rights. However, the European Community ignored those reservations and accepted that Croatia would gain independence without special conditions, but not Macedonia, because Greece vetoed its request, explaining that the country's name implies territorial claims to northern Greece and the area that has the same Name. The decisions of the European Community were announced on January 15, 1992. The independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognized on April 6, 1992.

МАЂАРСКА ДИПЛОМАТИЈА И РАСПАД ЈУГОСЛАВИЈЕ 1990–1991

Резиме

У данима промене режима у Мађарској 1990, новим властима је било јасно да јужни сусед доживљава озбиљну унутрашњу кризу. Дубока криза југословенске државе постала је очита током првих контаката и преговора између две државе. Преговори одржани 21. и 22. јуна 1990. током дводневне посете мађарског министраспољних послова Гезе Јешенског, утицали су не само на могућности економске сарадње и ситуацију мађарске мањине, већ и на југословенске унутрашње проблеме.

Уз дијалог са југословенским федералним властима, мађарско-српски дипломатски односи постали су повећано напети и потпом су се покварили због „калашњиков скандала“ и погоршања положаја Мађара у Војводини.

Пошто су Словенија и Хрватска прогласиле независност 25. јуна 1991, мађарска влада је постала активнија у међународној дипломатији у вези са кулминацијом југословенске кризе. Од да су високи мађарски владини званичници били у контакту са водећим западним силама и Совјетским савезом. Мађарско-југословенски (српски) дипломатски односи суштински су достигли ниску тачку до тренутка избијања рата у Хрватској. Међусобне оптужбе, позиви упућени амбасадорима, протестна писма са обе стране у вези са убрзано одвијајућим догађајима била су на агендама обе стране. Односи две државе били су све више затегнути због положаја мађарске мањине у Војводини и мобилизације повезане са сукобом, која није мимоишла ни Мађаре у Војводини. Сукоб између две земље достигао је врхунац октобра 1991. када је Југословенска народна армија бацила две касетне бомбе на мађарски град Барч.

Када је оружани сукоб избио, мађарска влада је испрва била опрезна поводом признавања независности републикама које су намеравале да се отцепе од југословенске федерације. Ипак, позиција Мађарске се променила пошто је постигнут договор на састанку Савета министара спољних послова Европске комисије 16. децембра 1991. који се тицао признавања југословенских република. У првој половини 1992. све ово је додатно погоршало мађарско-српске односе, које су до тада већ биле изразито затегнуте..

Кључне речи: Југославија, Србија, Војводина, Мађарска, распад, Антал Јозеф, Анте Марковић, мађарска мањина, случај Калашњиков.

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**EFFECTIVENESS OF USING INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY IN DEVELOPING MUSEUM
EXHIBITIONS: THE CASE OF THE SHARJAH MUSEUMS**

Abstract: Museums are increasingly embracing information and communication technology (ICT) to promote cultural tourism and to keep pace with changes in society. Cultural values, legacies, and customs are transmitted through museums, connecting current generations with their past. ICTs are used in almost all museum operations, both within and outside their walls, and especially for exhibitions and preservation. Prior research indicates that museums utilize a variety of ICTs to further modernize displays and artifacts and improve the visitor experience. Museums also use various digital communication tools to enrich the visitor experience. Many of the functions performed by ICTs used to create interactive processes in museum displays are the subject of ongoing research among museum scholars. This study investigates how experts and museum scholars view the effectiveness of using ICTs in creating a trend in the development of museum exhibitions in the Emirate of Sharjah. It will also discuss which available ICT applications museums can apply to improve technology services for their visitors. The study was conducted at the Sharjah Museum of Islamic Civilization, one of the largest museums in the Emirate of Sharjah. Both qualitative and quantitative data were collected, with questionnaires being the main method of data collection. A questionnaire was distributed to learn the views of experts about the application of ICTs in museum exhibitions. The results of the study indicate that ICTs should be designed with physical surroundings in mind. Physical distance can be bridged using “mixed interfaces” or mobile devices.

Keywords: Information and communication technology (ICT), Sharjah Museum Authority, Sharjah Museum of Islamic Civilization, digital technologies, museum exhibition.

1. Introduction

Information and communication technology (ICT) makes it possible for people to communicate and share information over long distances through telecommunication methods like the internet, wireless networks, and cell phones.¹ The cultural sector has witnessed unprecedented progress over the last few decades due to significant technological development and the evolution of the internet and digital applications. This is especially true for museums.² Technology has brought museums into a novel, imaginative world in which museums can play active and appealing roles while breaking down barriers, and particularly that presented by the spatial dimension.³

Anderson (2012) identified eight fundamental changes in the museum sector and the two key points for this study. First, museums are increasingly being required to become more acclimatized to the future and to be able to innovate and use ICT in museum exhibitions and interpretations. Second, communication with the audience must be sustained, and internet and digital technology applications should be used to continually attract visitors. An authentic visitor experience must be continually processed.⁴

Current ICTs in museums are defined by three features: computational virtuality, interactivity, and the multiplicity of interfaces. In computational virtuality, the boundaries of the physical dimension vanish, and any sort of exhibition can be built. Interactivity is the ability of systems to receive and react to human input. ICTs shatter the conventional perception of museums as being elitist, authoritative institutions by encouraging visitors to engage in a mutual, conscious environment in which they create their own experiences and identity. The third feature is the multiplicity of interfaces. ICTs come in a variety of forms, and can be used for a variety of purposes. This is closely linked to the museum level of the exhibition. Wearable or mobile devices are essential for exhibitions that place a focus on an object, but augmented reality systems can provide an additional layer of information that can be tailored to suit the needs of different types of visitors.⁵

Thus, many museums today cannot imagine permanent or temporary exhibitions without interactive components that might explain or replace artifacts unavailable in museum galleries, evoke an emotional response, or involve them in the museum's environment.

2. Theoretical Background

This study draws on two distinct bodies of literature: one that investigates the link between ICTs and museums, and another that assesses the effectiveness of ICTs in museum exhibitions.

¹ Perron et al. 2010: 1.

² Kulesz 2016: 2.

³ Vaz et al. 2018: 31.

⁴ Liebl 2015: 19.

⁵ Pujol-Tost 2011: 64.

2.1. Types of ICTs in Museum Exhibitions

ICTs used in museums can be divided into three main categories.⁶ These technologies are versatile and exist on various levels within other categories:

- **Informative and display technologies:** technologies that improve exhibition design and artifact/content presentation, primarily during the visit (audio and smart guides, touchscreen kiosks, 3D, virtual and augmented realities, mobile apps, etc.).
- **Communication and marketing technologies:** technologies that facilitate communication and marketing by encouraging additional and deeper audience involvement, mostly prior to and following a visit (digital media, websites, and social media tools).
- **Organizational and managerial operations technologies:** technologies mostly employed in organizational and management operations to offer and integrate the elements required for the display alongside other technologies (database, conservation technologies, and internal network systems).

Museums benefit from innovations supported by ICTs. They are most actively employed in museums for communication and mediation with the audience. There are various devices and applications used for mediation in museums. The main elements that ICTs are used for in the museum communication process are presentations, audience attraction, creating an effective experience, entertainment, and education (Fig. 1).⁷




Fig. 1: ICTs and the museum communication process.
Source: (Barbosa, Camila Costa. 2013). Ed. by the authors.

⁶ Barbosa 2013: 36.

⁷ Navarrete 2019: 202–203.

This paper discusses specific trends regarding ICT applications in the museum. Many ICT applications, such as multimedia kiosks, audio guides, smart guides, holographic displays, and short films, have been specifically developed to aid visitors in understanding exhibits. Virtual reality, augmented reality, and mobile apps may also be utilized on-site over the web.

Virtual reality (VR) enables users to interact in real time with a computer-simulated environment via human sensory channels.⁸ A VR system composition mainly includes five components: a virtual environment, a sensor device, other devices, and a generator of human and virtual environments (Fig. 2).⁹ Technologies like VR have unquestionably provided museums with tremendous potential for connecting with their visitors in new ways. The use of VR to recreate historical and cultural settings and to interpret and improve visitor experiences in and out of the museum increases audience involvement, improves education, and builds immersive museum environments.¹⁰ In addition, it can be used to create tours of exhibition and help curators contextualize objects and reveal their true scale.¹¹



Fig. 2: VR experience at the Utah Museum of Fine Arts.

Source: <https://jasoren.com/vr-in-museums/>

Augmented reality (AR) is associated with a reactive experience of a real-life environment in which objects in real life are enhanced via perceptual information generated by computer and sometimes via sensory modalities that include the tactile, auditory, and visual.¹² According to Azuma, AR can indeed be described as a system with three

⁸ Weng et al. 2011: 180.

⁹ Wang, Yue 2019: 1.

¹⁰ Shehade, Stylianos-Lambert 2020: 1.

¹¹ Coates 2020.

¹² Zhou et al. 2008: 193.

fundamental characteristics: the real world combined with virtual worlds, interaction in real time, and 3D real and virtual artifact registration.¹³ Augmented reality is also linked to two main components: a mixed reality (of which AR is a part) and a computer-mediated reality. AR thus changes one's perception of the real world, while VR fully replaces the user's environment.¹⁴ AR can be installed on various digital devices, including mobile phones, tablets, and mounted displays such as Microsoft HoloLens and Google Glass (Fig. 3).¹⁵



Fig. 3: Visitor experience (AR). 3D model of a fully animal.
Source: (Marques & Costello, 2018).

In addition to conventional displays at museums, AR technology provides new opportunities for objects to be digitized in several ways and to call up virtual and augmented objects.¹⁶ It also enhances critical thinking and the audience's thinking processes such as curiosity and analysis. It enhances an exhibition's digital content and digital storytelling methodology,¹⁷ and makes it possible for visitors to experience unattainable journeys through time or space. It also allows for targeting larger audiences, and especially technological audiences of both children and adults.¹⁸

The use of audio "digital" guides at museums dates back to the 1950s. The traditional audio guide service achieved great success as a mobile interpreter at this time.¹⁹ Interactive audio guides are electronic devices with an MP3 memory, a keypad, a few buttons, and a

¹³ Azuma 1997: 356.

¹⁴ Azuma et al. 2001: 34.

¹⁵ Ulukuz, Whitworth 2016: 19.

¹⁶ Weng et al. 2011: 180.

¹⁷ Poce et al. 2019: 2.

¹⁸ Loumos et al. 2018: 313.

¹⁹ Sexton 2013: 15–19.

speaker. RFID chips are connected to smart tags using radiofrequency and are analogous to the immersive guide: The reception of information is initiated once the device nears a sensor or, as with some systems, connects to a GPS.²⁰ Interactive audio guides commonly employ infrared technology to activate audio channels when directed at objects or displays or when suspended in rooms. Photos, pictures, audio, and text may be sent to a specific phone number to assist audiences in comprehending the displays (Fig. 4 and 5).²¹ Audio guides often utilized in museums or exhibitions may be classified as follows:

- Devices with number pads.
- Personal Digital Wizards or PDAs.
- Handsets.
- Special scenario devices.²²



Fig. 4: Visitors experience audio guide with new Nintendo 3DS – Navigation.

Source: <https://www.louvre.fr/en/museum-audio-guide>



Fig. 5: Visitor experiences traditional audio guide with a headset.

Source: <https://umfa.utah.edu/audio-guide>

Audio guides allow audiences to immerse themselves in stories that help them create meaningful memories and thus achieve a comprehensive experience.²³ It also enables the blind and visually impaired to visit museums and replaces the customary human guide, thus increasing visitor autonomy.²⁴

A mobile app is a software program designed to be run on smartphones, tablets, and other devices.²⁵ Apps are usually small, limited function, single software units. The use of this software is propagated by the app store and thousands of iPhones, iPads, and iPod Touch applications have been sold.²⁶ Each app offers limited and isolated features such as games, media, or mobile internet browsing. It generally depends on the computer software and is then transferred to the phone via the app store. The market provides many applications which can be classified according to function (Fig. 6) and include apps for managing, storing, and registering

²⁰ Gebbensleben et al. 2006: 249.

²¹ Martins 2012: 104.

²² Gebbensleben et al. 2006: 252.

²³ Cesário et al. 2017: 128.

²⁴ Martins 2012: 104.

²⁵ Wei, Jianping 2015: 90.

²⁶ Medić, Pavlović 2014: 168.

collections as well as apps for displaying collections and enhancing the visitor experience.²⁷




Fig. 6: The role of mobile applications used to link the museum and visitors.
Source: (Wei and Jianping 2015).

There are multiple possibilities for the use of mobile technologies in situ and online through exhibitions, QR codes, AR, mobile phone GPS, multimedia, audio tours, mobile websites, iPad tours, etc.²⁸ Generally, museums explore digital and mobile technologies to improve communication, content, and the visitor experience.²⁹ Moreover, visitors may explore unique artworks, play games created for children and for adults, experience contextualized learning through AR, and access additional sources of information such as visitor guides and interactive maps.³⁰

Information kiosks with touchscreens are one of the most important digital devices widely used in museum exhibitions. Some of them are more interactive and offer quizzes and mini-games, for example, while others present multimedia in many ways through text, images, video, and audio.³¹ This technology also allows visitors to have attractive personal experiences through video, specimens, details, associated images and texts, QR codes for more information, the museum mobile app, and sharing these experiences with other visitors. These touchscreen kiosks offer advantages such as:

- Dynamic content.
- Multimedia text.³²
- Creating a comfortable, highly familiar, and collaborative atmosphere

²⁷ Teslyuk et al. 2020: 314.

²⁸ Medić, Pavlović 2014: 168.

²⁹ Tsai, Sung 2012: 95–98.

³⁰ Petrelli, O'Brien 2018: 1–2

³¹ Hall 2013: 11.

³² Burmistrov 2015: 2–3.

- Increasing the interactive area of the display.³³
- Enhancing user experience (UX) and learning effectiveness.³⁴

Holograms, also known as holographs, are recordings of artwork, but the holograms are shown as the final product. Holography is a laser application that creates a virtual experience. The etymology of term holography comes from ancient Greek and consists of two parts: ὅλος (holo), meaning everything, and γράφω, which translates as “I describe all things” and indicates writing, coloration, or painting.³⁵ A hologram is technically a stereoscopic picture that is obtained using a laser and is stored on the level surface of an imaging board. When the laser beam illuminates this photographic plate according to the reference beam original, the beam flows through a transparent space and absorbs dark areas to various degrees, creating a body-composed wave. The result is photography and display applied simultaneously.

The advantages of holograms for exhibitions are:

- Replacing the original object with a holographic copy.
- Significantly enhancing the visual perception of the object by recording multiple images along with the same carrier.
- Enhancing the interpretation.³⁶
- Potential to restore a damaged part of an object using a laser.³⁷

The internet is a global network that allows devices of all kinds to interact and exchange information and services. It is also a shared global resource for information, knowledge, and cooperation among innumerable multicultural communities. The World Wide Web was mainly produced at CERN in 1989, in Geneva, Switzerland. The *www* is a hypertext distributed information system that enables internet users to create, edit, or browse online documents.³⁸

Museum websites promote museum or art gallery brands. These sites publish video ads, broadcast art museum exhibitions, publish pictures of masterpieces, and stream specialized conferences and special programs to pique the interest of visitors and encourage them to visit the museum.³⁹ Furthermore, visitors—including the disabled—can experience more museum visits through online museum tours.⁴⁰

There are some points that museum curators should consider when generating effective sites for their audiences, including:

- Diversity of visitors.
- Appropriateness of site content and text.
- Employing virtual agents and avatars.
- Visitor profiles.

³³ Geller 2006: 9.

³⁴ Zaharias et al. 2013: 375.

³⁵ Pietroni et al. 2019: 5.

³⁶ Markov 2011: 66.

³⁷ Fatima, Ahmed 2020: 662.

³⁸ Sabin 1997: 2.

³⁹ Weblium 2019.

⁴⁰ Navarrete 2019: 204.

2.2. Museum Exhibitions

Exhibitions are an essential part of the museum; there is no museum without a museum display.⁴¹ For an exhibition, the exhibit is generally includes a single display that is often extended to a series of displays covering the same theme, or sometimes there is a wide range of displays with one common theme.⁴²

The exhibition is the most significant, forceful, and direct visual communication in any museum. Every day, thousands of people come to visit museum exhibits. Museum displays and visitors are closely linked. While museums have many potential public activities, displays are the primary means of communicating with their audiences. The public's view of a museum is often based on their comprehension of an exhibition. Exhibitions have tremendous influence on museum creativity and resources in terms of content, character, installation demands, development, and operation. The audience is right to identify museums with exhibitions.⁴³

When planning to exhibit physically inside the museum, the question that comes to mind about the exhibition is this: Does the exhibited piece require it to be displayed permanently or for a limited period? For the former, the piece is indispensable for the display, while for the latter it is only an essential element for a limited period and can be changed according to the themes of the display. Using various criteria, exhibitions are labeled according to classifications by museologist Belcher.⁴⁴ Museum exhibitions can be divided into the following types:

- Permanent exhibitions
- Temporary exhibitions and special exhibitions
- Mobile exhibitions

Based on different criteria and literature, we have further divided the types of exhibitions as follows:

- Permanent exhibitions.
- Temporary exhibitions.
 - Mobile exhibitions.
 - Traveling exhibitions.
- Virtual exhibitions.

2.3. The Sharjah Museum Authority

Since 1971, the Emirate of Sharjah has been one of the seven emirates that comprise the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE is located in the Arabian Gulf in the Middle East.⁴⁵ Thanks to the vision of His Highness, the Ruler of Sharjah, and his appreciation of

⁴¹ McLean 1999: 83.

⁴² Bitgood 1992: 4.

⁴³ Kapukotuwa, Anedo 2020: 3.

⁴⁴ Herreman 2004: 92.

⁴⁵ Morris 2009: 631.

the value of cultural and natural heritage and Sharjah's identity, there are many different museums in the Emirate that focus on a wide range of topics, including Sharjah history and heritage, Islamic art, traditional art, marine heritage, and the natural sciences such as botany and modern science.⁴⁶

The Sharjah Museum Authority (SMA) coordinates seventeen museums in Sharjah and is responsible for designing potential strategic museum projects. The Sharjah Museums Authority covers Sharjah heritage and history, the arts, archaeology, Islamic culture, and science, and natural history. The Authority aims to be a cultural platform that promotes the Sharjah identity locally and globally and educates the public on the value of museums as cultural and educational institutions. Moreover, the Authority's mission is to continually improve the quality of the Emirate's educational and community displays and activities while also safeguarding the collections.⁴⁷

3. Methodology

The required data were gathered and verified using two methods: a case study (qualitative approach) and a survey (quantitative approach). We used the Sharjah museums as a case study to investigate the hypothesis that ICT applications in museums are beneficial. Surveys of professionals were distributed to learn their thoughts on this and determine their level of satisfaction with ICT applications and programs at exhibitions. Email interviews were conducted only with experts and professionals at the SMA to gather viewpoints regarding ICTs in Sharjah's museums. The interviews were very useful for gathering additional relevant information for the study. Questions were emailed to the SMA staff, who then responded with written answers. Seven open-ended questions were asked that were pertinent to ICTs in Sharjah's museums in the current socio-technological contexts. The seven questions were:

1. How do ICT applications affect the development of a museum exhibition?
2. What technology do you consider to be crucial investments for a museum? (Please describe them).
3. Are there any future projects for new ICT applications at the museums?
4. Do you have an IT staff dedicated to ICT applications in the museum?
5. What are the advantages and disadvantages of having ICT applications in museums?
6. How do ICT applications enhance the visitor experience?
7. What are the categories of museum visitors?

These questions were meant to test the hypothesis regarding the effectiveness of ICT applications (on-site and online) in museum exhibitions and the level of audience satisfaction with the exhibitions provided by the SMA.

⁴⁶ Bouchenaki 2011: 96.

⁴⁷ Sharjah Museum Authority 2020.

4. Data Analysis

4.1 Data Analysis of Feedback from Museum Professionals

The questionnaire used to collect the museum professionals' feedback was constructed using the online survey software Microsoft Forms. It was distributed to specialists in the museums through various social media tools. Data was gathered between the second and third quarters of 2021. In total, 134 professionals responded. It was arranged in four sections: the practical background of museum professionals, their opinions on the advantages and disadvantages of ICT application, the role of ICT applications during lockdowns and in serving audiences during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the audience categories that used technology in the exhibitions.

The survey had three parts. The first section covered information about the professionals and their functions. The second section covered their perspectives on ICTs in real and virtual exhibitions. The final section focused on ICT applications utilized by museums in response to lockdowns and to serve audiences during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the kinds of people who used the technology in the exhibition.

Q1. *Your job at the museum is related to ...?*

In total, 134 professionals answered the questionnaire. According to the participants' responses, around half of them had jobs related to the exhibition department (21%), higher management (19%), and education (13%), followed by database and registration (10%), conservation and restoration (7%), publication and scientific research (6%), and as professors and researchers (6%). Of the remaining respondents, 15% worked in museum-related positions (5% in storage, 5% in marketing, and 5% in facilities and operations). The remaining 3% held administrative positions (Fig. 7).




Figure 7: Position of respondents related to museums.

Q2. Where do you currently work?

According to the respondents' replies about their current work, the majority of them (70%) worked at a governmental organization with the rest in the private sector (13%) and in international or regional organizations (9%), and a few (3%) were freelancers (Fig. 8).




Figure 8: Types of organizations in which respondents work.

Q3. Which one of the following describes your museum best?

The respondents were asked to define the type of museum they worked at by selecting one or more of the nine options presented. Multiple replies were permitted, so the total number of responses surpassed the total number of respondents. The majority of respondents describe their museums as being archaeology, anthropology, and ethnographic museums (28%), followed by history and cultural museums (21%), art museums/centers (14%), natural history and agricultural museums, aquariums, or zoos (9%); children's museums (8%); science/technology museums or centers (7%); historic house/site (6%); specialized museums (4%); and open-air museums (3%) (Fig. 9).

Q4. Which of the following ICT applications does your museum utilize in the museum exhibitions?

Continuously, the total number of responses surpassed the total number of respondents due to multiple replies being permitted. The applications most commonly used in exhibitions, according to a sizable proportion of respondents, were social media (21%), followed by digital/touch screen kiosks (18%), and websites (17%) as. These were followed by two ICT applications: audio "digital" guide devices and mobile apps in equal proportions (12%). The rest of the ICT applications had smaller proportions: VR (9%), AR (5%), holograms (5%), and others (1%) (Fig. 10).

Q5. In your opinion, which of the following ICT applications does the museum need to invest in to develop museum exhibitions?

Once more, the total number of responses surpassed the total number of respondents due to multiple replies being permitted. The respondents selected mobile apps (17%) and VR (17%) as the most effective ICT applications for developing museum exhibitions (Table 22). AR was next (14.5%), followed by holograms (13.5%). The remaining ICT applications had




Figure 9: Types of museums in which respondents work.




Figure 10: The ICT applications which the respondents' museums utilize in the exhibitions.

lower but still crucial percentages: websites (12%), digital/ touch screen kiosks (10%), social media (9%), and audio “digital” guide devices (7%). It was noticeable that, when allowing for multiple responses, the percentages for selecting ICT applications were very close (Fig. 11).




Figure 11: ICT applications that the museum should invest in to develop museum exhibitions.

Q6. In your opinion, what are the advantages of using ICT applications in museum exhibitions?

One more time, the total number of responses surpassed the total number of respondents due to multiple replies being permitted. The majority of respondents stated that ICT applications in museum exhibitions had many advantages. Within close percentages, they agreed on eight points: 17% of the respondents agreed that they enhanced the visitor experience and increased overall comprehension of the museum collections. A share of 15.5% of the respondents indicated that they had provided an important role via the web in communication between the museum and its audience during the COVID-19 pandemic. Then 14.5% said that they delivered a new learning experience for the audience, while the same 14.5% stated that they allowed museums to reach new audiences. Furthermore, 14% of respondents believed they delivered an engaging, interpretive experience both on-site and online. Along with this, 13% of the respondents claimed they provided an interactive online and on-site experience. Also, 11.5% of the respondents stated that they highlighted the objects and created hot spots in the exhibitions. Consequently, the majority of respondents agreed that ICT application played an effective role in enhancing museum functions and especially exhibitions (Fig. 12).

Q7. In your opinion, what are the disadvantages of using ICT applications in museum exhibitions?

A total of 59% of respondents stated that ICT applications in museum exhibitions act as a distraction rather than an informative tool through shortening attention spans (Table 24). Approximately one-third of survey respondents (31%) indicated that it distracted from

the visitors' experience of the museum exhibition. However, the remaining 9% felt there were no disadvantages to using ICT applications in museum exhibitions (Fig. 13).




Figure 12: The percentage of the advantage of using the ICT applications in museum Exhibitions.




Figure 13: The disadvantages of using ICT applications in museum exhibitions.

Q8. *In your opinion, what are the main obstacles museums face when using ICTs in museum exhibitions?*

Again, the total number of responses surpassed the total number of respondents due to multiple replies being permitted. Half of respondents chose the lack of financial support (50%). Nearly a quarter of respondents saw rejection of digital technologies as being an obstacle for the role of traditional museums (24%). A smaller number of respondents selected indicated that museum staff's digital skills were still limited (16%) or they had no digital knowledge at all (10%) (Fig. 14).




Figure 14: Obstacles that face the use of ICT applications in museum exhibitions.

Q9. *If your museum used ICT applications to respond to lockdowns and serve audiences during the COVID-19 pandemic, which of the following methods was used?*

Once again, the total number of responses surpassed the total number of respondents due to multiple replies being permitted. Several respondents stated that their museums had used ICT applications during the pandemic. By far, the most frequently used methods cited by the specialists were offering digital content (27%), live streaming (20%), virtual tours (19%), virtual events (9%), offering activities online (8%), mobile apps (7%), and VR (5%). Museum podcasts (digital audio files) are kept by only 4% of specialists (Table 28), and only 1% of the specialists said other methods had been used in response to lockdowns (Fig. 15).

Q10. *In your opinion, what categories of museum visitors interact with ICT applications within the museum exhibitions?*

As before, the total number of responses surpassed the total number of respondents due to multiple replies being permitted. The majority of specialists stated there were three main categories of visitors to museums who engaged with ICT applications within the

museum exhibitions (Table 29): educational visitors (39%), general visitors (36%), specialist visitors (23%), along with some other categories (2%) (Fig. 16).




Figure 15: Methods used to overcome lockdown during the covid 19 pandemic.




Figure 16: Categories of museum visitors who interact with ICTs.

5. Results and Discussion

This study was conducted out of a need to understand and investigate ICT applications and their effectiveness for developing displays in museums in general and the Sharjah museums in particular. According to the research questionnaire and an analysis of the interviews, the findings can be summed up in two points related to the analysis of the research questions.

The first is related to the effectiveness of ICTs in producing a new perspective of the museum exhibition. According to the interviews and surveys, many museum professionals currently believe that the audience prefers for there to be digital technology and virtual experiences alongside static artwork. Museum visitors regularly use contemporary technology devices in daily life. This experience has an impact on how they perceive museum objects. Consequently, museums must keep pace with the times and not retain the old concept of museums with their deep-rooted, low-tech settings. Experts believe that ICTs in exhibitions provide a variety of applications. As one of them commented, "ICT improves the interpretation methods." One member of management also noted in an interview response: "ICT is one element to attract more visitors to the museums, interactive environments, is easy to reach more stories from different new ways."

According to data retrieved from the research questionnaire sent to experts, most participants believe that ICTs play an essential role in enriching museum exhibitions and creating a new vision for museum exhibitions. Nevertheless, many museum professionals argued that museums should use ICTs but within limits. One of the respondents said that "ICT is very important to use but with a limit that will give the visitor the ability to interact with the objects, to see and enjoy them, and to feel the history." Therefore, integrating ICTs into museum exhibits and working closely with museum scholars may open up new vistas for visitors. However, museums should make sure to also look for the best methods to combine technologies and enhance exhibitions rather than just using them for the sake of using technology.

The second is related to using ICT applications to develop museum exhibitions. In the interviews and in Q5 of the questionnaire, the experts indicated the most effective applications for this were mobile phones, VR, AR, holograms, and digital kiosks. Therefore, the SMA should consider investing in these applications.

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, ICT applications are now present in all aspects of our daily life. Consequently, all enterprises, large and small, around the world are attempting to integrate technology into their operations in some way. Museums are not far behind. On a global scale, it has become apparent that museums are adopting technology into their operations to attract a wider audience and enhance how they display their priceless objects and exhibitions in the best possible manner. Thus, incorporating ICT applications into such exhibitions is undoubtedly beneficial. As we mentioned previously, such initiatives in museums have generally been highly successful and demonstrated the extent of their advantages.

All the findings reveal that experts and audiences are interested in adopting and integrating sophisticated technology into Sharjah's museums, and that doing so will heighten the visitors' overall experience. The main conclusions of this study are as follows:

- ICTs can be used as a development tool for museum exhibitions and to attract a broader audience, but they should be used to support the visit without creating a distraction for the visitor. To that end, ICT technology must strike a balance between attraction, surprise impact, and content quality to supply the educational and entertaining experience visitors demand.
- Although ICT technologies show promise, they must be installed in accordance with the unique characteristics of the museum context and the ecology of museum artifacts.
- Despite the many advantages of ICT technology, there are some obstacles hindering their use, and foremost of these is financial support.
- Digital transformation is just a tool rather than a mission in its own right.

Therefore, in light of ICTs' impact on the development of museum exhibitions and enhancing the visitor experience, these results should encourage museums to employ ICTs in exhibitions. In addition, they must take advantage of their technical and functional characteristics. Over time, these ICTs tools have effectively demonstrated their ability to assist museums in communicating their mission, values, and content. ICTs also foster deep experiences and engagement with audiences, both in situ and online.

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ЕФЕКТИВНОСТ УПОТРЕБЕ ИНФОРМАЦИОНИХ И КОМУНИКАЦИОНИХ ТЕХНОЛОГИЈА У РАЗВОЈУ МУЗЕЈСКЕ ИЗЛОЖБЕ: ПРИМЕР МУЗЕЈА У ЕМИРАТУ ШАРЏА

Резиме

Музеји све више прихватају информационе и комуникационе технологије (ИКТ) да би промовисали културни туризам и остали у кораку са променама. Културне вредности, заоставштина и обичаји преносе се путем музеја, повезујући генерације са прошлошћу. ИКТ се користе у готово свим музејским активностима, у самим институцијама и изван њих, нарочито за излагање и заштиту. Претходна истраживања показују да музеји употребљавају разноврсне ИКТ да би изложбе и предмете начинили савременијим и како би умнапредили искуства посетилаца. Такође, музеји користе различите алате за дигиталну комуникацију како би обогатили доживљаје посетилаца. Ипак, многе функције ИКТ за интерактивне процесе и даље се истражују од стране музејских радника.

Стога, ово истраживање има за циљ ефективност употребе ИКТ са становишта стручњака и музејских радника ка стварању тренда развоја музејских изложби у Емирату Шарџа. Такође разматра доступне ИКТ апликације које музеји могу применити како би побољшали своје технолошке услуге за публику.

Истраживање је спроведено на примеру Шарџа музеја исламске цивилизације, будући да је то један од највећих музеја у Емирату Шарџа. Примењени су и квалитативни и квантитативни подаци, а упитник је био главни начин прикупљања информација. Упитник је прослеђен како би се дознала мишљења стручњака у погледу примене ИКТ у музејским изложбама. Истраживање предлаже да се ИКТ осмишљавају уз разматрање физичког окружења, и да се физичка раздаљина може премостити употребом „мешаних интерфејса“ мобилних уређаја.

Кључне речи: Информационе и комуникационе технологије (ИКТ), Управа Шарџа музеја, Шарџа музеј исламске цивилизације, дигиталне технологије, музејске изложбе.

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REVIEWS

Ognjen Krešić, *The Hilandar Monastery and the Eastern Balkans in the 18th Century: Cultural and Economic Ties*, Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Institute for Balkan Studies, 2021, 251 pp.

(Ognjen Krešić, *Manastir Hilandar i istočni Balkan u XVIII veku: Kulturne i ekonomske veze*, Beograd: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, Balkanološki institut, 2021, 251 str. (Serbian Cyrillic))

The position of Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire during the 18th century has largely been discussed through the status of taxpayers (*re'aya*), and the organization of the Orthodox Church and its role among Orthodox taxpayers has mostly been examined through archival sources written in the Balkan languages. Research on the activities of church officials was then extended to the organization of monastic communities. Mount Athos, the most important center of Orthodox monastic life, has attracted the attention of numerous researchers. The internal organization of the monastery has mostly been presented on the basis of documents created at the monastery or by the local administration. Documents in the Ottoman language have been compared with recent historiography, which has contributed to a better understanding of the monastic community's external activities and its relationship with the Ottoman administration.

In *Mount Athos and the Hilandar Monastery in the Ottoman Empire, 15th–17th Centuries*, Aleksandar Fotić presented a construct of previous research and some new information about Mount Athos after the establishment of Ottoman rule. Ognjen Krešić has continued this with his research into the position of the Hilandar monastery during what is referred to in the historiography as the Ottoman Empire's period of transition during the 17th and 18th centuries. He has presented his findings in *The Hilandar*

Monastery and the Eastern Balkans in the 18th Century: Cultural and Economic Ties. The main focuses of his investigation were the activities of Orthodox monks in the wider area of the Balkans and the position of monastic communities in different socio-political contexts within the Ottoman Empire. This primarily refers to the area of today's Bulgaria, where the religious and economic influence of the Hilandar monastic community spread during the 18th century. A theoretical consideration of questions of collective identities in the pre-national age dictated the choice of the study's chronological framework.

This book is an amended and supplemented version of the author's doctoral dissertation, *The Hilandar Monastery and the Bulgarians in the 18th century: Cultural and Economic Ties*. The resulting monograph is the outcome of several years of field research in the Hilandar monastery's archive, the archive in Sremski Karlovci, and the Ottoman archive in Istanbul. The theoretical approach to the topic was determined by the sources available at the time and the degree of achievement of earlier research. It was necessary to primarily use the method of structuralist historiography, since research on this topic based on Ottoman archival material is scant. Any examination of the position of non-Muslims in the 18th century always involves an attempt to differentiate the organization of the individual ethnic groups existing at the time. Therefore, the author included some theoretical considerations based on the division of non-Muslims into religious and ethnic groups known as millets. An argument about the collective identity of the pre-national era is analyzed through a case study of Paisius, a Hilandar monk at who combined an awareness of ethnicity with a sense of belonging to a wider Orthodox community in his historical work and daily life as monk.

The monograph is partitioned into four thematic units preceded by an introductory discourse on previous research and the issue of

sources. The most important research results are presented at the end. In the first unit, *Adapting to New Challenges: The Hilandar Monastery in the 18th Century* (pp. 28–76), the context surrounding the brotherhood's survival and *modus operandi* is explained. At the beginning, readers are introduced to the structure of the Ottoman Empire in the 18th century, which is known in historiography as a century of transition and nominal change in the socioeconomic order. The monastery community also had to adapt to new challenges, which are presented in a section on the monastery's relations with the Ottoman administration and the community's tax obligations and privileges. In an attempt to make later descriptions of the Hilandar monks' development clearer to the reader, the author builds on previous research on the monastery's status under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and its connection to the Patriarchate of Peć, (i.e., the Metropolitanate of Karlovci). This is followed by a section on the organization of monastery life in the 18th century, which describes how the people of Hilandar worked to improve the monastery, and especially its economic position, by taking advantage of economic improvements in the eastern Balkans.

The second unit, *Hilandar in the Eastern Balkans: Monastery Properties and Collection of Alms* (pp. 77–125), presents the author's main research findings. The monks' journeys outside the monastery walls to collect alms is explained in chronological order—from obtaining travel permits from representatives of the Ottoman administration and residence permits by local church dignitaries, to the journey itself and their communication with the faithful. The time the monks spent among the faithful had two principal goals: collecting alms and fostering the Christian faith, and establishing religious endowments for the benefit of the monastery. The procedure for establishing the monastery's *metochia* is described in the context of the Ottoman legal system and the legitimacy of the endowments from non-Muslims, in this case Orthodox Christians. The author then presents an accounting of the Hilandar properties which lists all the cities inhabited by monks during the 18th

century and the people who left their personal property to the Hilandar monastery.

In the third unit, *Contributors and Pilgrims from the Eastern Balkans in Hilandar* (pp. 127–150), the socioeconomic status position of the Orthodox faithful in the community mentioned in the sources as contributors to the monastery is examined. This unit is the most significant for understanding Orthodox Christians' position in the Ottoman Empire. This mainly introduces the reader to the local Orthodox Christians elite within the wealthy social classes, mostly from the urban areas, who fought for greater freedom of action in favor of their religious communities. All of this was accomplished through the mediation of the judicial authorities. The time the monks spent among common faithful also contributed to pilgrimage journeys and visits by the faithful to the Hilandar monastery, and sometimes even contributed to individuals from the Orthodox community choosing to take monastic vows. Pilgrimages were often undertaken in search of healing and for various other religious reasons. According to the findings presented in both chapters, it appeared the monastic community was relatively financially secure. Nevertheless, some sources indicate that, despite the monastery's vast holdings, it was still forced to borrow significant amounts of money due to excessive tax obligations. These findings once again confirm the author's thesis that the Ottoman eighteenth century was a period of uncontrolled tax burdens on the Ottoman Empire's non-Muslim subjects.

The final unit, *Hilandar and the Collective Identities of the Balkan Christians* (pp. 151–208), deals with the issue mentioned earlier of group identities in the Ottoman Balkans during the pre-national era. The argument about the status of religious communities raises questions of ethnicity and the Ottoman administration's position regarding group identities. The author's collective approach is based on the Greek or "Roman" identity, as was the generally accepted name in Ottoman administrative circles. Despite the Ottoman administration's general restraint around this issue and the common lack of interest in distinctions between ethnic groups, the author

presents findings that confirm existence of a very strong Serbian and Bulgarian ethnic self-awareness among the Hilandar monks. This issue is presented from within the monastery walls through the figure of monk Paisius and his work, *The History of the Slavic-Bulgarians (История славянобългарска)*.

In this highly regarded book, *The Hilandar Monastery and the Eastern Balkans in the 18th Century: Cultural and Economic Ties*, significant new research findings are presented and some long-held beliefs in historiography are thoroughly reexamined. Thus, the contribution made here to historiography is manifold. The primary significance of the findings outlined in it are fully considered and clearly explained through the Ottoman legal context within which the monastic community managed to survive. The very existence of self-awareness of ethnicity, as the authors concludes, did not affect the survival of monastic community's common social, cultural, and religious behavioral patterns or behavioral patterns among Orthodox faithful. This conclusion is supported through an investigation of the Ottoman administration's attitude toward divisions among the empire's non-Muslim subjects. Considering the research findings it presents, this monograph greatly contributes to clarifying the position of Orthodox Christians during the transitional period of Ottoman history. The true value of the book, however, is the wide range of archival material it analyzes.

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Radoš Ljušić, *Prince Miloš Obrenović I of Serbia: the State-building Monarch*, Pravoslavna reč, Novi Sad, 2021, 923 pp.

(Radoš Ljušić, *Knez Miloš: državotvorni vladar*, Novi Sad: Pravoslavna reč, 2021, 923 str. (Serbian Cyrillic))

From the pen of an esteemed Serbian historian and Belgrade University Lecturer, Professor Radoš Ljušić, a leading expert on 19th

century Serbian history, has come a monograph about Prince Miloš Obrenović I of Serbia. This monograph is a seminal publication in Serbian historiography. A quick glance at Professor Ljušić's curriculum vita, which includes 500 bibliographical references and several dozen special editions, shows immediately that this monograph, along with its focus, stands out as an endeavor of the utmost significance. It should be noted that the author has spent decades researching and documenting 19th century Serbian history. Some of his monographs are currently regarded as canonical books of Serbian historiography, such as *Биографија Војвода Карађорђа (A Biography of Vozhd Karadjordje)*, the monograph *Српска државност 19 века (Serbian Statehood in the 19th Century)*, *Кнежевина Србија 1830–1839 (The Principality of Serbia, 1830–1839)*, and *Књига о Начертанију (The Book of Nacertanije)*. The author focuses specifically on defining and documenting the chronological history of Serbia, including all of the crucial events and turning points during the 19th century, thereby assuming a pivotal role both as a historian and a contributor to the field. To that end it can be stated that the this book is the product of decades of devoted research and writing, and an entire century after the biography written by Mihailo Gavrilović, it has emerged as a full and complete historical account of life and politics of Prince Miloš Obrenović.

The book demonstrates impeccable methodology and structure. It has been assembled and organized according to the highest standards of contemporary historiography. The author has skillfully composed a historical narrative that informatively and consistently includes all the relevant sections that comprise the chronology of events in the turbulent personal history of Prince Miloš Obrenović. Organized into six chapters with several well-grouped subchapters, the author narrates the life and history of Prince Miloš with a clear, comprehensible style and in a consistent and lucid manner. Not a single event in Prince Miloš Obrenović's life has been left unaccounted for. Starting with his early childhood, we discover a string of historical

events that were significant not just for the life of Prince Miloš but for the overall history of the 20th century in Serbia. In a highly competent yet unassuming manner, the author leads his reader through relevant historical events and intervals with a confident demonstration of flawless narrative skill.

In the first part of the monograph (*From Shepard to Vozhd*, pages 39–199), the principal focus is not solely on the life of Prince Miloš; it also shifts to the historical events in Serbia prior to and during the First Serbian Uprising. This is the consistent and dominant narrative style throughout the book: through the perspective and viewpoint of Prince Miloš Obrenović, the author portrays a dramatic chronicle of the entirety of Serbia. During countless battles and armed encounters, with Prince Miloš Obrenović as an outstanding leader, and with a multitude of events from the life of Karadjordje, through the intertwined fates of the two most prominent figures in the political history of Serbia during the 19th century, the reader discovers these historical events within a dynamic and compelling storyline. The historical facts presented in the book demonstrate the extensive depth and vast knowledge of the matter presented by the author. This fact may be the most prominent characterization of the monograph as a whole. The next thread of events surrounding the Second Serbian Uprising and the dramatic rise of Miloš Obrenović is narrated with equal narrative strength and zeal.

In the same light, Part Two (*The Prince*, pages 199–411), puts on display the historical and personal events surrounding the first reign of Prince Miloš Obrenović. The historical flow of the period was unmerciful toward Prince Miloš. From the negotiations with Mehmed Ali Pasha, the tragic assassination of Vozhd Karadjordje, several rebellions against him as a ruler, and the insistent pressure in Constantinople to assert Serbian autonomy, to daily life and political perplexities, this historical account demonstrates a superior command and mastery of the relevant historical facts.

Convoluting international relations, moderate and realistic foreign policy, and existing ties with

powerful countries are elaborated on throughout Part Two. These facts and events that dominate this part of the book are the connective tissues of the historical narrative. The author has devoted special attention to Serbian society during the first reign of Prince Miloš Obrenović, elaborately narrating the prince's visit to Constantinople. Professor Ljušić writes about these events knowingly and appealingly.

Part Three (*An Exile and Returnee*, pages 531–639), presents an account of Prince Miloš's life, from his abdication to his return to Serbia, and his second reign until his death. The chapter abounds in significant, noteworthy events and is based mostly on information about Miloš Obrenović's attempts to return to Serbia. The historical events that stand out in this part of the monograph are the Revolutions of 1848–1849, Tenka's Plot, and with special distinctness, the National Assembly. The author narrates this difficult period in Miloš Obrenović's life truthfully and realistically by relying on official historical sources. Significant events line up one after another and the author analyzes them objectively and impartially, including comparisons of the character traits of the members of the two dynasties, Obrenović and Karadjordjević. It should be noted that the author treats the conflict between the two Serbian dynasties with due consideration, characterizing it as one of the milestones in 19th century Serbian history. The intertwined destinies, conspiracies, rebellions, assassinations, and breakdowns that marked this historical conflict paint a dramatic picture of events in Serbia during this time. The last days in the life of Prince Miloš are vividly narrated as they reflect on the views of society during this time about the personality and the legacy of the aging Miloš Obrenović.

Part Four (*The Legacy*, pages 639–713), bears special relevance with respect to Serbian social history. At one point in the book, the author offers a full account of all the Obrenović Dynasty's assets and property. He portrays the Obrenović family and their legacy via a fresh, innovative, and original narrative approach. The author puts special emphasis on the mansions and manor houses in their possession, followed by an equally

interesting, detailed account of Prince Miloš's personal property and belongings. Similarly, in Part Five (*Unfaithful*, pages 713–765), the author narrates various details of Prince Miloš Obrenović's personal life. Among the Serbs, Prince Miloš had the image and a reputation of a man who had numerous love affairs, which makes this part of the monograph amusing but nonetheless still credible in the light of relevant historical information. This chapter also offers details about Miloš's family and family customs.

Part six (*Rudnicanin*, pages 765–861), contains countless details about Prince Miloš's personality and the impressions of others, and it describes his portraits, personal items, everyday life, and character traits. This part of the monograph, supported by the author's extraordinarily impeccable narration, presents Prince Miloš as a real man who had both virtues and flaws, yet was a great man who left an important legacy not only to his family but also to future generations in the Serbian social and political scene.

The part *Goodevil Prince Miloš* (pages 861–869), presents the author's conclusions and final thoughts about Prince Miloš Obrenović. Just like the rest of the book, this chapter can be read in a heartbeat. This section of the monograph is the summation of the life and reign of Prince Miloš Obrenović of Serbia, who undoubtedly was one of the greatest rulers in contemporary Serbian history. The author offers both praise and criticism of Miloš Obrenović, thus putting forward an objective and impartial account clearly, precisely, and realistically through the book's overall organization and composition.

This monograph by professor Radoš Ljušić, *Prince Miloš Obrenović I of Serbia: the State-building Monarch*, is an example of a truly valuable historiographic study that is sure to become a seminal book based on the contemporary principles of historiography as a discipline. What the author has demonstrated is that decades of research, writing, lecturing, and presenting indeed can be integrated into a comprehensive publication about a ruler who left his mark on his era, and which is narrated realistically, vividly, and strikingly. For this

reason, I strongly and wholeheartedly support the view that this monograph should be used as an example to look up to in the field of historiography. This is to state that national history should be regarded as the very initiative that indeed makes the wheel of history turn. It can thus safely be said that professor Ljušić has contributed a great book, one that raises the standards in the field of historiography. To conclude, this is a truly valuable study that deserves the utmost regard and admiration both from the general public and fellow historians.

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Aleksandra Ilić Rajković and Sanja Petrović Todosijević (eds.), *What Would We Do Without School?!: Essays on the History of Education in Serbia and Yugoslavia from the 19th Century to the Present Day*. Belgrade: The Institute for Recent History of Serbia, The Institute for Pedagogy and Andragogy, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, 2021, 486 pp.
(Aleksandra Ilić Rajković i Sanja Petrović Todosijević (ur.), *Bez škole šta bi mi?!: Ogledi iz istorije obrazovanja u Srbiji i Jugoslaviji od 19. veka do danas*. Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, Institut za pedagogiju i andragogiju Filozofskog fakulteta Univerziteta u Beogradu, 2021, 486 str. (Serbian Cyrillic))

The collection of papers entitled *What Would We Do Without School?!: Essays on the History of Education in Serbia and Yugoslavia from the 19th Century to the Present Day* is the result of collaboration between the Institute for Recent History of Serbia and the Institute of Pedagogy and Andragogy in Belgrade, which was initiated by its main editors. Aleksandra Ilić Rajković is an associate professor at the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade, and her research and teaching focuses on the history of pedagogical ideas and the history of education in Serbia in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Sanja Petrović Todosijević is a senior research associate at the Institute for

Recent History of Serbia, and she explores the social history of Serbia and Yugoslavia in the aftermath of the Second World War. More specifically, she looks at the history of childhood and the history of education, and school reforms in the 1950s and 1960s in particular.

The collection's central theme is the view that education as a fundamental human and civil right (pp. 9). It uses a multi-perspective approach to present the long and complex historical development of the construction of the educational system in Serbia from the 19th century to the present day, along with the main stages of that development, reform processes, and points out basic social factors that influenced how educational policies were formulated during different periods. This has been successfully accomplished through a careful selection of papers that approach numerous aspects of the history of education from a multidisciplinary perspective: policy of education and upbringing, how school systems are constructed and function, and analyses of various educational practices. Right from the start, the reader will be interested in the title. The name of the collection is a line borrowed from a popular song called "Teacher" by the 1980s group Zana. The first line, "Without school, what would we do" is emblematic of more than the period in which it was written. According to the assessment in the book's preface, this was a time globally dominated by a culture of positivism that viewed knowledge as being based on empirical and natural sciences and on formal disciplines such as mathematics and logic, which led to marginalization of the humanities, crisis, and re-examination of the principles on which a modern education system had been built in the previous period (pp. 9). Contemporary school reform to a certain extent actualizes issues we encounter in the collection, which is why the title could be understood as an invitation to readers to question the place, role, and importance of education in society.

The collection of papers is divided chronologically into three sections. The first section, *In the 19th Century*, contains a group of papers that deal with the issue of education at the time of the emergence of nation-states. In this

period, for the first time, education was beginning to be understood as an essential prerequisite for social progress. The educational system began to take on characteristics of a modern system: secularization of education, compulsory primary education, and greater inclusion of children in school. In Serbia, this process started with the educational reform of 1882, which is why Aleksandra Ilić Rajković's "Compulsory Education in the Kingdom of Serbia: Between Regulations and Practice," (pp. 23–59), is one of the mainstays of the collection. Other contributions in this section cover all levels of education: preschool in Ljiljana Stankov's "Preschool education in Serbia: The first 100 Years," (pp. 135–162), elementary school in Nataša Vujisić Živković's "The Development of Primary School Supervision in Serbia in the first half of the 19th Century," (pp. 63–86), and adult education in Jovan Miljković's "Institutional Development of Adult Education in Serbia in the 19th Century," (pp. 165–188). The collection also contains several works that deal with specific topics in educational practice during different historical periods. In this section, special attention is given to girls' education in Ljubinka Trgovčević's "The Beginnings of Higher Education for Young Women in the World and in Serbia," (pp. 89–107) and Ana Stolić's "The Education of Female Children in the Principality/Kingdom of Serbia: A Gender Perspective," (pp. 111–132).

The second part, *In the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes/Yugoslavia*, consists of works dealing with education and the school system in the interwar period in a country burdened with numerous differences in terms of inherited educational systems and a low literacy rates, and where the educational policy was aimed at building a unified school system. During this period, a law on eight-year compulsory education was adopted in 1929 but did not take effect. The first paper in this section is Đurđa Maksimović's "Institutional Development of Education in the Kingdom of SCS/Yugoslavia 1918–1941" (pp. 193–215). It is followed by Zoran Janjetović's "Education of National Minorities in Yugoslavia 1918–1991" (pp. 219–258), which addresses the

government's attitude toward the education of national minorities in the Yugoslav State. This section also includes an article by Ljubinka Škodrić dealing with primary education in occupied Serbia between 1941 and 1944, the main feature of which was the negation of the Yugoslav national idea on which education and schooling of the previous period had been based (pp. 261–279).

The third section, *In Socialist Yugoslavia*, consists of works dealing with education and upbringing when a uniform eight-grade primary school system was finally introduced in the entire country after the General Law on Education was passed in 1958. This section begins with Sanja Petrović Todosijević's "The Reform of the Primary School System in Serbia 1944–1959: We Will Steal the Light from the Noisy Waterfall to Illuminate the Village and the City," (pp. 285–319). This paper points out the last school law in the Yugoslav State adopted at the federal level and was valid for all republics (pp. 461) and which rounded off the reform processes begun in the 19th century, whose main goal was the introduction of eight-year primary schooling. Within this section, there are two articles on secondary education, which is a topic that so far has been neglected in historiography. It includes Milica Sekulović's "Contributions on the Reform of Secondary Education in the Journals Teaching and Education and Pedagogical Work 1958–1970" (pp. 343–372), and Srđan Milošević's "Secondary Vocational Agricultural Education in Yugoslavia 1945–1953" (pp. 375–340). Dragomir Bondžić makes a valuable contribution to university education in "Higher Education Reforms in Serbia 1945–1990: In Search of a Socialist University" (pp. 403–429). The history of the school subject is treated as a specific issue of education and upbringing in Lada Duraković's "Sing Along, Comrades, Before we Get to Work: Choir Singing in Croatian Primary Schools in the Early Post-War Era 1945–1960" (pp. 323–340).

The final section, *What Happened Next*, presents Vladimir Džinović and Ivana Đerić's "Education Reforms from 2000 to 2010 from the Perspective of the 'Experimental Generation'" (pp. 435–453), and is about research conducted by

the Institute for Pedagogical Research in Belgrade, in which other relevant institutions were also involved. The article presents the results of the first phase of the current school reform from the point of view of its key actors. The research objective was to find an answer to the question of how teachers, principals, parents, and experts experienced education reform (pp. 442). The research conclusions in all of these papers are valuable for those who are currently participating in the creation of educational reforms.

The collection ends with an interview with Professor Nikola Potkonjak (pp. 459–474), a prominent Serbian pedagogue and university professor who has also contributed significantly to the creation of educational policy during the second half of the 20th century.

This collection of papers represents an important contribution to the pedagogical and historiographical literature. It is valuable for researchers in various disciplines and equally appealing for a broader audience. Seen through a historian's perspective, it contains a series of studies that portray the challenges faced by Serbian and Yugoslav society in building a modern educational system, which primarily included obstacles and discontinuities of their own past. It also shows that progressive thought among educators, pedagogues, and university instructors persisted, which this product of collaboration among historians and pedagogues that points to the importance of education, undoubtedly speaks in favor of.

Paulina Čović

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IN MEMORIAM

DEJAN MIKAVICA (1964–2022)

Dr. Dejan Mikavica died before his time yet left behind a significant body of historiographic work. During his three decades of scholarly endeavor, he wrote or coauthored over twenty monographs and left a permanent mark on Serbian historiography. His areas of interest were primarily connected to the history of the Serbs in the Habsburg monarchy, but he also took an interest in the history of Serbs in Montenegro. In all these fields Dr. Mikavica gave momentum to historiography and future researchers alike through his new and original interpretations.

Of his vast opus, what truly stands out is the extraordinary *Sabrane Spise Svetozara Miletića* (The Collected Writings of Svetozar Miletić), coedited with Dr. Čedomir Popov and published in three volumes between 1999 and 2002. These books are indispensable for the exploration of liberal ideas and thought among the Serbs in the Habsburg monarchy. In the same vein is his superb 2004 monograph on Laza Kostić, *Poslednji srpski pankalist: političko-filozofska biografija Laze Kostića* (The Last Serbian Pankalist: a Political and Philosophical Biography of Laza Kostić), which is a comprehensive political biography of the celebrated Serbian poet, presented in way that was innovative, original, and until then, unprecedented. His 2007 monograph *Mihailo Polit-Desančić, vođa srpskih liberala u Austrougarskoj* (Mihailo Polit-Desančić, Leader of the Serbian Liberals in Austria-Hungary), uses the same style to create an original, nuanced image of Serbian liberal politics, and it is a definitive guide to the history of the Serbs in the Habsburg monarchy. In his studies of the history of the Serbs in the Monarchy, Dr. Mikavica's remarkable endeavors were embodied in the books *Srpsko pitanje na Ugarskom saboru 1690–1918*. (The Serbian Question at the Diet of Hungary, 1690-1918) (2011), *Srpska politika u Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji 1538–1918*. (Serbian Politics in Croatia and Slavonia 1538-1918) (2015), *Srpska politika u Vojvodini 1526–1918*. (Serbian Politics in Vojvodina 1526-1918) (2017), *Jovan Subotić i Svetozar Pribičević* (Jovan Subotić and Svetozar Pribičević) (2017), *Srpska politička elita u Austrougarskoj monarhiji 1526–1918*. (The Serbian Political Elite in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, 1526-1918) (2018), and were rounded off with *Srpska politika u Hrvatskoj: 1538–1918*. (Serbian Politics in Croatia 1538-1918) (2017) and *Srpska Vojvodina – od autonomije do prisajedinjenja: 1683–1918*. (The Serbian Vojvodina: From Autonomy to Unification, 1683-1918) (2018) which, when taken as a whole, present a complete picture of the political, social, and economic events in the history of the Serbs in the Habsburg Monarchy.

It is with profound sadness that I mention the 2013 monograph *Istorija Srba u Crnoj Gori 1496–1918*. (History of the Serbs in Montenegro), coauthored with Nenad Ninković, that Dr. Mikavica and I wrote together as a team; along with *Srbi u Habzburškoj monarhiji od 1526 do 1918*. (Serbs in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1526–1918), coauthored with Nenad Lemajić and Nenad Ninković) (2016); *Prečanski Srbi u Velikom ratu 1914–1918*. (The Serbs of the Habsburg Monarchy in the Great War, 1914–1918) (2018), also coauthored with Nenad Ninković. These are all examples of amazing collaboration, full of support and understanding, and assistance for one another during the long processes of archival research and writing. During extended research trips, Dr. Mikavica, Dr. Ninković, and I thought over and sought out new ideas, objectives, and projects that could further the study of the Serbs in the Habsburg monarchy.

Dr. Mikavica was especially proud of his participation at academic conferences. He attended dozens of them in Serbia and abroad, always presenting his work in his original and appealing manner.

He used anecdotes as a source of new ideas and new inspiration, and he was always supportive and open to younger colleagues who gathered around him. In this, the younger generation of historians can be especially thankful to him for his help and support, for his understanding and advice, but mostly for his constant and ubiquitous admonition that the role and place of the historian in Serbian society are of crucial importance to an understanding of current developments. He was often deeply emotional about Serbia's tragic and turbulent history, and he was always searching for answers to difficult questions, but in his signature style—original, innovative, and full of enthusiasm.

Dr. Dejan Mikavica will be remembered for his books, lectures, public appearances, and anecdotes, which is just as how he would have wanted to be remembered. As he often told us, eternity only lasts for as long as we are remembered as historians and lecturers. Through his books and contributions to historiography, Dr. Dejan Mikavica has secured his place in the pantheon of Serbian historiography.

Goran Vasin

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IN MEMORIAM

KARL KASER (1964–2022)

On 11 April 2022 the prominent historian Karl Kaser of the University of Graz, one of the foremost experts on the history of southeast Europe, passed away in Piran. He made considerable contributions to the history of family and kinship, migration, historical anthropology, visual culture, and many other areas as he expanded his interests from the European southeast to the Near East. He led numerous research projects in these fields, and for many of them, he was the pioneer, motivator, and innovator.

Karl Kaser was born in 1954 in Pischeldorf in the southeastern Austrian state of Styria. After completing his studies in History and Slavic Studies, he earned a doctorate in 1980 after successfully defending his thesis “Die serbischen politischen Gruppen, Bewegungen und Parteien und ihre Programme in Bosnien-Herzegowina 1903–1914” [Serbian Political Groups, Movements, Parties, and their Programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1903–1914]. His academic career began in 1988 at the Department for the History of Southeast Europe at the Karl-Franzens-University Graz as part-time teaching assistant, and in 1996 he became its chair. He completed his habilitation (Univ.-Doz.) in 1985 with the publication “Freier Bauer und Soldat. Die Militarisierung der agrarischen Gesellschaft an der kroatisch-slawnischen Militärgrenze (1535–1881)” [Free Peasant and Soldier: The Militarization of Agrarian Society along the Croatian and Slavonian Military Frontier] (Graz 1986; Böhlau: Wien-Köln-Weimar 1997).¹ In this book, Kaser innovatively presented in his own concept of social development in the Military Frontier from its beginnings in the 16th century until it was abolished in 1881. This work had a significant influence on future research into topics connected to the frontier. Croatian and Serbian historiography has long been indebted to him after he published his book “Popis Like i Krbave 1712. godine. Obitelj, zemljišni posjed i etničnost u jugozapadnoj Hrvatskoj” [The 1712 Census of Lika and Krbava: Family, Property, and Ethnicity in Southwest Croatia], which he and his colleagues published in Zagreb in 2013. This book was connected to earlier research into the Balkan family, about which he published many works, including the monograph „Porodica i srodstvo na Balkanu. Analiza jedne kulture koja nestaje” [Family and Kinship in the Balkans: An Analysis of a Disappearing Culture] (2002), which was translated into Serbian.

Of his more recent monographs, “Patriarchy After Patriarchy: Gender Relations in Turkey and in the Balkans, 1500–2000” (2008); “Balkan und Naher Osten. Einführung in eine gemeinsame Geschichte,” translated into English as “The Balkans And the Near East: Introduction To A Shared History” (2011); “*Andere Blicke: Religion Und Visuelle Kulturen Auf Dem Balkan Und Im Nahen Osten*” (2013); “Hollywood auf dem Balkan: Die visuelle Moderne an der europäischen Peripherie (1900–1970)” [Hollywood in the Balkans: Visual Modernism in the European Periphery (1900–1970)] (2018); and “Femininities and Masculinities in the Digital Age: Realia and Utopia in the Balkans and South Caucasus” (2021).

¹ The book was published in Croatia in 1997 by Naprijed, under the title “Slobodan seljak i vojnik. Povojačenje agrarnog društva u Hrvatsko-slavonskoj Vojnoj krajini (1535–1881)” [Free peasant and soldier – the militarization of the agrarian society in the Croatian and Slavonian military borders 1535–1881], and in Japanese translation by Isao Koshimura in 2013.

My personal interactions with Karl Kaser followed two paths of shared interests. One was environmental history, a topic on which Kaser had published an article as far back as 1987 in the journal *Historijski zbornik*: “Uništenje šuma na obalnom kraškom području hrvatske Vojne krajine u prvoj polovici 18.stoljeća. Njegovi demografski, privredni i socijalni uzroci” [Destruction of Forests in Coastal Karst Area of the Croatian Military Frontier in the Early 18th Century: Demographic, Economic, and Social Causes]. Although I was already familiar with his work through the international research project Triplex Confinium, I first met him face-to-face in 2000 at the first conference on environmental history in southeast Europe, organized in Zadar, Croatia by the same project. From 2002 on, I regularly spent my summers conducting research in the Graz archives, so were able to chat during our breaks. During one of these conversations, we arranged for him to attend a second conference on environmental history in southeast Europe that was being held in Koprivnica, Croatia in 2003. There he presented the paper “Mensch und Ökologie aus historisch-anthropologischer Perspektive” [Humankind and Ecology from a Historical and Anthropological Perspective], published in the journal *Ekonomika i ekohistorije*, which prof. Kaser had supported from the beginning and served on the editorial board from the first issue.

The second area of interest we shared was the Military Frontier. He offered helpful advice when I was writing a book about the fortification in Koprivnica in the 17th century when it was part of the Military Frontier, which I developed from my master’s thesis and was published by the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Zagreb. I also discussed my doctoral dissertation with him, and he found my idea of comparing the Varaždin Generalate with Križevci County in the 17th century quite interesting. He helped me tremendously with getting copies for me of many documents from the Austrian archives and with creating the concept for my dissertation. Finally, as a reviewer, he supported the publication of my dissertation in book form as “Pogranična društva i okoliš. Varaždinski generalat i Križevačka županija u XVII. Stoljeću” [Border Society and the Environment: The Varaždin Generalate and the County of Križevci in the 17th century].

Apart from Graz and Zagreb, we also met at other places where we presented at conferences (Belgrade) and at meetings connected to the joint master’s program for southeast European studies (Sofia, Novi Sad, Regensburg, and Cluj) that he successfully coordinated.

Karl Kaser nurtured numerous historians, and some of them, like Ulf Brunnbauer or Hannes Grandits, are now among the leading researchers of southeast European history. The Department of Southeast European History and Anthropology at the University of Graz’s Institute of History the was unavoidable place of communication for many historians who shared an interest in history and the historical anthropology of the European southeast. In addition, he directly or indirectly influenced many younger colleagues in almost all parts of southeast Europe in many other ways, so the death of Prof. Kaser is a great loss and has left a void in the historiography of these areas.

Hrvoje Petrić

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